Media at risk under new Afghan law
April 24 Al Jazeera
By
Aunohita Mojumdar
Afghanistan's parliament is on the brink of passing a new media law that may considerably reduce the independence of the country's media.
The controversial amendments to the law, proposed by the religious and cultural affairs commission of the parliament, chaired by former regional commander Haji Mohammed Mohaqeq and supported by the government, will bring both private and state media under greater government control.
Proposed changes include an oversight committee that will scrutinise the functioning of the media including its content.
An earlier proposal to institute an independent commission to carry out this monitoring function has been scrapped in favour of a single body that will have officials from government ministries and departments but not media representatives.
Complaints relating to media content will be referred directly to the supreme court which, in Afghanistan, remains a conservative bastion.
Control of content will be guided through clauses which include prohibitions that prevent publicity of any other religion than Islam, prohibit the media from producing any content that is unislamic or jeopardises the stability of the nation or any false information which might disrupt public opinion.
While some of these clauses are seemingly innocuous, they are so wide-ranging as to allow them to be misused against media organisations not toeing the line.
Fact and falsehood
Interpretations of facts and falsehood, for example, are always contentious in a conflict zone.
The government's determination of what are facts will result in one-sided reportage. Already there have been several attempts to impose guidelines for reporting on the media with a wide-ranging list of subjects which should not be reported.
The recently passed amnesty bill, immunising all jihadis from prosecution also sought to introduce a clause which would force the media to honour the jihadis in any reportage. Both moves were dropped under pressure but may be reintroduced through this bill.
The growing tensions between the media and the government are evident in recent events. The government's decision to trade Taliban prisoners for an Italian reporter leaving an Afghan reporter Ajmal Naqshbandi to be murdered has angered and shocked Afghan journalists.
Tolo television
More recently the country's most popular channel Tolo TV has been locked in a standoff with the attorney general of Afghanistan after police raided the channel following allegations of "misquoting" by Tolo.
Tolo TV, owned by three Afghan-Australian brothers, hit back accusing the attorney general of having carried out an illegal action and calling for his removal from office.
"The potential crimes [of the attorney general] are of the utmost seriousness and directly affect [the] issue of rule of law and sustainability of democracy in Afghanistan, especially given that they may be perpetrated by a person holding the highest operational legal position in Afghanistan," Tolo said.
The information ministry's commission to look into the matter has asked Tolo to apologise saying the channel had "presented the attorney general's statements in a way that can lead to various interpretations and cause unnecessary public anguish. The way this news was broadcast, could be seen as ill-intentioned."
However, Zaid Mohseni, a director of Tolo, states that the commission's finding does not show how and where Tolo had reported inaccurately.
"We are not convinced there is a reason to apologise and we are looking into the matter," Mohseni told Al Jazeera.
The order is indeed ambiguous in that it refers to possible interpretations and mala fides, rather than any substantive breach of facts.
The row illustrates an increasing pattern of confrontation between Afghanistan's independent media and those in power.
As the fledgling post-conflict state comes into being, with old roles being challenged and the balance of power changing, there are few areas where the contradictions have emerged as sharply as in the area of media.
Tolo itself is no stranger to controversy, having pushed the boundaries of media content in Afghanistan with programming content that is often considered to be too forward by Afghan standards.
However, Tolo also acts as a shock absorber for most of the media outlets that also fall far short of the restrictions that conservative sections would like to impose on them.
The new media law will also reverse moves to make the state broadcaster a public service broadcaster, by bringing it under government control.
Abdul Karim Khurram, the information minister, said the government cannot afford not to have control over the state broadcaster since the county was at war.
Khurram also said he would like to ensure a ceiling on the use of foreign content in Afghan media. Channels such as Tolo are highly dependent on foreign content.
Afghanistan currently does not have the capacity to produce adequate programming to meet an increasing demand that has seen the establishment of seven different private channels in the past three years. Khurram's ministry recently banned Tolo TV from rebroadcasting Al Jazeera content.
Mohaqeq, chairman of the religious affairs commission, told this reporter that they would not want the government to use the RTA for propaganda but that the media needed to be brought under specific rules to prevent them from misusing their power to humiliate people.
The argument, which is also one forwarded by the government, has emerged as a uniting platform for those seeking to impose more curbs on media.
Resurgent conservatism as well as consolidation of power by former local commanders, an increasingly authoritative government and other power-brokers has seen increasing attacks on an independent Afghan media that had emerged as one of the strongest components of Afghanistan's attempts to form a democratic pluralistic state.
Source: Al Jazeera
April 25, 2007
Afghan schools' money problems
Afghan schools' money problems
BBC NEWS
By Aunohita Mojumdar Kabul
The return of five million Afghan children to school is one of the major success stories of post-conflict reconstruction in the country.
The figure is cited by the government and the donor community as one of the landmark achievements in a difficult process of rebuilding.
One person for whom the figure remains a source of concern, however, is Afghanistan's Education Minister Hanif Atmar.
"It is the greatest achievement in the history of this country" he says. "However, at best it represents 50-55% of our school-age children."
Ahead of Afghanistan's national budget, Mr Atmar expressed concern that, despite the major challenges ahead, funding for education funding will fall far short of what is needed.
"We will get 24% of what we asked for in the development budget," he predicted.
Planning problems
Most of the donor funding continues to be routed outside the government.
Donors often cite a lack of capacity in government departments to spend the money. They also argue that a lot of money given to the government gets siphoned off by corrupt officials.
The lack of funding through the government creates problems in forward planning.
"The ministry has no clear idea of how much money it is going to get from the external budget at the time of making annual plans because donor funding cycles are often different to the Afghan financial year," says a senior adviser to Mr Atmar.
"Multi-year funding would solve a part of this problem, but right now this is not happening.
"Although we now have a five-year strategy, it is difficult to plan implementation of programmes if we don't know there will be money to support it," the adviser says.
Mr Atmar argues that money spent on education by organisations other than the education ministry is largely wasted, with much of it being eaten away by overheads.
This is a contention supported by many donors.
The UK's Department For International Development (Dfid) estimates that the money given to the government and spent directly by it is eight times more productive than when spent by outside agencies.
Dfid itself routes more than 70% of its aid through the government.
Afghanistan's largest donor, USAid, spends only 7% of its annual budget through the government.
Spending money outside the government "undermines the state rebuilding project", says Mr Atmar, and "the state loses legitimacy".
"We have been invested with the responsibility to develop a sound strategy by the people of this country but we do not have the resources to implement it," he says.
'Decent space'
The strategy spelt out by Mr Atmar has many challenges.
According to the minister, only 40% of school children have "a decent space" to study.
The remaining 60% are in tents or dilapidated structures.
That has a particularly strong impact on the enrolment of girls as parents often want them to study in a more protective and sheltered area.
The problem enrolling of girls is further compounded by the lack of women teachers.
According to the international aid agency Oxfam, only about one quarter of the teachers in Afghanistan are women.
In many conservative parts of the country parents will not send their girls to school unless there are women teachers.
While at primary level there is one girl student for every two boys, this ratio drops to one girl for every five to six boys at secondary level.
Of the 143,000 school teachers on the government's payroll, 80% are not qualified, says Mr Atmar.
In the next five years, he hopes to increase the number of women teachers to 50% of the workforce.
He also wants to make sure that least 70% of the teachers pass competency tests by going through teacher training centres that he hopes to establish in the provinces.
The education ministry is also currently in the process of writing and printing text books for the secondary level curriculum, all of which costs money.
"We are trying to persuade donors to support the national budget or at least programmes under the national education strategy and not implement their own programmes," says the minister's adviser.
"In a 'post-conflict' situation such as in Afghanistan, it is important that the state takes on the responsibility to provide access to basic rights such as education as part of the state-building exercise, unlike under 'normal' development situations where the private sector can play a major role," he says.
"Some donors are now routing more of their money through the national budget which is encouraging, but it is still a fraction and not sufficient considering the needs."
Story from BBC NEWS
BBC NEWS
By Aunohita Mojumdar Kabul
The return of five million Afghan children to school is one of the major success stories of post-conflict reconstruction in the country.
The figure is cited by the government and the donor community as one of the landmark achievements in a difficult process of rebuilding.
One person for whom the figure remains a source of concern, however, is Afghanistan's Education Minister Hanif Atmar.
"It is the greatest achievement in the history of this country" he says. "However, at best it represents 50-55% of our school-age children."
Ahead of Afghanistan's national budget, Mr Atmar expressed concern that, despite the major challenges ahead, funding for education funding will fall far short of what is needed.
"We will get 24% of what we asked for in the development budget," he predicted.
Planning problems
Most of the donor funding continues to be routed outside the government.
Donors often cite a lack of capacity in government departments to spend the money. They also argue that a lot of money given to the government gets siphoned off by corrupt officials.
The lack of funding through the government creates problems in forward planning.
"The ministry has no clear idea of how much money it is going to get from the external budget at the time of making annual plans because donor funding cycles are often different to the Afghan financial year," says a senior adviser to Mr Atmar.
"Multi-year funding would solve a part of this problem, but right now this is not happening.
"Although we now have a five-year strategy, it is difficult to plan implementation of programmes if we don't know there will be money to support it," the adviser says.
Mr Atmar argues that money spent on education by organisations other than the education ministry is largely wasted, with much of it being eaten away by overheads.
This is a contention supported by many donors.
The UK's Department For International Development (Dfid) estimates that the money given to the government and spent directly by it is eight times more productive than when spent by outside agencies.
Dfid itself routes more than 70% of its aid through the government.
Afghanistan's largest donor, USAid, spends only 7% of its annual budget through the government.
Spending money outside the government "undermines the state rebuilding project", says Mr Atmar, and "the state loses legitimacy".
"We have been invested with the responsibility to develop a sound strategy by the people of this country but we do not have the resources to implement it," he says.
'Decent space'
The strategy spelt out by Mr Atmar has many challenges.
According to the minister, only 40% of school children have "a decent space" to study.
The remaining 60% are in tents or dilapidated structures.
That has a particularly strong impact on the enrolment of girls as parents often want them to study in a more protective and sheltered area.
The problem enrolling of girls is further compounded by the lack of women teachers.
According to the international aid agency Oxfam, only about one quarter of the teachers in Afghanistan are women.
In many conservative parts of the country parents will not send their girls to school unless there are women teachers.
While at primary level there is one girl student for every two boys, this ratio drops to one girl for every five to six boys at secondary level.
Of the 143,000 school teachers on the government's payroll, 80% are not qualified, says Mr Atmar.
In the next five years, he hopes to increase the number of women teachers to 50% of the workforce.
He also wants to make sure that least 70% of the teachers pass competency tests by going through teacher training centres that he hopes to establish in the provinces.
The education ministry is also currently in the process of writing and printing text books for the secondary level curriculum, all of which costs money.
"We are trying to persuade donors to support the national budget or at least programmes under the national education strategy and not implement their own programmes," says the minister's adviser.
"In a 'post-conflict' situation such as in Afghanistan, it is important that the state takes on the responsibility to provide access to basic rights such as education as part of the state-building exercise, unlike under 'normal' development situations where the private sector can play a major role," he says.
"Some donors are now routing more of their money through the national budget which is encouraging, but it is still a fraction and not sufficient considering the needs."
Story from BBC NEWS
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
AFGHANISTAN: Gov't bid to boost police in south
AFGHANISTAN: Gov't bid to boost police in south
KANDAHAR , 4 March 2007 (IRIN) - Abdul Bari has just quit his job. Recruited into the auxiliary police in Kandahar, part of a temporary supplementary force to meet Afghanistan’s shortfall of security forces in the south, the 23-year-old said the job was simply too difficult and dangerous. Despite the resurgence of pro-Taliban forces in the area, there has been little commensurate increase in security forces. Funding and support for the Afghan national police and the army are being stepped up only now, while an increase in the deployment of international forces has been incremental. The Afghan national army has experienced high rates of desertion and it has only half the force of 70,000 it was expected to reach by 2010. As a result, police in the volatile south have no choice but to take on anti-insurgency duties, which prompted the government to set up an auxiliary force. According to Interior Ministry spokesman Zemarai Bashary, the auxiliary police will comprise an additional force of 20,000 for two years for the six southern provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Zabul and Ghazni.
Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias. “We needed a temporary increase because we did not have enough police in the remote districts of the south,” Bashary said. However, critics say the force could create yet another source of long-term instability in the country as re-arming of local communities has proved counter-productive in the past. The auxiliary police are drawn from the community and deployed in their own towns and villages, as living with their families in their own areas is supposed to prevent them from deserting. In Helmand, more than 700 of the 1,050 mandated auxiliary police have been trained and deployed, while in Kandahar the original force of 1,300-plus is likely to be increased to 2,000. There are questions, however, over the integrity of the training these men receive as it is a fraction of what regular police are given, allowing for quicker deployment, but sceptics remain concerned over its quality. The International Crisis Group (ICG) says that after just 10 days of training the auxiliary police were given the same weapons and salary as the regular police. “Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias,” the ICG said.
Bashary says the auxiliary police are only mandated to carry out law-enforcement duties and not combat, although they must defend themselves if attacked. But for most policemen serving in the south, carrying out their duties involves confronting and usually engaging anti-government elements. For this reason Bari did not believe community policing was an advantage. “I quit because I was commissioned to serve in my own area where everyone in the community knew I was a policeman. I am a resident of Panjwayi district - control of which changes hands between the government and insurgents - so it is difficult and dangerous for me to serve in such an area,” he said. Moreover, for a salary of just US$70 a month, Abdul’s family thought the risks were not worth it. am/ds/at/ar/mw
KANDAHAR , 4 March 2007 (IRIN) - Abdul Bari has just quit his job. Recruited into the auxiliary police in Kandahar, part of a temporary supplementary force to meet Afghanistan’s shortfall of security forces in the south, the 23-year-old said the job was simply too difficult and dangerous. Despite the resurgence of pro-Taliban forces in the area, there has been little commensurate increase in security forces. Funding and support for the Afghan national police and the army are being stepped up only now, while an increase in the deployment of international forces has been incremental. The Afghan national army has experienced high rates of desertion and it has only half the force of 70,000 it was expected to reach by 2010. As a result, police in the volatile south have no choice but to take on anti-insurgency duties, which prompted the government to set up an auxiliary force. According to Interior Ministry spokesman Zemarai Bashary, the auxiliary police will comprise an additional force of 20,000 for two years for the six southern provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Zabul and Ghazni.
Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias. “We needed a temporary increase because we did not have enough police in the remote districts of the south,” Bashary said. However, critics say the force could create yet another source of long-term instability in the country as re-arming of local communities has proved counter-productive in the past. The auxiliary police are drawn from the community and deployed in their own towns and villages, as living with their families in their own areas is supposed to prevent them from deserting. In Helmand, more than 700 of the 1,050 mandated auxiliary police have been trained and deployed, while in Kandahar the original force of 1,300-plus is likely to be increased to 2,000. There are questions, however, over the integrity of the training these men receive as it is a fraction of what regular police are given, allowing for quicker deployment, but sceptics remain concerned over its quality. The International Crisis Group (ICG) says that after just 10 days of training the auxiliary police were given the same weapons and salary as the regular police. “Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias,” the ICG said.
Bashary says the auxiliary police are only mandated to carry out law-enforcement duties and not combat, although they must defend themselves if attacked. But for most policemen serving in the south, carrying out their duties involves confronting and usually engaging anti-government elements. For this reason Bari did not believe community policing was an advantage. “I quit because I was commissioned to serve in my own area where everyone in the community knew I was a policeman. I am a resident of Panjwayi district - control of which changes hands between the government and insurgents - so it is difficult and dangerous for me to serve in such an area,” he said. Moreover, for a salary of just US$70 a month, Abdul’s family thought the risks were not worth it. am/ds/at/ar/mw
March 06, 2007
Badland Roses
AFGHANISTAN: INDIAN WOMEN
Badland Roses
Four Indian women brave Kabul's perils to help in reconstruction
Aunohita Mojumdar
e-mail one page format feedback: send
Vrinda Dar wanted a "regular" job after a career spent mostly freelancing. "Time to do something settled," she thought. So she accepted an offer from an international NGO to work in Kabul. Not many people would consider a posting in war-torn Afghanistan, separated from one's family, a settling experience. But then Vrinda is not usual. She is among a small group of remarkable Indian women contributing in different ways to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Their experiences are far from ordinary—as foreigners they face huge security restrictions, as women they combat social conservatism—but as Indians, they benefit from a special regard on the part of Afghans.Working in Afghanistan is not a job for the faint-hearted. While south Afghanistan is in the throes of a conventional military battle, Kabul frequently experiences rocket attacks and suicide bombings in public places. International workers have been kidnapped in broad daylight. In May last year, anti-foreigner riots raged through the city. Several offices and guesthouses where foreigners work or live were set on fire and vandalised. The inhabitants had to escape by jumping over walls. Pushpa Pathak, caught in her office in the Kabul municipality where she works as a senior advisor, was one of them. Pushpa recalls this as one of two times when she has felt scared in Afghanistan. The other occasion was when a massive bomb explosion nearly blew away the glass windows of her guesthouse in 2004.Pushpa, Vrinda and the other Indian women live under an enormously restrictive security regime, in high-walled houses with bunkers, guards and protective plastic on the windows. Also required are a minimum of three residents per establishment, including at least one male. These rules, plus high rents, force them and other foreigners to live in a guesthouse, or share a house with other international workers. Their social activities are severely limited because of curfews and rules that prohibit them from walking anywhere, let alone go shopping or using public transport. Travel within the city has to be under escort, usually with door-to-door drops by office vehicles and only to a limited number of restricted 'security cleared' places. Vrinda, for instance, is not allowed to visit Afghan colleagues. For security reasons, the aid agency she works for can't be named in this article.Anita Nirody (Centre) at a meeting during Pranab Mukherjee’s recent Kabul visit
From time to time, 'lockdowns' are declared that prohibit foreigners from leaving home, or only allow essential travel. Anita Nirody, who is the country director of UNDP in its largest office globally, cancelled her first appointment with Outlook because of a lockdown following a new security alert. Any house she visits has to be security-cleared, in advance. Pushpa says she misses the freedom to go out for a play or a movie or a walk. "I sometimes feel like I am in a cage," frets Vrinda.What makes matters worse are the restrictions on women. While expatriate women generally have more freedom than locals, South Asian women are somewhat differently placed because, as Vrinda points out, Afghan society views them differently. "There is more desire to see reaffirmation of moral standards from South Asian woman," she says.Interestingly, Vrinda finds it far more liberating to be in the villages of Afghanistan than the cities. "Rural people are far more flexible," she says, describing the way she has been able to bond with families there. In Kabul, on the other hand, she finds the intense scrutiny of unescorted women in public spaces very irksome.
Pushpa, who earlier chose not to wear the customary hijab in public, has now started doing so because she otherwise "attracts too much attention".Yet, in her own way, Pushpa has breached many a frontier, as have other Indian women working here. Entrusted with the task of preparing policy and project proposals to raise funding and develop Kabul's land use framework, Pushpa was excited by the professional challenge Afghanistan presented.Pushpa Pathak with her Kabul Municipality colleagues
When she joined the municipality two years ago, it had no women in senior positions, and it took her a while to get respect and cooperation. But she was not surprised or daunted. "I had experienced this before in small towns in India," she recalls. In Afghanistan, there was actually an advantage—her Indian identity helped to gain acceptance, because Afghans like Indians.Other Indian women working in Afghanistan have also experienced this. Shanthini Dawson, a special advisor in the Afghan government for five years, who works in the ministry of education, says Afghans are always too proud to accept help but "find it much easier to accept technical assistance when it comes from the region". "In fact, the downside is more with my Western colleagues who often have patronising questions," she says, adding, "I don't see myself as a foreigner anymore."Cultural affinities between Indians and Afghanistan run deep. They stem from a shared history, cultural similarities, and a sense of common identity that comes from being a developing country with common traditions, problems and challenges. Last but not the least, Afghans and Indians are united in a negative perception of Pakistan. "Hindi not a foreigner" is a common refrain. "When you say you are from Hindustan, doors open by themselves," says Vrinda. It is an advantage Nirody appreciates as well, even though she is now a US citizen and her work with the UN emphasises her international status. Nirody, who grew up in India, says with Indians, Afghans "are willing to take that extra step and there is a sense of familiarity". Nirody applied for work in Afghanistan as soon as the opportunity arose. "It was too exciting to resist," she says. Though all the Indian women Outlook spoke to in Kabul were well aware of the professional and personal challenges, it was a tough decision, with families having to be left behind. Afghanistan is a non-family station for the UN. Pushpa had to counter resistance from her family in UP. Vrinda's Italian husband looks after their children while she's in Afghanistan. But they all feel it has been worth it, mostly for the chance to see their work take shape and change things. "It was the opportunity of a lifetime to come here," says Vrinda. For her, and the others, there are no regrets.
Badland Roses
Four Indian women brave Kabul's perils to help in reconstruction
Aunohita Mojumdar
e-mail one page format feedback: send
Vrinda Dar wanted a "regular" job after a career spent mostly freelancing. "Time to do something settled," she thought. So she accepted an offer from an international NGO to work in Kabul. Not many people would consider a posting in war-torn Afghanistan, separated from one's family, a settling experience. But then Vrinda is not usual. She is among a small group of remarkable Indian women contributing in different ways to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Their experiences are far from ordinary—as foreigners they face huge security restrictions, as women they combat social conservatism—but as Indians, they benefit from a special regard on the part of Afghans.Working in Afghanistan is not a job for the faint-hearted. While south Afghanistan is in the throes of a conventional military battle, Kabul frequently experiences rocket attacks and suicide bombings in public places. International workers have been kidnapped in broad daylight. In May last year, anti-foreigner riots raged through the city. Several offices and guesthouses where foreigners work or live were set on fire and vandalised. The inhabitants had to escape by jumping over walls. Pushpa Pathak, caught in her office in the Kabul municipality where she works as a senior advisor, was one of them. Pushpa recalls this as one of two times when she has felt scared in Afghanistan. The other occasion was when a massive bomb explosion nearly blew away the glass windows of her guesthouse in 2004.Pushpa, Vrinda and the other Indian women live under an enormously restrictive security regime, in high-walled houses with bunkers, guards and protective plastic on the windows. Also required are a minimum of three residents per establishment, including at least one male. These rules, plus high rents, force them and other foreigners to live in a guesthouse, or share a house with other international workers. Their social activities are severely limited because of curfews and rules that prohibit them from walking anywhere, let alone go shopping or using public transport. Travel within the city has to be under escort, usually with door-to-door drops by office vehicles and only to a limited number of restricted 'security cleared' places. Vrinda, for instance, is not allowed to visit Afghan colleagues. For security reasons, the aid agency she works for can't be named in this article.Anita Nirody (Centre) at a meeting during Pranab Mukherjee’s recent Kabul visit
From time to time, 'lockdowns' are declared that prohibit foreigners from leaving home, or only allow essential travel. Anita Nirody, who is the country director of UNDP in its largest office globally, cancelled her first appointment with Outlook because of a lockdown following a new security alert. Any house she visits has to be security-cleared, in advance. Pushpa says she misses the freedom to go out for a play or a movie or a walk. "I sometimes feel like I am in a cage," frets Vrinda.What makes matters worse are the restrictions on women. While expatriate women generally have more freedom than locals, South Asian women are somewhat differently placed because, as Vrinda points out, Afghan society views them differently. "There is more desire to see reaffirmation of moral standards from South Asian woman," she says.Interestingly, Vrinda finds it far more liberating to be in the villages of Afghanistan than the cities. "Rural people are far more flexible," she says, describing the way she has been able to bond with families there. In Kabul, on the other hand, she finds the intense scrutiny of unescorted women in public spaces very irksome.
Pushpa, who earlier chose not to wear the customary hijab in public, has now started doing so because she otherwise "attracts too much attention".Yet, in her own way, Pushpa has breached many a frontier, as have other Indian women working here. Entrusted with the task of preparing policy and project proposals to raise funding and develop Kabul's land use framework, Pushpa was excited by the professional challenge Afghanistan presented.Pushpa Pathak with her Kabul Municipality colleagues
When she joined the municipality two years ago, it had no women in senior positions, and it took her a while to get respect and cooperation. But she was not surprised or daunted. "I had experienced this before in small towns in India," she recalls. In Afghanistan, there was actually an advantage—her Indian identity helped to gain acceptance, because Afghans like Indians.Other Indian women working in Afghanistan have also experienced this. Shanthini Dawson, a special advisor in the Afghan government for five years, who works in the ministry of education, says Afghans are always too proud to accept help but "find it much easier to accept technical assistance when it comes from the region". "In fact, the downside is more with my Western colleagues who often have patronising questions," she says, adding, "I don't see myself as a foreigner anymore."Cultural affinities between Indians and Afghanistan run deep. They stem from a shared history, cultural similarities, and a sense of common identity that comes from being a developing country with common traditions, problems and challenges. Last but not the least, Afghans and Indians are united in a negative perception of Pakistan. "Hindi not a foreigner" is a common refrain. "When you say you are from Hindustan, doors open by themselves," says Vrinda. It is an advantage Nirody appreciates as well, even though she is now a US citizen and her work with the UN emphasises her international status. Nirody, who grew up in India, says with Indians, Afghans "are willing to take that extra step and there is a sense of familiarity". Nirody applied for work in Afghanistan as soon as the opportunity arose. "It was too exciting to resist," she says. Though all the Indian women Outlook spoke to in Kabul were well aware of the professional and personal challenges, it was a tough decision, with families having to be left behind. Afghanistan is a non-family station for the UN. Pushpa had to counter resistance from her family in UP. Vrinda's Italian husband looks after their children while she's in Afghanistan. But they all feel it has been worth it, mostly for the chance to see their work take shape and change things. "It was the opportunity of a lifetime to come here," says Vrinda. For her, and the others, there are no regrets.
Doubts grow over Afghan war crimes amnesty
Doubts grow over Afghan war crimes amnesty
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Published: February 12 2007 19:50 Last updated: February 12 2007 19:50
Haji Safar still remembers vividly the day in 1993 that his 19-year-old son was gunned down in fighting between rival mujahideen groups in the area of western Kabul where he lives and works. He also remembers who was responsible for the fighting.
Abdul al-Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittihad-e-Islami faction “was located in that area,” Mr Safar says, as he points down a road in his neighbourhood. “[Former Afghan President Burhanuddin] Rabbani and Rabbani’s Shura-e Nazar [were] rocketing from that mountain.”
In a newly democratic Afghanistan both factions are now members of parliament. They were also part of a group which on January 31 successfully pushed legislation granting immunity from prosecution to “all people involved in the conflict of the past two-and-a-half decades” through the lower house of the Afghan parliament, the Wolesi Jirga.
The proposed amnesty would also be offered to any anti-government forces now fighting Nato and Afghan troops, as long as they joined a process of reconciliation.
To the normally soft-spoken Haji Safar, the two MPs and others responsible for Afghanistan’s lost decades of violence deserve not amnesty, but death. “I would not just like to see them die. I want them to be hanged more than 10 times,” he says.
The memories of the past 30 years remain fresh for many Afghans, and critics say if the amnesty becomes law it is unlikely that millions of Afghans will ever get a sense of closure. Rough-and-ready retribution may instead become the way to settle decades-old scores.
“The voices of the victims must be heard – and they have spoken out clearly for the culture of impunity in Afghanistan to end,” Louise Arbour, UN Commissioner for Human Rights, said soon after the amnesty resolution was passed by the Wolesi Jirga.
“Experience has shown time and again that effective and durable national reconciliation must be based on respect for international human rights standards and the rule of law, and must not come at their expense.”
Western officials say the resolution’s passing appears to have been a pre-emptive move aimed at averting growing pressure from both inside and outside Afghanistan for the prosecution of war crimes.
A plan endorsed in December by President Hamid Karzai would have seen any war crimes or gross human rights violations prosecuted, and a recent Human Rights Watch report identified a number of Jihadi leaders implicated in past war crimes who were occupying key positions in the government and legislature.
Shukria Barakzai, one of a small minority of MPs who opposed the resolution, calls its passage “a sign of growing extremism and a big threat for democracy, for human rights and for the future of this country”.
The issue has also highlighted the problems underlying the efforts to rush a parliament into being following the US-led 2001 ousting of the Taliban.
The result, critics say, has been a body dominated by a minority of warlords who wield power far disproportionate to their standing with the electorate.
Human rights activists initially dismissed the charter which passed the parliament as a non-binding resolution with no legal standing. Now they say it appears to be a draft law which will be presented to the upper house.
A group of MPs opposed to an amnesty is trying to challenge the resolution’s constitutionality. President Karzai, who would have to sign the legislation into law, has declined to take a position and asked for legal advice, although any presidential veto could be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the lower house.
The position before international law is also unclear. UN officials insist the UN cannot be party to a blanket amnesty and that it would violate Afghanistan’s obligations to international law. However, supporters in the Afghan parliament cite examples such as South Africa as models for granting an amnesty.
“The principle of amnesty in itself is not a bad one,” points out one western observer. “What is problematic is the process which has led to it.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Published: February 12 2007 19:50 Last updated: February 12 2007 19:50
Haji Safar still remembers vividly the day in 1993 that his 19-year-old son was gunned down in fighting between rival mujahideen groups in the area of western Kabul where he lives and works. He also remembers who was responsible for the fighting.
Abdul al-Rasul Sayyaf and his Ittihad-e-Islami faction “was located in that area,” Mr Safar says, as he points down a road in his neighbourhood. “[Former Afghan President Burhanuddin] Rabbani and Rabbani’s Shura-e Nazar [were] rocketing from that mountain.”
In a newly democratic Afghanistan both factions are now members of parliament. They were also part of a group which on January 31 successfully pushed legislation granting immunity from prosecution to “all people involved in the conflict of the past two-and-a-half decades” through the lower house of the Afghan parliament, the Wolesi Jirga.
The proposed amnesty would also be offered to any anti-government forces now fighting Nato and Afghan troops, as long as they joined a process of reconciliation.
To the normally soft-spoken Haji Safar, the two MPs and others responsible for Afghanistan’s lost decades of violence deserve not amnesty, but death. “I would not just like to see them die. I want them to be hanged more than 10 times,” he says.
The memories of the past 30 years remain fresh for many Afghans, and critics say if the amnesty becomes law it is unlikely that millions of Afghans will ever get a sense of closure. Rough-and-ready retribution may instead become the way to settle decades-old scores.
“The voices of the victims must be heard – and they have spoken out clearly for the culture of impunity in Afghanistan to end,” Louise Arbour, UN Commissioner for Human Rights, said soon after the amnesty resolution was passed by the Wolesi Jirga.
“Experience has shown time and again that effective and durable national reconciliation must be based on respect for international human rights standards and the rule of law, and must not come at their expense.”
Western officials say the resolution’s passing appears to have been a pre-emptive move aimed at averting growing pressure from both inside and outside Afghanistan for the prosecution of war crimes.
A plan endorsed in December by President Hamid Karzai would have seen any war crimes or gross human rights violations prosecuted, and a recent Human Rights Watch report identified a number of Jihadi leaders implicated in past war crimes who were occupying key positions in the government and legislature.
Shukria Barakzai, one of a small minority of MPs who opposed the resolution, calls its passage “a sign of growing extremism and a big threat for democracy, for human rights and for the future of this country”.
The issue has also highlighted the problems underlying the efforts to rush a parliament into being following the US-led 2001 ousting of the Taliban.
The result, critics say, has been a body dominated by a minority of warlords who wield power far disproportionate to their standing with the electorate.
Human rights activists initially dismissed the charter which passed the parliament as a non-binding resolution with no legal standing. Now they say it appears to be a draft law which will be presented to the upper house.
A group of MPs opposed to an amnesty is trying to challenge the resolution’s constitutionality. President Karzai, who would have to sign the legislation into law, has declined to take a position and asked for legal advice, although any presidential veto could be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the lower house.
The position before international law is also unclear. UN officials insist the UN cannot be party to a blanket amnesty and that it would violate Afghanistan’s obligations to international law. However, supporters in the Afghan parliament cite examples such as South Africa as models for granting an amnesty.
“The principle of amnesty in itself is not a bad one,” points out one western observer. “What is problematic is the process which has led to it.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
December 16, 2006
Afghan Female MPs Call It a Rough First Year
December 17, 2006
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Sahira Sharif sits with Zabah, the youngest of her four children on her lap. He is 3 and a half years old, but looks much younger. The child suffers from Down's syndrome, says Sharif, with no trace of self-consciousness.
It is a matter of fact--along with cooking, shopping, teaching her children, taking them to and from school--in addition to her work as one of Afghanistan's first female parliamentarians.
During the session, debates can begin as early as 8:30 or 9 a.m. and go on all day, sometimes late into the evening five days a week. But there are no concessions to her traditional women's duties, no extra help. Sharif is virtually a single parent since her husband lives in Khost where he has a government job.
This week the newly constituted Afghan parliament marks its first anniversary on Dec. 19 and Sharif completes the first year of her five-year term.
In what is left of her tenure, she hopes to introduce legislation to ban forced marriages, which the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission estimates as 38 percent of all marriages in the country.
Another female member of the Afghan Parliament, Fawzia Kofi, the second deputy chair of the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house, hopes a law will be adopted to empower police to investigate suicides and domestic violence without having to refer to a complaint by the victim or the victim's family. Kofi says the family may be complicit in the violence and the victim reluctant to make a complaint.
In the past year 197 cases of suicide were attempted in Herat province, of which 69 were successful, the country's human rights commission reports. Many have been linked to domestic abuse. In Kandahar, 200 women tried to escape from abusive homes.
But whatever their legislative hopes and ambitions, female parliamentarians such as Sharif and Kofi say their first year in office leaves them prepared for more rough times ahead.
Security Problems Take Toll
The country's national security is deteriorating.
A week ago, Afghan police arrested six Taliban insurgents suspected of killing two female teachers along with three other relatives, according to press reports quoting Afghan and NATO officials. The killings come on top of attacks on aid workers, government officials and intensifying clashes between international forces and the Taliban.
Amid these dangers, female parliamentarians have made fewer trips out of the capital city of Kabul back home to their constituencies.
Sharif--who until two months ago traveled without a burka to her province of Khost--has started wearing one recently and avoids staying too long in any one area. Anyone associated with the government is at risk, she says. Not only the Taliban but commanders and political factions that have lost power are potentially dangerous.
Sharifa Zurmati Wardak, represents Paktia, a conservative Pashtun constituency in the southeastern part of the country bordering Pakistan where many women never step out of their homes for any reason whatsoever. She does not travel without a male escort.
Afghanistan's new constitution, adopted in 2004, requires that two women be elected from each of its 34 provinces. With a current strength of 248 this puts the representation of women at just over 25 percent, ahead of many legislative bodies. Internationally, 30 percent is considered the minimum for any group to leverage its representation.
Last year 19 of the 68 female parliamentarians won enough votes to have been elected even without any special mandate.
Year of Anti-Woman Debates
While providing one of the widest spaces in the country for women's participation in public life, the Parliament in the past year has debated a number of anti-women measures.
Members have discussed whether female parliamentarians should be required to have a "mehram," or male escort, when traveling outside the country.
Despite constitutional provisions for gender equality and laws that stipulate 18 as the minimum legal age for marriage, the upper house of Parliament wants it lowered to 15. Fearing the effect on young women in forced marriages, a number of female members have been battling the push, which would require passage in the lower house to become law.
Women have been unable to close ranks against a move to abolish the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was formed in 2001 as an advisory group to help rebuild women's rights lost under the Taliban. So far the ministry has survived, although women themselves were split over the issue, with some women siding with their own male-led factions and debate over eliminating the ministry may reopen.
"Women stand against other women," says Sharif.
Efforts to Erode Representation
Women's 25-percent representation is itself insecure.
Abdul Salaam Rocketi--his last name was acquired due to his prowess with rocket launchers--is a former Taliban commander. Now representing Zabul in Parliament, he calls the reservation of seats for women "undemocratic."
Efforts to build a women's caucus are going slowly.
UNIFEM, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, has set up a resource center stocked with documents and books and research materials pertaining to Afghanistan and political issues. The center has phone lines and Internet access to aid interaction and information gathering.
The National Democratic Institute, a U.S. civil-society nonprofit, has been organizing workshops to help bring women together to discuss their common concerns and a recent meeting focused on violence against women. But the female parliamentarians are far too politically divided to realistically discuss the creation of a formal caucus.
Despite the numerous hurdles and disappointments of the past year, Wardak says the presence of women in the Parliament has nonetheless encouraged debate on issues that might otherwise have been ignored. Female parliamentarians, for instance, visited a women's prison and were upset by some of the conditions they discovered. Wardak and Sharif said that as a result of their interventions female inmates are now allowed to have visits from their children and pregnant women are getting better medical attention.
"We are there," Wardak says. "Our voices exist."
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Sahira Sharif sits with Zabah, the youngest of her four children on her lap. He is 3 and a half years old, but looks much younger. The child suffers from Down's syndrome, says Sharif, with no trace of self-consciousness.
It is a matter of fact--along with cooking, shopping, teaching her children, taking them to and from school--in addition to her work as one of Afghanistan's first female parliamentarians.
During the session, debates can begin as early as 8:30 or 9 a.m. and go on all day, sometimes late into the evening five days a week. But there are no concessions to her traditional women's duties, no extra help. Sharif is virtually a single parent since her husband lives in Khost where he has a government job.
This week the newly constituted Afghan parliament marks its first anniversary on Dec. 19 and Sharif completes the first year of her five-year term.
In what is left of her tenure, she hopes to introduce legislation to ban forced marriages, which the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission estimates as 38 percent of all marriages in the country.
Another female member of the Afghan Parliament, Fawzia Kofi, the second deputy chair of the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house, hopes a law will be adopted to empower police to investigate suicides and domestic violence without having to refer to a complaint by the victim or the victim's family. Kofi says the family may be complicit in the violence and the victim reluctant to make a complaint.
In the past year 197 cases of suicide were attempted in Herat province, of which 69 were successful, the country's human rights commission reports. Many have been linked to domestic abuse. In Kandahar, 200 women tried to escape from abusive homes.
But whatever their legislative hopes and ambitions, female parliamentarians such as Sharif and Kofi say their first year in office leaves them prepared for more rough times ahead.
Security Problems Take Toll
The country's national security is deteriorating.
A week ago, Afghan police arrested six Taliban insurgents suspected of killing two female teachers along with three other relatives, according to press reports quoting Afghan and NATO officials. The killings come on top of attacks on aid workers, government officials and intensifying clashes between international forces and the Taliban.
Amid these dangers, female parliamentarians have made fewer trips out of the capital city of Kabul back home to their constituencies.
Sharif--who until two months ago traveled without a burka to her province of Khost--has started wearing one recently and avoids staying too long in any one area. Anyone associated with the government is at risk, she says. Not only the Taliban but commanders and political factions that have lost power are potentially dangerous.
Sharifa Zurmati Wardak, represents Paktia, a conservative Pashtun constituency in the southeastern part of the country bordering Pakistan where many women never step out of their homes for any reason whatsoever. She does not travel without a male escort.
Afghanistan's new constitution, adopted in 2004, requires that two women be elected from each of its 34 provinces. With a current strength of 248 this puts the representation of women at just over 25 percent, ahead of many legislative bodies. Internationally, 30 percent is considered the minimum for any group to leverage its representation.
Last year 19 of the 68 female parliamentarians won enough votes to have been elected even without any special mandate.
Year of Anti-Woman Debates
While providing one of the widest spaces in the country for women's participation in public life, the Parliament in the past year has debated a number of anti-women measures.
Members have discussed whether female parliamentarians should be required to have a "mehram," or male escort, when traveling outside the country.
Despite constitutional provisions for gender equality and laws that stipulate 18 as the minimum legal age for marriage, the upper house of Parliament wants it lowered to 15. Fearing the effect on young women in forced marriages, a number of female members have been battling the push, which would require passage in the lower house to become law.
Women have been unable to close ranks against a move to abolish the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was formed in 2001 as an advisory group to help rebuild women's rights lost under the Taliban. So far the ministry has survived, although women themselves were split over the issue, with some women siding with their own male-led factions and debate over eliminating the ministry may reopen.
"Women stand against other women," says Sharif.
Efforts to Erode Representation
Women's 25-percent representation is itself insecure.
Abdul Salaam Rocketi--his last name was acquired due to his prowess with rocket launchers--is a former Taliban commander. Now representing Zabul in Parliament, he calls the reservation of seats for women "undemocratic."
Efforts to build a women's caucus are going slowly.
UNIFEM, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, has set up a resource center stocked with documents and books and research materials pertaining to Afghanistan and political issues. The center has phone lines and Internet access to aid interaction and information gathering.
The National Democratic Institute, a U.S. civil-society nonprofit, has been organizing workshops to help bring women together to discuss their common concerns and a recent meeting focused on violence against women. But the female parliamentarians are far too politically divided to realistically discuss the creation of a formal caucus.
Despite the numerous hurdles and disappointments of the past year, Wardak says the presence of women in the Parliament has nonetheless encouraged debate on issues that might otherwise have been ignored. Female parliamentarians, for instance, visited a women's prison and were upset by some of the conditions they discovered. Wardak and Sharif said that as a result of their interventions female inmates are now allowed to have visits from their children and pregnant women are getting better medical attention.
"We are there," Wardak says. "Our voices exist."
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
December 10, 2006
Focus: Nato's Afghan policy
Al Jazeera
December 7
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Nato forces faced a fierce engagement in the Musakala district of the Southern province of Helmand this weekend, resulting, according to Nato officials, in the death of 70-80 Taliban fighters.
While Nato troops have fought several pitched battles in the Southern provinces since they took control of the South of Afghanistan, this weekend's engagement was distinguished by one new factor. Musakala is the area where in October this year Nato troops and local elders brokered a truce for "cessation of hostilities" with the insurgent forces.
The apparent peace that the deal brought to the area in the weeks since has been promoted as a measure of its success by both UN and Nato officials.
The return of fighting near Musakala is a blow for the Nato deal with local tribes
However the deal was also suggestive of a withdrawal by the Afghan government, with the possibility of leaving the area a safe sanctuary for use by Taliban fighters, a scenario that may have just turned into a reality this weekend.
Musakala reflects of the attempts by the architects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction to restore some semblance of control to a peace that increasingly looks like it is slipping away.
"Cessation of hostilities"
Background
Al Jazeera first reported the Nato deal with tibal leaders in Musa Kala
Nato's agreement in Musakala and president Hamid Karzai's declaration via a loya jirga (meeting of tribal elders) could indicate that decision makers are now moving toward quicker fixes rather than long term solutions.
In doing so both the government and the international forces may be securing some transitory peace in return for ceding their authority.
According to Nato officials the agreement there is not a ceasefire but a "cessation of hostilities". The absence of fighting in the area since then was being exhibited as a major triumph.
Justifying the agreement General James L Jones, Nato's outgoing Supreme Allied Commander said, "anything that can be done to reduce violence and to control the outbreak of violence and make people more safe and secure is our goal".
Yet Jones stopped short of revealing that the agreement actually represented a retreat of the international forces.
According to a Nato official who did not want to be named, the reason for the Musakala agreement was the realisation that the forces had been stretched too thinly and were suffering severe losses as a result.
However Nato officials have also openly supported the idea of coming to similar arrangements elsewhere.
No policy support
Nato's civilian spokesman Mark Laity has said that "in principle, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is open to similar kinds of arrangements elsewhere" while pointing out that no two situations are the same.
However in terms of the implication of the agreement on national security there is no defence policy that mandates it, no UN Security Council resolution that calls for it and no policy document nor approach that supports it.
General Jones himself pointed to the ad hoc nature of the policy by saying such agreements are to be "reported up the chain of command so that we can have visibility on exactly what the nature of those discussions are”, adding such moves had to be "carefully coordinated and worked within the overall context of our campaign objectives".
In recent weeks senior UN and Nato officials have suggested that the success of the agreement has been evident from the lack of conflict.
However the peace in the area came to an abrupt end in this weekend's fighting.
Major Luke Knittig, a spokeman for Nato, said that the fighting did not represent a breach of the original agreement which had been limited solely to the area of the Musakala town.
"The elders, as I understand it, have extraordinary influence, but that influence doesn't spread across the whole district, just mostly in the town," he said.
Development
Asked whether the agreement had allowed the Taliban to use the area as a safe sanctuary, Knittig said there was "nothing to indicate that the large group of insurgents that Nato had engaged have used the town as a support base".
Nato officials say that the cessation of hostilities has helped create the space for development and Knittig argued that the development activities were proceeding in Musa Kalan despite the battle.
Jones has defended the
agreement in Musa Kalan
Both UN officials as well as Nato have referred repeatedly to the consultation with the tribal and community leaders in arriving at this agreement, and a senior UN official described the decision as one of "empowering the tribal leadership."
However, although community involvement is important and clearly lacking in many areas of development, village and provincial leaders usually do not determine military strategies.
Also such community consultations seem lacking in another recent political decision, the cross border loya jirga or 'peace jirga' as it is being termed.
Scepticism
The decision, taken during the visit of President Hamad Karzai to the US, was done so without the backing of or consultation with Afghan institutions and groups.
Media reports have suggested that several cabinet ministers have also expressed scepticism about the jirga privately, given how it will work practically is yet unclear.
It is also arguable whether any such peace deals will be able to yield results if they do not have the backing of major political forces in Afghanistan.
The last five years has seen a concentration of political and administrative power in the presidency, with the marginalisation and exclusion of major political groups who may lay claim to power.
The same formula is in operation now, in the exclusive appeal to Pashtuns on either side of the border. President Karzai himself has spoken of the "traditional Pashtun leadership of Pakistan "being undermined systematically and violently".
The danger now is that the constant appeal to Pashtun leadership, could have the effect of increasing separatist instincts and reinforcing their existence outside the structures of state and the rule of law creating a scenario that the leadership of Pakistan and Afghanistan are not likely to be ready to deal with at present.
Source: Al Jazeera
Al Jazeera
December 7
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Nato forces faced a fierce engagement in the Musakala district of the Southern province of Helmand this weekend, resulting, according to Nato officials, in the death of 70-80 Taliban fighters.
While Nato troops have fought several pitched battles in the Southern provinces since they took control of the South of Afghanistan, this weekend's engagement was distinguished by one new factor. Musakala is the area where in October this year Nato troops and local elders brokered a truce for "cessation of hostilities" with the insurgent forces.
The apparent peace that the deal brought to the area in the weeks since has been promoted as a measure of its success by both UN and Nato officials.
The return of fighting near Musakala is a blow for the Nato deal with local tribes
However the deal was also suggestive of a withdrawal by the Afghan government, with the possibility of leaving the area a safe sanctuary for use by Taliban fighters, a scenario that may have just turned into a reality this weekend.
Musakala reflects of the attempts by the architects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction to restore some semblance of control to a peace that increasingly looks like it is slipping away.
"Cessation of hostilities"
Background
Al Jazeera first reported the Nato deal with tibal leaders in Musa Kala
Nato's agreement in Musakala and president Hamid Karzai's declaration via a loya jirga (meeting of tribal elders) could indicate that decision makers are now moving toward quicker fixes rather than long term solutions.
In doing so both the government and the international forces may be securing some transitory peace in return for ceding their authority.
According to Nato officials the agreement there is not a ceasefire but a "cessation of hostilities". The absence of fighting in the area since then was being exhibited as a major triumph.
Justifying the agreement General James L Jones, Nato's outgoing Supreme Allied Commander said, "anything that can be done to reduce violence and to control the outbreak of violence and make people more safe and secure is our goal".
Yet Jones stopped short of revealing that the agreement actually represented a retreat of the international forces.
According to a Nato official who did not want to be named, the reason for the Musakala agreement was the realisation that the forces had been stretched too thinly and were suffering severe losses as a result.
However Nato officials have also openly supported the idea of coming to similar arrangements elsewhere.
No policy support
Nato's civilian spokesman Mark Laity has said that "in principle, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is open to similar kinds of arrangements elsewhere" while pointing out that no two situations are the same.
However in terms of the implication of the agreement on national security there is no defence policy that mandates it, no UN Security Council resolution that calls for it and no policy document nor approach that supports it.
General Jones himself pointed to the ad hoc nature of the policy by saying such agreements are to be "reported up the chain of command so that we can have visibility on exactly what the nature of those discussions are”, adding such moves had to be "carefully coordinated and worked within the overall context of our campaign objectives".
In recent weeks senior UN and Nato officials have suggested that the success of the agreement has been evident from the lack of conflict.
However the peace in the area came to an abrupt end in this weekend's fighting.
Major Luke Knittig, a spokeman for Nato, said that the fighting did not represent a breach of the original agreement which had been limited solely to the area of the Musakala town.
"The elders, as I understand it, have extraordinary influence, but that influence doesn't spread across the whole district, just mostly in the town," he said.
Development
Asked whether the agreement had allowed the Taliban to use the area as a safe sanctuary, Knittig said there was "nothing to indicate that the large group of insurgents that Nato had engaged have used the town as a support base".
Nato officials say that the cessation of hostilities has helped create the space for development and Knittig argued that the development activities were proceeding in Musa Kalan despite the battle.
Jones has defended the
agreement in Musa Kalan
Both UN officials as well as Nato have referred repeatedly to the consultation with the tribal and community leaders in arriving at this agreement, and a senior UN official described the decision as one of "empowering the tribal leadership."
However, although community involvement is important and clearly lacking in many areas of development, village and provincial leaders usually do not determine military strategies.
Also such community consultations seem lacking in another recent political decision, the cross border loya jirga or 'peace jirga' as it is being termed.
Scepticism
The decision, taken during the visit of President Hamad Karzai to the US, was done so without the backing of or consultation with Afghan institutions and groups.
Media reports have suggested that several cabinet ministers have also expressed scepticism about the jirga privately, given how it will work practically is yet unclear.
It is also arguable whether any such peace deals will be able to yield results if they do not have the backing of major political forces in Afghanistan.
The last five years has seen a concentration of political and administrative power in the presidency, with the marginalisation and exclusion of major political groups who may lay claim to power.
The same formula is in operation now, in the exclusive appeal to Pashtuns on either side of the border. President Karzai himself has spoken of the "traditional Pashtun leadership of Pakistan "being undermined systematically and violently".
The danger now is that the constant appeal to Pashtun leadership, could have the effect of increasing separatist instincts and reinforcing their existence outside the structures of state and the rule of law creating a scenario that the leadership of Pakistan and Afghanistan are not likely to be ready to deal with at present.
Source: Al Jazeera
November 02, 2006
Project Afghanistan and the thinking enemy
Himal
November 2006
Analysis
Project Afghanistan and the thinking enemy
Five years of backward progress on securing the country now has NATO forces taking over security in Afghanistan. With few of the lessons of the past having sunk in, it appears unlikely that the country will breathe easier in the coming year.
by | AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Security in Afghanistan has hit the lowest point since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. This year has seen pitched battles between the anti-government insurgents and the newly deployed NATO forces. As the country approaches the first anniversary of its first democratically elected Parliament based on full adult franchise, it seems as if the hopes of the international community and the Afghan citizens could be belied.
Suicide bombings are now a regular feature in the country, with nearly 80 thus far this year alone. Kabul increasingly resembles a city under siege, with more bunkers, roadblocks and barbed-wire fences than at any time since 2001. Both the development arm of the international community and the military forces are now agreed that Afghanistan has entered a ‘critical’ year.
This is a far cry from the end of 2001, when the US-led Coalition Forces claimed they were mopping up the remnants of the Taliban, and the US Defence Secretary said there were not enough good targets for the US to bomb. The turnaround in the security situation seems to have taken most of the international community by surprise, and the determination and desperation of the Taliban are often being cited equally as ‘new’ factors in the equation. During her visit to Afghanistan this year, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeatedly exclaimed that the international forces were facing a ‘thinking enemy’, and needed to change strategy – as if that had been an unexpected factor, and the entire military strategy of the last five years had simply been based on the assumption that the enemy could not or would not ‘think’.
Yet even with the changes in strategy now being employed to combat the Taliban, there is little evidence that the international community and its military strategists have really learned from the experience of the last five years. The slow but steady deterioration of the security situation has not been in spite of the military strategies implemented, but largely because of them – strategies that have been short-sighted, and focused on piecemeal solutions. This is an approach that continues to inform military operations even now, with compartmentalised policies, exhibiting little understanding of the interlinkages of reasons causing the instability.
Hunting down, moving on
In September, newspapers, radios and TV stations could not get enough of Afghanistan. The fifth anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001 was an occasion on which to review ‘Project Afghanistan’, chalking up the pluses and minuses. While the significance of that date cannot and should not be forgotten, it is unfortunate that Afghanistan and its future continue to be viewed through that lens. The rationale for revisiting Afghanistan on the occasion of 9/11 is not just some quirk of chronology or news cycle. It continues to be the most important date for viewing Afghanistan because Afghanistan itself has never really been central to what has taken place in the country since then. Rather, it has been a staging ground for the agendas of other countries, ranging from the benign to the self-absorbed interests of major powers.
When the US-led coalition led the attack on Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, there was little attempt to gloss over the fact that it was to be a war of retribution. In pursuit of that end, more than one compromise has been made over the past five years – shortcuts and half measures that have led to the inevitable consequences of an unstable and unsustainable path of post-conflict reconstruction.
In the immediate aftermath of the US-led bombing there was no attempt to either reach a peace agreement or accommodate different political interests in the new democratic framework. The more patient process of arriving at a wider political consensus, which could have helped stabilise the country, was considered to be unadvisable as it might have led to a broader political leadership that would be more ‘messy’ to manage. Far better, the logic seemed to go, to install a government with a compliant leadership, one that would predictably follow the agenda of the power players of the international community.
Though the late 2001 Bonn Agreement was presented as the roadmap for the process of reconstruction and stabilisation, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ultimately stayed confined to Kabul. It was only in September of this year that NATO expansion was completed to cover the rest of the country. Whatever the reasons for the apparent inability of NATO to expand its operations during the long hiatus, it certainly left the US-led Coalition Forces free to carry out their missions in the ‘war against terror’. The approach to dealing with the issue of security and stabilisation of Afghanistan was ultimately compartmentalised, with the US forces targeting only the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Rather than a holistic approach that would include removing the warlords and commanders, and installing legitimate state security forces, these same potentates and illegitimate armed groups were used to carry out operations against the targets. The US forces took the help of anyone they felt had some muscle power in an area – often warlords with track records in human-rights abuses that left little to distinguish them from the demonised Taliban. The idea seemed to be to get the targets in the US radarscope first, and deal with other issues later. Never mind that these same warlords terrorised the population, and had been responsible for much of the violence, murders and rapes in their areas over the last two decades.
The methods used to carry out operations in populated areas were also rough and ready. By entering homes and carrying out searches in the very conservative areas of the south, the international forces alienated most of the populace. Having seen through operations in an area, troops would move on, making no effort to secure the areas where they had combed. This approach of hunting down and moving on left the local population angry, alienated and with no means to defend itself against the return of anti-government insurgents. It also left the local commanders in a strengthened position, their use of force having been legitimised by their close cohabitation with the international forces.
With reports of alienation, the military forces then hit upon the idea of mixing up civilian and military duties. Though the intention may have been a good one – to win the hearts and minds of the people – the approach was as thoughtless and short-term as any other. The PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) were supposed to be the civilian face of the military carrying out development projects. Rather than securing an area and making it possible for development agencies to carry out their tasks, the military itself spent vast amounts of money on construction of infrastructure. This led to a blurring of lines between the soldier and the civilian, making it easier for the anti-government forces to turn all internationals or those working for international agencies into legitimate targets.
Dysfunctional cooperation
Any process of working with the moderate Taliban was haphazard and sporadic. There were victorious announcements of Taliban leaders joining the government from time to time, but no clarity on the criterion for engagement, let alone defining parameters of a cohesive peace process.
The efforts on regional cooperation were equally dismal. The US initiated a process of border cooperation, a trilateral initiative involving the US and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite claims of working closely with the Islamabad government, an ally in the ‘war on terror’, there was little to indicate that the US government was seriously analysing the causes of terrorism from across the border. Rather than look at the reasons behind the rise of armed groups, including the denial of democracy, most of the international community chose to support, either vocally or silently, the military autocrat in Pervez Musharraf in the hope that one man would deliver the goods.
The result of five years of diplomatic efforts was evident during the visit of President Musharraf to Afghanistan in September. The Pakistani government signed an agreement with the tribal elders of North Waziristan on the issue of crossborder terrorism a day before President Musharraf’s visit. But the Afghan government was not consulted on an agreement that would have a direct bearing on its security, and the Pakistani president did not even exhibit the courtesy of informing Hamid Karzai prior to his arrival in Kabul.
Despite the rhetorical support for democracy, the international preference for authoritarian methods as far as Afghanistan is concerned has been evident again and again. If a military dictator was the preferred mode in Pakistan, in Afghanistan no effort was spared to ensure that the presidency of Hamid Karzai would be strengthened at the cost of other state institutions. Political parties were not allowed to contest in the parliamentary elections, hardly surprising since President Karzai himself has no domestic political base or party (See Himal Sept-Oct 2006, “Afghans go for Parliament”). The result, of course, has been a Parliament that has great problems of authority.
Democratic processes have not been allowed to take root, and powers have been concentrated in the hands of one man. In recent weeks President Karzai himself has been criticised for failing to deliver on a number of fronts, as if the fault lay with him personally rather than the lack of strong institutions.
Even as the security situation deteriorates, enough is not being done to reassign responsibility acceding to experience. The US-led Coalition Forces are still carrying out their combat operations as part of the ‘war on terror’, and are charged with carrying out anti-terrorist operations. The NATO-led ISAF forces, meanwhile, declare that they are mandated to support the Afghan government, which is facing insurgency. While ‘terrorism’ is linked to an international dynamic aimed at destabilising large parts of the world, ‘insurgency’ includes those whose aim is to specifically destabilise the Kabul government. As for the issue of the narcotics trade, this is left to the responsibility of the Afghan national army and the police.
The compartmentalised approach continues despite the apparent understanding of the interlinkages between the three crucial arenas – terrorism, the ongoing insurgency, and the drug trade. Though there is recognition that the anti-government insurgency is also fuelled by terrorism, and vice-versa, there is a feeling that the ‘global’ war can be fought by the Coalition Forces, and the national war by NATO. Though drug money fuels both terrorism and the insurgency, and drug barons have a direct stake in destabilising the state, neither NATO nor the Coalition Forces are willing to undertake direct operations on this front.
Unfortunately for Afghanistan, there seems to be little to suggest that there will be any real change in the current approaches of the international actors. If the situation does unravel completely there will always be a scapegoat person or issue found to take the blame for the international failure – be it Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, the lack of good governance or inadequate aid. If all else fails, the anti-government forces can always be blamed for behaving in ways in which they were not supposed to have done – for thinking and evolving their strategies in ways with which the international forces are apparently unable to deal. The ultimate excuse, as already hinted at by Condoleezza Rice, is that the insurgents ‘think’.
November 2006
Analysis
Project Afghanistan and the thinking enemy
Five years of backward progress on securing the country now has NATO forces taking over security in Afghanistan. With few of the lessons of the past having sunk in, it appears unlikely that the country will breathe easier in the coming year.
by | AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Security in Afghanistan has hit the lowest point since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. This year has seen pitched battles between the anti-government insurgents and the newly deployed NATO forces. As the country approaches the first anniversary of its first democratically elected Parliament based on full adult franchise, it seems as if the hopes of the international community and the Afghan citizens could be belied.
Suicide bombings are now a regular feature in the country, with nearly 80 thus far this year alone. Kabul increasingly resembles a city under siege, with more bunkers, roadblocks and barbed-wire fences than at any time since 2001. Both the development arm of the international community and the military forces are now agreed that Afghanistan has entered a ‘critical’ year.
This is a far cry from the end of 2001, when the US-led Coalition Forces claimed they were mopping up the remnants of the Taliban, and the US Defence Secretary said there were not enough good targets for the US to bomb. The turnaround in the security situation seems to have taken most of the international community by surprise, and the determination and desperation of the Taliban are often being cited equally as ‘new’ factors in the equation. During her visit to Afghanistan this year, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeatedly exclaimed that the international forces were facing a ‘thinking enemy’, and needed to change strategy – as if that had been an unexpected factor, and the entire military strategy of the last five years had simply been based on the assumption that the enemy could not or would not ‘think’.
Yet even with the changes in strategy now being employed to combat the Taliban, there is little evidence that the international community and its military strategists have really learned from the experience of the last five years. The slow but steady deterioration of the security situation has not been in spite of the military strategies implemented, but largely because of them – strategies that have been short-sighted, and focused on piecemeal solutions. This is an approach that continues to inform military operations even now, with compartmentalised policies, exhibiting little understanding of the interlinkages of reasons causing the instability.
Hunting down, moving on
In September, newspapers, radios and TV stations could not get enough of Afghanistan. The fifth anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001 was an occasion on which to review ‘Project Afghanistan’, chalking up the pluses and minuses. While the significance of that date cannot and should not be forgotten, it is unfortunate that Afghanistan and its future continue to be viewed through that lens. The rationale for revisiting Afghanistan on the occasion of 9/11 is not just some quirk of chronology or news cycle. It continues to be the most important date for viewing Afghanistan because Afghanistan itself has never really been central to what has taken place in the country since then. Rather, it has been a staging ground for the agendas of other countries, ranging from the benign to the self-absorbed interests of major powers.
When the US-led coalition led the attack on Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, there was little attempt to gloss over the fact that it was to be a war of retribution. In pursuit of that end, more than one compromise has been made over the past five years – shortcuts and half measures that have led to the inevitable consequences of an unstable and unsustainable path of post-conflict reconstruction.
In the immediate aftermath of the US-led bombing there was no attempt to either reach a peace agreement or accommodate different political interests in the new democratic framework. The more patient process of arriving at a wider political consensus, which could have helped stabilise the country, was considered to be unadvisable as it might have led to a broader political leadership that would be more ‘messy’ to manage. Far better, the logic seemed to go, to install a government with a compliant leadership, one that would predictably follow the agenda of the power players of the international community.
Though the late 2001 Bonn Agreement was presented as the roadmap for the process of reconstruction and stabilisation, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ultimately stayed confined to Kabul. It was only in September of this year that NATO expansion was completed to cover the rest of the country. Whatever the reasons for the apparent inability of NATO to expand its operations during the long hiatus, it certainly left the US-led Coalition Forces free to carry out their missions in the ‘war against terror’. The approach to dealing with the issue of security and stabilisation of Afghanistan was ultimately compartmentalised, with the US forces targeting only the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Rather than a holistic approach that would include removing the warlords and commanders, and installing legitimate state security forces, these same potentates and illegitimate armed groups were used to carry out operations against the targets. The US forces took the help of anyone they felt had some muscle power in an area – often warlords with track records in human-rights abuses that left little to distinguish them from the demonised Taliban. The idea seemed to be to get the targets in the US radarscope first, and deal with other issues later. Never mind that these same warlords terrorised the population, and had been responsible for much of the violence, murders and rapes in their areas over the last two decades.
The methods used to carry out operations in populated areas were also rough and ready. By entering homes and carrying out searches in the very conservative areas of the south, the international forces alienated most of the populace. Having seen through operations in an area, troops would move on, making no effort to secure the areas where they had combed. This approach of hunting down and moving on left the local population angry, alienated and with no means to defend itself against the return of anti-government insurgents. It also left the local commanders in a strengthened position, their use of force having been legitimised by their close cohabitation with the international forces.
With reports of alienation, the military forces then hit upon the idea of mixing up civilian and military duties. Though the intention may have been a good one – to win the hearts and minds of the people – the approach was as thoughtless and short-term as any other. The PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) were supposed to be the civilian face of the military carrying out development projects. Rather than securing an area and making it possible for development agencies to carry out their tasks, the military itself spent vast amounts of money on construction of infrastructure. This led to a blurring of lines between the soldier and the civilian, making it easier for the anti-government forces to turn all internationals or those working for international agencies into legitimate targets.
Dysfunctional cooperation
Any process of working with the moderate Taliban was haphazard and sporadic. There were victorious announcements of Taliban leaders joining the government from time to time, but no clarity on the criterion for engagement, let alone defining parameters of a cohesive peace process.
The efforts on regional cooperation were equally dismal. The US initiated a process of border cooperation, a trilateral initiative involving the US and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite claims of working closely with the Islamabad government, an ally in the ‘war on terror’, there was little to indicate that the US government was seriously analysing the causes of terrorism from across the border. Rather than look at the reasons behind the rise of armed groups, including the denial of democracy, most of the international community chose to support, either vocally or silently, the military autocrat in Pervez Musharraf in the hope that one man would deliver the goods.
The result of five years of diplomatic efforts was evident during the visit of President Musharraf to Afghanistan in September. The Pakistani government signed an agreement with the tribal elders of North Waziristan on the issue of crossborder terrorism a day before President Musharraf’s visit. But the Afghan government was not consulted on an agreement that would have a direct bearing on its security, and the Pakistani president did not even exhibit the courtesy of informing Hamid Karzai prior to his arrival in Kabul.
Despite the rhetorical support for democracy, the international preference for authoritarian methods as far as Afghanistan is concerned has been evident again and again. If a military dictator was the preferred mode in Pakistan, in Afghanistan no effort was spared to ensure that the presidency of Hamid Karzai would be strengthened at the cost of other state institutions. Political parties were not allowed to contest in the parliamentary elections, hardly surprising since President Karzai himself has no domestic political base or party (See Himal Sept-Oct 2006, “Afghans go for Parliament”). The result, of course, has been a Parliament that has great problems of authority.
Democratic processes have not been allowed to take root, and powers have been concentrated in the hands of one man. In recent weeks President Karzai himself has been criticised for failing to deliver on a number of fronts, as if the fault lay with him personally rather than the lack of strong institutions.
Even as the security situation deteriorates, enough is not being done to reassign responsibility acceding to experience. The US-led Coalition Forces are still carrying out their combat operations as part of the ‘war on terror’, and are charged with carrying out anti-terrorist operations. The NATO-led ISAF forces, meanwhile, declare that they are mandated to support the Afghan government, which is facing insurgency. While ‘terrorism’ is linked to an international dynamic aimed at destabilising large parts of the world, ‘insurgency’ includes those whose aim is to specifically destabilise the Kabul government. As for the issue of the narcotics trade, this is left to the responsibility of the Afghan national army and the police.
The compartmentalised approach continues despite the apparent understanding of the interlinkages between the three crucial arenas – terrorism, the ongoing insurgency, and the drug trade. Though there is recognition that the anti-government insurgency is also fuelled by terrorism, and vice-versa, there is a feeling that the ‘global’ war can be fought by the Coalition Forces, and the national war by NATO. Though drug money fuels both terrorism and the insurgency, and drug barons have a direct stake in destabilising the state, neither NATO nor the Coalition Forces are willing to undertake direct operations on this front.
Unfortunately for Afghanistan, there seems to be little to suggest that there will be any real change in the current approaches of the international actors. If the situation does unravel completely there will always be a scapegoat person or issue found to take the blame for the international failure – be it Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, the lack of good governance or inadequate aid. If all else fails, the anti-government forces can always be blamed for behaving in ways in which they were not supposed to have done – for thinking and evolving their strategies in ways with which the international forces are apparently unable to deal. The ultimate excuse, as already hinted at by Condoleezza Rice, is that the insurgents ‘think’.
October 09, 2006
Afghan Governor Says Her Future Rides on Asphalt
Women's Enews
October 9, 2006
Afghan Governor Says Her Future Rides on Asphalt
Run Date: 10/08/06
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
Habiba Sarobi was appointed Afghanistan's first female provincial governor last year amid media fanfare about women's rights. Now she says nothing matters for her province or her political career except getting some paved roads.
(WOMENSENEWS)--Two years ago, even the most ambitious girls going to school in Afghanistan's central province of Bamiyan dreamed only of becoming schoolteachers, the favored job for educated young women in Afghanistan.
Then came Habiba Sarobi, Afghanistan's first and so far only female governor, appointed by President Hamid Karzai in March 2005. She presides in a relatively peaceful, poppy-free region where women have significantly more freedom than in neighboring regions.
Still, a concern over the safety of women working in Afghanistan was underscored by the assassination two weeks ago of Safia Ama Jan, a provincial director for Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs. Ama Jan was murdered by two gunmen on a motorcycle outside her house in Kandahar while she was going to her office.
Before naming her as a governor, Karzai had selected Sarobi in 2001 to be minister for women's affairs, a job she held for two and a half years. She spent five years of Taliban control over Kabul in Peshawar, Pakistan, running workshops for women and funding an underground school in Kabul.
"Now the same girls talk of being a governor when they grow up; some even talk of being the president," says Abdullah Barat, an activist with various civil society groups working to rebuild Bamiyan.
Bamiyan, the home of the giant Buddhas that were dynamited by the Taliban in March 2001, lies in Hazarajat and is dominated by the Hazaras, descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups. They are the third largest ethnic community in Afghanistan and were under Taliban control between 1998 and 2001.
After some Hazaras mounted resistance, the Taliban massacred 200 people in Yakawlang, a town in Bamiyan in early 2001. Reports by the media including the BBC indicated that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead. The United Nations subsequently reported four mass graves in the town of Bamiyan, which has the same name as the province.
Show of Women's Rights
When Sarobi became governor last year international media hailed it as a sign of the Karzai government's commitment to promoting women in a country where political parties are traditionally male-dominated and which, during the last two decades, completely excluded women as armed groups fought each other for political control.
The New York Times described it as a "major advance in a society where only four years ago, under the Taliban, women were denied everything from school lessons to lipstick."
"Her appointment is part of a national initiative to promote women to positions of power," a Voice of America Web site report said at the time.
"There are gifted women in Afghanistan emerging from the destruction and intolerance that is all around," a BBC report concluded. "Habiba Sarobi seems to be one of them."
But a year and a half later, Sarobi, a 49-year-old chemist, says many ultra-conservatives, both nationally and within her own province, are waiting for her to trip and fail.
"Road, road and road," she says when asked to list what she needs most to keep her constituents happy and hang on to her post. Sarobi met with Women's eNews for an interview at her Kabul home.
Sarobi says she raises the province's need for better infrastructure in every meeting, whether with the central government or international donors.
Neither the governor nor Sarobi's staff provided Women's eNews with details of the provincial budget or funding sources. For proof of the province's dire financial straits, Sarobi simply points to Bamiyan's lack of a single meter of asphalted road.
Bone-Rattling Trip to Market
An official involved with disbursing U.S. development aid denies the province is being neglected, and says a ground-breaking ceremony for the first paved road in the province is going to take place soon.
The central government also recently began building a paved road to link Kabul to Bamiyan. The project, announced three years ago, is only just now getting underway.
Sarobi says these road projects are a big relief, but the political heat on her will not let up until traffic is rolling.
A trip from Kabul to Bamiyan that would take three hours on a smooth road currently takes a bone-rattling 10 to 12 hours along an unpaved road.
There are no regular commercial flights to the province and Bamiyan, in the central highlands, needs roads to help diversify its economy. The province chiefly grows potatoes because they are less perishable than other crops and can survive long trips to market.
Three Conditions for Aid
In various statements and compacts, international donors including the U.S. government and U.N. entities, have promised to link development aid to peace, drug eradication and gender justice.
Sarobi says her province boasts all three conditions.
She says it is one of the most peaceful of the country. Insurgent activity is absent and local commanders have largely been demobilized. That relative security allows local government to police poppy cultivation, which is illegal but still rampant in many places. She says the area under poppy cultivation in Bamiyan province has declined from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares in 2006. A hectare is about two and a half acres.
Hazara women enjoy relative freedom. Few wear the head-to-toe covering burka common in some other parts of the country. Sarobi herself is a sign of the relatively strong status of women in the province. When asked if she could be governor in Helmand or Kandahar, two southern districts, Sarobi laughs. "It would have been impossible there," she says.
Those districts suffer frequent outbreaks of violence between the international forces and the anti-government insurgents. By custom in those provinces, women can be killed by family members--a father, brother or husband--for the slightest hint of dishonor, such as the suspicion of extramarital sex. They can also be given in marriage to settle a feud or to compensate for a crime.
In Bamiyan, Sarobi says, women are not subject to such treatment.
But a confidante of Sarobi's--who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject--said her gender is still a political factor. "Some people are not happy that there is a female governor here," she says. "This is still a country where in many places women are not allowed to go out. The fact that she has no political base allows them to create problems. The warlords and lesser warlords who have lost their power in the Bamiyan area are waiting for her to fail."
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.)
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more information:
"Italians Train Afghans for Non-Traditional Jobs":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2843/
"Afghan Women Wind Up Tough Campaigns":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2455/
"Afghan Women Building Their Own Councils":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2488/
October 9, 2006
Afghan Governor Says Her Future Rides on Asphalt
Run Date: 10/08/06
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
Habiba Sarobi was appointed Afghanistan's first female provincial governor last year amid media fanfare about women's rights. Now she says nothing matters for her province or her political career except getting some paved roads.
(WOMENSENEWS)--Two years ago, even the most ambitious girls going to school in Afghanistan's central province of Bamiyan dreamed only of becoming schoolteachers, the favored job for educated young women in Afghanistan.
Then came Habiba Sarobi, Afghanistan's first and so far only female governor, appointed by President Hamid Karzai in March 2005. She presides in a relatively peaceful, poppy-free region where women have significantly more freedom than in neighboring regions.
Still, a concern over the safety of women working in Afghanistan was underscored by the assassination two weeks ago of Safia Ama Jan, a provincial director for Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs. Ama Jan was murdered by two gunmen on a motorcycle outside her house in Kandahar while she was going to her office.
Before naming her as a governor, Karzai had selected Sarobi in 2001 to be minister for women's affairs, a job she held for two and a half years. She spent five years of Taliban control over Kabul in Peshawar, Pakistan, running workshops for women and funding an underground school in Kabul.
"Now the same girls talk of being a governor when they grow up; some even talk of being the president," says Abdullah Barat, an activist with various civil society groups working to rebuild Bamiyan.
Bamiyan, the home of the giant Buddhas that were dynamited by the Taliban in March 2001, lies in Hazarajat and is dominated by the Hazaras, descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups. They are the third largest ethnic community in Afghanistan and were under Taliban control between 1998 and 2001.
After some Hazaras mounted resistance, the Taliban massacred 200 people in Yakawlang, a town in Bamiyan in early 2001. Reports by the media including the BBC indicated that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead. The United Nations subsequently reported four mass graves in the town of Bamiyan, which has the same name as the province.
Show of Women's Rights
When Sarobi became governor last year international media hailed it as a sign of the Karzai government's commitment to promoting women in a country where political parties are traditionally male-dominated and which, during the last two decades, completely excluded women as armed groups fought each other for political control.
The New York Times described it as a "major advance in a society where only four years ago, under the Taliban, women were denied everything from school lessons to lipstick."
"Her appointment is part of a national initiative to promote women to positions of power," a Voice of America Web site report said at the time.
"There are gifted women in Afghanistan emerging from the destruction and intolerance that is all around," a BBC report concluded. "Habiba Sarobi seems to be one of them."
But a year and a half later, Sarobi, a 49-year-old chemist, says many ultra-conservatives, both nationally and within her own province, are waiting for her to trip and fail.
"Road, road and road," she says when asked to list what she needs most to keep her constituents happy and hang on to her post. Sarobi met with Women's eNews for an interview at her Kabul home.
Sarobi says she raises the province's need for better infrastructure in every meeting, whether with the central government or international donors.
Neither the governor nor Sarobi's staff provided Women's eNews with details of the provincial budget or funding sources. For proof of the province's dire financial straits, Sarobi simply points to Bamiyan's lack of a single meter of asphalted road.
Bone-Rattling Trip to Market
An official involved with disbursing U.S. development aid denies the province is being neglected, and says a ground-breaking ceremony for the first paved road in the province is going to take place soon.
The central government also recently began building a paved road to link Kabul to Bamiyan. The project, announced three years ago, is only just now getting underway.
Sarobi says these road projects are a big relief, but the political heat on her will not let up until traffic is rolling.
A trip from Kabul to Bamiyan that would take three hours on a smooth road currently takes a bone-rattling 10 to 12 hours along an unpaved road.
There are no regular commercial flights to the province and Bamiyan, in the central highlands, needs roads to help diversify its economy. The province chiefly grows potatoes because they are less perishable than other crops and can survive long trips to market.
Three Conditions for Aid
In various statements and compacts, international donors including the U.S. government and U.N. entities, have promised to link development aid to peace, drug eradication and gender justice.
Sarobi says her province boasts all three conditions.
She says it is one of the most peaceful of the country. Insurgent activity is absent and local commanders have largely been demobilized. That relative security allows local government to police poppy cultivation, which is illegal but still rampant in many places. She says the area under poppy cultivation in Bamiyan province has declined from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares in 2006. A hectare is about two and a half acres.
Hazara women enjoy relative freedom. Few wear the head-to-toe covering burka common in some other parts of the country. Sarobi herself is a sign of the relatively strong status of women in the province. When asked if she could be governor in Helmand or Kandahar, two southern districts, Sarobi laughs. "It would have been impossible there," she says.
Those districts suffer frequent outbreaks of violence between the international forces and the anti-government insurgents. By custom in those provinces, women can be killed by family members--a father, brother or husband--for the slightest hint of dishonor, such as the suspicion of extramarital sex. They can also be given in marriage to settle a feud or to compensate for a crime.
In Bamiyan, Sarobi says, women are not subject to such treatment.
But a confidante of Sarobi's--who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject--said her gender is still a political factor. "Some people are not happy that there is a female governor here," she says. "This is still a country where in many places women are not allowed to go out. The fact that she has no political base allows them to create problems. The warlords and lesser warlords who have lost their power in the Bamiyan area are waiting for her to fail."
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.)
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more information:
"Italians Train Afghans for Non-Traditional Jobs":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2843/
"Afghan Women Wind Up Tough Campaigns":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2455/
"Afghan Women Building Their Own Councils":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2488/
Breaking point
Hindustan Times, October 6
Breaking point
Aunohita Mojumdar
On October 7, 2001, the international community, led by the US, stepped in to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan from the Taliban. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent on security and on rebuilding a country bombed out of the current century by 30 years of war. Yet, after five years of efforts, during which time the Taliban was ousted and the Karzai government installed, Afghanistan has hit its lowest point.
Security is spiralling out of control, poppy cultivation and the drug trade have hit a new high, governance remains confined to pockets of security and development has completely halted in some areas. For the first time, the international community is talking of the possibility of a ‘failed State’. The current year is being described as a critical period, one which will make or break the situation.
Milestones of progress are trotted out glibly by diplomats and politicians: children back in school, refugees returning to the country, the absence of the Taliban. The benchmarks of the Bonn process are also recounted as major accomplishments — a new Constitution, presidential elections and a new Parliament. Yet, despite the completion of the road- map, these efforts and institutions have not yielded the results hoped for.
Three years ago, the fact that the government’s authority extended only over Kabul was an object of mockery. But even that small oasis of comfort no longer exists. Bomb explosions are routine, there are frequent suicide attacks and kidnappings. Foreigners are considered a favourite target of anti-government insurgents and have been urged by their countries to curtail their movement. An increasing number of roads have been blocked off and there are new barbed wire fences and cement blocks outside offices and residences of foreigners. While glitzy malls and restaurants — some of which prohibit entry to Afghans — proclaim the advent of easy money in some sections, most of the country continues to lack the basics.
Nothing illustrates the unravelling of the Afghan effort better than the ongoing blame game. Whether it is the Afghan government, the diplomatic community or the international military forces, each has its favourite reason: lack of money, lack of security, corruption, an ineffectual President, the drug trade.
Yet, most of the anger among Afghans seems to stem not from resentment about lack of international aid and support, but from a perception of its misuse. The real question is not whether things have not improved for some people, but whether the reconstruction of the last five years could have been delivered better.
“Few expected the international community to fix all these problems in five years,” says Fariba Nawa, an Afghan American, in a critique of the reconstruction process that she did for CorpWatch, a US watchdog body. “But taxpayers do expect their aid money to be spent responsibly,” she adds. According to Senlis Council, a think-tank, “Afghans perceive that their government is accountable to international donors and not to the Afghans themselves.”
Focus on poverty relief and development could have created a solid foundation on which to rebuild Afghanistan, it says. Instead, $ 82.5 million was spent on military operations as opposed to $ 7.3 billion on development (since 2002). Even money spent on reconstruction has been “mismanaged, misused and wasted”, says Nawa, “International and national aid agencies have designed a system that in effect funnels money back to the wealthy donor countries without providing sustainable development in poor states.”
The effort is on having projects up and running rather than on the sustainability of projects or community engagement. An example was the pressure on deadlines before the presidential elections in both the US and Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan was to be presented as a success story, it was imperative to have achievements in numbers. But it is not just roads, school buildings and ill thought-out income generation projects that have paid the price for the short-sightedness. There has been little effort to build and strengthen the institutions of State.
The international community has reposed its faith on the instrument of the presidency alone, often strengthening it at the cost of other institutions. This was best illustrated during the parliamentary elections. A Brussels-based think tank, International Crisis Group, wrote: “The Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) system used in the 2005 legislative election all but excluded political parties vital for the development of a robust democracy. Karzai has done all he can to marginalise these parties, leaving him isolated and dependent on unstable alliances in a fragmented body.”
Efforts on the security front have been equally myopic. Though billions have been spent on military expenditure, little has gone into rebuilding and stabilising institutions of security within the country — the police, the judiciary and the Afghan National Army.
Warlords, often with records of abuse of human rights to match the Taliban’s excesses, have been co-opted in the hope that they will deliver quick results against the war on terror, at the cost of stabilisation of the country.
The result is a slow unravelling of faith, bringing the country once again to a dangerous brink where it could pose a serious threat to the world.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is a freelance journalist currently based in Kabul)
Breaking point
Aunohita Mojumdar
On October 7, 2001, the international community, led by the US, stepped in to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan from the Taliban. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent on security and on rebuilding a country bombed out of the current century by 30 years of war. Yet, after five years of efforts, during which time the Taliban was ousted and the Karzai government installed, Afghanistan has hit its lowest point.
Security is spiralling out of control, poppy cultivation and the drug trade have hit a new high, governance remains confined to pockets of security and development has completely halted in some areas. For the first time, the international community is talking of the possibility of a ‘failed State’. The current year is being described as a critical period, one which will make or break the situation.
Milestones of progress are trotted out glibly by diplomats and politicians: children back in school, refugees returning to the country, the absence of the Taliban. The benchmarks of the Bonn process are also recounted as major accomplishments — a new Constitution, presidential elections and a new Parliament. Yet, despite the completion of the road- map, these efforts and institutions have not yielded the results hoped for.
Three years ago, the fact that the government’s authority extended only over Kabul was an object of mockery. But even that small oasis of comfort no longer exists. Bomb explosions are routine, there are frequent suicide attacks and kidnappings. Foreigners are considered a favourite target of anti-government insurgents and have been urged by their countries to curtail their movement. An increasing number of roads have been blocked off and there are new barbed wire fences and cement blocks outside offices and residences of foreigners. While glitzy malls and restaurants — some of which prohibit entry to Afghans — proclaim the advent of easy money in some sections, most of the country continues to lack the basics.
Nothing illustrates the unravelling of the Afghan effort better than the ongoing blame game. Whether it is the Afghan government, the diplomatic community or the international military forces, each has its favourite reason: lack of money, lack of security, corruption, an ineffectual President, the drug trade.
Yet, most of the anger among Afghans seems to stem not from resentment about lack of international aid and support, but from a perception of its misuse. The real question is not whether things have not improved for some people, but whether the reconstruction of the last five years could have been delivered better.
“Few expected the international community to fix all these problems in five years,” says Fariba Nawa, an Afghan American, in a critique of the reconstruction process that she did for CorpWatch, a US watchdog body. “But taxpayers do expect their aid money to be spent responsibly,” she adds. According to Senlis Council, a think-tank, “Afghans perceive that their government is accountable to international donors and not to the Afghans themselves.”
Focus on poverty relief and development could have created a solid foundation on which to rebuild Afghanistan, it says. Instead, $ 82.5 million was spent on military operations as opposed to $ 7.3 billion on development (since 2002). Even money spent on reconstruction has been “mismanaged, misused and wasted”, says Nawa, “International and national aid agencies have designed a system that in effect funnels money back to the wealthy donor countries without providing sustainable development in poor states.”
The effort is on having projects up and running rather than on the sustainability of projects or community engagement. An example was the pressure on deadlines before the presidential elections in both the US and Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan was to be presented as a success story, it was imperative to have achievements in numbers. But it is not just roads, school buildings and ill thought-out income generation projects that have paid the price for the short-sightedness. There has been little effort to build and strengthen the institutions of State.
The international community has reposed its faith on the instrument of the presidency alone, often strengthening it at the cost of other institutions. This was best illustrated during the parliamentary elections. A Brussels-based think tank, International Crisis Group, wrote: “The Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) system used in the 2005 legislative election all but excluded political parties vital for the development of a robust democracy. Karzai has done all he can to marginalise these parties, leaving him isolated and dependent on unstable alliances in a fragmented body.”
Efforts on the security front have been equally myopic. Though billions have been spent on military expenditure, little has gone into rebuilding and stabilising institutions of security within the country — the police, the judiciary and the Afghan National Army.
Warlords, often with records of abuse of human rights to match the Taliban’s excesses, have been co-opted in the hope that they will deliver quick results against the war on terror, at the cost of stabilisation of the country.
The result is a slow unravelling of faith, bringing the country once again to a dangerous brink where it could pose a serious threat to the world.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is a freelance journalist currently based in Kabul)
In the shadow of the Buddhas
Asia Times, Oct 4, 2006
In the shadow of the Buddhas
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - Dead monuments mean more in Afganistan's Bamiyan province than living people.
The Taliban's destruction of the two giant Buddhas in 2001 put Bamiyan squarely on the map of international public consciousness. With widespread outrage at the annihilation of the colossal, centuries-old structures, money has since poured in for the preservation of the site, and the fragments of the Buddhas are being collected and preserved. While that effort is creditable, what
is unfortunate is the continuing neglect of the people of the area. The inhabitants, whose ancestors built and preserved the
structures, are today one of the most neglected communities in all Afghanistan.
In 2003 "the cultural landscape and archeological remains of the Bamiyan Valley" were officially inscribed on the World Heritage list on an emergency basis. The stabilization of the crumbling "great cliff" where the Buddhas were situated, the preservation of the niches with their imprints of the Buddhas, collection of the fragments, preventing theft and preserving the cave paintings were identified as priorities to prevent further destruction through man and natural causes.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines "cultural landscapes" as those that "represent the combined works of nature and man". The historic system of irrigation, which has created an intricate pattern of green and yellow terraces, fields on the floor of the Bamiyan Valley, and the "vernacular" architecture using traditional designs and materials were also considered to be part of the unique heritage. The holistic appreciation of the entire area with all its components will certainly make the World Heritage Site much more complete, and a master plan has been prepared to look into all the issues.
However, five years after the ouster of the Taliban and three and a half years after the declaration of the World Heritage Site, the people of Bamiyan still feel neglected and ignored.
The reasons for this are several. The Bamiyan area in the central highlands of the country is home to the Hazaras, the ethnic group that is the lowest in the social order of Afghanistan. The Hazaras are Shi'ites, a religious minority in Afghanistan. The descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups who settled there; they are also racially distinct and have been severely segregated by the other communities.
The Bamiyan area saw horrific massacres of the Hazara population after it fell to the Taliban. Angered by the resistance, including an attack by the Hizb-e-Wahadat that represents the Hazara community, the Taliban massacred 200 ordinary people in Yakawlang in early 2001. Estimates also suggest that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead, with four mass graves discovered in Bamiyan town alone. Traditionally Hazaras were forced to do menial jobs, while the dominant positions were held by the Pashtun and Tajik communities.
It is a dominance that the people of Bamiyan feel continues to dominate decision-making, denying them the benefits of aid and development. "People at the decision-making level are not so keen to support Bamiyan," said Amir Fuladi, an adviser to the governor of Bamiyan, Habiba Sarobi.
Afghanistan's first and only female governor, Sarobi is more reticent. She does not agree that there is discrimination against the Hazara community, but agrees that if the neglect continues, such accusations may indeed appear to be true.
Bamiyan pays a high price for the neglect. The central highlands are geographically isolated. Being in the middle of the country, the province has no revenue from border trade. There are no industries in the area, which is almost completely dependent on agriculture and animal herding.
"The province is isolated and there is no road accessibility," said Fuladi. "The entire province does not have one meter of asphalt road."
The roads connecting Bamiyan to the capital Kabul are little more than broad dirt tracks, potholed and bumpy. What could be a distance of two to three hours takes anything from eight to 12 hours, provided the vehicle is a four-wheel-drive well equipped with spare tires. Flights to Bamiyan, even if they were affordable, are only provided by the UN or by Paktec, which serves non-governmental organizations. There are no flights for ordinary travelers.
With no local industry and bad roads, getting materials to Bamiyan is extremely difficult, said Fuladi, pointing out that in this area, at an altitude of 2,500 meters, even the construction season is extremely short - five months. The lack of road connectivity also prevents any significant revenue generation from the agricultural produce and animal husbandry as nothing can be exported out of the province.
Asked to list her priorities for the province, Sarobi said: "Roads, roads and roads." She compared the province's situation with the millions being spent on road building in the south and wonders why nothing reaches her area. After three years of promises to the people of the province, President Hamid Karzai inaugurated a road-building project three weeks ago, but how soon that connectivity is achieved remains to be seen.
The main reason for the neglect, many in the province feel, lies in security. Bamiyan today is one of the most secure areas of the country, and Sarobi and others feel the province is paying a price for this. All attention in the country is focused on the areas now facing insurgency. Even while the international community and the government chant the mantra of how difficult it is to provide development in insecure areas, one sees no signs that areas that are relatively secure are benefiting. Rather than set an example by developing Bamiyan, which could be seen as a model of the stakes of peace, the province is not considered worthy of attention.
"Because we have security here, there is a lack of attention," said Fuladi. "Stability or security has no advantage for us."
But security may deteriorate, he said, if the relations between the government and the community continue to deteriorate as people get more and more angry. "There should be a change of strategy. They should support a stable and safe area so that people feel that peace leads to development."
The amount of corruption and misuse of resources in a stable area is also very little, he says. Pointing out that millions of dollars are being spent on provinces in the south, Fuladi also compares the lack of aid in his area to the aid pouring into the much smaller province of Panjshir, an area that many believe was made into a separate province for political rather than administrative reasons.
"We are thinking of burning down some paper schools as a symbolic protest," said Abdullah Barat, a founding member of the Bamiyan Preservation Association for Cultural Heritage, in a cynical reference to the burning down of schools in the southern provinces.
Though there is no indigenous base for the Taliban in Bamiyan, what is dangerously missing from the area is a stake in peace. Though the area may not create new Taliban forces, there is also likely to be less resistance to anti-government forces than before. The area has actually seen demobilization and disarmament as opposed to other areas such as Panjshir that merely claim to have demobilized, and people in Bamiyan would not be able to put up stiff resistance. Moreover, what is currently merely the anger of the disgruntled may in future turn into support for any instability. Anti-government elements who choose to operate in the area may not find the people unwilling hosts.
Bamiyan has also seen a sharp drop in cultivation of opium poppies. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Bamiyan has seen a reduction in the area under poppy cultivation from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares this year.
Advocating solutions for decreasing poppy cultivation, which has risen by 60% in the country this year, UNODC chief Antonio Maria Costa says in a recent report that "drug and integrity" conditions have to be inserted into aid programs. "The more vigorously district and provincial leaders commit themselves to activity free of opium, the more they deserve generous development assistance," he said.
But sentiments such as these are mere rhetoric to the people of Bamiyan, who see no such linkages in their area. "The message here is: no poppy, no money," said an international worker in the province.
Referring to the province's lack of leverage at the political level, Fuladi said bitterly: "It doesn't really matter [to others] whether Bamiyan is a hell or a heaven. It is so isolated."
The neglect is especially unfortunate since the area is also the most liberal area in the country in terms of its attitude toward woman. Women move relatively freely, wearing colorful clothes rather than the burqa, engaging in work openly. Yet the area gets no credit for this even though the issue of gender justice is one of the main issues that occupy the international community's agenda - at least on paper.
"We have peace. No narcotics. Bamiyan can also be an example of the success of women's rights if I can succeed. Why don't they support me?" wonders Governor Sarobi, saying much of the talk about women's rights is just lip service.
It is not just neglect that makes the tale of Bamiyan a poignant one. The designation of the area as a world heritage site has meant that even normal development, construction of buildings and markets, is at a standstill since there is no room for "unplanned" development. The designation of the entire area as a cultural and historical landscape has meant that all growth must now devolve on the adoption of the master plan. However, as yet there is no coordination, planning or funding for the master plan and even the perimeter boundary of the heritage site is yet to be finalized.
Protection of the vernacular architecture, the beautiful terraced fields and of course the area around the Buddhas has meant that people will have to wait for permissions before building or altering anything. Is Bamiyan being held hostage to its heritage? Sarobi admits that this is a widespread feeling among people in her province and an issue she plans to raise at the next meeting of the international coordination committee on Bamiyan.
There is no tangible benefit to the people yet, admits UNESCO expert Junko Okahashi, assistant program specialist for the Asia and Pacific World Heritage Center, who flew into Bamiyan for a week, though she said it is not too late and that things have to start now.
It is not that there are no non-governmental or UN organizations working in Bamiyan. There were at least 40 by the last count. However, their efforts are piecemeal, uncoordinated and, indeed, in some cases, counterproductive. In the absence of basic infrastructure, the outcome of these projects, however beneficial, has a limited impact.
The issue is not whether the people come first or the monuments. It would be tragic to see further deterioration of great historical heritage, which once lost cannot be retrieved. A successful implementation of the "master plan" is expected to change the fortunes of the locals - eventually. The concern is whether the current efforts at preservation can be combined with community-oriented programs that engage the community in this heritage, building stakes in the local community simultaneously.
"People have no sense of ownership right now," said Fuladi. While the living wait, the international community and organizations pore over the pieces of monuments.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.)
In the shadow of the Buddhas
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - Dead monuments mean more in Afganistan's Bamiyan province than living people.
The Taliban's destruction of the two giant Buddhas in 2001 put Bamiyan squarely on the map of international public consciousness. With widespread outrage at the annihilation of the colossal, centuries-old structures, money has since poured in for the preservation of the site, and the fragments of the Buddhas are being collected and preserved. While that effort is creditable, what
is unfortunate is the continuing neglect of the people of the area. The inhabitants, whose ancestors built and preserved the
structures, are today one of the most neglected communities in all Afghanistan.
In 2003 "the cultural landscape and archeological remains of the Bamiyan Valley" were officially inscribed on the World Heritage list on an emergency basis. The stabilization of the crumbling "great cliff" where the Buddhas were situated, the preservation of the niches with their imprints of the Buddhas, collection of the fragments, preventing theft and preserving the cave paintings were identified as priorities to prevent further destruction through man and natural causes.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines "cultural landscapes" as those that "represent the combined works of nature and man". The historic system of irrigation, which has created an intricate pattern of green and yellow terraces, fields on the floor of the Bamiyan Valley, and the "vernacular" architecture using traditional designs and materials were also considered to be part of the unique heritage. The holistic appreciation of the entire area with all its components will certainly make the World Heritage Site much more complete, and a master plan has been prepared to look into all the issues.
However, five years after the ouster of the Taliban and three and a half years after the declaration of the World Heritage Site, the people of Bamiyan still feel neglected and ignored.
The reasons for this are several. The Bamiyan area in the central highlands of the country is home to the Hazaras, the ethnic group that is the lowest in the social order of Afghanistan. The Hazaras are Shi'ites, a religious minority in Afghanistan. The descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups who settled there; they are also racially distinct and have been severely segregated by the other communities.
The Bamiyan area saw horrific massacres of the Hazara population after it fell to the Taliban. Angered by the resistance, including an attack by the Hizb-e-Wahadat that represents the Hazara community, the Taliban massacred 200 ordinary people in Yakawlang in early 2001. Estimates also suggest that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead, with four mass graves discovered in Bamiyan town alone. Traditionally Hazaras were forced to do menial jobs, while the dominant positions were held by the Pashtun and Tajik communities.
It is a dominance that the people of Bamiyan feel continues to dominate decision-making, denying them the benefits of aid and development. "People at the decision-making level are not so keen to support Bamiyan," said Amir Fuladi, an adviser to the governor of Bamiyan, Habiba Sarobi.
Afghanistan's first and only female governor, Sarobi is more reticent. She does not agree that there is discrimination against the Hazara community, but agrees that if the neglect continues, such accusations may indeed appear to be true.
Bamiyan pays a high price for the neglect. The central highlands are geographically isolated. Being in the middle of the country, the province has no revenue from border trade. There are no industries in the area, which is almost completely dependent on agriculture and animal herding.
"The province is isolated and there is no road accessibility," said Fuladi. "The entire province does not have one meter of asphalt road."
The roads connecting Bamiyan to the capital Kabul are little more than broad dirt tracks, potholed and bumpy. What could be a distance of two to three hours takes anything from eight to 12 hours, provided the vehicle is a four-wheel-drive well equipped with spare tires. Flights to Bamiyan, even if they were affordable, are only provided by the UN or by Paktec, which serves non-governmental organizations. There are no flights for ordinary travelers.
With no local industry and bad roads, getting materials to Bamiyan is extremely difficult, said Fuladi, pointing out that in this area, at an altitude of 2,500 meters, even the construction season is extremely short - five months. The lack of road connectivity also prevents any significant revenue generation from the agricultural produce and animal husbandry as nothing can be exported out of the province.
Asked to list her priorities for the province, Sarobi said: "Roads, roads and roads." She compared the province's situation with the millions being spent on road building in the south and wonders why nothing reaches her area. After three years of promises to the people of the province, President Hamid Karzai inaugurated a road-building project three weeks ago, but how soon that connectivity is achieved remains to be seen.
The main reason for the neglect, many in the province feel, lies in security. Bamiyan today is one of the most secure areas of the country, and Sarobi and others feel the province is paying a price for this. All attention in the country is focused on the areas now facing insurgency. Even while the international community and the government chant the mantra of how difficult it is to provide development in insecure areas, one sees no signs that areas that are relatively secure are benefiting. Rather than set an example by developing Bamiyan, which could be seen as a model of the stakes of peace, the province is not considered worthy of attention.
"Because we have security here, there is a lack of attention," said Fuladi. "Stability or security has no advantage for us."
But security may deteriorate, he said, if the relations between the government and the community continue to deteriorate as people get more and more angry. "There should be a change of strategy. They should support a stable and safe area so that people feel that peace leads to development."
The amount of corruption and misuse of resources in a stable area is also very little, he says. Pointing out that millions of dollars are being spent on provinces in the south, Fuladi also compares the lack of aid in his area to the aid pouring into the much smaller province of Panjshir, an area that many believe was made into a separate province for political rather than administrative reasons.
"We are thinking of burning down some paper schools as a symbolic protest," said Abdullah Barat, a founding member of the Bamiyan Preservation Association for Cultural Heritage, in a cynical reference to the burning down of schools in the southern provinces.
Though there is no indigenous base for the Taliban in Bamiyan, what is dangerously missing from the area is a stake in peace. Though the area may not create new Taliban forces, there is also likely to be less resistance to anti-government forces than before. The area has actually seen demobilization and disarmament as opposed to other areas such as Panjshir that merely claim to have demobilized, and people in Bamiyan would not be able to put up stiff resistance. Moreover, what is currently merely the anger of the disgruntled may in future turn into support for any instability. Anti-government elements who choose to operate in the area may not find the people unwilling hosts.
Bamiyan has also seen a sharp drop in cultivation of opium poppies. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Bamiyan has seen a reduction in the area under poppy cultivation from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares this year.
Advocating solutions for decreasing poppy cultivation, which has risen by 60% in the country this year, UNODC chief Antonio Maria Costa says in a recent report that "drug and integrity" conditions have to be inserted into aid programs. "The more vigorously district and provincial leaders commit themselves to activity free of opium, the more they deserve generous development assistance," he said.
But sentiments such as these are mere rhetoric to the people of Bamiyan, who see no such linkages in their area. "The message here is: no poppy, no money," said an international worker in the province.
Referring to the province's lack of leverage at the political level, Fuladi said bitterly: "It doesn't really matter [to others] whether Bamiyan is a hell or a heaven. It is so isolated."
The neglect is especially unfortunate since the area is also the most liberal area in the country in terms of its attitude toward woman. Women move relatively freely, wearing colorful clothes rather than the burqa, engaging in work openly. Yet the area gets no credit for this even though the issue of gender justice is one of the main issues that occupy the international community's agenda - at least on paper.
"We have peace. No narcotics. Bamiyan can also be an example of the success of women's rights if I can succeed. Why don't they support me?" wonders Governor Sarobi, saying much of the talk about women's rights is just lip service.
It is not just neglect that makes the tale of Bamiyan a poignant one. The designation of the area as a world heritage site has meant that even normal development, construction of buildings and markets, is at a standstill since there is no room for "unplanned" development. The designation of the entire area as a cultural and historical landscape has meant that all growth must now devolve on the adoption of the master plan. However, as yet there is no coordination, planning or funding for the master plan and even the perimeter boundary of the heritage site is yet to be finalized.
Protection of the vernacular architecture, the beautiful terraced fields and of course the area around the Buddhas has meant that people will have to wait for permissions before building or altering anything. Is Bamiyan being held hostage to its heritage? Sarobi admits that this is a widespread feeling among people in her province and an issue she plans to raise at the next meeting of the international coordination committee on Bamiyan.
There is no tangible benefit to the people yet, admits UNESCO expert Junko Okahashi, assistant program specialist for the Asia and Pacific World Heritage Center, who flew into Bamiyan for a week, though she said it is not too late and that things have to start now.
It is not that there are no non-governmental or UN organizations working in Bamiyan. There were at least 40 by the last count. However, their efforts are piecemeal, uncoordinated and, indeed, in some cases, counterproductive. In the absence of basic infrastructure, the outcome of these projects, however beneficial, has a limited impact.
The issue is not whether the people come first or the monuments. It would be tragic to see further deterioration of great historical heritage, which once lost cannot be retrieved. A successful implementation of the "master plan" is expected to change the fortunes of the locals - eventually. The concern is whether the current efforts at preservation can be combined with community-oriented programs that engage the community in this heritage, building stakes in the local community simultaneously.
"People have no sense of ownership right now," said Fuladi. While the living wait, the international community and organizations pore over the pieces of monuments.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.)
Bodhi's Third Avatar
Outlook Magazine| Oct 02, 2006
EXCLUSIVE: afghanistan archaeology
Bodhi's Third Avatar
Archaeologists believe they have found the site of a giant reclining Buddha at Bamiyan
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Five years ago, this wide, green valley surrounded by towering cliffs in the heart of Afghanistan was the country's Ground Zero. This was where the giant Buddhas carved into the cliff face were blown up by the Taliban, just six months before 9/11. Today, new hope and excitement grips Bamiyan as a team of archaeologists believes it has found the site of a third giant Buddha which may still be intact, buried out of sight for centuries.
The third Buddha was described in detail by the Chinese monk Hiuen Tsang, who visited Bamiyan on his way to India in 630 AD. The monk's record of his travels is the first documented account of Bamiyan and its Buddhas. He describes not only the standing images (destroyed in 2001) but also a much larger reclining Buddha which he saw in a thriving monastery in the valley. The man was not given to flights of fantasy—his records are so precise they have often helped archaeologists in their quest to uncover the past. About Bamiyan, he wrote of "a reclining figure of the Buddha about to enter Nirvana, more than one thousand chi (300 metres) in length, in a temple two or three li (about 2 km) to the east of the royal palace".
Afghan archaeologist Dr Zemaryalai Tarzi, who heads the French Archaeological Mission in Bamiyan, says his team recently uncovered part of the Eastern Monastery, the location of the "reclining Buddha". The site is just in front of the great cliff, to the east of the now-empty niche where the smaller of the standing Buddhas used to be. "We believe we've found the monastery," says Tarzi, who's worked on excavations here since the '70s, when he was director of Afghanistan's Institute of Archaeology.
Tarzi's current endeavour began in '01. "We have found lots of things at this site, including five stupas and more than 30 heads of Buddha modelled in clay, which still have remains of the polychromatic painting on their faces," he reveals. Uncovering this site took months of painstaking digging through layers of history. "Below the surface are layers of the Ghorid, Ghaznavid and pre-Islamic Turkic periods, and below that is the Buddhist monastery," explained Tarzi at his camp in the ruined village of Tulvara. Bone fragments and pieces of clay statuary lay in heaps at the camp. Bamiyan's Buddhist past is said to date to the Kushana and Hepthalite Hun empire, spanning from the 1st to 6th centuries AD.
The excavation site is closely guarded and visitors are not allowed. Photographs were not permitted either, though a brief look inside reveals the remains of solid structures, steps, a paved courtyard and, most exciting of all, a pair of giant feet. They may have been part of a large statue, or just a symbolic representation of the feet of the Buddha—it is hard to tell, for the excavation is not complete. Tarzi took some persuading to agree to speak to Outlook, because exclusive rights to the story of the new excavations have been sold to National Geographic, presumably to fund the excavations. With winter approaching in the Bamiyan valley (height: 2,500 metres), excavations have been suspended and will now resume only next summer.
Bamiyan, which means "place of shining light", gets its name from the light bouncing off the cliffs of conglomerate rock, layered in shades of purple and brown. Now an isolated region a bone-rattling 8-10 hours' drive from Kabul, Bamiyan was once at the crossroads of many civilisations, a prosperous valley along the Silk Road with the two huge Buddhas, one of them 55 metres and the other 38 metres tall, hewn out of the cliffs and standing sentinel over caravans of traders, pilgrims, scholars and soldiers. Built in the 3rd and 5th centuries AD, the two Buddhas were left untouched for over 1,500 years, even by the marauding armies of Genghis Khan, Mahmud Ghazni and Nadir Shah.Aurangzeb did, however, have a bash at them, but his artillery only succeeded in damaging the foot of one of the Buddhas.
Today the empty niches still inspire awe, with the outline of the smaller Buddha clearly visible. Opinion is still divided on whether the Buddhas should be rebuilt. Today, it would be impossible to carve them out of the same cliff face; and to build new images and instal them there would not recreate the aura and magnificence of the originals. "They just would not have the same feeling," says Afghan deputy minister of culture, Omar Sultan. A proposal to recreate the images using laser beams, as has been suggested for the Twin Towers site in New York, is being given serious consideration.
For now, the most urgent task is to consolidate the fragile, crumbling cliffs, further weakened by the dynamiting carried out by the Taliban. The last restoration was done in the '60s and '70s by the Archaeological Survey of India, which had repaired and strengthened the Buddhas, the cliff face, cornices and balconies. Today, Georgios Toubekis, an architect with ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites), has the task of collecting and preserving the fragments of the destroyed Buddhas—some of them as large as boulders—and consolidating the surface of the cliffs, in a major project funded by Japan and Germany.
Bamiyan's cliffs are also honeycombed with caves, many of them with exquisite paintings executed by Indian and Persian artists during the Hepthalite period. Some 80 per cent of these have been destroyed over the centuries through neglect, theft and destruction, but those that remain are now being carefully preserved and protected. The people of Bamiyan are Hazaras, an ethnic and religious minority who are Shias of Mongol-Turkic origin, believed to be descended from the 'hazaar'—the thousand soldiers Genghis Khan left behind here after conquering the region. Among the poorest and most backward communities in Afghanistan, they are counting on the third Buddha to emerge from the sands of time, and usher in a tourism boom that will bring Bamiyan the development and prosperity it so desperately needs.
EXCLUSIVE: afghanistan archaeology
Bodhi's Third Avatar
Archaeologists believe they have found the site of a giant reclining Buddha at Bamiyan
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Five years ago, this wide, green valley surrounded by towering cliffs in the heart of Afghanistan was the country's Ground Zero. This was where the giant Buddhas carved into the cliff face were blown up by the Taliban, just six months before 9/11. Today, new hope and excitement grips Bamiyan as a team of archaeologists believes it has found the site of a third giant Buddha which may still be intact, buried out of sight for centuries.
The third Buddha was described in detail by the Chinese monk Hiuen Tsang, who visited Bamiyan on his way to India in 630 AD. The monk's record of his travels is the first documented account of Bamiyan and its Buddhas. He describes not only the standing images (destroyed in 2001) but also a much larger reclining Buddha which he saw in a thriving monastery in the valley. The man was not given to flights of fantasy—his records are so precise they have often helped archaeologists in their quest to uncover the past. About Bamiyan, he wrote of "a reclining figure of the Buddha about to enter Nirvana, more than one thousand chi (300 metres) in length, in a temple two or three li (about 2 km) to the east of the royal palace".
Afghan archaeologist Dr Zemaryalai Tarzi, who heads the French Archaeological Mission in Bamiyan, says his team recently uncovered part of the Eastern Monastery, the location of the "reclining Buddha". The site is just in front of the great cliff, to the east of the now-empty niche where the smaller of the standing Buddhas used to be. "We believe we've found the monastery," says Tarzi, who's worked on excavations here since the '70s, when he was director of Afghanistan's Institute of Archaeology.
Tarzi's current endeavour began in '01. "We have found lots of things at this site, including five stupas and more than 30 heads of Buddha modelled in clay, which still have remains of the polychromatic painting on their faces," he reveals. Uncovering this site took months of painstaking digging through layers of history. "Below the surface are layers of the Ghorid, Ghaznavid and pre-Islamic Turkic periods, and below that is the Buddhist monastery," explained Tarzi at his camp in the ruined village of Tulvara. Bone fragments and pieces of clay statuary lay in heaps at the camp. Bamiyan's Buddhist past is said to date to the Kushana and Hepthalite Hun empire, spanning from the 1st to 6th centuries AD.
The excavation site is closely guarded and visitors are not allowed. Photographs were not permitted either, though a brief look inside reveals the remains of solid structures, steps, a paved courtyard and, most exciting of all, a pair of giant feet. They may have been part of a large statue, or just a symbolic representation of the feet of the Buddha—it is hard to tell, for the excavation is not complete. Tarzi took some persuading to agree to speak to Outlook, because exclusive rights to the story of the new excavations have been sold to National Geographic, presumably to fund the excavations. With winter approaching in the Bamiyan valley (height: 2,500 metres), excavations have been suspended and will now resume only next summer.
Bamiyan, which means "place of shining light", gets its name from the light bouncing off the cliffs of conglomerate rock, layered in shades of purple and brown. Now an isolated region a bone-rattling 8-10 hours' drive from Kabul, Bamiyan was once at the crossroads of many civilisations, a prosperous valley along the Silk Road with the two huge Buddhas, one of them 55 metres and the other 38 metres tall, hewn out of the cliffs and standing sentinel over caravans of traders, pilgrims, scholars and soldiers. Built in the 3rd and 5th centuries AD, the two Buddhas were left untouched for over 1,500 years, even by the marauding armies of Genghis Khan, Mahmud Ghazni and Nadir Shah.Aurangzeb did, however, have a bash at them, but his artillery only succeeded in damaging the foot of one of the Buddhas.
Today the empty niches still inspire awe, with the outline of the smaller Buddha clearly visible. Opinion is still divided on whether the Buddhas should be rebuilt. Today, it would be impossible to carve them out of the same cliff face; and to build new images and instal them there would not recreate the aura and magnificence of the originals. "They just would not have the same feeling," says Afghan deputy minister of culture, Omar Sultan. A proposal to recreate the images using laser beams, as has been suggested for the Twin Towers site in New York, is being given serious consideration.
For now, the most urgent task is to consolidate the fragile, crumbling cliffs, further weakened by the dynamiting carried out by the Taliban. The last restoration was done in the '60s and '70s by the Archaeological Survey of India, which had repaired and strengthened the Buddhas, the cliff face, cornices and balconies. Today, Georgios Toubekis, an architect with ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites), has the task of collecting and preserving the fragments of the destroyed Buddhas—some of them as large as boulders—and consolidating the surface of the cliffs, in a major project funded by Japan and Germany.
Bamiyan's cliffs are also honeycombed with caves, many of them with exquisite paintings executed by Indian and Persian artists during the Hepthalite period. Some 80 per cent of these have been destroyed over the centuries through neglect, theft and destruction, but those that remain are now being carefully preserved and protected. The people of Bamiyan are Hazaras, an ethnic and religious minority who are Shias of Mongol-Turkic origin, believed to be descended from the 'hazaar'—the thousand soldiers Genghis Khan left behind here after conquering the region. Among the poorest and most backward communities in Afghanistan, they are counting on the third Buddha to emerge from the sands of time, and usher in a tourism boom that will bring Bamiyan the development and prosperity it so desperately needs.
The Return of Big Brother
The Hindu, August 13
DEBATE
The return of Big Brother
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
THE spectre of the Taliban police flailing whips on the streets to enforce their laws is a common image associated with their rule in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue issued edicts which banned girls going to school, women revealing any part of their body including ankles, men shaving or cutting beards, kite flying, music, amongst others. Four and a half years after the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue is back, under the Hamid Karzai government. The move, passed by the cabinet, now awaits a nod from Parliament.
The step has sparked some consternation amongst human rights activists and organisations both within and outside the country, which have expressed fears about the purposes and powers of the body. Human Rights Watch said the department could be used to silence critical voices and further limit women's and girls' access to work, healthcare and education. It called on the international community to make a clear commitment to Afghanistan's long term security and reconstruction and to avoid a return to repressive past practices. Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission also expressed concern over the department, saying there were no clear terms of reference for the body.
No cause for alarm?
The Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, which will oversee the department, however says there is no cause for alarm or worry and that there will be no departure from functions already being carried out by the government. The department would not resemble its namesake under the Taliban in any way, the Ministry has stated, saying the Taliban had abused and misused religion.
In fact, the Department of Vice and Virtue did not emerge with the Taliban. Instituted by the mujahideen who came to power after fighting the Soviets, the department was elevated to the level of a full ministry under the Taliban. Moreover, the department was never abolished by the current government after it came to power, but in fact lay dormant until now.
The recent move, says Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, Moulvi Mohammed Qasim, has been undertaken only to streamline and coordinate and unify the activities of three existing departments: one under the Ministry of Information and Culture which preaches Islamic values through programmes and publications in the electronic and print media, thse second under the Ministry of Haj which is in charge of Islamic preaching and the third under the Supreme Court which is supposed to ensure accountability to the principles of Islam.
According to Moulvi Qasim, the powers and purposes of the reactivated department will be very limited. The department will not have its own enforcement agency or police, but will only spread the message of Islamic principles and morality in society, mainly through public preaching. The government currently employs the preachers in mosques and the new move will strengthen their role and provide uniform guidelines on how and what to preach he said, adding, "all religions — Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism preach the holy word and the principles of religion".
`Rising immorality'
The department, the Minister said in an exclusive interview, was set up by President Karzai on the urging of people from rural areas as well as the Ulema Councils of the various provinces. "We ourselves felt immorality in society was on the increase. More and more sex workers were being arrested and alcohol was being seized by the Interior Ministry police. This is worrying and we are concerned about the people."
A task force under the Ministry of Interior already exists to "combat immorality". Set up in January 2005, the task force has since cracked down on alcohol consumption and prostitution, carrying out raids and affecting arrests. Both prostitution and alcohol are banned under Afghanistan's Constitution. However, a unwritten code "allows" foreigners to consume alcohol and it is served in restaurants frequented by them. In recent months however, alcohol, or at least beer, is also being sold openly in street corners.
In February this year the Upper House of Afghanistan's Parliament expressed grave concern at what it called rampant moral vices in Afghanistan — the widespread use of alcohol, prostitution and other social and moral evils.
Moulvi Qasim fights shy of saying whether Western lifestyles are the reason for the reactivation of the department. While stating that all foreigners are bound by the laws of the land, he however insists that the department's activities will have an impact on Afghans "so that they do not accept anything that is against the culture of Afghanistan."
Key players in the international community have been cautious in their response to the move to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue. The UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) emphasised that any new body must have effective safeguards to prevent misuse of powers. Welcoming the Government's assurances, the U.N. body said "we await further information on this issue, particularly more transparency on the question of why this body is needed and how it will be used."
The E.U. came up with a similar response with E.U. special representative Frances Vendrell saying he did not want to pass judgement on the department until he had seen what the department was going to be, while emphasising the need for it to be consistent with the rights enshrined in the Constitution.
While the E.U. and U.N. have been cautious, there are those in the international community who actually feel that the move to set up the department is a good one as it would deflect the pressure from conservative sections of the community. An aid worker who has spent more than a decade working on and in Afghanistan wondered what the fuss was all about. The expatriate lifestyles, he said, had created some consternation and the pendulum was now swinging back. The aid worker, who did not want to be named, said the current government had always had to "walk the tightrope between the turban and the Armani suit" and this move (to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue) might be an instrument that would help it do that, acting as a pressure valve for conservative opinions and pressures.
Deputy Minister Qasim denies that the move was meant to address concerns about the current government's un-Islamic character but admitted that it would help improve the government's image. "The government will be strengthened if people see the government working to spread the message of Islam and morality. That will improve the picture of the government in the eyes of the people."
An Afghan youth who is critical of the international community's role in his country however felt the government had probably backed down from what it may have planned earlier following international pressure. "I see nothing new in this move. Maybe they got scared and diluted their earlier plans."
DEBATE
The return of Big Brother
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
THE spectre of the Taliban police flailing whips on the streets to enforce their laws is a common image associated with their rule in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue issued edicts which banned girls going to school, women revealing any part of their body including ankles, men shaving or cutting beards, kite flying, music, amongst others. Four and a half years after the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue is back, under the Hamid Karzai government. The move, passed by the cabinet, now awaits a nod from Parliament.
The step has sparked some consternation amongst human rights activists and organisations both within and outside the country, which have expressed fears about the purposes and powers of the body. Human Rights Watch said the department could be used to silence critical voices and further limit women's and girls' access to work, healthcare and education. It called on the international community to make a clear commitment to Afghanistan's long term security and reconstruction and to avoid a return to repressive past practices. Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission also expressed concern over the department, saying there were no clear terms of reference for the body.
No cause for alarm?
The Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, which will oversee the department, however says there is no cause for alarm or worry and that there will be no departure from functions already being carried out by the government. The department would not resemble its namesake under the Taliban in any way, the Ministry has stated, saying the Taliban had abused and misused religion.
In fact, the Department of Vice and Virtue did not emerge with the Taliban. Instituted by the mujahideen who came to power after fighting the Soviets, the department was elevated to the level of a full ministry under the Taliban. Moreover, the department was never abolished by the current government after it came to power, but in fact lay dormant until now.
The recent move, says Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, Moulvi Mohammed Qasim, has been undertaken only to streamline and coordinate and unify the activities of three existing departments: one under the Ministry of Information and Culture which preaches Islamic values through programmes and publications in the electronic and print media, thse second under the Ministry of Haj which is in charge of Islamic preaching and the third under the Supreme Court which is supposed to ensure accountability to the principles of Islam.
According to Moulvi Qasim, the powers and purposes of the reactivated department will be very limited. The department will not have its own enforcement agency or police, but will only spread the message of Islamic principles and morality in society, mainly through public preaching. The government currently employs the preachers in mosques and the new move will strengthen their role and provide uniform guidelines on how and what to preach he said, adding, "all religions — Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism preach the holy word and the principles of religion".
`Rising immorality'
The department, the Minister said in an exclusive interview, was set up by President Karzai on the urging of people from rural areas as well as the Ulema Councils of the various provinces. "We ourselves felt immorality in society was on the increase. More and more sex workers were being arrested and alcohol was being seized by the Interior Ministry police. This is worrying and we are concerned about the people."
A task force under the Ministry of Interior already exists to "combat immorality". Set up in January 2005, the task force has since cracked down on alcohol consumption and prostitution, carrying out raids and affecting arrests. Both prostitution and alcohol are banned under Afghanistan's Constitution. However, a unwritten code "allows" foreigners to consume alcohol and it is served in restaurants frequented by them. In recent months however, alcohol, or at least beer, is also being sold openly in street corners.
In February this year the Upper House of Afghanistan's Parliament expressed grave concern at what it called rampant moral vices in Afghanistan — the widespread use of alcohol, prostitution and other social and moral evils.
Moulvi Qasim fights shy of saying whether Western lifestyles are the reason for the reactivation of the department. While stating that all foreigners are bound by the laws of the land, he however insists that the department's activities will have an impact on Afghans "so that they do not accept anything that is against the culture of Afghanistan."
Key players in the international community have been cautious in their response to the move to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue. The UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) emphasised that any new body must have effective safeguards to prevent misuse of powers. Welcoming the Government's assurances, the U.N. body said "we await further information on this issue, particularly more transparency on the question of why this body is needed and how it will be used."
The E.U. came up with a similar response with E.U. special representative Frances Vendrell saying he did not want to pass judgement on the department until he had seen what the department was going to be, while emphasising the need for it to be consistent with the rights enshrined in the Constitution.
While the E.U. and U.N. have been cautious, there are those in the international community who actually feel that the move to set up the department is a good one as it would deflect the pressure from conservative sections of the community. An aid worker who has spent more than a decade working on and in Afghanistan wondered what the fuss was all about. The expatriate lifestyles, he said, had created some consternation and the pendulum was now swinging back. The aid worker, who did not want to be named, said the current government had always had to "walk the tightrope between the turban and the Armani suit" and this move (to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue) might be an instrument that would help it do that, acting as a pressure valve for conservative opinions and pressures.
Deputy Minister Qasim denies that the move was meant to address concerns about the current government's un-Islamic character but admitted that it would help improve the government's image. "The government will be strengthened if people see the government working to spread the message of Islam and morality. That will improve the picture of the government in the eyes of the people."
An Afghan youth who is critical of the international community's role in his country however felt the government had probably backed down from what it may have planned earlier following international pressure. "I see nothing new in this move. Maybe they got scared and diluted their earlier plans."
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