December 17, 2006
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Sahira Sharif sits with Zabah, the youngest of her four children on her lap. He is 3 and a half years old, but looks much younger. The child suffers from Down's syndrome, says Sharif, with no trace of self-consciousness.
It is a matter of fact--along with cooking, shopping, teaching her children, taking them to and from school--in addition to her work as one of Afghanistan's first female parliamentarians.
During the session, debates can begin as early as 8:30 or 9 a.m. and go on all day, sometimes late into the evening five days a week. But there are no concessions to her traditional women's duties, no extra help. Sharif is virtually a single parent since her husband lives in Khost where he has a government job.
This week the newly constituted Afghan parliament marks its first anniversary on Dec. 19 and Sharif completes the first year of her five-year term.
In what is left of her tenure, she hopes to introduce legislation to ban forced marriages, which the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission estimates as 38 percent of all marriages in the country.
Another female member of the Afghan Parliament, Fawzia Kofi, the second deputy chair of the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house, hopes a law will be adopted to empower police to investigate suicides and domestic violence without having to refer to a complaint by the victim or the victim's family. Kofi says the family may be complicit in the violence and the victim reluctant to make a complaint.
In the past year 197 cases of suicide were attempted in Herat province, of which 69 were successful, the country's human rights commission reports. Many have been linked to domestic abuse. In Kandahar, 200 women tried to escape from abusive homes.
But whatever their legislative hopes and ambitions, female parliamentarians such as Sharif and Kofi say their first year in office leaves them prepared for more rough times ahead.
Security Problems Take Toll
The country's national security is deteriorating.
A week ago, Afghan police arrested six Taliban insurgents suspected of killing two female teachers along with three other relatives, according to press reports quoting Afghan and NATO officials. The killings come on top of attacks on aid workers, government officials and intensifying clashes between international forces and the Taliban.
Amid these dangers, female parliamentarians have made fewer trips out of the capital city of Kabul back home to their constituencies.
Sharif--who until two months ago traveled without a burka to her province of Khost--has started wearing one recently and avoids staying too long in any one area. Anyone associated with the government is at risk, she says. Not only the Taliban but commanders and political factions that have lost power are potentially dangerous.
Sharifa Zurmati Wardak, represents Paktia, a conservative Pashtun constituency in the southeastern part of the country bordering Pakistan where many women never step out of their homes for any reason whatsoever. She does not travel without a male escort.
Afghanistan's new constitution, adopted in 2004, requires that two women be elected from each of its 34 provinces. With a current strength of 248 this puts the representation of women at just over 25 percent, ahead of many legislative bodies. Internationally, 30 percent is considered the minimum for any group to leverage its representation.
Last year 19 of the 68 female parliamentarians won enough votes to have been elected even without any special mandate.
Year of Anti-Woman Debates
While providing one of the widest spaces in the country for women's participation in public life, the Parliament in the past year has debated a number of anti-women measures.
Members have discussed whether female parliamentarians should be required to have a "mehram," or male escort, when traveling outside the country.
Despite constitutional provisions for gender equality and laws that stipulate 18 as the minimum legal age for marriage, the upper house of Parliament wants it lowered to 15. Fearing the effect on young women in forced marriages, a number of female members have been battling the push, which would require passage in the lower house to become law.
Women have been unable to close ranks against a move to abolish the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which was formed in 2001 as an advisory group to help rebuild women's rights lost under the Taliban. So far the ministry has survived, although women themselves were split over the issue, with some women siding with their own male-led factions and debate over eliminating the ministry may reopen.
"Women stand against other women," says Sharif.
Efforts to Erode Representation
Women's 25-percent representation is itself insecure.
Abdul Salaam Rocketi--his last name was acquired due to his prowess with rocket launchers--is a former Taliban commander. Now representing Zabul in Parliament, he calls the reservation of seats for women "undemocratic."
Efforts to build a women's caucus are going slowly.
UNIFEM, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, has set up a resource center stocked with documents and books and research materials pertaining to Afghanistan and political issues. The center has phone lines and Internet access to aid interaction and information gathering.
The National Democratic Institute, a U.S. civil-society nonprofit, has been organizing workshops to help bring women together to discuss their common concerns and a recent meeting focused on violence against women. But the female parliamentarians are far too politically divided to realistically discuss the creation of a formal caucus.
Despite the numerous hurdles and disappointments of the past year, Wardak says the presence of women in the Parliament has nonetheless encouraged debate on issues that might otherwise have been ignored. Female parliamentarians, for instance, visited a women's prison and were upset by some of the conditions they discovered. Wardak and Sharif said that as a result of their interventions female inmates are now allowed to have visits from their children and pregnant women are getting better medical attention.
"We are there," Wardak says. "Our voices exist."
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
December 16, 2006
December 10, 2006
Focus: Nato's Afghan policy
Al Jazeera
December 7
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Nato forces faced a fierce engagement in the Musakala district of the Southern province of Helmand this weekend, resulting, according to Nato officials, in the death of 70-80 Taliban fighters.
While Nato troops have fought several pitched battles in the Southern provinces since they took control of the South of Afghanistan, this weekend's engagement was distinguished by one new factor. Musakala is the area where in October this year Nato troops and local elders brokered a truce for "cessation of hostilities" with the insurgent forces.
The apparent peace that the deal brought to the area in the weeks since has been promoted as a measure of its success by both UN and Nato officials.
The return of fighting near Musakala is a blow for the Nato deal with local tribes
However the deal was also suggestive of a withdrawal by the Afghan government, with the possibility of leaving the area a safe sanctuary for use by Taliban fighters, a scenario that may have just turned into a reality this weekend.
Musakala reflects of the attempts by the architects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction to restore some semblance of control to a peace that increasingly looks like it is slipping away.
"Cessation of hostilities"
Background
Al Jazeera first reported the Nato deal with tibal leaders in Musa Kala
Nato's agreement in Musakala and president Hamid Karzai's declaration via a loya jirga (meeting of tribal elders) could indicate that decision makers are now moving toward quicker fixes rather than long term solutions.
In doing so both the government and the international forces may be securing some transitory peace in return for ceding their authority.
According to Nato officials the agreement there is not a ceasefire but a "cessation of hostilities". The absence of fighting in the area since then was being exhibited as a major triumph.
Justifying the agreement General James L Jones, Nato's outgoing Supreme Allied Commander said, "anything that can be done to reduce violence and to control the outbreak of violence and make people more safe and secure is our goal".
Yet Jones stopped short of revealing that the agreement actually represented a retreat of the international forces.
According to a Nato official who did not want to be named, the reason for the Musakala agreement was the realisation that the forces had been stretched too thinly and were suffering severe losses as a result.
However Nato officials have also openly supported the idea of coming to similar arrangements elsewhere.
No policy support
Nato's civilian spokesman Mark Laity has said that "in principle, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is open to similar kinds of arrangements elsewhere" while pointing out that no two situations are the same.
However in terms of the implication of the agreement on national security there is no defence policy that mandates it, no UN Security Council resolution that calls for it and no policy document nor approach that supports it.
General Jones himself pointed to the ad hoc nature of the policy by saying such agreements are to be "reported up the chain of command so that we can have visibility on exactly what the nature of those discussions are”, adding such moves had to be "carefully coordinated and worked within the overall context of our campaign objectives".
In recent weeks senior UN and Nato officials have suggested that the success of the agreement has been evident from the lack of conflict.
However the peace in the area came to an abrupt end in this weekend's fighting.
Major Luke Knittig, a spokeman for Nato, said that the fighting did not represent a breach of the original agreement which had been limited solely to the area of the Musakala town.
"The elders, as I understand it, have extraordinary influence, but that influence doesn't spread across the whole district, just mostly in the town," he said.
Development
Asked whether the agreement had allowed the Taliban to use the area as a safe sanctuary, Knittig said there was "nothing to indicate that the large group of insurgents that Nato had engaged have used the town as a support base".
Nato officials say that the cessation of hostilities has helped create the space for development and Knittig argued that the development activities were proceeding in Musa Kalan despite the battle.
Jones has defended the
agreement in Musa Kalan
Both UN officials as well as Nato have referred repeatedly to the consultation with the tribal and community leaders in arriving at this agreement, and a senior UN official described the decision as one of "empowering the tribal leadership."
However, although community involvement is important and clearly lacking in many areas of development, village and provincial leaders usually do not determine military strategies.
Also such community consultations seem lacking in another recent political decision, the cross border loya jirga or 'peace jirga' as it is being termed.
Scepticism
The decision, taken during the visit of President Hamad Karzai to the US, was done so without the backing of or consultation with Afghan institutions and groups.
Media reports have suggested that several cabinet ministers have also expressed scepticism about the jirga privately, given how it will work practically is yet unclear.
It is also arguable whether any such peace deals will be able to yield results if they do not have the backing of major political forces in Afghanistan.
The last five years has seen a concentration of political and administrative power in the presidency, with the marginalisation and exclusion of major political groups who may lay claim to power.
The same formula is in operation now, in the exclusive appeal to Pashtuns on either side of the border. President Karzai himself has spoken of the "traditional Pashtun leadership of Pakistan "being undermined systematically and violently".
The danger now is that the constant appeal to Pashtun leadership, could have the effect of increasing separatist instincts and reinforcing their existence outside the structures of state and the rule of law creating a scenario that the leadership of Pakistan and Afghanistan are not likely to be ready to deal with at present.
Source: Al Jazeera
Al Jazeera
December 7
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Nato forces faced a fierce engagement in the Musakala district of the Southern province of Helmand this weekend, resulting, according to Nato officials, in the death of 70-80 Taliban fighters.
While Nato troops have fought several pitched battles in the Southern provinces since they took control of the South of Afghanistan, this weekend's engagement was distinguished by one new factor. Musakala is the area where in October this year Nato troops and local elders brokered a truce for "cessation of hostilities" with the insurgent forces.
The apparent peace that the deal brought to the area in the weeks since has been promoted as a measure of its success by both UN and Nato officials.
The return of fighting near Musakala is a blow for the Nato deal with local tribes
However the deal was also suggestive of a withdrawal by the Afghan government, with the possibility of leaving the area a safe sanctuary for use by Taliban fighters, a scenario that may have just turned into a reality this weekend.
Musakala reflects of the attempts by the architects of Afghanistan’s reconstruction to restore some semblance of control to a peace that increasingly looks like it is slipping away.
"Cessation of hostilities"
Background
Al Jazeera first reported the Nato deal with tibal leaders in Musa Kala
Nato's agreement in Musakala and president Hamid Karzai's declaration via a loya jirga (meeting of tribal elders) could indicate that decision makers are now moving toward quicker fixes rather than long term solutions.
In doing so both the government and the international forces may be securing some transitory peace in return for ceding their authority.
According to Nato officials the agreement there is not a ceasefire but a "cessation of hostilities". The absence of fighting in the area since then was being exhibited as a major triumph.
Justifying the agreement General James L Jones, Nato's outgoing Supreme Allied Commander said, "anything that can be done to reduce violence and to control the outbreak of violence and make people more safe and secure is our goal".
Yet Jones stopped short of revealing that the agreement actually represented a retreat of the international forces.
According to a Nato official who did not want to be named, the reason for the Musakala agreement was the realisation that the forces had been stretched too thinly and were suffering severe losses as a result.
However Nato officials have also openly supported the idea of coming to similar arrangements elsewhere.
No policy support
Nato's civilian spokesman Mark Laity has said that "in principle, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is open to similar kinds of arrangements elsewhere" while pointing out that no two situations are the same.
However in terms of the implication of the agreement on national security there is no defence policy that mandates it, no UN Security Council resolution that calls for it and no policy document nor approach that supports it.
General Jones himself pointed to the ad hoc nature of the policy by saying such agreements are to be "reported up the chain of command so that we can have visibility on exactly what the nature of those discussions are”, adding such moves had to be "carefully coordinated and worked within the overall context of our campaign objectives".
In recent weeks senior UN and Nato officials have suggested that the success of the agreement has been evident from the lack of conflict.
However the peace in the area came to an abrupt end in this weekend's fighting.
Major Luke Knittig, a spokeman for Nato, said that the fighting did not represent a breach of the original agreement which had been limited solely to the area of the Musakala town.
"The elders, as I understand it, have extraordinary influence, but that influence doesn't spread across the whole district, just mostly in the town," he said.
Development
Asked whether the agreement had allowed the Taliban to use the area as a safe sanctuary, Knittig said there was "nothing to indicate that the large group of insurgents that Nato had engaged have used the town as a support base".
Nato officials say that the cessation of hostilities has helped create the space for development and Knittig argued that the development activities were proceeding in Musa Kalan despite the battle.
Jones has defended the
agreement in Musa Kalan
Both UN officials as well as Nato have referred repeatedly to the consultation with the tribal and community leaders in arriving at this agreement, and a senior UN official described the decision as one of "empowering the tribal leadership."
However, although community involvement is important and clearly lacking in many areas of development, village and provincial leaders usually do not determine military strategies.
Also such community consultations seem lacking in another recent political decision, the cross border loya jirga or 'peace jirga' as it is being termed.
Scepticism
The decision, taken during the visit of President Hamad Karzai to the US, was done so without the backing of or consultation with Afghan institutions and groups.
Media reports have suggested that several cabinet ministers have also expressed scepticism about the jirga privately, given how it will work practically is yet unclear.
It is also arguable whether any such peace deals will be able to yield results if they do not have the backing of major political forces in Afghanistan.
The last five years has seen a concentration of political and administrative power in the presidency, with the marginalisation and exclusion of major political groups who may lay claim to power.
The same formula is in operation now, in the exclusive appeal to Pashtuns on either side of the border. President Karzai himself has spoken of the "traditional Pashtun leadership of Pakistan "being undermined systematically and violently".
The danger now is that the constant appeal to Pashtun leadership, could have the effect of increasing separatist instincts and reinforcing their existence outside the structures of state and the rule of law creating a scenario that the leadership of Pakistan and Afghanistan are not likely to be ready to deal with at present.
Source: Al Jazeera
November 02, 2006
Project Afghanistan and the thinking enemy
Himal
November 2006
Analysis
Project Afghanistan and the thinking enemy
Five years of backward progress on securing the country now has NATO forces taking over security in Afghanistan. With few of the lessons of the past having sunk in, it appears unlikely that the country will breathe easier in the coming year.
by | AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Security in Afghanistan has hit the lowest point since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. This year has seen pitched battles between the anti-government insurgents and the newly deployed NATO forces. As the country approaches the first anniversary of its first democratically elected Parliament based on full adult franchise, it seems as if the hopes of the international community and the Afghan citizens could be belied.
Suicide bombings are now a regular feature in the country, with nearly 80 thus far this year alone. Kabul increasingly resembles a city under siege, with more bunkers, roadblocks and barbed-wire fences than at any time since 2001. Both the development arm of the international community and the military forces are now agreed that Afghanistan has entered a ‘critical’ year.
This is a far cry from the end of 2001, when the US-led Coalition Forces claimed they were mopping up the remnants of the Taliban, and the US Defence Secretary said there were not enough good targets for the US to bomb. The turnaround in the security situation seems to have taken most of the international community by surprise, and the determination and desperation of the Taliban are often being cited equally as ‘new’ factors in the equation. During her visit to Afghanistan this year, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeatedly exclaimed that the international forces were facing a ‘thinking enemy’, and needed to change strategy – as if that had been an unexpected factor, and the entire military strategy of the last five years had simply been based on the assumption that the enemy could not or would not ‘think’.
Yet even with the changes in strategy now being employed to combat the Taliban, there is little evidence that the international community and its military strategists have really learned from the experience of the last five years. The slow but steady deterioration of the security situation has not been in spite of the military strategies implemented, but largely because of them – strategies that have been short-sighted, and focused on piecemeal solutions. This is an approach that continues to inform military operations even now, with compartmentalised policies, exhibiting little understanding of the interlinkages of reasons causing the instability.
Hunting down, moving on
In September, newspapers, radios and TV stations could not get enough of Afghanistan. The fifth anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001 was an occasion on which to review ‘Project Afghanistan’, chalking up the pluses and minuses. While the significance of that date cannot and should not be forgotten, it is unfortunate that Afghanistan and its future continue to be viewed through that lens. The rationale for revisiting Afghanistan on the occasion of 9/11 is not just some quirk of chronology or news cycle. It continues to be the most important date for viewing Afghanistan because Afghanistan itself has never really been central to what has taken place in the country since then. Rather, it has been a staging ground for the agendas of other countries, ranging from the benign to the self-absorbed interests of major powers.
When the US-led coalition led the attack on Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, there was little attempt to gloss over the fact that it was to be a war of retribution. In pursuit of that end, more than one compromise has been made over the past five years – shortcuts and half measures that have led to the inevitable consequences of an unstable and unsustainable path of post-conflict reconstruction.
In the immediate aftermath of the US-led bombing there was no attempt to either reach a peace agreement or accommodate different political interests in the new democratic framework. The more patient process of arriving at a wider political consensus, which could have helped stabilise the country, was considered to be unadvisable as it might have led to a broader political leadership that would be more ‘messy’ to manage. Far better, the logic seemed to go, to install a government with a compliant leadership, one that would predictably follow the agenda of the power players of the international community.
Though the late 2001 Bonn Agreement was presented as the roadmap for the process of reconstruction and stabilisation, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ultimately stayed confined to Kabul. It was only in September of this year that NATO expansion was completed to cover the rest of the country. Whatever the reasons for the apparent inability of NATO to expand its operations during the long hiatus, it certainly left the US-led Coalition Forces free to carry out their missions in the ‘war against terror’. The approach to dealing with the issue of security and stabilisation of Afghanistan was ultimately compartmentalised, with the US forces targeting only the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Rather than a holistic approach that would include removing the warlords and commanders, and installing legitimate state security forces, these same potentates and illegitimate armed groups were used to carry out operations against the targets. The US forces took the help of anyone they felt had some muscle power in an area – often warlords with track records in human-rights abuses that left little to distinguish them from the demonised Taliban. The idea seemed to be to get the targets in the US radarscope first, and deal with other issues later. Never mind that these same warlords terrorised the population, and had been responsible for much of the violence, murders and rapes in their areas over the last two decades.
The methods used to carry out operations in populated areas were also rough and ready. By entering homes and carrying out searches in the very conservative areas of the south, the international forces alienated most of the populace. Having seen through operations in an area, troops would move on, making no effort to secure the areas where they had combed. This approach of hunting down and moving on left the local population angry, alienated and with no means to defend itself against the return of anti-government insurgents. It also left the local commanders in a strengthened position, their use of force having been legitimised by their close cohabitation with the international forces.
With reports of alienation, the military forces then hit upon the idea of mixing up civilian and military duties. Though the intention may have been a good one – to win the hearts and minds of the people – the approach was as thoughtless and short-term as any other. The PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) were supposed to be the civilian face of the military carrying out development projects. Rather than securing an area and making it possible for development agencies to carry out their tasks, the military itself spent vast amounts of money on construction of infrastructure. This led to a blurring of lines between the soldier and the civilian, making it easier for the anti-government forces to turn all internationals or those working for international agencies into legitimate targets.
Dysfunctional cooperation
Any process of working with the moderate Taliban was haphazard and sporadic. There were victorious announcements of Taliban leaders joining the government from time to time, but no clarity on the criterion for engagement, let alone defining parameters of a cohesive peace process.
The efforts on regional cooperation were equally dismal. The US initiated a process of border cooperation, a trilateral initiative involving the US and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite claims of working closely with the Islamabad government, an ally in the ‘war on terror’, there was little to indicate that the US government was seriously analysing the causes of terrorism from across the border. Rather than look at the reasons behind the rise of armed groups, including the denial of democracy, most of the international community chose to support, either vocally or silently, the military autocrat in Pervez Musharraf in the hope that one man would deliver the goods.
The result of five years of diplomatic efforts was evident during the visit of President Musharraf to Afghanistan in September. The Pakistani government signed an agreement with the tribal elders of North Waziristan on the issue of crossborder terrorism a day before President Musharraf’s visit. But the Afghan government was not consulted on an agreement that would have a direct bearing on its security, and the Pakistani president did not even exhibit the courtesy of informing Hamid Karzai prior to his arrival in Kabul.
Despite the rhetorical support for democracy, the international preference for authoritarian methods as far as Afghanistan is concerned has been evident again and again. If a military dictator was the preferred mode in Pakistan, in Afghanistan no effort was spared to ensure that the presidency of Hamid Karzai would be strengthened at the cost of other state institutions. Political parties were not allowed to contest in the parliamentary elections, hardly surprising since President Karzai himself has no domestic political base or party (See Himal Sept-Oct 2006, “Afghans go for Parliament”). The result, of course, has been a Parliament that has great problems of authority.
Democratic processes have not been allowed to take root, and powers have been concentrated in the hands of one man. In recent weeks President Karzai himself has been criticised for failing to deliver on a number of fronts, as if the fault lay with him personally rather than the lack of strong institutions.
Even as the security situation deteriorates, enough is not being done to reassign responsibility acceding to experience. The US-led Coalition Forces are still carrying out their combat operations as part of the ‘war on terror’, and are charged with carrying out anti-terrorist operations. The NATO-led ISAF forces, meanwhile, declare that they are mandated to support the Afghan government, which is facing insurgency. While ‘terrorism’ is linked to an international dynamic aimed at destabilising large parts of the world, ‘insurgency’ includes those whose aim is to specifically destabilise the Kabul government. As for the issue of the narcotics trade, this is left to the responsibility of the Afghan national army and the police.
The compartmentalised approach continues despite the apparent understanding of the interlinkages between the three crucial arenas – terrorism, the ongoing insurgency, and the drug trade. Though there is recognition that the anti-government insurgency is also fuelled by terrorism, and vice-versa, there is a feeling that the ‘global’ war can be fought by the Coalition Forces, and the national war by NATO. Though drug money fuels both terrorism and the insurgency, and drug barons have a direct stake in destabilising the state, neither NATO nor the Coalition Forces are willing to undertake direct operations on this front.
Unfortunately for Afghanistan, there seems to be little to suggest that there will be any real change in the current approaches of the international actors. If the situation does unravel completely there will always be a scapegoat person or issue found to take the blame for the international failure – be it Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, the lack of good governance or inadequate aid. If all else fails, the anti-government forces can always be blamed for behaving in ways in which they were not supposed to have done – for thinking and evolving their strategies in ways with which the international forces are apparently unable to deal. The ultimate excuse, as already hinted at by Condoleezza Rice, is that the insurgents ‘think’.
November 2006
Analysis
Project Afghanistan and the thinking enemy
Five years of backward progress on securing the country now has NATO forces taking over security in Afghanistan. With few of the lessons of the past having sunk in, it appears unlikely that the country will breathe easier in the coming year.
by | AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Security in Afghanistan has hit the lowest point since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. This year has seen pitched battles between the anti-government insurgents and the newly deployed NATO forces. As the country approaches the first anniversary of its first democratically elected Parliament based on full adult franchise, it seems as if the hopes of the international community and the Afghan citizens could be belied.
Suicide bombings are now a regular feature in the country, with nearly 80 thus far this year alone. Kabul increasingly resembles a city under siege, with more bunkers, roadblocks and barbed-wire fences than at any time since 2001. Both the development arm of the international community and the military forces are now agreed that Afghanistan has entered a ‘critical’ year.
This is a far cry from the end of 2001, when the US-led Coalition Forces claimed they were mopping up the remnants of the Taliban, and the US Defence Secretary said there were not enough good targets for the US to bomb. The turnaround in the security situation seems to have taken most of the international community by surprise, and the determination and desperation of the Taliban are often being cited equally as ‘new’ factors in the equation. During her visit to Afghanistan this year, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeatedly exclaimed that the international forces were facing a ‘thinking enemy’, and needed to change strategy – as if that had been an unexpected factor, and the entire military strategy of the last five years had simply been based on the assumption that the enemy could not or would not ‘think’.
Yet even with the changes in strategy now being employed to combat the Taliban, there is little evidence that the international community and its military strategists have really learned from the experience of the last five years. The slow but steady deterioration of the security situation has not been in spite of the military strategies implemented, but largely because of them – strategies that have been short-sighted, and focused on piecemeal solutions. This is an approach that continues to inform military operations even now, with compartmentalised policies, exhibiting little understanding of the interlinkages of reasons causing the instability.
Hunting down, moving on
In September, newspapers, radios and TV stations could not get enough of Afghanistan. The fifth anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001 was an occasion on which to review ‘Project Afghanistan’, chalking up the pluses and minuses. While the significance of that date cannot and should not be forgotten, it is unfortunate that Afghanistan and its future continue to be viewed through that lens. The rationale for revisiting Afghanistan on the occasion of 9/11 is not just some quirk of chronology or news cycle. It continues to be the most important date for viewing Afghanistan because Afghanistan itself has never really been central to what has taken place in the country since then. Rather, it has been a staging ground for the agendas of other countries, ranging from the benign to the self-absorbed interests of major powers.
When the US-led coalition led the attack on Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, there was little attempt to gloss over the fact that it was to be a war of retribution. In pursuit of that end, more than one compromise has been made over the past five years – shortcuts and half measures that have led to the inevitable consequences of an unstable and unsustainable path of post-conflict reconstruction.
In the immediate aftermath of the US-led bombing there was no attempt to either reach a peace agreement or accommodate different political interests in the new democratic framework. The more patient process of arriving at a wider political consensus, which could have helped stabilise the country, was considered to be unadvisable as it might have led to a broader political leadership that would be more ‘messy’ to manage. Far better, the logic seemed to go, to install a government with a compliant leadership, one that would predictably follow the agenda of the power players of the international community.
Though the late 2001 Bonn Agreement was presented as the roadmap for the process of reconstruction and stabilisation, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ultimately stayed confined to Kabul. It was only in September of this year that NATO expansion was completed to cover the rest of the country. Whatever the reasons for the apparent inability of NATO to expand its operations during the long hiatus, it certainly left the US-led Coalition Forces free to carry out their missions in the ‘war against terror’. The approach to dealing with the issue of security and stabilisation of Afghanistan was ultimately compartmentalised, with the US forces targeting only the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Rather than a holistic approach that would include removing the warlords and commanders, and installing legitimate state security forces, these same potentates and illegitimate armed groups were used to carry out operations against the targets. The US forces took the help of anyone they felt had some muscle power in an area – often warlords with track records in human-rights abuses that left little to distinguish them from the demonised Taliban. The idea seemed to be to get the targets in the US radarscope first, and deal with other issues later. Never mind that these same warlords terrorised the population, and had been responsible for much of the violence, murders and rapes in their areas over the last two decades.
The methods used to carry out operations in populated areas were also rough and ready. By entering homes and carrying out searches in the very conservative areas of the south, the international forces alienated most of the populace. Having seen through operations in an area, troops would move on, making no effort to secure the areas where they had combed. This approach of hunting down and moving on left the local population angry, alienated and with no means to defend itself against the return of anti-government insurgents. It also left the local commanders in a strengthened position, their use of force having been legitimised by their close cohabitation with the international forces.
With reports of alienation, the military forces then hit upon the idea of mixing up civilian and military duties. Though the intention may have been a good one – to win the hearts and minds of the people – the approach was as thoughtless and short-term as any other. The PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) were supposed to be the civilian face of the military carrying out development projects. Rather than securing an area and making it possible for development agencies to carry out their tasks, the military itself spent vast amounts of money on construction of infrastructure. This led to a blurring of lines between the soldier and the civilian, making it easier for the anti-government forces to turn all internationals or those working for international agencies into legitimate targets.
Dysfunctional cooperation
Any process of working with the moderate Taliban was haphazard and sporadic. There were victorious announcements of Taliban leaders joining the government from time to time, but no clarity on the criterion for engagement, let alone defining parameters of a cohesive peace process.
The efforts on regional cooperation were equally dismal. The US initiated a process of border cooperation, a trilateral initiative involving the US and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite claims of working closely with the Islamabad government, an ally in the ‘war on terror’, there was little to indicate that the US government was seriously analysing the causes of terrorism from across the border. Rather than look at the reasons behind the rise of armed groups, including the denial of democracy, most of the international community chose to support, either vocally or silently, the military autocrat in Pervez Musharraf in the hope that one man would deliver the goods.
The result of five years of diplomatic efforts was evident during the visit of President Musharraf to Afghanistan in September. The Pakistani government signed an agreement with the tribal elders of North Waziristan on the issue of crossborder terrorism a day before President Musharraf’s visit. But the Afghan government was not consulted on an agreement that would have a direct bearing on its security, and the Pakistani president did not even exhibit the courtesy of informing Hamid Karzai prior to his arrival in Kabul.
Despite the rhetorical support for democracy, the international preference for authoritarian methods as far as Afghanistan is concerned has been evident again and again. If a military dictator was the preferred mode in Pakistan, in Afghanistan no effort was spared to ensure that the presidency of Hamid Karzai would be strengthened at the cost of other state institutions. Political parties were not allowed to contest in the parliamentary elections, hardly surprising since President Karzai himself has no domestic political base or party (See Himal Sept-Oct 2006, “Afghans go for Parliament”). The result, of course, has been a Parliament that has great problems of authority.
Democratic processes have not been allowed to take root, and powers have been concentrated in the hands of one man. In recent weeks President Karzai himself has been criticised for failing to deliver on a number of fronts, as if the fault lay with him personally rather than the lack of strong institutions.
Even as the security situation deteriorates, enough is not being done to reassign responsibility acceding to experience. The US-led Coalition Forces are still carrying out their combat operations as part of the ‘war on terror’, and are charged with carrying out anti-terrorist operations. The NATO-led ISAF forces, meanwhile, declare that they are mandated to support the Afghan government, which is facing insurgency. While ‘terrorism’ is linked to an international dynamic aimed at destabilising large parts of the world, ‘insurgency’ includes those whose aim is to specifically destabilise the Kabul government. As for the issue of the narcotics trade, this is left to the responsibility of the Afghan national army and the police.
The compartmentalised approach continues despite the apparent understanding of the interlinkages between the three crucial arenas – terrorism, the ongoing insurgency, and the drug trade. Though there is recognition that the anti-government insurgency is also fuelled by terrorism, and vice-versa, there is a feeling that the ‘global’ war can be fought by the Coalition Forces, and the national war by NATO. Though drug money fuels both terrorism and the insurgency, and drug barons have a direct stake in destabilising the state, neither NATO nor the Coalition Forces are willing to undertake direct operations on this front.
Unfortunately for Afghanistan, there seems to be little to suggest that there will be any real change in the current approaches of the international actors. If the situation does unravel completely there will always be a scapegoat person or issue found to take the blame for the international failure – be it Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, the lack of good governance or inadequate aid. If all else fails, the anti-government forces can always be blamed for behaving in ways in which they were not supposed to have done – for thinking and evolving their strategies in ways with which the international forces are apparently unable to deal. The ultimate excuse, as already hinted at by Condoleezza Rice, is that the insurgents ‘think’.
October 09, 2006
Afghan Governor Says Her Future Rides on Asphalt
Women's Enews
October 9, 2006
Afghan Governor Says Her Future Rides on Asphalt
Run Date: 10/08/06
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
Habiba Sarobi was appointed Afghanistan's first female provincial governor last year amid media fanfare about women's rights. Now she says nothing matters for her province or her political career except getting some paved roads.
(WOMENSENEWS)--Two years ago, even the most ambitious girls going to school in Afghanistan's central province of Bamiyan dreamed only of becoming schoolteachers, the favored job for educated young women in Afghanistan.
Then came Habiba Sarobi, Afghanistan's first and so far only female governor, appointed by President Hamid Karzai in March 2005. She presides in a relatively peaceful, poppy-free region where women have significantly more freedom than in neighboring regions.
Still, a concern over the safety of women working in Afghanistan was underscored by the assassination two weeks ago of Safia Ama Jan, a provincial director for Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs. Ama Jan was murdered by two gunmen on a motorcycle outside her house in Kandahar while she was going to her office.
Before naming her as a governor, Karzai had selected Sarobi in 2001 to be minister for women's affairs, a job she held for two and a half years. She spent five years of Taliban control over Kabul in Peshawar, Pakistan, running workshops for women and funding an underground school in Kabul.
"Now the same girls talk of being a governor when they grow up; some even talk of being the president," says Abdullah Barat, an activist with various civil society groups working to rebuild Bamiyan.
Bamiyan, the home of the giant Buddhas that were dynamited by the Taliban in March 2001, lies in Hazarajat and is dominated by the Hazaras, descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups. They are the third largest ethnic community in Afghanistan and were under Taliban control between 1998 and 2001.
After some Hazaras mounted resistance, the Taliban massacred 200 people in Yakawlang, a town in Bamiyan in early 2001. Reports by the media including the BBC indicated that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead. The United Nations subsequently reported four mass graves in the town of Bamiyan, which has the same name as the province.
Show of Women's Rights
When Sarobi became governor last year international media hailed it as a sign of the Karzai government's commitment to promoting women in a country where political parties are traditionally male-dominated and which, during the last two decades, completely excluded women as armed groups fought each other for political control.
The New York Times described it as a "major advance in a society where only four years ago, under the Taliban, women were denied everything from school lessons to lipstick."
"Her appointment is part of a national initiative to promote women to positions of power," a Voice of America Web site report said at the time.
"There are gifted women in Afghanistan emerging from the destruction and intolerance that is all around," a BBC report concluded. "Habiba Sarobi seems to be one of them."
But a year and a half later, Sarobi, a 49-year-old chemist, says many ultra-conservatives, both nationally and within her own province, are waiting for her to trip and fail.
"Road, road and road," she says when asked to list what she needs most to keep her constituents happy and hang on to her post. Sarobi met with Women's eNews for an interview at her Kabul home.
Sarobi says she raises the province's need for better infrastructure in every meeting, whether with the central government or international donors.
Neither the governor nor Sarobi's staff provided Women's eNews with details of the provincial budget or funding sources. For proof of the province's dire financial straits, Sarobi simply points to Bamiyan's lack of a single meter of asphalted road.
Bone-Rattling Trip to Market
An official involved with disbursing U.S. development aid denies the province is being neglected, and says a ground-breaking ceremony for the first paved road in the province is going to take place soon.
The central government also recently began building a paved road to link Kabul to Bamiyan. The project, announced three years ago, is only just now getting underway.
Sarobi says these road projects are a big relief, but the political heat on her will not let up until traffic is rolling.
A trip from Kabul to Bamiyan that would take three hours on a smooth road currently takes a bone-rattling 10 to 12 hours along an unpaved road.
There are no regular commercial flights to the province and Bamiyan, in the central highlands, needs roads to help diversify its economy. The province chiefly grows potatoes because they are less perishable than other crops and can survive long trips to market.
Three Conditions for Aid
In various statements and compacts, international donors including the U.S. government and U.N. entities, have promised to link development aid to peace, drug eradication and gender justice.
Sarobi says her province boasts all three conditions.
She says it is one of the most peaceful of the country. Insurgent activity is absent and local commanders have largely been demobilized. That relative security allows local government to police poppy cultivation, which is illegal but still rampant in many places. She says the area under poppy cultivation in Bamiyan province has declined from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares in 2006. A hectare is about two and a half acres.
Hazara women enjoy relative freedom. Few wear the head-to-toe covering burka common in some other parts of the country. Sarobi herself is a sign of the relatively strong status of women in the province. When asked if she could be governor in Helmand or Kandahar, two southern districts, Sarobi laughs. "It would have been impossible there," she says.
Those districts suffer frequent outbreaks of violence between the international forces and the anti-government insurgents. By custom in those provinces, women can be killed by family members--a father, brother or husband--for the slightest hint of dishonor, such as the suspicion of extramarital sex. They can also be given in marriage to settle a feud or to compensate for a crime.
In Bamiyan, Sarobi says, women are not subject to such treatment.
But a confidante of Sarobi's--who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject--said her gender is still a political factor. "Some people are not happy that there is a female governor here," she says. "This is still a country where in many places women are not allowed to go out. The fact that she has no political base allows them to create problems. The warlords and lesser warlords who have lost their power in the Bamiyan area are waiting for her to fail."
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.)
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more information:
"Italians Train Afghans for Non-Traditional Jobs":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2843/
"Afghan Women Wind Up Tough Campaigns":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2455/
"Afghan Women Building Their Own Councils":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2488/
October 9, 2006
Afghan Governor Says Her Future Rides on Asphalt
Run Date: 10/08/06
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
Habiba Sarobi was appointed Afghanistan's first female provincial governor last year amid media fanfare about women's rights. Now she says nothing matters for her province or her political career except getting some paved roads.
(WOMENSENEWS)--Two years ago, even the most ambitious girls going to school in Afghanistan's central province of Bamiyan dreamed only of becoming schoolteachers, the favored job for educated young women in Afghanistan.
Then came Habiba Sarobi, Afghanistan's first and so far only female governor, appointed by President Hamid Karzai in March 2005. She presides in a relatively peaceful, poppy-free region where women have significantly more freedom than in neighboring regions.
Still, a concern over the safety of women working in Afghanistan was underscored by the assassination two weeks ago of Safia Ama Jan, a provincial director for Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs. Ama Jan was murdered by two gunmen on a motorcycle outside her house in Kandahar while she was going to her office.
Before naming her as a governor, Karzai had selected Sarobi in 2001 to be minister for women's affairs, a job she held for two and a half years. She spent five years of Taliban control over Kabul in Peshawar, Pakistan, running workshops for women and funding an underground school in Kabul.
"Now the same girls talk of being a governor when they grow up; some even talk of being the president," says Abdullah Barat, an activist with various civil society groups working to rebuild Bamiyan.
Bamiyan, the home of the giant Buddhas that were dynamited by the Taliban in March 2001, lies in Hazarajat and is dominated by the Hazaras, descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups. They are the third largest ethnic community in Afghanistan and were under Taliban control between 1998 and 2001.
After some Hazaras mounted resistance, the Taliban massacred 200 people in Yakawlang, a town in Bamiyan in early 2001. Reports by the media including the BBC indicated that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead. The United Nations subsequently reported four mass graves in the town of Bamiyan, which has the same name as the province.
Show of Women's Rights
When Sarobi became governor last year international media hailed it as a sign of the Karzai government's commitment to promoting women in a country where political parties are traditionally male-dominated and which, during the last two decades, completely excluded women as armed groups fought each other for political control.
The New York Times described it as a "major advance in a society where only four years ago, under the Taliban, women were denied everything from school lessons to lipstick."
"Her appointment is part of a national initiative to promote women to positions of power," a Voice of America Web site report said at the time.
"There are gifted women in Afghanistan emerging from the destruction and intolerance that is all around," a BBC report concluded. "Habiba Sarobi seems to be one of them."
But a year and a half later, Sarobi, a 49-year-old chemist, says many ultra-conservatives, both nationally and within her own province, are waiting for her to trip and fail.
"Road, road and road," she says when asked to list what she needs most to keep her constituents happy and hang on to her post. Sarobi met with Women's eNews for an interview at her Kabul home.
Sarobi says she raises the province's need for better infrastructure in every meeting, whether with the central government or international donors.
Neither the governor nor Sarobi's staff provided Women's eNews with details of the provincial budget or funding sources. For proof of the province's dire financial straits, Sarobi simply points to Bamiyan's lack of a single meter of asphalted road.
Bone-Rattling Trip to Market
An official involved with disbursing U.S. development aid denies the province is being neglected, and says a ground-breaking ceremony for the first paved road in the province is going to take place soon.
The central government also recently began building a paved road to link Kabul to Bamiyan. The project, announced three years ago, is only just now getting underway.
Sarobi says these road projects are a big relief, but the political heat on her will not let up until traffic is rolling.
A trip from Kabul to Bamiyan that would take three hours on a smooth road currently takes a bone-rattling 10 to 12 hours along an unpaved road.
There are no regular commercial flights to the province and Bamiyan, in the central highlands, needs roads to help diversify its economy. The province chiefly grows potatoes because they are less perishable than other crops and can survive long trips to market.
Three Conditions for Aid
In various statements and compacts, international donors including the U.S. government and U.N. entities, have promised to link development aid to peace, drug eradication and gender justice.
Sarobi says her province boasts all three conditions.
She says it is one of the most peaceful of the country. Insurgent activity is absent and local commanders have largely been demobilized. That relative security allows local government to police poppy cultivation, which is illegal but still rampant in many places. She says the area under poppy cultivation in Bamiyan province has declined from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares in 2006. A hectare is about two and a half acres.
Hazara women enjoy relative freedom. Few wear the head-to-toe covering burka common in some other parts of the country. Sarobi herself is a sign of the relatively strong status of women in the province. When asked if she could be governor in Helmand or Kandahar, two southern districts, Sarobi laughs. "It would have been impossible there," she says.
Those districts suffer frequent outbreaks of violence between the international forces and the anti-government insurgents. By custom in those provinces, women can be killed by family members--a father, brother or husband--for the slightest hint of dishonor, such as the suspicion of extramarital sex. They can also be given in marriage to settle a feud or to compensate for a crime.
In Bamiyan, Sarobi says, women are not subject to such treatment.
But a confidante of Sarobi's--who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject--said her gender is still a political factor. "Some people are not happy that there is a female governor here," she says. "This is still a country where in many places women are not allowed to go out. The fact that she has no political base allows them to create problems. The warlords and lesser warlords who have lost their power in the Bamiyan area are waiting for her to fail."
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.)
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more information:
"Italians Train Afghans for Non-Traditional Jobs":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2843/
"Afghan Women Wind Up Tough Campaigns":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2455/
"Afghan Women Building Their Own Councils":
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2488/
Breaking point
Hindustan Times, October 6
Breaking point
Aunohita Mojumdar
On October 7, 2001, the international community, led by the US, stepped in to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan from the Taliban. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent on security and on rebuilding a country bombed out of the current century by 30 years of war. Yet, after five years of efforts, during which time the Taliban was ousted and the Karzai government installed, Afghanistan has hit its lowest point.
Security is spiralling out of control, poppy cultivation and the drug trade have hit a new high, governance remains confined to pockets of security and development has completely halted in some areas. For the first time, the international community is talking of the possibility of a ‘failed State’. The current year is being described as a critical period, one which will make or break the situation.
Milestones of progress are trotted out glibly by diplomats and politicians: children back in school, refugees returning to the country, the absence of the Taliban. The benchmarks of the Bonn process are also recounted as major accomplishments — a new Constitution, presidential elections and a new Parliament. Yet, despite the completion of the road- map, these efforts and institutions have not yielded the results hoped for.
Three years ago, the fact that the government’s authority extended only over Kabul was an object of mockery. But even that small oasis of comfort no longer exists. Bomb explosions are routine, there are frequent suicide attacks and kidnappings. Foreigners are considered a favourite target of anti-government insurgents and have been urged by their countries to curtail their movement. An increasing number of roads have been blocked off and there are new barbed wire fences and cement blocks outside offices and residences of foreigners. While glitzy malls and restaurants — some of which prohibit entry to Afghans — proclaim the advent of easy money in some sections, most of the country continues to lack the basics.
Nothing illustrates the unravelling of the Afghan effort better than the ongoing blame game. Whether it is the Afghan government, the diplomatic community or the international military forces, each has its favourite reason: lack of money, lack of security, corruption, an ineffectual President, the drug trade.
Yet, most of the anger among Afghans seems to stem not from resentment about lack of international aid and support, but from a perception of its misuse. The real question is not whether things have not improved for some people, but whether the reconstruction of the last five years could have been delivered better.
“Few expected the international community to fix all these problems in five years,” says Fariba Nawa, an Afghan American, in a critique of the reconstruction process that she did for CorpWatch, a US watchdog body. “But taxpayers do expect their aid money to be spent responsibly,” she adds. According to Senlis Council, a think-tank, “Afghans perceive that their government is accountable to international donors and not to the Afghans themselves.”
Focus on poverty relief and development could have created a solid foundation on which to rebuild Afghanistan, it says. Instead, $ 82.5 million was spent on military operations as opposed to $ 7.3 billion on development (since 2002). Even money spent on reconstruction has been “mismanaged, misused and wasted”, says Nawa, “International and national aid agencies have designed a system that in effect funnels money back to the wealthy donor countries without providing sustainable development in poor states.”
The effort is on having projects up and running rather than on the sustainability of projects or community engagement. An example was the pressure on deadlines before the presidential elections in both the US and Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan was to be presented as a success story, it was imperative to have achievements in numbers. But it is not just roads, school buildings and ill thought-out income generation projects that have paid the price for the short-sightedness. There has been little effort to build and strengthen the institutions of State.
The international community has reposed its faith on the instrument of the presidency alone, often strengthening it at the cost of other institutions. This was best illustrated during the parliamentary elections. A Brussels-based think tank, International Crisis Group, wrote: “The Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) system used in the 2005 legislative election all but excluded political parties vital for the development of a robust democracy. Karzai has done all he can to marginalise these parties, leaving him isolated and dependent on unstable alliances in a fragmented body.”
Efforts on the security front have been equally myopic. Though billions have been spent on military expenditure, little has gone into rebuilding and stabilising institutions of security within the country — the police, the judiciary and the Afghan National Army.
Warlords, often with records of abuse of human rights to match the Taliban’s excesses, have been co-opted in the hope that they will deliver quick results against the war on terror, at the cost of stabilisation of the country.
The result is a slow unravelling of faith, bringing the country once again to a dangerous brink where it could pose a serious threat to the world.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is a freelance journalist currently based in Kabul)
Breaking point
Aunohita Mojumdar
On October 7, 2001, the international community, led by the US, stepped in to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan from the Taliban. Since then, billions of dollars have been spent on security and on rebuilding a country bombed out of the current century by 30 years of war. Yet, after five years of efforts, during which time the Taliban was ousted and the Karzai government installed, Afghanistan has hit its lowest point.
Security is spiralling out of control, poppy cultivation and the drug trade have hit a new high, governance remains confined to pockets of security and development has completely halted in some areas. For the first time, the international community is talking of the possibility of a ‘failed State’. The current year is being described as a critical period, one which will make or break the situation.
Milestones of progress are trotted out glibly by diplomats and politicians: children back in school, refugees returning to the country, the absence of the Taliban. The benchmarks of the Bonn process are also recounted as major accomplishments — a new Constitution, presidential elections and a new Parliament. Yet, despite the completion of the road- map, these efforts and institutions have not yielded the results hoped for.
Three years ago, the fact that the government’s authority extended only over Kabul was an object of mockery. But even that small oasis of comfort no longer exists. Bomb explosions are routine, there are frequent suicide attacks and kidnappings. Foreigners are considered a favourite target of anti-government insurgents and have been urged by their countries to curtail their movement. An increasing number of roads have been blocked off and there are new barbed wire fences and cement blocks outside offices and residences of foreigners. While glitzy malls and restaurants — some of which prohibit entry to Afghans — proclaim the advent of easy money in some sections, most of the country continues to lack the basics.
Nothing illustrates the unravelling of the Afghan effort better than the ongoing blame game. Whether it is the Afghan government, the diplomatic community or the international military forces, each has its favourite reason: lack of money, lack of security, corruption, an ineffectual President, the drug trade.
Yet, most of the anger among Afghans seems to stem not from resentment about lack of international aid and support, but from a perception of its misuse. The real question is not whether things have not improved for some people, but whether the reconstruction of the last five years could have been delivered better.
“Few expected the international community to fix all these problems in five years,” says Fariba Nawa, an Afghan American, in a critique of the reconstruction process that she did for CorpWatch, a US watchdog body. “But taxpayers do expect their aid money to be spent responsibly,” she adds. According to Senlis Council, a think-tank, “Afghans perceive that their government is accountable to international donors and not to the Afghans themselves.”
Focus on poverty relief and development could have created a solid foundation on which to rebuild Afghanistan, it says. Instead, $ 82.5 million was spent on military operations as opposed to $ 7.3 billion on development (since 2002). Even money spent on reconstruction has been “mismanaged, misused and wasted”, says Nawa, “International and national aid agencies have designed a system that in effect funnels money back to the wealthy donor countries without providing sustainable development in poor states.”
The effort is on having projects up and running rather than on the sustainability of projects or community engagement. An example was the pressure on deadlines before the presidential elections in both the US and Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan was to be presented as a success story, it was imperative to have achievements in numbers. But it is not just roads, school buildings and ill thought-out income generation projects that have paid the price for the short-sightedness. There has been little effort to build and strengthen the institutions of State.
The international community has reposed its faith on the instrument of the presidency alone, often strengthening it at the cost of other institutions. This was best illustrated during the parliamentary elections. A Brussels-based think tank, International Crisis Group, wrote: “The Single Non-Transferable Voting (SNTV) system used in the 2005 legislative election all but excluded political parties vital for the development of a robust democracy. Karzai has done all he can to marginalise these parties, leaving him isolated and dependent on unstable alliances in a fragmented body.”
Efforts on the security front have been equally myopic. Though billions have been spent on military expenditure, little has gone into rebuilding and stabilising institutions of security within the country — the police, the judiciary and the Afghan National Army.
Warlords, often with records of abuse of human rights to match the Taliban’s excesses, have been co-opted in the hope that they will deliver quick results against the war on terror, at the cost of stabilisation of the country.
The result is a slow unravelling of faith, bringing the country once again to a dangerous brink where it could pose a serious threat to the world.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is a freelance journalist currently based in Kabul)
In the shadow of the Buddhas
Asia Times, Oct 4, 2006
In the shadow of the Buddhas
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - Dead monuments mean more in Afganistan's Bamiyan province than living people.
The Taliban's destruction of the two giant Buddhas in 2001 put Bamiyan squarely on the map of international public consciousness. With widespread outrage at the annihilation of the colossal, centuries-old structures, money has since poured in for the preservation of the site, and the fragments of the Buddhas are being collected and preserved. While that effort is creditable, what
is unfortunate is the continuing neglect of the people of the area. The inhabitants, whose ancestors built and preserved the
structures, are today one of the most neglected communities in all Afghanistan.
In 2003 "the cultural landscape and archeological remains of the Bamiyan Valley" were officially inscribed on the World Heritage list on an emergency basis. The stabilization of the crumbling "great cliff" where the Buddhas were situated, the preservation of the niches with their imprints of the Buddhas, collection of the fragments, preventing theft and preserving the cave paintings were identified as priorities to prevent further destruction through man and natural causes.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines "cultural landscapes" as those that "represent the combined works of nature and man". The historic system of irrigation, which has created an intricate pattern of green and yellow terraces, fields on the floor of the Bamiyan Valley, and the "vernacular" architecture using traditional designs and materials were also considered to be part of the unique heritage. The holistic appreciation of the entire area with all its components will certainly make the World Heritage Site much more complete, and a master plan has been prepared to look into all the issues.
However, five years after the ouster of the Taliban and three and a half years after the declaration of the World Heritage Site, the people of Bamiyan still feel neglected and ignored.
The reasons for this are several. The Bamiyan area in the central highlands of the country is home to the Hazaras, the ethnic group that is the lowest in the social order of Afghanistan. The Hazaras are Shi'ites, a religious minority in Afghanistan. The descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups who settled there; they are also racially distinct and have been severely segregated by the other communities.
The Bamiyan area saw horrific massacres of the Hazara population after it fell to the Taliban. Angered by the resistance, including an attack by the Hizb-e-Wahadat that represents the Hazara community, the Taliban massacred 200 ordinary people in Yakawlang in early 2001. Estimates also suggest that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead, with four mass graves discovered in Bamiyan town alone. Traditionally Hazaras were forced to do menial jobs, while the dominant positions were held by the Pashtun and Tajik communities.
It is a dominance that the people of Bamiyan feel continues to dominate decision-making, denying them the benefits of aid and development. "People at the decision-making level are not so keen to support Bamiyan," said Amir Fuladi, an adviser to the governor of Bamiyan, Habiba Sarobi.
Afghanistan's first and only female governor, Sarobi is more reticent. She does not agree that there is discrimination against the Hazara community, but agrees that if the neglect continues, such accusations may indeed appear to be true.
Bamiyan pays a high price for the neglect. The central highlands are geographically isolated. Being in the middle of the country, the province has no revenue from border trade. There are no industries in the area, which is almost completely dependent on agriculture and animal herding.
"The province is isolated and there is no road accessibility," said Fuladi. "The entire province does not have one meter of asphalt road."
The roads connecting Bamiyan to the capital Kabul are little more than broad dirt tracks, potholed and bumpy. What could be a distance of two to three hours takes anything from eight to 12 hours, provided the vehicle is a four-wheel-drive well equipped with spare tires. Flights to Bamiyan, even if they were affordable, are only provided by the UN or by Paktec, which serves non-governmental organizations. There are no flights for ordinary travelers.
With no local industry and bad roads, getting materials to Bamiyan is extremely difficult, said Fuladi, pointing out that in this area, at an altitude of 2,500 meters, even the construction season is extremely short - five months. The lack of road connectivity also prevents any significant revenue generation from the agricultural produce and animal husbandry as nothing can be exported out of the province.
Asked to list her priorities for the province, Sarobi said: "Roads, roads and roads." She compared the province's situation with the millions being spent on road building in the south and wonders why nothing reaches her area. After three years of promises to the people of the province, President Hamid Karzai inaugurated a road-building project three weeks ago, but how soon that connectivity is achieved remains to be seen.
The main reason for the neglect, many in the province feel, lies in security. Bamiyan today is one of the most secure areas of the country, and Sarobi and others feel the province is paying a price for this. All attention in the country is focused on the areas now facing insurgency. Even while the international community and the government chant the mantra of how difficult it is to provide development in insecure areas, one sees no signs that areas that are relatively secure are benefiting. Rather than set an example by developing Bamiyan, which could be seen as a model of the stakes of peace, the province is not considered worthy of attention.
"Because we have security here, there is a lack of attention," said Fuladi. "Stability or security has no advantage for us."
But security may deteriorate, he said, if the relations between the government and the community continue to deteriorate as people get more and more angry. "There should be a change of strategy. They should support a stable and safe area so that people feel that peace leads to development."
The amount of corruption and misuse of resources in a stable area is also very little, he says. Pointing out that millions of dollars are being spent on provinces in the south, Fuladi also compares the lack of aid in his area to the aid pouring into the much smaller province of Panjshir, an area that many believe was made into a separate province for political rather than administrative reasons.
"We are thinking of burning down some paper schools as a symbolic protest," said Abdullah Barat, a founding member of the Bamiyan Preservation Association for Cultural Heritage, in a cynical reference to the burning down of schools in the southern provinces.
Though there is no indigenous base for the Taliban in Bamiyan, what is dangerously missing from the area is a stake in peace. Though the area may not create new Taliban forces, there is also likely to be less resistance to anti-government forces than before. The area has actually seen demobilization and disarmament as opposed to other areas such as Panjshir that merely claim to have demobilized, and people in Bamiyan would not be able to put up stiff resistance. Moreover, what is currently merely the anger of the disgruntled may in future turn into support for any instability. Anti-government elements who choose to operate in the area may not find the people unwilling hosts.
Bamiyan has also seen a sharp drop in cultivation of opium poppies. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Bamiyan has seen a reduction in the area under poppy cultivation from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares this year.
Advocating solutions for decreasing poppy cultivation, which has risen by 60% in the country this year, UNODC chief Antonio Maria Costa says in a recent report that "drug and integrity" conditions have to be inserted into aid programs. "The more vigorously district and provincial leaders commit themselves to activity free of opium, the more they deserve generous development assistance," he said.
But sentiments such as these are mere rhetoric to the people of Bamiyan, who see no such linkages in their area. "The message here is: no poppy, no money," said an international worker in the province.
Referring to the province's lack of leverage at the political level, Fuladi said bitterly: "It doesn't really matter [to others] whether Bamiyan is a hell or a heaven. It is so isolated."
The neglect is especially unfortunate since the area is also the most liberal area in the country in terms of its attitude toward woman. Women move relatively freely, wearing colorful clothes rather than the burqa, engaging in work openly. Yet the area gets no credit for this even though the issue of gender justice is one of the main issues that occupy the international community's agenda - at least on paper.
"We have peace. No narcotics. Bamiyan can also be an example of the success of women's rights if I can succeed. Why don't they support me?" wonders Governor Sarobi, saying much of the talk about women's rights is just lip service.
It is not just neglect that makes the tale of Bamiyan a poignant one. The designation of the area as a world heritage site has meant that even normal development, construction of buildings and markets, is at a standstill since there is no room for "unplanned" development. The designation of the entire area as a cultural and historical landscape has meant that all growth must now devolve on the adoption of the master plan. However, as yet there is no coordination, planning or funding for the master plan and even the perimeter boundary of the heritage site is yet to be finalized.
Protection of the vernacular architecture, the beautiful terraced fields and of course the area around the Buddhas has meant that people will have to wait for permissions before building or altering anything. Is Bamiyan being held hostage to its heritage? Sarobi admits that this is a widespread feeling among people in her province and an issue she plans to raise at the next meeting of the international coordination committee on Bamiyan.
There is no tangible benefit to the people yet, admits UNESCO expert Junko Okahashi, assistant program specialist for the Asia and Pacific World Heritage Center, who flew into Bamiyan for a week, though she said it is not too late and that things have to start now.
It is not that there are no non-governmental or UN organizations working in Bamiyan. There were at least 40 by the last count. However, their efforts are piecemeal, uncoordinated and, indeed, in some cases, counterproductive. In the absence of basic infrastructure, the outcome of these projects, however beneficial, has a limited impact.
The issue is not whether the people come first or the monuments. It would be tragic to see further deterioration of great historical heritage, which once lost cannot be retrieved. A successful implementation of the "master plan" is expected to change the fortunes of the locals - eventually. The concern is whether the current efforts at preservation can be combined with community-oriented programs that engage the community in this heritage, building stakes in the local community simultaneously.
"People have no sense of ownership right now," said Fuladi. While the living wait, the international community and organizations pore over the pieces of monuments.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.)
In the shadow of the Buddhas
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - Dead monuments mean more in Afganistan's Bamiyan province than living people.
The Taliban's destruction of the two giant Buddhas in 2001 put Bamiyan squarely on the map of international public consciousness. With widespread outrage at the annihilation of the colossal, centuries-old structures, money has since poured in for the preservation of the site, and the fragments of the Buddhas are being collected and preserved. While that effort is creditable, what
is unfortunate is the continuing neglect of the people of the area. The inhabitants, whose ancestors built and preserved the
structures, are today one of the most neglected communities in all Afghanistan.
In 2003 "the cultural landscape and archeological remains of the Bamiyan Valley" were officially inscribed on the World Heritage list on an emergency basis. The stabilization of the crumbling "great cliff" where the Buddhas were situated, the preservation of the niches with their imprints of the Buddhas, collection of the fragments, preventing theft and preserving the cave paintings were identified as priorities to prevent further destruction through man and natural causes.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines "cultural landscapes" as those that "represent the combined works of nature and man". The historic system of irrigation, which has created an intricate pattern of green and yellow terraces, fields on the floor of the Bamiyan Valley, and the "vernacular" architecture using traditional designs and materials were also considered to be part of the unique heritage. The holistic appreciation of the entire area with all its components will certainly make the World Heritage Site much more complete, and a master plan has been prepared to look into all the issues.
However, five years after the ouster of the Taliban and three and a half years after the declaration of the World Heritage Site, the people of Bamiyan still feel neglected and ignored.
The reasons for this are several. The Bamiyan area in the central highlands of the country is home to the Hazaras, the ethnic group that is the lowest in the social order of Afghanistan. The Hazaras are Shi'ites, a religious minority in Afghanistan. The descendents of Mongol or Turkic groups who settled there; they are also racially distinct and have been severely segregated by the other communities.
The Bamiyan area saw horrific massacres of the Hazara population after it fell to the Taliban. Angered by the resistance, including an attack by the Hizb-e-Wahadat that represents the Hazara community, the Taliban massacred 200 ordinary people in Yakawlang in early 2001. Estimates also suggest that a scorch-and-burn policy in several villages left at least 1,000 Hazaras dead, with four mass graves discovered in Bamiyan town alone. Traditionally Hazaras were forced to do menial jobs, while the dominant positions were held by the Pashtun and Tajik communities.
It is a dominance that the people of Bamiyan feel continues to dominate decision-making, denying them the benefits of aid and development. "People at the decision-making level are not so keen to support Bamiyan," said Amir Fuladi, an adviser to the governor of Bamiyan, Habiba Sarobi.
Afghanistan's first and only female governor, Sarobi is more reticent. She does not agree that there is discrimination against the Hazara community, but agrees that if the neglect continues, such accusations may indeed appear to be true.
Bamiyan pays a high price for the neglect. The central highlands are geographically isolated. Being in the middle of the country, the province has no revenue from border trade. There are no industries in the area, which is almost completely dependent on agriculture and animal herding.
"The province is isolated and there is no road accessibility," said Fuladi. "The entire province does not have one meter of asphalt road."
The roads connecting Bamiyan to the capital Kabul are little more than broad dirt tracks, potholed and bumpy. What could be a distance of two to three hours takes anything from eight to 12 hours, provided the vehicle is a four-wheel-drive well equipped with spare tires. Flights to Bamiyan, even if they were affordable, are only provided by the UN or by Paktec, which serves non-governmental organizations. There are no flights for ordinary travelers.
With no local industry and bad roads, getting materials to Bamiyan is extremely difficult, said Fuladi, pointing out that in this area, at an altitude of 2,500 meters, even the construction season is extremely short - five months. The lack of road connectivity also prevents any significant revenue generation from the agricultural produce and animal husbandry as nothing can be exported out of the province.
Asked to list her priorities for the province, Sarobi said: "Roads, roads and roads." She compared the province's situation with the millions being spent on road building in the south and wonders why nothing reaches her area. After three years of promises to the people of the province, President Hamid Karzai inaugurated a road-building project three weeks ago, but how soon that connectivity is achieved remains to be seen.
The main reason for the neglect, many in the province feel, lies in security. Bamiyan today is one of the most secure areas of the country, and Sarobi and others feel the province is paying a price for this. All attention in the country is focused on the areas now facing insurgency. Even while the international community and the government chant the mantra of how difficult it is to provide development in insecure areas, one sees no signs that areas that are relatively secure are benefiting. Rather than set an example by developing Bamiyan, which could be seen as a model of the stakes of peace, the province is not considered worthy of attention.
"Because we have security here, there is a lack of attention," said Fuladi. "Stability or security has no advantage for us."
But security may deteriorate, he said, if the relations between the government and the community continue to deteriorate as people get more and more angry. "There should be a change of strategy. They should support a stable and safe area so that people feel that peace leads to development."
The amount of corruption and misuse of resources in a stable area is also very little, he says. Pointing out that millions of dollars are being spent on provinces in the south, Fuladi also compares the lack of aid in his area to the aid pouring into the much smaller province of Panjshir, an area that many believe was made into a separate province for political rather than administrative reasons.
"We are thinking of burning down some paper schools as a symbolic protest," said Abdullah Barat, a founding member of the Bamiyan Preservation Association for Cultural Heritage, in a cynical reference to the burning down of schools in the southern provinces.
Though there is no indigenous base for the Taliban in Bamiyan, what is dangerously missing from the area is a stake in peace. Though the area may not create new Taliban forces, there is also likely to be less resistance to anti-government forces than before. The area has actually seen demobilization and disarmament as opposed to other areas such as Panjshir that merely claim to have demobilized, and people in Bamiyan would not be able to put up stiff resistance. Moreover, what is currently merely the anger of the disgruntled may in future turn into support for any instability. Anti-government elements who choose to operate in the area may not find the people unwilling hosts.
Bamiyan has also seen a sharp drop in cultivation of opium poppies. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Bamiyan has seen a reduction in the area under poppy cultivation from 803 hectares in 2004 to 17 hectares this year.
Advocating solutions for decreasing poppy cultivation, which has risen by 60% in the country this year, UNODC chief Antonio Maria Costa says in a recent report that "drug and integrity" conditions have to be inserted into aid programs. "The more vigorously district and provincial leaders commit themselves to activity free of opium, the more they deserve generous development assistance," he said.
But sentiments such as these are mere rhetoric to the people of Bamiyan, who see no such linkages in their area. "The message here is: no poppy, no money," said an international worker in the province.
Referring to the province's lack of leverage at the political level, Fuladi said bitterly: "It doesn't really matter [to others] whether Bamiyan is a hell or a heaven. It is so isolated."
The neglect is especially unfortunate since the area is also the most liberal area in the country in terms of its attitude toward woman. Women move relatively freely, wearing colorful clothes rather than the burqa, engaging in work openly. Yet the area gets no credit for this even though the issue of gender justice is one of the main issues that occupy the international community's agenda - at least on paper.
"We have peace. No narcotics. Bamiyan can also be an example of the success of women's rights if I can succeed. Why don't they support me?" wonders Governor Sarobi, saying much of the talk about women's rights is just lip service.
It is not just neglect that makes the tale of Bamiyan a poignant one. The designation of the area as a world heritage site has meant that even normal development, construction of buildings and markets, is at a standstill since there is no room for "unplanned" development. The designation of the entire area as a cultural and historical landscape has meant that all growth must now devolve on the adoption of the master plan. However, as yet there is no coordination, planning or funding for the master plan and even the perimeter boundary of the heritage site is yet to be finalized.
Protection of the vernacular architecture, the beautiful terraced fields and of course the area around the Buddhas has meant that people will have to wait for permissions before building or altering anything. Is Bamiyan being held hostage to its heritage? Sarobi admits that this is a widespread feeling among people in her province and an issue she plans to raise at the next meeting of the international coordination committee on Bamiyan.
There is no tangible benefit to the people yet, admits UNESCO expert Junko Okahashi, assistant program specialist for the Asia and Pacific World Heritage Center, who flew into Bamiyan for a week, though she said it is not too late and that things have to start now.
It is not that there are no non-governmental or UN organizations working in Bamiyan. There were at least 40 by the last count. However, their efforts are piecemeal, uncoordinated and, indeed, in some cases, counterproductive. In the absence of basic infrastructure, the outcome of these projects, however beneficial, has a limited impact.
The issue is not whether the people come first or the monuments. It would be tragic to see further deterioration of great historical heritage, which once lost cannot be retrieved. A successful implementation of the "master plan" is expected to change the fortunes of the locals - eventually. The concern is whether the current efforts at preservation can be combined with community-oriented programs that engage the community in this heritage, building stakes in the local community simultaneously.
"People have no sense of ownership right now," said Fuladi. While the living wait, the international community and organizations pore over the pieces of monuments.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.)
Bodhi's Third Avatar
Outlook Magazine| Oct 02, 2006
EXCLUSIVE: afghanistan archaeology
Bodhi's Third Avatar
Archaeologists believe they have found the site of a giant reclining Buddha at Bamiyan
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Five years ago, this wide, green valley surrounded by towering cliffs in the heart of Afghanistan was the country's Ground Zero. This was where the giant Buddhas carved into the cliff face were blown up by the Taliban, just six months before 9/11. Today, new hope and excitement grips Bamiyan as a team of archaeologists believes it has found the site of a third giant Buddha which may still be intact, buried out of sight for centuries.
The third Buddha was described in detail by the Chinese monk Hiuen Tsang, who visited Bamiyan on his way to India in 630 AD. The monk's record of his travels is the first documented account of Bamiyan and its Buddhas. He describes not only the standing images (destroyed in 2001) but also a much larger reclining Buddha which he saw in a thriving monastery in the valley. The man was not given to flights of fantasy—his records are so precise they have often helped archaeologists in their quest to uncover the past. About Bamiyan, he wrote of "a reclining figure of the Buddha about to enter Nirvana, more than one thousand chi (300 metres) in length, in a temple two or three li (about 2 km) to the east of the royal palace".
Afghan archaeologist Dr Zemaryalai Tarzi, who heads the French Archaeological Mission in Bamiyan, says his team recently uncovered part of the Eastern Monastery, the location of the "reclining Buddha". The site is just in front of the great cliff, to the east of the now-empty niche where the smaller of the standing Buddhas used to be. "We believe we've found the monastery," says Tarzi, who's worked on excavations here since the '70s, when he was director of Afghanistan's Institute of Archaeology.
Tarzi's current endeavour began in '01. "We have found lots of things at this site, including five stupas and more than 30 heads of Buddha modelled in clay, which still have remains of the polychromatic painting on their faces," he reveals. Uncovering this site took months of painstaking digging through layers of history. "Below the surface are layers of the Ghorid, Ghaznavid and pre-Islamic Turkic periods, and below that is the Buddhist monastery," explained Tarzi at his camp in the ruined village of Tulvara. Bone fragments and pieces of clay statuary lay in heaps at the camp. Bamiyan's Buddhist past is said to date to the Kushana and Hepthalite Hun empire, spanning from the 1st to 6th centuries AD.
The excavation site is closely guarded and visitors are not allowed. Photographs were not permitted either, though a brief look inside reveals the remains of solid structures, steps, a paved courtyard and, most exciting of all, a pair of giant feet. They may have been part of a large statue, or just a symbolic representation of the feet of the Buddha—it is hard to tell, for the excavation is not complete. Tarzi took some persuading to agree to speak to Outlook, because exclusive rights to the story of the new excavations have been sold to National Geographic, presumably to fund the excavations. With winter approaching in the Bamiyan valley (height: 2,500 metres), excavations have been suspended and will now resume only next summer.
Bamiyan, which means "place of shining light", gets its name from the light bouncing off the cliffs of conglomerate rock, layered in shades of purple and brown. Now an isolated region a bone-rattling 8-10 hours' drive from Kabul, Bamiyan was once at the crossroads of many civilisations, a prosperous valley along the Silk Road with the two huge Buddhas, one of them 55 metres and the other 38 metres tall, hewn out of the cliffs and standing sentinel over caravans of traders, pilgrims, scholars and soldiers. Built in the 3rd and 5th centuries AD, the two Buddhas were left untouched for over 1,500 years, even by the marauding armies of Genghis Khan, Mahmud Ghazni and Nadir Shah.Aurangzeb did, however, have a bash at them, but his artillery only succeeded in damaging the foot of one of the Buddhas.
Today the empty niches still inspire awe, with the outline of the smaller Buddha clearly visible. Opinion is still divided on whether the Buddhas should be rebuilt. Today, it would be impossible to carve them out of the same cliff face; and to build new images and instal them there would not recreate the aura and magnificence of the originals. "They just would not have the same feeling," says Afghan deputy minister of culture, Omar Sultan. A proposal to recreate the images using laser beams, as has been suggested for the Twin Towers site in New York, is being given serious consideration.
For now, the most urgent task is to consolidate the fragile, crumbling cliffs, further weakened by the dynamiting carried out by the Taliban. The last restoration was done in the '60s and '70s by the Archaeological Survey of India, which had repaired and strengthened the Buddhas, the cliff face, cornices and balconies. Today, Georgios Toubekis, an architect with ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites), has the task of collecting and preserving the fragments of the destroyed Buddhas—some of them as large as boulders—and consolidating the surface of the cliffs, in a major project funded by Japan and Germany.
Bamiyan's cliffs are also honeycombed with caves, many of them with exquisite paintings executed by Indian and Persian artists during the Hepthalite period. Some 80 per cent of these have been destroyed over the centuries through neglect, theft and destruction, but those that remain are now being carefully preserved and protected. The people of Bamiyan are Hazaras, an ethnic and religious minority who are Shias of Mongol-Turkic origin, believed to be descended from the 'hazaar'—the thousand soldiers Genghis Khan left behind here after conquering the region. Among the poorest and most backward communities in Afghanistan, they are counting on the third Buddha to emerge from the sands of time, and usher in a tourism boom that will bring Bamiyan the development and prosperity it so desperately needs.
EXCLUSIVE: afghanistan archaeology
Bodhi's Third Avatar
Archaeologists believe they have found the site of a giant reclining Buddha at Bamiyan
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Five years ago, this wide, green valley surrounded by towering cliffs in the heart of Afghanistan was the country's Ground Zero. This was where the giant Buddhas carved into the cliff face were blown up by the Taliban, just six months before 9/11. Today, new hope and excitement grips Bamiyan as a team of archaeologists believes it has found the site of a third giant Buddha which may still be intact, buried out of sight for centuries.
The third Buddha was described in detail by the Chinese monk Hiuen Tsang, who visited Bamiyan on his way to India in 630 AD. The monk's record of his travels is the first documented account of Bamiyan and its Buddhas. He describes not only the standing images (destroyed in 2001) but also a much larger reclining Buddha which he saw in a thriving monastery in the valley. The man was not given to flights of fantasy—his records are so precise they have often helped archaeologists in their quest to uncover the past. About Bamiyan, he wrote of "a reclining figure of the Buddha about to enter Nirvana, more than one thousand chi (300 metres) in length, in a temple two or three li (about 2 km) to the east of the royal palace".
Afghan archaeologist Dr Zemaryalai Tarzi, who heads the French Archaeological Mission in Bamiyan, says his team recently uncovered part of the Eastern Monastery, the location of the "reclining Buddha". The site is just in front of the great cliff, to the east of the now-empty niche where the smaller of the standing Buddhas used to be. "We believe we've found the monastery," says Tarzi, who's worked on excavations here since the '70s, when he was director of Afghanistan's Institute of Archaeology.
Tarzi's current endeavour began in '01. "We have found lots of things at this site, including five stupas and more than 30 heads of Buddha modelled in clay, which still have remains of the polychromatic painting on their faces," he reveals. Uncovering this site took months of painstaking digging through layers of history. "Below the surface are layers of the Ghorid, Ghaznavid and pre-Islamic Turkic periods, and below that is the Buddhist monastery," explained Tarzi at his camp in the ruined village of Tulvara. Bone fragments and pieces of clay statuary lay in heaps at the camp. Bamiyan's Buddhist past is said to date to the Kushana and Hepthalite Hun empire, spanning from the 1st to 6th centuries AD.
The excavation site is closely guarded and visitors are not allowed. Photographs were not permitted either, though a brief look inside reveals the remains of solid structures, steps, a paved courtyard and, most exciting of all, a pair of giant feet. They may have been part of a large statue, or just a symbolic representation of the feet of the Buddha—it is hard to tell, for the excavation is not complete. Tarzi took some persuading to agree to speak to Outlook, because exclusive rights to the story of the new excavations have been sold to National Geographic, presumably to fund the excavations. With winter approaching in the Bamiyan valley (height: 2,500 metres), excavations have been suspended and will now resume only next summer.
Bamiyan, which means "place of shining light", gets its name from the light bouncing off the cliffs of conglomerate rock, layered in shades of purple and brown. Now an isolated region a bone-rattling 8-10 hours' drive from Kabul, Bamiyan was once at the crossroads of many civilisations, a prosperous valley along the Silk Road with the two huge Buddhas, one of them 55 metres and the other 38 metres tall, hewn out of the cliffs and standing sentinel over caravans of traders, pilgrims, scholars and soldiers. Built in the 3rd and 5th centuries AD, the two Buddhas were left untouched for over 1,500 years, even by the marauding armies of Genghis Khan, Mahmud Ghazni and Nadir Shah.Aurangzeb did, however, have a bash at them, but his artillery only succeeded in damaging the foot of one of the Buddhas.
Today the empty niches still inspire awe, with the outline of the smaller Buddha clearly visible. Opinion is still divided on whether the Buddhas should be rebuilt. Today, it would be impossible to carve them out of the same cliff face; and to build new images and instal them there would not recreate the aura and magnificence of the originals. "They just would not have the same feeling," says Afghan deputy minister of culture, Omar Sultan. A proposal to recreate the images using laser beams, as has been suggested for the Twin Towers site in New York, is being given serious consideration.
For now, the most urgent task is to consolidate the fragile, crumbling cliffs, further weakened by the dynamiting carried out by the Taliban. The last restoration was done in the '60s and '70s by the Archaeological Survey of India, which had repaired and strengthened the Buddhas, the cliff face, cornices and balconies. Today, Georgios Toubekis, an architect with ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites), has the task of collecting and preserving the fragments of the destroyed Buddhas—some of them as large as boulders—and consolidating the surface of the cliffs, in a major project funded by Japan and Germany.
Bamiyan's cliffs are also honeycombed with caves, many of them with exquisite paintings executed by Indian and Persian artists during the Hepthalite period. Some 80 per cent of these have been destroyed over the centuries through neglect, theft and destruction, but those that remain are now being carefully preserved and protected. The people of Bamiyan are Hazaras, an ethnic and religious minority who are Shias of Mongol-Turkic origin, believed to be descended from the 'hazaar'—the thousand soldiers Genghis Khan left behind here after conquering the region. Among the poorest and most backward communities in Afghanistan, they are counting on the third Buddha to emerge from the sands of time, and usher in a tourism boom that will bring Bamiyan the development and prosperity it so desperately needs.
The Return of Big Brother
The Hindu, August 13
DEBATE
The return of Big Brother
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
THE spectre of the Taliban police flailing whips on the streets to enforce their laws is a common image associated with their rule in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue issued edicts which banned girls going to school, women revealing any part of their body including ankles, men shaving or cutting beards, kite flying, music, amongst others. Four and a half years after the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue is back, under the Hamid Karzai government. The move, passed by the cabinet, now awaits a nod from Parliament.
The step has sparked some consternation amongst human rights activists and organisations both within and outside the country, which have expressed fears about the purposes and powers of the body. Human Rights Watch said the department could be used to silence critical voices and further limit women's and girls' access to work, healthcare and education. It called on the international community to make a clear commitment to Afghanistan's long term security and reconstruction and to avoid a return to repressive past practices. Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission also expressed concern over the department, saying there were no clear terms of reference for the body.
No cause for alarm?
The Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, which will oversee the department, however says there is no cause for alarm or worry and that there will be no departure from functions already being carried out by the government. The department would not resemble its namesake under the Taliban in any way, the Ministry has stated, saying the Taliban had abused and misused religion.
In fact, the Department of Vice and Virtue did not emerge with the Taliban. Instituted by the mujahideen who came to power after fighting the Soviets, the department was elevated to the level of a full ministry under the Taliban. Moreover, the department was never abolished by the current government after it came to power, but in fact lay dormant until now.
The recent move, says Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, Moulvi Mohammed Qasim, has been undertaken only to streamline and coordinate and unify the activities of three existing departments: one under the Ministry of Information and Culture which preaches Islamic values through programmes and publications in the electronic and print media, thse second under the Ministry of Haj which is in charge of Islamic preaching and the third under the Supreme Court which is supposed to ensure accountability to the principles of Islam.
According to Moulvi Qasim, the powers and purposes of the reactivated department will be very limited. The department will not have its own enforcement agency or police, but will only spread the message of Islamic principles and morality in society, mainly through public preaching. The government currently employs the preachers in mosques and the new move will strengthen their role and provide uniform guidelines on how and what to preach he said, adding, "all religions — Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism preach the holy word and the principles of religion".
`Rising immorality'
The department, the Minister said in an exclusive interview, was set up by President Karzai on the urging of people from rural areas as well as the Ulema Councils of the various provinces. "We ourselves felt immorality in society was on the increase. More and more sex workers were being arrested and alcohol was being seized by the Interior Ministry police. This is worrying and we are concerned about the people."
A task force under the Ministry of Interior already exists to "combat immorality". Set up in January 2005, the task force has since cracked down on alcohol consumption and prostitution, carrying out raids and affecting arrests. Both prostitution and alcohol are banned under Afghanistan's Constitution. However, a unwritten code "allows" foreigners to consume alcohol and it is served in restaurants frequented by them. In recent months however, alcohol, or at least beer, is also being sold openly in street corners.
In February this year the Upper House of Afghanistan's Parliament expressed grave concern at what it called rampant moral vices in Afghanistan — the widespread use of alcohol, prostitution and other social and moral evils.
Moulvi Qasim fights shy of saying whether Western lifestyles are the reason for the reactivation of the department. While stating that all foreigners are bound by the laws of the land, he however insists that the department's activities will have an impact on Afghans "so that they do not accept anything that is against the culture of Afghanistan."
Key players in the international community have been cautious in their response to the move to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue. The UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) emphasised that any new body must have effective safeguards to prevent misuse of powers. Welcoming the Government's assurances, the U.N. body said "we await further information on this issue, particularly more transparency on the question of why this body is needed and how it will be used."
The E.U. came up with a similar response with E.U. special representative Frances Vendrell saying he did not want to pass judgement on the department until he had seen what the department was going to be, while emphasising the need for it to be consistent with the rights enshrined in the Constitution.
While the E.U. and U.N. have been cautious, there are those in the international community who actually feel that the move to set up the department is a good one as it would deflect the pressure from conservative sections of the community. An aid worker who has spent more than a decade working on and in Afghanistan wondered what the fuss was all about. The expatriate lifestyles, he said, had created some consternation and the pendulum was now swinging back. The aid worker, who did not want to be named, said the current government had always had to "walk the tightrope between the turban and the Armani suit" and this move (to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue) might be an instrument that would help it do that, acting as a pressure valve for conservative opinions and pressures.
Deputy Minister Qasim denies that the move was meant to address concerns about the current government's un-Islamic character but admitted that it would help improve the government's image. "The government will be strengthened if people see the government working to spread the message of Islam and morality. That will improve the picture of the government in the eyes of the people."
An Afghan youth who is critical of the international community's role in his country however felt the government had probably backed down from what it may have planned earlier following international pressure. "I see nothing new in this move. Maybe they got scared and diluted their earlier plans."
DEBATE
The return of Big Brother
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
THE spectre of the Taliban police flailing whips on the streets to enforce their laws is a common image associated with their rule in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue issued edicts which banned girls going to school, women revealing any part of their body including ankles, men shaving or cutting beards, kite flying, music, amongst others. Four and a half years after the Taliban, the Department of Vice and Virtue is back, under the Hamid Karzai government. The move, passed by the cabinet, now awaits a nod from Parliament.
The step has sparked some consternation amongst human rights activists and organisations both within and outside the country, which have expressed fears about the purposes and powers of the body. Human Rights Watch said the department could be used to silence critical voices and further limit women's and girls' access to work, healthcare and education. It called on the international community to make a clear commitment to Afghanistan's long term security and reconstruction and to avoid a return to repressive past practices. Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission also expressed concern over the department, saying there were no clear terms of reference for the body.
No cause for alarm?
The Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, which will oversee the department, however says there is no cause for alarm or worry and that there will be no departure from functions already being carried out by the government. The department would not resemble its namesake under the Taliban in any way, the Ministry has stated, saying the Taliban had abused and misused religion.
In fact, the Department of Vice and Virtue did not emerge with the Taliban. Instituted by the mujahideen who came to power after fighting the Soviets, the department was elevated to the level of a full ministry under the Taliban. Moreover, the department was never abolished by the current government after it came to power, but in fact lay dormant until now.
The recent move, says Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Haj and Auqaf, Moulvi Mohammed Qasim, has been undertaken only to streamline and coordinate and unify the activities of three existing departments: one under the Ministry of Information and Culture which preaches Islamic values through programmes and publications in the electronic and print media, thse second under the Ministry of Haj which is in charge of Islamic preaching and the third under the Supreme Court which is supposed to ensure accountability to the principles of Islam.
According to Moulvi Qasim, the powers and purposes of the reactivated department will be very limited. The department will not have its own enforcement agency or police, but will only spread the message of Islamic principles and morality in society, mainly through public preaching. The government currently employs the preachers in mosques and the new move will strengthen their role and provide uniform guidelines on how and what to preach he said, adding, "all religions — Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism preach the holy word and the principles of religion".
`Rising immorality'
The department, the Minister said in an exclusive interview, was set up by President Karzai on the urging of people from rural areas as well as the Ulema Councils of the various provinces. "We ourselves felt immorality in society was on the increase. More and more sex workers were being arrested and alcohol was being seized by the Interior Ministry police. This is worrying and we are concerned about the people."
A task force under the Ministry of Interior already exists to "combat immorality". Set up in January 2005, the task force has since cracked down on alcohol consumption and prostitution, carrying out raids and affecting arrests. Both prostitution and alcohol are banned under Afghanistan's Constitution. However, a unwritten code "allows" foreigners to consume alcohol and it is served in restaurants frequented by them. In recent months however, alcohol, or at least beer, is also being sold openly in street corners.
In February this year the Upper House of Afghanistan's Parliament expressed grave concern at what it called rampant moral vices in Afghanistan — the widespread use of alcohol, prostitution and other social and moral evils.
Moulvi Qasim fights shy of saying whether Western lifestyles are the reason for the reactivation of the department. While stating that all foreigners are bound by the laws of the land, he however insists that the department's activities will have an impact on Afghans "so that they do not accept anything that is against the culture of Afghanistan."
Key players in the international community have been cautious in their response to the move to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue. The UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) emphasised that any new body must have effective safeguards to prevent misuse of powers. Welcoming the Government's assurances, the U.N. body said "we await further information on this issue, particularly more transparency on the question of why this body is needed and how it will be used."
The E.U. came up with a similar response with E.U. special representative Frances Vendrell saying he did not want to pass judgement on the department until he had seen what the department was going to be, while emphasising the need for it to be consistent with the rights enshrined in the Constitution.
While the E.U. and U.N. have been cautious, there are those in the international community who actually feel that the move to set up the department is a good one as it would deflect the pressure from conservative sections of the community. An aid worker who has spent more than a decade working on and in Afghanistan wondered what the fuss was all about. The expatriate lifestyles, he said, had created some consternation and the pendulum was now swinging back. The aid worker, who did not want to be named, said the current government had always had to "walk the tightrope between the turban and the Armani suit" and this move (to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue) might be an instrument that would help it do that, acting as a pressure valve for conservative opinions and pressures.
Deputy Minister Qasim denies that the move was meant to address concerns about the current government's un-Islamic character but admitted that it would help improve the government's image. "The government will be strengthened if people see the government working to spread the message of Islam and morality. That will improve the picture of the government in the eyes of the people."
An Afghan youth who is critical of the international community's role in his country however felt the government had probably backed down from what it may have planned earlier following international pressure. "I see nothing new in this move. Maybe they got scared and diluted their earlier plans."
August 11, 2006
Vice and virtue in Afghanistan
Vice and virtue in Afghanistan
Asia Times
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - The Afghan government's move to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue has set alarm bells ringing among sections of the international community. Under the Taliban, a full-fledged ministry was responsible for formulating some of its most contentious laws.
The Taliban's tal-Amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-Nahi 'an al-Munkir or Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was responsible for implementing a wide range of codes governing public behavior, including bans on activities ranging from homosexuality and apparently innocent pastimes such as kite-flying and music to the absurd, including on women showing their ankles, as well as diktats on the length of men's beards.
Reacting to the move by President Hamid Karzai government, Human Rights Watch said it raised "serious concerns about the
potential abuse of the rights of women and vulnerable groups". The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission said it was "concerned about the move, since this would evoke fears of the legacy of human-rights abuses at the hand of the Taliban".
However, though the step has been projected as "setting up" of the department, the reality is that the department was never closed down by the Karzai government after it came to power, but lay dormant. Another little-reported fact is that the department was first set up under the mujahideen, though the Taliban upgraded it into a full-fledged ministry.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, and US military operations in Afghanistan, all terror and abuse in the country is equated solely with the Taliban. Though the Taliban period did reflect the worst excesses of religious conservatism, the international community has by and large chosen to ignore the rabid conservatism within sections of the jihadi leaders, as it has their human-rights excesses and abuses. Many of these leaders are now in government as well as being allies of the forces prosecuting the "war on terror".
There was little reaction from any of the international community when the government's equivalent of the moral police was first set up. In January 2005, the government instituted a task force under the Interior Ministry that was charged with cracking down on immorality in public. The department has raided brothels and some foreign guesthouses, seized liquor and arrested suspected prostitutes. (Under Afghan law, alcohol and prostitution are both banned, though an unwritten code allows foreigners to consume alcohol.)
The lack of a major public outcry over the continuing abuse of women within the judicial and criminal system - there are large numbers of women in jail, arrested for crimes including attempts to escape from abusive domestic situations - suggests that the consternation over the Vice and Virtue Department has more to do with the paradigm of the "war against terror" and its demonization of the Taliban.
Moulvi Mohammed Qasim, deputy minister of Haj and Religious Affairs (the ministry charged with the oversight of the Vice and Virtue Department), insists there is nothing dangerous in the move to reactivate the department, since its only purpose will be to preach to the public about morality, a task it already does. (Preachers employed in many of the mosques throughout the country are employees of the ministry.) The move was a response to the "public demand" arising out of concerns about "growing immorality in society", he said.
A young Kabul professional, Mustafa, has traditional values and similar concerns about growing immorality in society through alcohol and prostitution. However, in a democracy the task of dealing with this ought to be left to the police, who have the necessary authority, he feels. Though the police system also needs revamping to deal with corruption, Mustafa fears the reactivation of the old Vice Department will bring back bad memories.
Parveen is from a far more radical background. A member of the underground Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, Parveen said secularism is an important component of democracy and that the government should not be involved in religion. This is despite the fact that she too has concerns about a certain Westernized culture she said has been introduced into Afghan society to distract the youth from taking an active part in politics and questioning the way the country is being governed.
While reactions to the department have been mixed, there are also a fair number of international observers who think the move is a good one. A longtime aid worker suggested that the move would be good for the government, which is walking a tightrope between liberal and conservative forces. He suggested the decision to reactivate the department was a reaction to the moves to modernize too quickly.
The European Union and the United Nations have reacted with circumspection, saying they were waiting to see what the department is all about, even while both have referred to the need to uphold human-rights commitments. The UN, even while welcoming the government's assurances on the department, called for more information, transparency about the purpose and suggested safeguards.
The absence of clear rules governing this department is indeed a cause for worry. Though the current proposed role of the department does not appear to endanger civil liberties, much will depend on the implementation and the checks and balances. The stick of un-Islamic behavior could be used against sections and persons critical of the government. Media, says one political observer, could be the first casualty.
However, Qasim insists that the move is nothing more than a revamping of existing structures. It will bring together three existing departments under one roof to ensure coordination and better functioning, he said. The three are the Department for Propagating Islamic Values through Media (currently under the Information Ministry), the Department of Accountability to Islamic Principles (under the Supreme Court), and the Department on Islamic Preaching (under the Ministry of Haj). Preaching morality is enjoined by Islam, and most of the major religions preach morality, Qasim said.
He denied that the move seeks to strengthen the Karzai government, but admitted that it will be good for its image "if people see that the government is taking steps to preach Islamic principles", since their belief in the government being Islamic will be strengthened.
The decision by the government reflects a trend whereby Karzai, wholly reliant on international support initially, has for some time begun taking greater backing from conservative sections. In a weakened polity (political parties have been deliberately kept weak through successive measures, endorsed by the international community, that serve to maintain a strong presidency), the only cohesive political groups are either commanders of armed groups or leaders with religious backing. These groups alone are capable of delivering the support of larger groups, something that Karzai has taken advantage of repeatedly recently.
The result has been a gradual ascendancy of conservative sections. Marginalized in the immediate aftermath of the ouster of the Taliban, the conservative sections are now gradually acquiring respectability and getting back their space within the mainstream. A series of small but significant steps are being taken now in response to the concerns of this community. These include tightened controls on the media, a larger role in governance for conservative sections, and measures such as reactivation of the Department of Vice and Virtue.
The reactivation of the department, if approved by parliament, may yet turn out to be a toothless body. But its symbolic value will definitely help the government.
Asia Times
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - The Afghan government's move to reactivate the Department of Vice and Virtue has set alarm bells ringing among sections of the international community. Under the Taliban, a full-fledged ministry was responsible for formulating some of its most contentious laws.
The Taliban's tal-Amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-Nahi 'an al-Munkir or Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice was responsible for implementing a wide range of codes governing public behavior, including bans on activities ranging from homosexuality and apparently innocent pastimes such as kite-flying and music to the absurd, including on women showing their ankles, as well as diktats on the length of men's beards.
Reacting to the move by President Hamid Karzai government, Human Rights Watch said it raised "serious concerns about the
potential abuse of the rights of women and vulnerable groups". The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission said it was "concerned about the move, since this would evoke fears of the legacy of human-rights abuses at the hand of the Taliban".
However, though the step has been projected as "setting up" of the department, the reality is that the department was never closed down by the Karzai government after it came to power, but lay dormant. Another little-reported fact is that the department was first set up under the mujahideen, though the Taliban upgraded it into a full-fledged ministry.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, and US military operations in Afghanistan, all terror and abuse in the country is equated solely with the Taliban. Though the Taliban period did reflect the worst excesses of religious conservatism, the international community has by and large chosen to ignore the rabid conservatism within sections of the jihadi leaders, as it has their human-rights excesses and abuses. Many of these leaders are now in government as well as being allies of the forces prosecuting the "war on terror".
There was little reaction from any of the international community when the government's equivalent of the moral police was first set up. In January 2005, the government instituted a task force under the Interior Ministry that was charged with cracking down on immorality in public. The department has raided brothels and some foreign guesthouses, seized liquor and arrested suspected prostitutes. (Under Afghan law, alcohol and prostitution are both banned, though an unwritten code allows foreigners to consume alcohol.)
The lack of a major public outcry over the continuing abuse of women within the judicial and criminal system - there are large numbers of women in jail, arrested for crimes including attempts to escape from abusive domestic situations - suggests that the consternation over the Vice and Virtue Department has more to do with the paradigm of the "war against terror" and its demonization of the Taliban.
Moulvi Mohammed Qasim, deputy minister of Haj and Religious Affairs (the ministry charged with the oversight of the Vice and Virtue Department), insists there is nothing dangerous in the move to reactivate the department, since its only purpose will be to preach to the public about morality, a task it already does. (Preachers employed in many of the mosques throughout the country are employees of the ministry.) The move was a response to the "public demand" arising out of concerns about "growing immorality in society", he said.
A young Kabul professional, Mustafa, has traditional values and similar concerns about growing immorality in society through alcohol and prostitution. However, in a democracy the task of dealing with this ought to be left to the police, who have the necessary authority, he feels. Though the police system also needs revamping to deal with corruption, Mustafa fears the reactivation of the old Vice Department will bring back bad memories.
Parveen is from a far more radical background. A member of the underground Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, Parveen said secularism is an important component of democracy and that the government should not be involved in religion. This is despite the fact that she too has concerns about a certain Westernized culture she said has been introduced into Afghan society to distract the youth from taking an active part in politics and questioning the way the country is being governed.
While reactions to the department have been mixed, there are also a fair number of international observers who think the move is a good one. A longtime aid worker suggested that the move would be good for the government, which is walking a tightrope between liberal and conservative forces. He suggested the decision to reactivate the department was a reaction to the moves to modernize too quickly.
The European Union and the United Nations have reacted with circumspection, saying they were waiting to see what the department is all about, even while both have referred to the need to uphold human-rights commitments. The UN, even while welcoming the government's assurances on the department, called for more information, transparency about the purpose and suggested safeguards.
The absence of clear rules governing this department is indeed a cause for worry. Though the current proposed role of the department does not appear to endanger civil liberties, much will depend on the implementation and the checks and balances. The stick of un-Islamic behavior could be used against sections and persons critical of the government. Media, says one political observer, could be the first casualty.
However, Qasim insists that the move is nothing more than a revamping of existing structures. It will bring together three existing departments under one roof to ensure coordination and better functioning, he said. The three are the Department for Propagating Islamic Values through Media (currently under the Information Ministry), the Department of Accountability to Islamic Principles (under the Supreme Court), and the Department on Islamic Preaching (under the Ministry of Haj). Preaching morality is enjoined by Islam, and most of the major religions preach morality, Qasim said.
He denied that the move seeks to strengthen the Karzai government, but admitted that it will be good for its image "if people see that the government is taking steps to preach Islamic principles", since their belief in the government being Islamic will be strengthened.
The decision by the government reflects a trend whereby Karzai, wholly reliant on international support initially, has for some time begun taking greater backing from conservative sections. In a weakened polity (political parties have been deliberately kept weak through successive measures, endorsed by the international community, that serve to maintain a strong presidency), the only cohesive political groups are either commanders of armed groups or leaders with religious backing. These groups alone are capable of delivering the support of larger groups, something that Karzai has taken advantage of repeatedly recently.
The result has been a gradual ascendancy of conservative sections. Marginalized in the immediate aftermath of the ouster of the Taliban, the conservative sections are now gradually acquiring respectability and getting back their space within the mainstream. A series of small but significant steps are being taken now in response to the concerns of this community. These include tightened controls on the media, a larger role in governance for conservative sections, and measures such as reactivation of the Department of Vice and Virtue.
The reactivation of the department, if approved by parliament, may yet turn out to be a toothless body. But its symbolic value will definitely help the government.
July 30, 2006
Italians Train Afghans for Non-Traditional Jobs
Italians Train Afghans for Non-Traditional Jobs
By Aunohita Mojumdar - WeNews correspondent
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Merafzon has a determined set to her chin and a resolute look in her eye as she surveys the pushing and jostling crowd grouped around the food counter. These are her customers, but she will take no nonsense from them.
While her customers clamor for attention she firmly tells them to wait their turn as she ladles out their food. Their attempts to bargain down the price of the dishes are also met with firm rebuttals. "The price is fixed and the menu set," she says, pointing her customers to the payment counter managed by a female cashier-in-training.
Merafzon--like many Afghans she has only one name--is the president of Mushtari Cooking and Catering Company, an all-woman association that has just opened a lunchtime canteen for employees of the government's Ministry of Women's Affairs.
Merafzon, 42, is part of a small group of women entering Afghanistan's male-dominated domains with the help of a program sponsored by Italian Cooperation, the Italian government's aid and development agency that has allocated $260,000 for the project. Another $30,000 has been provided by the Lombardy region.
Bypassing the traditional skills usually held by women--such as sewing and cleaning for poorer women and teaching or receptionist jobs for the middle class--the Italian program introduced a group of 60 women to four skilled trades: catering, gem-cutting, repairing mobile phones and making solar lanterns. Once they are fully trained, they will work in cooperative business associations officially registered with the Afghan government and will share the profits equally.
Atmosphere of Camaraderie
The women's center is a three-story building in a lower middle-class neighborhood of Kabul. In the basement is the gem-cutting room with its massive machines. On the first floor two rooms house the mobile phone unit and the solar lantern unit. There is a kindergarten on the second floor where the women leave their children while they learn new skills and receive literacy training. The atmosphere in each room is friendly and one of camaraderie; the women chat together as they pore over their work.
At the center, an Italian volunteer came to train women for catering, a field that is predominantly male in Afghanistan. To teach lantern-making and gem-cutting, experts came from India to pass on their skills. Some of the women also traveled to Jaipur, India's famed gem center, to train there.
When the project was launched a year and a half ago, Italian Cooperation opened it to women from Kabul's eighth district, one of the city's poorest areas. "The most vulnerable women were identified through a survey," says Monica Matarazzo, the social project officer with Italian Cooperation.
The choice of unusual professions was deliberate. "It was more challenging and original," says Matarazzo. It was felt, she says, that there were already plenty of projects in Kabul teaching sewing and more traditional skills to women.
Although Afghanistan's constitution now guarantees equal rights for women, customs restricting their movement still remain. Some women, especially those from more affluent or liberal families, have the freedom to leave their homes, but for others it is still forbidden, especially if their work will put them into contact with male colleagues. Women traveling alone still face harassment in the streets.
Layer of Protective Approval
Recognizing the difficulty the women had in leaving their neighborhoods, Italian Cooperation located the training center near their homes and worked with the local shura--the group of elders that make decisions in the community--to gain their support and give the women a layer of protective approval. The women are able to walk in to the center and their families and neighbors can visit and see what happens there. Once the first step was taken, it has now become possible for the women to travel further.
The Sultan Razia Gem-Cutting and Polishing Company is about to open a window on Chicken Street, Kabul's top tourist destination. Merchants along the narrow street lined with shops sell carpet and jewelry. Afghanistan is rich in lapis and quartz; during the war, the mines were plundered to finance the fighting forces.
Asifa, a 40-year-old war widow, has brought up five daughters and two sons since her husband's death a decade ago. She is a graduate of the project's gem-cutting program. Asifa remembers a very different earlier life, when she lived comfortably and securely with her husband, a senior employee of the government-owned radio and television network.
"But the Taliban came to him asking him not to make anti-Taliban programs," Asifa says. "When he didn't listen to them one day they came to the house. They knocked on the door and shot him dead. I survived by sewing clothes. No one helped. Then the center opened. In the beginning no one wanted to come to the center. They were not sure its work was in accordance with Islam. But slowly we saw what it was and now my neighbors have no problems with it."
Doing the Work Themselves
Another student in the gem-cutting program, Saleha, says she did not find it easy to start working outside the home. The big polishing and cutting machines scared her initially. Now, she says, the women can easily repair any of the minor problems in the machines themselves.
An owner of a local mobile phone repair shop offered his expertise to the project, and the nation's largest mobile service provider, Roshan, a Kabul-based company that says 21 percent of its employees are female, plans to donate equipment and says it will send a stream of customers to the women once they are officially in business.
One of those will be 19-year-old Fahima. Her father was shot in the eye six years ago by the "gilam jam," the "carpet-baggers" of the North who looted and pillaged Afghanistan in the civil war before the Taliban seized control in 1996. Refugees for 12 years, the family returned to their home city to find their shops burned down and their home in need of extensive repairs. Now Fahima has become an expert mobile phone repairer.
Shakila is only 35, but looks older. A hard life, a heart ailment and unending struggles have taken their toll, as they have for many Afghan women, who have an average life expectancy of 42 years and endure maternal mortality rates that are among the highest in the world. But Shakila says she is doing much better these days.
"I have six children and a husband at home," she says. "Before, the money my husband used to earn was not enough for the living expenses and my medicine as well. Now, after I started training here, I can afford my medicines."
Shakila is a part of a group of women who make solar lanterns. They disassemble kerosene lanterns and retrofit them with small solar panels and microchips. Although relatively costly at $75 apiece, the lanterns are useful in Afghanistan, which has plenty of sunshine but often runs short on electricity.
By Aunohita Mojumdar - WeNews correspondent
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Merafzon has a determined set to her chin and a resolute look in her eye as she surveys the pushing and jostling crowd grouped around the food counter. These are her customers, but she will take no nonsense from them.
While her customers clamor for attention she firmly tells them to wait their turn as she ladles out their food. Their attempts to bargain down the price of the dishes are also met with firm rebuttals. "The price is fixed and the menu set," she says, pointing her customers to the payment counter managed by a female cashier-in-training.
Merafzon--like many Afghans she has only one name--is the president of Mushtari Cooking and Catering Company, an all-woman association that has just opened a lunchtime canteen for employees of the government's Ministry of Women's Affairs.
Merafzon, 42, is part of a small group of women entering Afghanistan's male-dominated domains with the help of a program sponsored by Italian Cooperation, the Italian government's aid and development agency that has allocated $260,000 for the project. Another $30,000 has been provided by the Lombardy region.
Bypassing the traditional skills usually held by women--such as sewing and cleaning for poorer women and teaching or receptionist jobs for the middle class--the Italian program introduced a group of 60 women to four skilled trades: catering, gem-cutting, repairing mobile phones and making solar lanterns. Once they are fully trained, they will work in cooperative business associations officially registered with the Afghan government and will share the profits equally.
Atmosphere of Camaraderie
The women's center is a three-story building in a lower middle-class neighborhood of Kabul. In the basement is the gem-cutting room with its massive machines. On the first floor two rooms house the mobile phone unit and the solar lantern unit. There is a kindergarten on the second floor where the women leave their children while they learn new skills and receive literacy training. The atmosphere in each room is friendly and one of camaraderie; the women chat together as they pore over their work.
At the center, an Italian volunteer came to train women for catering, a field that is predominantly male in Afghanistan. To teach lantern-making and gem-cutting, experts came from India to pass on their skills. Some of the women also traveled to Jaipur, India's famed gem center, to train there.
When the project was launched a year and a half ago, Italian Cooperation opened it to women from Kabul's eighth district, one of the city's poorest areas. "The most vulnerable women were identified through a survey," says Monica Matarazzo, the social project officer with Italian Cooperation.
The choice of unusual professions was deliberate. "It was more challenging and original," says Matarazzo. It was felt, she says, that there were already plenty of projects in Kabul teaching sewing and more traditional skills to women.
Although Afghanistan's constitution now guarantees equal rights for women, customs restricting their movement still remain. Some women, especially those from more affluent or liberal families, have the freedom to leave their homes, but for others it is still forbidden, especially if their work will put them into contact with male colleagues. Women traveling alone still face harassment in the streets.
Layer of Protective Approval
Recognizing the difficulty the women had in leaving their neighborhoods, Italian Cooperation located the training center near their homes and worked with the local shura--the group of elders that make decisions in the community--to gain their support and give the women a layer of protective approval. The women are able to walk in to the center and their families and neighbors can visit and see what happens there. Once the first step was taken, it has now become possible for the women to travel further.
The Sultan Razia Gem-Cutting and Polishing Company is about to open a window on Chicken Street, Kabul's top tourist destination. Merchants along the narrow street lined with shops sell carpet and jewelry. Afghanistan is rich in lapis and quartz; during the war, the mines were plundered to finance the fighting forces.
Asifa, a 40-year-old war widow, has brought up five daughters and two sons since her husband's death a decade ago. She is a graduate of the project's gem-cutting program. Asifa remembers a very different earlier life, when she lived comfortably and securely with her husband, a senior employee of the government-owned radio and television network.
"But the Taliban came to him asking him not to make anti-Taliban programs," Asifa says. "When he didn't listen to them one day they came to the house. They knocked on the door and shot him dead. I survived by sewing clothes. No one helped. Then the center opened. In the beginning no one wanted to come to the center. They were not sure its work was in accordance with Islam. But slowly we saw what it was and now my neighbors have no problems with it."
Doing the Work Themselves
Another student in the gem-cutting program, Saleha, says she did not find it easy to start working outside the home. The big polishing and cutting machines scared her initially. Now, she says, the women can easily repair any of the minor problems in the machines themselves.
An owner of a local mobile phone repair shop offered his expertise to the project, and the nation's largest mobile service provider, Roshan, a Kabul-based company that says 21 percent of its employees are female, plans to donate equipment and says it will send a stream of customers to the women once they are officially in business.
One of those will be 19-year-old Fahima. Her father was shot in the eye six years ago by the "gilam jam," the "carpet-baggers" of the North who looted and pillaged Afghanistan in the civil war before the Taliban seized control in 1996. Refugees for 12 years, the family returned to their home city to find their shops burned down and their home in need of extensive repairs. Now Fahima has become an expert mobile phone repairer.
Shakila is only 35, but looks older. A hard life, a heart ailment and unending struggles have taken their toll, as they have for many Afghan women, who have an average life expectancy of 42 years and endure maternal mortality rates that are among the highest in the world. But Shakila says she is doing much better these days.
"I have six children and a husband at home," she says. "Before, the money my husband used to earn was not enough for the living expenses and my medicine as well. Now, after I started training here, I can afford my medicines."
Shakila is a part of a group of women who make solar lanterns. They disassemble kerosene lanterns and retrofit them with small solar panels and microchips. Although relatively costly at $75 apiece, the lanterns are useful in Afghanistan, which has plenty of sunshine but often runs short on electricity.
July 23, 2006
Desert Phoenix :The Mughal sire's grave has been roused from the cinders of war
Outlook Magazine| Jul 31, 2006
Heritage: Babar's tomb
Desert Phoenix
The Mughal sire's grave has been roused from the cinders of war
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
A few weeks ago, Kabul's Bagh-e-Babar, the resting place of the first Mughal emperor, hosted a sumptuous lunch. The invitees were the workmen on the site as well as the neighbours, residents of the adjoining hill. Sheep were slaughtered in the ritual manner, and kabab and pulau were feasted on. It was a traditional thanksgiving in the best Afghan tradition, offered by an Uzbek businessman who traces his lineage to Emperor Zahiruddin Mohammad Babar.
In a city bombed to smithereens, not a single historical monument remains intact, and restoration has to be only one of the many contending priorities in a country where people's very lives have been shattered. But the project for the restoration of the garden that Babar, a prince in exile, created for a sense of peace and belonging in a strange land is also one of the ways in which a war-ravaged city is now being restored to its people.
Even before the completion of the project, the gates of the garden are open to the people of Kabul. Families and groups of friends are flocking in to rest and picnic in this tranquil green oasis. Only residents of a city picking out their lives amidst the rubble and dust of 30 years of war can understand the importance of this space.
The garden, which is being restored by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC), together with Afghanistan's ministry of culture, the Kabul municipality and UNESCO, has tried to resuscitate traditional crafts by using techniques employed in the original building as well as those used widely in rural Afghanistan even now, so that Afghan craftsmen do not forget their traditions, says Jolyon Leslie, program manager, AKTC. To train the workmen, the trust went back to some of the ancient building techniques still preserved in Iran and India, and several Afghan master-craftsmen received training in India where these skills are still alive. The same techniques have been used in the restoration of Humayun's Tomb in Delhi. When AKTC took charge of the Bagh-e-Babar, it was a wilderness of tangled weeds, mine holes and bomb craters. The site had formed part of the frontline in fierce battles for control of Kabul, and taken a heavy share of the hits. Work has had to proceed with care, with plenty of live ammunition extracted from the site.
A 1994 picture of Haremsarai after its destruction by the mujahideen
The Bagh-e-Babar began as a natural wilderness spread over 11 hectares. Always longing for Fergana, the small kingdom in present-day Uzbekistan that he lost when he was 13, Babar tried to recreate its beauty wherever he went, building gardens in different parts of his growing empire, and introducing new plants and fruits to the regions he conquered. Unlike the highly stylised gardens of the later Mughal rulers, Babar's gardens were more natural pieces of land reclaimed from the wilderness and transformed with some ordered plots, flowers, fruit trees, and watered by streams. His attention to detail in the creation of his gardens is recorded in his memoirs, the Babarnama. "It is necessary to make geometrical grass plots and plant some flowers with nice colours and scents around the edges of the grass," Babar notes. But his favourites always remained his gardens in and around Kabul, the kingdom he conquered in 1504. His memoirs describe how in his garden in Kabul he had "a spring surrounded by stonework into a ten by ten pool, such that the four sides would form benches overlooking the grove of Judas trees. When the trees blossom, no place in the world equals it".On his death in 1530, Babar was first buried in Agra until, at the urging of his Afghan wife Bibi Mubarika, Humayun brought the remains to his garden in Kabul, fulfilling Babar's wishes.
In succeeding years, during visits to Kabul by later Mughal kings, including Shah Jahan, the Bagh-e-Babar became more structured and formal, with walls and water cascades added. More structures were built in subsequent years. The pavilion and the queen's palace were built by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan at the end of the 19th century but cut into the original design of the garden, including the central axis. The central water channel was disrupted. During the Soviet era, a swimming pool was built inside the garden as well as a greenhouse in an attempt to make it more of a public space. The garden suffered its worst blow in 1992-93 when bombing destroyed the water systems. Though these were restored in the mid-'90s, the original trees had died by then.
Babar’s tomb built in Indian marble by Indian craftsmen
While past archaeological surveys provided some information about the original garden, old foundations like that of the Shahjahani gate were discovered during the ongoing restoration, as was the central water channel. For the enclosure of Babar's grave, an 1852 drawing by Charles Mason which was found in the British Library was used to recreate the original. For this work, the marble was brought from India, and Indian craftsmen were used to create a replica, which was assembled in spring this year.
Sixteen species of plants mentioned in the original Babarnama have been replanted in the Bagh-e-Babar—planes, apricot, apples, peaches, quince, pomegranate, hawthorn, cherry and argowan (judas) trees. Traditional Afghan building techniques, including the use of hand-laid earth (pakhsa) and sun-dried bricks on stone foundations, have been used, as have their methods of mixing lime and making load-bearing arches.
But while tradition has been resurrected, the garden's restoration also reflects contemporary needs. The Shahjahani gate, for instance, will now become a public reception centre. The Soviet-era swimming pool, an eyesore in the original design, has been shifted just outside the perimeter and will provide valuable revenue for the garden. The queen's palace has been redeveloped—it has already hosted the performance of a Shakespeare play. As the Bagh-e-Babar regains its former glory, providing balm for the soul of this bruised and battered city, Babar can rest easy in his grave again.
___________________
http://www.outlookindia.com/fullprint.asp?choice=1&fodname=20060731&fname=Babar+Garden+%28F%29&sid=1
Heritage: Babar's tomb
Desert Phoenix
The Mughal sire's grave has been roused from the cinders of war
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
A few weeks ago, Kabul's Bagh-e-Babar, the resting place of the first Mughal emperor, hosted a sumptuous lunch. The invitees were the workmen on the site as well as the neighbours, residents of the adjoining hill. Sheep were slaughtered in the ritual manner, and kabab and pulau were feasted on. It was a traditional thanksgiving in the best Afghan tradition, offered by an Uzbek businessman who traces his lineage to Emperor Zahiruddin Mohammad Babar.
In a city bombed to smithereens, not a single historical monument remains intact, and restoration has to be only one of the many contending priorities in a country where people's very lives have been shattered. But the project for the restoration of the garden that Babar, a prince in exile, created for a sense of peace and belonging in a strange land is also one of the ways in which a war-ravaged city is now being restored to its people.
Even before the completion of the project, the gates of the garden are open to the people of Kabul. Families and groups of friends are flocking in to rest and picnic in this tranquil green oasis. Only residents of a city picking out their lives amidst the rubble and dust of 30 years of war can understand the importance of this space.
The garden, which is being restored by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (AKTC), together with Afghanistan's ministry of culture, the Kabul municipality and UNESCO, has tried to resuscitate traditional crafts by using techniques employed in the original building as well as those used widely in rural Afghanistan even now, so that Afghan craftsmen do not forget their traditions, says Jolyon Leslie, program manager, AKTC. To train the workmen, the trust went back to some of the ancient building techniques still preserved in Iran and India, and several Afghan master-craftsmen received training in India where these skills are still alive. The same techniques have been used in the restoration of Humayun's Tomb in Delhi. When AKTC took charge of the Bagh-e-Babar, it was a wilderness of tangled weeds, mine holes and bomb craters. The site had formed part of the frontline in fierce battles for control of Kabul, and taken a heavy share of the hits. Work has had to proceed with care, with plenty of live ammunition extracted from the site.
A 1994 picture of Haremsarai after its destruction by the mujahideen
The Bagh-e-Babar began as a natural wilderness spread over 11 hectares. Always longing for Fergana, the small kingdom in present-day Uzbekistan that he lost when he was 13, Babar tried to recreate its beauty wherever he went, building gardens in different parts of his growing empire, and introducing new plants and fruits to the regions he conquered. Unlike the highly stylised gardens of the later Mughal rulers, Babar's gardens were more natural pieces of land reclaimed from the wilderness and transformed with some ordered plots, flowers, fruit trees, and watered by streams. His attention to detail in the creation of his gardens is recorded in his memoirs, the Babarnama. "It is necessary to make geometrical grass plots and plant some flowers with nice colours and scents around the edges of the grass," Babar notes. But his favourites always remained his gardens in and around Kabul, the kingdom he conquered in 1504. His memoirs describe how in his garden in Kabul he had "a spring surrounded by stonework into a ten by ten pool, such that the four sides would form benches overlooking the grove of Judas trees. When the trees blossom, no place in the world equals it".On his death in 1530, Babar was first buried in Agra until, at the urging of his Afghan wife Bibi Mubarika, Humayun brought the remains to his garden in Kabul, fulfilling Babar's wishes.
In succeeding years, during visits to Kabul by later Mughal kings, including Shah Jahan, the Bagh-e-Babar became more structured and formal, with walls and water cascades added. More structures were built in subsequent years. The pavilion and the queen's palace were built by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan at the end of the 19th century but cut into the original design of the garden, including the central axis. The central water channel was disrupted. During the Soviet era, a swimming pool was built inside the garden as well as a greenhouse in an attempt to make it more of a public space. The garden suffered its worst blow in 1992-93 when bombing destroyed the water systems. Though these were restored in the mid-'90s, the original trees had died by then.
Babar’s tomb built in Indian marble by Indian craftsmen
While past archaeological surveys provided some information about the original garden, old foundations like that of the Shahjahani gate were discovered during the ongoing restoration, as was the central water channel. For the enclosure of Babar's grave, an 1852 drawing by Charles Mason which was found in the British Library was used to recreate the original. For this work, the marble was brought from India, and Indian craftsmen were used to create a replica, which was assembled in spring this year.
Sixteen species of plants mentioned in the original Babarnama have been replanted in the Bagh-e-Babar—planes, apricot, apples, peaches, quince, pomegranate, hawthorn, cherry and argowan (judas) trees. Traditional Afghan building techniques, including the use of hand-laid earth (pakhsa) and sun-dried bricks on stone foundations, have been used, as have their methods of mixing lime and making load-bearing arches.
But while tradition has been resurrected, the garden's restoration also reflects contemporary needs. The Shahjahani gate, for instance, will now become a public reception centre. The Soviet-era swimming pool, an eyesore in the original design, has been shifted just outside the perimeter and will provide valuable revenue for the garden. The queen's palace has been redeveloped—it has already hosted the performance of a Shakespeare play. As the Bagh-e-Babar regains its former glory, providing balm for the soul of this bruised and battered city, Babar can rest easy in his grave again.
___________________
http://www.outlookindia.com/fullprint.asp?choice=1&fodname=20060731&fname=Babar+Garden+%28F%29&sid=1
July 12, 2006
Optimism Gives Way to Despair in Afghanistan
Optimism Gives Way to Despair in Afghanistan
July 2006
Arab News
Four and a half years of governance with international support, a new Constitution, presidential elections and a new Parliament, over 4 million children back in school and 4.5 million refugees back in Afghanistan — these are the achievements that were being trotted out with some satisfaction by the Afghan government and the international community until a few months ago.
Yet, in recent weeks and months the word “failure” is creeping up with greater frequency as Afghanistan enters what is being described as its most challenging year since the ouster of the Taleban in late 2001.
Insecurity has increased, the drug eradication program appears headed for failure and the security sector reforms are not yielding the desired results. The government’s authority is severely circumscribed by both insecurity and lack of capacity; the NGOs and foreign governments are finding wider areas of the country out of bounds severely hampering their aid programs and there are increasing signs of friction between President Hamid Karzai and Afghanistan’s friends.
“The possibility of failure cannot be ruled out,” a UN diplomat told this writer in a private conversation this week adding that for the first time since 2001 “the failure of the entire process was a possibility”.
The views, which are being repeated by diplomats and experts seem to mark a long distance since the parliamentary elections a few months ago that were being projected as the cap to the successful completion of the first phase, the end of the Bonn process.
While some of Karzai’s foreign supporters are criticizing the Afghan government in public, the Afghan government too has been lashing out at the donor community with the president repeatedly calling for greater apportioning of donor funds to the government and change in the military strategy.
The changeover from the upbeat optimism of 2005 to the pessimism of mid-2006 seems remarkable. Have the reconstruction efforts in the country disintegrated in the last several months?
Have the anti-government forces including the Taleban received a shot in the arm that has turned them from remnants into a formidable foe? Or is it simply that the consequences of the intrinsic problems in the reconstruction efforts are beginning to make themselves felt?
The reconstruction of Afghanistan was not preceded by a peace agreement but by an invasion, points out an observer of Afghan politics. The American— led invasion paved the way for the ouster of the Taleban but the immediate needs of the US in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks overshadowed any discussions on subsequent nation— building. Faced with a power vacuum the government of Hamid Karzai was hurriedly installed but this led to the most perfunctory decision making process.
Having created its own quick blueprint for reconstruction, the world community and the Afghan government it installed have focused largely on fulfilling it, adopting short cuts and making compromises to meet the pre-selected benchmarks of success. If some people and governments are focusing their criticism on President Karzai for not having delivered, they must also take a great share of the blame for having opted for individualism over institution building.
Many of the compromises in the past few years have been made with a view to keeping Hamid Karzai in power and in a position of strength on the assumption that there is no one else capable of delivering. The result has been marginalization of some important political factions in decision— making and the weakening of the polity and state institutions.
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections, for example, rules were changed to keep political parties out of the fray. A process of vetting the antecedents of candidates undertaken with the professed intention of weeding out criminals satisfied no one and the process of national reconciliation has lacked both logic and transparency.
With the exception of some NGOs with long-term commitments to the country, the international donor programs have largely concentrated on clocking up numbers and deadlines as a measure of their success in rebuilding the country. This ensures impatience with the far slower process of capacity building and involving local community that would have led to a greater degree of stability.
The result has been a huge gap between the high expectations built up after the ouster of the Taleban and the actual delivery, a fertile ground for breeding dissatisfaction and the lack of support to state institutions, bringing Afghanistan to a critical situation.
________________________
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=85119&d=10&m=7&y=2006
July 2006
Arab News
Four and a half years of governance with international support, a new Constitution, presidential elections and a new Parliament, over 4 million children back in school and 4.5 million refugees back in Afghanistan — these are the achievements that were being trotted out with some satisfaction by the Afghan government and the international community until a few months ago.
Yet, in recent weeks and months the word “failure” is creeping up with greater frequency as Afghanistan enters what is being described as its most challenging year since the ouster of the Taleban in late 2001.
Insecurity has increased, the drug eradication program appears headed for failure and the security sector reforms are not yielding the desired results. The government’s authority is severely circumscribed by both insecurity and lack of capacity; the NGOs and foreign governments are finding wider areas of the country out of bounds severely hampering their aid programs and there are increasing signs of friction between President Hamid Karzai and Afghanistan’s friends.
“The possibility of failure cannot be ruled out,” a UN diplomat told this writer in a private conversation this week adding that for the first time since 2001 “the failure of the entire process was a possibility”.
The views, which are being repeated by diplomats and experts seem to mark a long distance since the parliamentary elections a few months ago that were being projected as the cap to the successful completion of the first phase, the end of the Bonn process.
While some of Karzai’s foreign supporters are criticizing the Afghan government in public, the Afghan government too has been lashing out at the donor community with the president repeatedly calling for greater apportioning of donor funds to the government and change in the military strategy.
The changeover from the upbeat optimism of 2005 to the pessimism of mid-2006 seems remarkable. Have the reconstruction efforts in the country disintegrated in the last several months?
Have the anti-government forces including the Taleban received a shot in the arm that has turned them from remnants into a formidable foe? Or is it simply that the consequences of the intrinsic problems in the reconstruction efforts are beginning to make themselves felt?
The reconstruction of Afghanistan was not preceded by a peace agreement but by an invasion, points out an observer of Afghan politics. The American— led invasion paved the way for the ouster of the Taleban but the immediate needs of the US in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks overshadowed any discussions on subsequent nation— building. Faced with a power vacuum the government of Hamid Karzai was hurriedly installed but this led to the most perfunctory decision making process.
Having created its own quick blueprint for reconstruction, the world community and the Afghan government it installed have focused largely on fulfilling it, adopting short cuts and making compromises to meet the pre-selected benchmarks of success. If some people and governments are focusing their criticism on President Karzai for not having delivered, they must also take a great share of the blame for having opted for individualism over institution building.
Many of the compromises in the past few years have been made with a view to keeping Hamid Karzai in power and in a position of strength on the assumption that there is no one else capable of delivering. The result has been marginalization of some important political factions in decision— making and the weakening of the polity and state institutions.
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections, for example, rules were changed to keep political parties out of the fray. A process of vetting the antecedents of candidates undertaken with the professed intention of weeding out criminals satisfied no one and the process of national reconciliation has lacked both logic and transparency.
With the exception of some NGOs with long-term commitments to the country, the international donor programs have largely concentrated on clocking up numbers and deadlines as a measure of their success in rebuilding the country. This ensures impatience with the far slower process of capacity building and involving local community that would have led to a greater degree of stability.
The result has been a huge gap between the high expectations built up after the ouster of the Taleban and the actual delivery, a fertile ground for breeding dissatisfaction and the lack of support to state institutions, bringing Afghanistan to a critical situation.
________________________
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=85119&d=10&m=7&y=2006
June 22, 2006
Afghanistan: Fighting ‘NGOism’
Afghanistan: Fighting ‘NGOism’
January 2006
Women's Feature Service
First there was Communism, then there was Talibanism and now there is NGOism,” goes a joke that gained currency after the arrival of the international community in post-Taliban Afghanistan in 2001-02. Nearly four years later, with targeted attacks on a large number of aid workers by anti-government militants that joke is no longer funny.
According to a report brought out by the Afghan NGO Security Organisation and CARE International (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere), as many as 24 NGO workers were killed in 2004, compared to 12 in 2003. Slow progress in reconstruction, misplaced aid priorities and misperceptions that club the international community together as one monolithic entity, are increasingly squeezing the space for non-profit NGOs working in Afghanistan, making them easy target for politicians playing on populist sentiment.
One politician riding high on this sentiment is former Planning Minister, Basher Dost. One of the highest vote-grossing candidates contesting the elections to Afghanistan’s new Parliament, he has acquired a reputation for anti-NGO rhetoric — one of the main reasons for his popularity.
Afghanistan receives a fairly large amount of aid funding. From January 2002 to September 2004, donor assistance totalled $1.226 billion directly to the Afghan government, $1.957 billion to the UN, $705 million to private contractors and $413 million to NGOs (as per Financial Report, Fourth Quarter: Ministry of Finance, Government of Afghanistan). Although NGOs get very little of the direct funding, the misperception that they receive the bulk of donor money persists, fuelled by populist rhetoric.
Dost denies that his is a populist stand that cashes in on jingoistic sentiment, claiming he is only against corrupt NGOs. Out of the 2,350 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Planning, Dost cancelled the registration of 1,935 in 2004, saying, “They were not really NGOs”. He also feels that all international aid should be routed through the office of the President; he thinks at present the aid is being controlled by a “mafia that shares it for its own luxurious lifestyles”.
Dost is tapping into the core of the latent anti-foreigner sentiment in the country. Afghanistan’s history of foreign invasions and fighting occupying forces ensures a simmering anti-foreigner sentiment. The resentment is also fuelled by the perceived lifestyles of the international community. Security restrictions on large sections of the international aid workers — especially those under the UN mandate — make it mandatory for them to travel in secured vehicles and live in secured areas. Unable to interact normally, a large number of foreigners lead insulated lives, travelling from office to home, where many lead lifestyles that are perceived alien to Afghan culture with its strict social and moral codes.
Alcohol consumption, for example, is banned under the Afghan Constitution; but under an unwritten code, expatriates continue to drink and be served alcohol at restaurants, which have to ensure that no Afghans are served alcohol. This and any form of open mingling between men and women are often the target of criticism from conservatives.
While the entire aid community is not a monolithic entity, there is little perception of distinction amongst Afghans. In fact, the blurring of lines extends even to different sections of the international community. With the military forces now engaged in reconstruction, the distinction between the military and civilian aid workers has been lost. So has the distinction between UN workers, contractors and the NGO community.
Attempting to redress this, ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief), an umbrella organisation for NGOs, led the development of an Afghanistan NGO Code of Conduct, which was launched in May 2005. Barbara Stapleton, ACBAR’s Advocacy and Policy Coordinator, says, “The Code will help professionalise the national NGO community further and provide a mechanism for following up on alleged complaints against any signatory organisation. It will also provide a tool to communicate to the Afghan government, media and people what non-profit NGOs are and what they are not. The Code is also intended to increase the transparency and accountability of NGOs working in Afghanistan. International NGOs prioritise capacity building and, in line with this objective, tend to have a predominantly Afghan staff.”
This contrasts sharply with the profiles of contractors and for-profit organisations. With huge sums of money available for reconstruction, their work focuses primarily on execution of projects to meet deadlines and pre-ordained benchmarks. This often leads to the creation of unsustainable projects, and institutions with little or no capacity building. The idea is to move in, build, collect payment and move on to the next project.
Unfortunately for NGOs, critics do not make this distinction. Paul Barker of CARE International says, “Much of the hostility against NGOs in Afghanistan is not very well-informed. Populist politicians, the media and many in the public tend to lump all aid agencies (including private contractors, UN agencies, private security contractors, and even the NATO-led International Assistance Security Force) into one group and refer to them as ‘NGOs’. The frustration felt by critics of the aid community reflects a perceived frustration with the rate of reconstruction and development in the country.”
A year ago, security for this community had reached rock bottom with repeated attacks in different parts of the country, forcing NGOs to curb their activities. Even popular agitation against the central government took the form of pinpointed and organised attacks on the international community and aid offices. While few chose to pull out, almost all restricted their activities, curtailing the movement of non-Afghans in some areas.
The situation was a little better in 2005, but seems perched to worsen again. A senior analyst dealing with security issues points out that this is not because of any decrease in anti-foreigner sentiment but because of the changing tactics of anti-government forces. These include the Taliban and various other forces jockeying for power — former commanders of legal and illegal militias, drug smugglers and criminals.
The anti-government forces have chosen to concentrate their energies on low-level government officials, having failed in their attempt to make a difference by targeting NGOs, the analyst said. However, he pointed out that the situation was changing with some more targeted attacks on NGOs. Barker says, “CARE programmes suffered some short interruptions due to security concerns in some areas in 2004, but we did not pull out of any provinces due to this. In 2004, we expanded to include Daikundi and Bamiyan. In 2005, we added Panjshir and Kapisa. In 2006, we will start work in Balkh and Baghlan.”
January 2006
Women's Feature Service
First there was Communism, then there was Talibanism and now there is NGOism,” goes a joke that gained currency after the arrival of the international community in post-Taliban Afghanistan in 2001-02. Nearly four years later, with targeted attacks on a large number of aid workers by anti-government militants that joke is no longer funny.
According to a report brought out by the Afghan NGO Security Organisation and CARE International (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere), as many as 24 NGO workers were killed in 2004, compared to 12 in 2003. Slow progress in reconstruction, misplaced aid priorities and misperceptions that club the international community together as one monolithic entity, are increasingly squeezing the space for non-profit NGOs working in Afghanistan, making them easy target for politicians playing on populist sentiment.
One politician riding high on this sentiment is former Planning Minister, Basher Dost. One of the highest vote-grossing candidates contesting the elections to Afghanistan’s new Parliament, he has acquired a reputation for anti-NGO rhetoric — one of the main reasons for his popularity.
Afghanistan receives a fairly large amount of aid funding. From January 2002 to September 2004, donor assistance totalled $1.226 billion directly to the Afghan government, $1.957 billion to the UN, $705 million to private contractors and $413 million to NGOs (as per Financial Report, Fourth Quarter: Ministry of Finance, Government of Afghanistan). Although NGOs get very little of the direct funding, the misperception that they receive the bulk of donor money persists, fuelled by populist rhetoric.
Dost denies that his is a populist stand that cashes in on jingoistic sentiment, claiming he is only against corrupt NGOs. Out of the 2,350 NGOs registered with the Ministry of Planning, Dost cancelled the registration of 1,935 in 2004, saying, “They were not really NGOs”. He also feels that all international aid should be routed through the office of the President; he thinks at present the aid is being controlled by a “mafia that shares it for its own luxurious lifestyles”.
Dost is tapping into the core of the latent anti-foreigner sentiment in the country. Afghanistan’s history of foreign invasions and fighting occupying forces ensures a simmering anti-foreigner sentiment. The resentment is also fuelled by the perceived lifestyles of the international community. Security restrictions on large sections of the international aid workers — especially those under the UN mandate — make it mandatory for them to travel in secured vehicles and live in secured areas. Unable to interact normally, a large number of foreigners lead insulated lives, travelling from office to home, where many lead lifestyles that are perceived alien to Afghan culture with its strict social and moral codes.
Alcohol consumption, for example, is banned under the Afghan Constitution; but under an unwritten code, expatriates continue to drink and be served alcohol at restaurants, which have to ensure that no Afghans are served alcohol. This and any form of open mingling between men and women are often the target of criticism from conservatives.
While the entire aid community is not a monolithic entity, there is little perception of distinction amongst Afghans. In fact, the blurring of lines extends even to different sections of the international community. With the military forces now engaged in reconstruction, the distinction between the military and civilian aid workers has been lost. So has the distinction between UN workers, contractors and the NGO community.
Attempting to redress this, ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief), an umbrella organisation for NGOs, led the development of an Afghanistan NGO Code of Conduct, which was launched in May 2005. Barbara Stapleton, ACBAR’s Advocacy and Policy Coordinator, says, “The Code will help professionalise the national NGO community further and provide a mechanism for following up on alleged complaints against any signatory organisation. It will also provide a tool to communicate to the Afghan government, media and people what non-profit NGOs are and what they are not. The Code is also intended to increase the transparency and accountability of NGOs working in Afghanistan. International NGOs prioritise capacity building and, in line with this objective, tend to have a predominantly Afghan staff.”
This contrasts sharply with the profiles of contractors and for-profit organisations. With huge sums of money available for reconstruction, their work focuses primarily on execution of projects to meet deadlines and pre-ordained benchmarks. This often leads to the creation of unsustainable projects, and institutions with little or no capacity building. The idea is to move in, build, collect payment and move on to the next project.
Unfortunately for NGOs, critics do not make this distinction. Paul Barker of CARE International says, “Much of the hostility against NGOs in Afghanistan is not very well-informed. Populist politicians, the media and many in the public tend to lump all aid agencies (including private contractors, UN agencies, private security contractors, and even the NATO-led International Assistance Security Force) into one group and refer to them as ‘NGOs’. The frustration felt by critics of the aid community reflects a perceived frustration with the rate of reconstruction and development in the country.”
A year ago, security for this community had reached rock bottom with repeated attacks in different parts of the country, forcing NGOs to curb their activities. Even popular agitation against the central government took the form of pinpointed and organised attacks on the international community and aid offices. While few chose to pull out, almost all restricted their activities, curtailing the movement of non-Afghans in some areas.
The situation was a little better in 2005, but seems perched to worsen again. A senior analyst dealing with security issues points out that this is not because of any decrease in anti-foreigner sentiment but because of the changing tactics of anti-government forces. These include the Taliban and various other forces jockeying for power — former commanders of legal and illegal militias, drug smugglers and criminals.
The anti-government forces have chosen to concentrate their energies on low-level government officials, having failed in their attempt to make a difference by targeting NGOs, the analyst said. However, he pointed out that the situation was changing with some more targeted attacks on NGOs. Barker says, “CARE programmes suffered some short interruptions due to security concerns in some areas in 2004, but we did not pull out of any provinces due to this. In 2004, we expanded to include Daikundi and Bamiyan. In 2005, we added Panjshir and Kapisa. In 2006, we will start work in Balkh and Baghlan.”
Afghans go for Parliament
Afghans go for Parliament
September 2005
Himal
On 18 September, more than 12 million people are expected to participate in Afghanistan’s first experiment in parliamentary democracy, when they vote for the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of Parliament) and 34 provincial councils. The term ‘experiment’ is appropriate, as the complete decimation of structures of a modern nation state during the 25 years of unrelenting war makes the holding of elections challenging, difficult as well as novel. The polling process will also be an exercise in bringing together innumerable variables that have been changing the face of Afghanistan in the past four years.
The elections are being held under the framework of the Bonn Agreement, signed in the wake of the US military victory in Afghanistan in 2001. The Bonn process had laid down a timetable for the recovery and reconstruction of the country. The roadmap included convening of an emergency loya jirga (grand council) for establishment of the transitional government, holding a constitutional loya jirga to adopt a new constitution, to be followed by elections for a fully representational government. Scheduled for June 2004, the elections were to be held for the office of president, seats in the Wolesi Jirga, the provincial councils, and the district councils finally leading to the establishment of the Meshrano Jirga or upper house through indirect election and nominations. However, given the enormity of the task and the fragile security situation, only the Presidential elections were held in October 2004, and polls for other institutions postponed for later.
While the announcement of the present round of elections has been welcomed by the international community, many political leaders as well as aware citizens point to the lack of adequate preparation and controversial electoral procedures. This has made some cautious and others cynical about the ‘experiment’ of elections coming up in a few days’ time.
A society in transition
Afghanistan is in a period of transition, with remarkable change underway in society. For some Afghan women, the transformation has been enormous. Many are back in the workforce while quite a few are contesting elections, fighting for their rights, and working for the development of their society. Yet, the majority still faces the same restrictions and constraints of old. Over three million children are back in school and over three million refugees have returned to the country. Urban centers see new businesses and enterprises coming up every day and the country now has an independent and growing media. At the same time, there are people with destroyed homes facing relentless poverty, drought and floods. Clear signs of Afghanistan’s bitter history are visible everywhere. War widows beg on the streets; children without limbs drag themselves from car to car; young girls are sold to pay off debts incurred in a drug run; poppy growers, with their fields destroyed, have no means of employment; old men pull carts, piled high with lumber; young fighters, their guns taken away, are now at a loss never having known any other way of life. There is also rage and hatred, against other ethnic groups, against the foreign aid worker who earns more in a day than most will see in a month.
The socio-economic indicators present a dismal picture. The country ranks 173rd on the Human Development Index, far below neighbouring countries – Pakistan (142), Tajikistan (116), Uzbekistan (107), Iran (101) and Turkmenistan (86). The literacy rate is 28.7 percent and nearly one out of two Afghans will not survive to the age of 40. The infant mortality rate is 115 (per thousand) and that of children under five years, 172. The maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births is 1,600.
Yet, talk to ordinary Afghans and their spirit is indomitable. Unlike the victim syndrome in many post-conflict areas, Afghans blame themselves for their own fate, hoping that time will give them a chance to make a better life and country. It is these citizens who will exercise their right to franchise in less than a month wishing for a peaceful, democratic state at long last.
The security dilemma
For the international community charged with conducting the polls, the elections are a major step in the road to transfer of power and giving rights back to the people. However, there are critics who believe the process should have been delayed until the country was better prepared for it. They are apprehensive that the elections may end up legitimising the illegal centers of power that exist all over the provinces and enshrining the bad precedents, such as the absence of voter lists and adequate means of vetting candidates. But the biggest worry is the lack of a relatively secure atmosphere needed for free and fair polling. As an independent observer of the electoral process observes, “It is important to do it right the first time around.” Cutting corners and making compromises harm the credibility of elections, and it will be difficult to change the norm, he says. Skeptics argue that the rush to complete the polls is merely to arrive at a benchmark international powers have set for themselves, rather than based on an assessment of the needs arising from the changing situation on the ground.
Nearly four years after the fall of the Taliban, the installation of the transitional government of Hamid Karzai and the deployment of international presence in the country (troops, UN agencies and innumerable ngos), the institutions of the Afghan state are yet to take firm root. Rebuilding a country, especially one where violence continues to dominate, has been an arduous process. Unfortunately, the emphasis placed by the international community on numbers and deadlines has often been to the detriment of actual capacity-building and greater community participation. This gives the state apparatus an inordinate power despite its obvious weakness.
An example is the ongoing fight against militancy. The international military intervention, in the wake of 9/11, was led by the US Coalition forces in 2001 and the US remains in charge of the command and control of a multinational force operating against the “enemies of Afghanistan”. However this ambiguously defined target has resulted in neglect of the equally important tasks of peacekeeping in secured areas, of ensuring protection against existing warlords who were equally brutal even if not identified as ‘Taliban’, and of ensuring security that would provide the space for implementing laws and ensuring justice. As a result, even previously secure areas have faced a security vacuum which was taken advantage by a regrouped Taliban and other armed groups and criminal elements. While the figures are contested, the country has seen as many as 1000 deaths in the last six months alone. Even though the Coalition Forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) publicly claim that the security situation has improved, this is doubtful. More independent international observers have noted that the violence now is the worst they have seen since 2001.
Col Jim Yonts, spokesman of the Coalition Forces Command, says, “Security has improved as a result of cooperation and coordination between the Afghan security forces, Coalition forces, local leadership and the Afghan people.” Maintaining that 60 percent of the weapons’ cache and explosive discoveries are now taking place through Afghans, Yonts adds the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army forces have increased in number and capacity. There is no significant terrorist presence or threat in areas where ISAF is operating, claims its spokesperson Major Andy Elmes.
Others are not as sanguine as the spokespersons of the security forces. Spokesperson for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), Adrian Edwards, says the security situation this year has been a matter of concern. The UN Security Council has expressed concern over the increased attacks by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other groups. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s special representative on Afghanistan told the Council recently that extremists were targeting pro-government and international forces, raising concerns for the forthcoming elections. Even the new American ambassador to Afghanistan, who arrived here from a posting in Iraq, expressed the international community’s concerns on security at his maiden press conference in August. Ronald Neumann was quoted as saying “there is certainly more violence and there are violent elements trying to come back.” The ambassador also said, “I think this is a situation that will probably be difficult for some time. But there is a strong international presence and there is a strong American presence, which is quite adequate to deal with the violence.”
Survival in this country remains a tenuous negotiation for citizens, especially outside the urban areas. Though the UN mandated process of DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the standing armies of the provincial leaders) is nearly complete, there are questions about its efficacy. After a quarter century of war, there is no real way to measure the amount of weapons in Afghanistan and this means that officials have to rely on the declarations made by the commanders. Meanwhile, the process of disarming ‘illegal’ armed groups has just begun. At the time of nominations for the elections, the candidature of 255 candidates was challenged on the grounds that they still possessed arms. They were threatened with disqualification unless they turned in a specified amount of weapons. At the time of the final announcement however, only 17 were barred. According to the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), “many who were provisionally excluded were let back on the candidate list with ‘undertakings’ of future compliance”.
The commanders of the disarmed groups have not been marginalized either. An example is Abdul Rasheed Dostum, the strongman of the North. Dostum was appointed chief of staff to the commander of the armed forces, i.e. President Hamid Karzai, earlier this year. Though his duties in that position remain unclear, the appointment came as a betrayal to many people who had believed in President Karzai’s promise to weed out warlords. Dostum, by all accounts, ran one of the most brutal regimes in the northern areas.
A June 2005 report on verification of political rights, carried out jointly by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the UNAMA, says “the widespread fears, feelings of mistrust and acts of self-censorship”, that the team found, were based on past patterns of behavior rather than current threats or violations. Nonetheless, these attitudes “could, however, have a significant impact in the coming months as the electoral competition intensifies.”
Responding to comments that elections ought to have been postponeddue to the fragile security situation, Adrian Edwards of UNAMA says that the debate between whether there should be rule of law first or elections first could go on and it would never have been possible to have a perfect election. He argues that that this is as right a time as any other to hold elections to take people out of an environment of conflict.
George wants the elections badly
Voting without voter lists
A report on the parliamentary polls prepared by a leading think tank, the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), states that the new Parliament will be “one important means for the people to have an active voice in government”. However, it cautions that while the elections are a golden opportunity, “they also pose a serious threat to the prospects for democracy if they fail”. A deeply flawed elections would betray the trust of the voting public, says the report. The AREU also points out that the parliamentary/provincial elections are far more susceptible to fraud, vote buying and intimidation than the presidential polls held in 2004. In these elections, AREU says, the margin of victory may be quite small, and a few votes stolen here and there may dramatically alter the delegation that each province sends to Parliament.
There are enough reasons why that is a real danger. Apart from direct intimidation and violence, the hurry to hold elections has also led to the adoption of short cuts which would not stand scrutiny elsewhere. For example, there has not been enough time to either carry out a census or register voters according to their area of residence. There are therefore no voter lists which polling staff could use to cross-check the eligibility of voters lining up to vote. This is the reason why the Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB) says it is printing 40 million ballots, nearly double the estimated number of voters. The JEMB is the independent electoral authority comprising of nine Afghan election commissioners appointed by President Hamid Karzai and four international electoral experts designated by UNAMA. At an estimated electorate of 12 million voting twice (for provincial and presidential elections) the ballots needed should have been a little over 24 million. However since no one knows how many people will choose to turn up at which polling station, there have to be enough ballots in each one just in case.
The bulwark against fraud is supposed to be the ‘indelible’ ink which will be used to mark the fingers of the voters, a method in use (and misuse) all over Southasia. This assumes that security in each and every polling station cannot be breached and that there will be no stuffing of ballot boxes, a guarantee that is difficult to ensure even in the more developed democracies of the region.
The lack of census data, the ICG points out, has also meant that there is no accurate estimate in the allocation of seats to each province. Therefore, the numbers that have been arrived at remain highly disputed. The electoral laws formulated for the parliamentary polls are also controversial. Though a large number of parties as well as sections of the international community counseled for the proportional representation system, the government proceeded with adopting the single non transferable vote (SNTV) system. Though this might seem like a more simple system to adopt, given the nascent nature of Afghanistan’s democracy, it is actually far more complicated since each constituency is a multi-seat constituency. The system does not bode well for political parties either. Any party seeking to secure votes for its multiple candidates from that constituency will have to calculate exactly how many voters it should encourage to vote for each candidate, a difficult science in the best possible circumstances and impossibility here.
The parties
The reason for the adoption of such an awkward system is said to be the antipathy of President Hamid Karzai towards political parties. Nearly four years into power, Karzai himself has neither joined nor launched a political party. While supporters of the president like to claim that he is trying to remain above the fray, critics allege Karzai wants to keep the political parties weakened since he himself has no political base of his own. Under the current system, political parties have no right to use a common symbol for their party candidates thus preventing them from effectively building up a cross-country support base.
One person who certainly thinks the electoral system has been designed to Karzai’s advantage is the ‘leader of the opposition’ Younis Qanooni. Leader of the newly formed New Afghanistan party (Afghanistan e Nawin) and a former member of the Hezb e Jamiat Islami Afghanistan, Qanooni was a cabinet minister in the interim and transitional governments. He feels that “the government implemented the SNTV system forcibly because it does not have a base”. A leader of the former Northern Alliance who challenged Karzai in the presidential elections, Qanooni says the JEMB is not independent and that the current system provides ample opportunities for fraud and cheating during the polls.
On the other hand, Qanooni fully supports holding the elections, claiming that it is the only mechanism against a government that “is the biggest threat to the country today.” Stressing the importance of Parliament, he says the upcoming legislation must seek to introduce fundamental reforms for the benefit of people. “Policies will need to be updated, the Constitution changed, the cabinet reconstituted and foreign aid will have to become more transparent. The balance of power will have to shift from the presidency to the parliament.”
It is this relationship between the presidency and the legislature that has been a matter of concern in some quarters. Under the Constitution, both houses of parliament will have the authority to pass, amend and review all laws. If the president disagrees he can ask them to reconsider, but the final binding authority rests with the Wolesi Jirga or lower house. The Wolesi Jirga can also approve or reject government proposals to obtain or grant loans, make decisions on the annual budget and state funded development programmes, set up commissions to investigate actions of the government and approve or reject individuals appointed by the president to government positions.
In the absence of a cohesive system of political parties, usually the source of organized support and opposition to the government, the search for a balance of power vis-à-vis the Afghan presidency is likely to be fairly chaotic. In the absence of a political party from which he can derive his authority, Karzai will have to not just persuade every political grouping in Parliament, but also every individual member to see things his way. This would considerably erode the authority of the government and may force him to compromise on key political issues against his better judgement.
A key issue on which Qanooni disagrees with the Karzai government is what he says are the latter’s efforts to bring Taliban leaders into the fold. This, he believes, is leading to increasing instability and insecurity in the country. “How can we bring the ideology of the Taliban and the government together? The Taliban believe the country is under occupation, they believe the current government is un-Islamic, they don’t believe in women’s rights, education. How can they be in government?” Qanooni claims that the only reason for the overtures to the Taliban was Karzai’s attempt to marginalise the former mujahideen leaders, who he sees as competition.
Though Qanooni does not mention the Northern Alliance, claiming his constituency cuts across all ethnic communities and power groups, it is clear that in the last two years, Karzai has effectively marginalised most of the leaders of the Northern Alliance, even while making overtures to other warlords and some of the more radical mujahideen leaders. The Panjshiris, who take their name from their military stronghold, the Panjshir valley in the Shomali belt north of Kabul, were the major anti-Taliban force at the time of the US operations against the Taliban. Though this strength allowed them to occupy key ministries in the immediate aftermath of the US invasion, most of them were later removed, leaving only the well-known public face of Afghanistan, the suave Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah.
The head of the Republican Party of Afghanistan, Sebgatullah Sanjar, also emphasises the importance of holding the upcoming elections. He says, “The main challenge to Afghan politics today is the absence of political organizations.” Sanjar, who supported Karzai in the presidential elections last year, carries the advantage of being a relatively unknown figure. Unlike most factional leaders, he has no apparent history of being directly involved in violence. Sanjar argues that even with all its flaws, Parliament will still provide the only public forum for political debate and to build an alternative leadership. He too believes that the proportional representational electoral system would have been more beneficial even while acknowledging that in several parts of the country his party candidates are unable to openly acknowledge their affiliation, so great is the mistrust of people towards political parties of all shades.
Also in the fray are a number of other political parties, most of them registered recently under a new law on parties, which are led by former leaders, both communist and their arch enemy the mujahideen. Abu Sayyaf, one of the radical Islamist leaders, who at one point was in the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, heads the Ittehad e Islami. Afghan Millad, a Pashtun-dominated party considered close to Karzai is also contesting the elections. Former communist leader and defence minister Shahnawaz Tanai heads the Movement of Peace party. Gulbuddin Hekmatayar’s Hizb e Islami saw a split recently, and a faction headed by Humayun Aria has been recognized as a registered political party.
The electoral campaign, such as it is, is nothing like the frenzied political activity that defines parliamentary politics in Southasia. Travelling and holding meetings remains a difficult task in the absence of security. The JEMB, in an attempt to provide somewhat of a level playing field, has provided all candidates with the opportunity to broadcast and telecast their messages on electronic media free of charge. Parliamentary candidates are allowed either 10 minutes time on radio or 5 minutes on TV and provincial council candidates are allowed 4 minutes on radio or 2 minutes on TV. They are also allowed to buy a total of four pages of space in a newspaper or magazine. Though candidates are allowed to hold meetings with the prior permission of the local police, large-scale political rallies are considered too dangerous. While in urban areas, most candidates either campaign through small meetings or loudspeaker fitted vehicles, the preferred methods of canvassing in the villages are by holding meetings with community leaders, addressing the communities at prayer meetings or hosting meals.
An independent woman candidate from Paktia province, Sharifa Zurmati Wardak initially received death threats while campaigning and drew back. However after some community leaders pledged their support, she once again picked up the courage to go out into her electoral district. During her last visit to the constituency however, she was advised to flee the border area where she was staying as she had become a well-known face through her posters. That which in any other country during elections would have been an advantage, had turned into a source of threat for Sharifa.
For Sharifa as for most other candidates contesting in this nascent parliamentary process, the issues on the stump are very basic: bringing peace to the country and working for development. While she and candidates like Sanjar play up the need for new leaders who are not tainted by bloody wars, older political leaders like Qanooni are campaigning on the slogan that the government has failed to deliver either peace or development. The situation here does not allow for more complex political platforms or detailed manifestos.
However, the cynicism that greets elections in the rest of Southasia is already visible among some here. Jawed, an educated urban voter has scant interest in the polls, believing it is far too early for legitimate candidates to come to the fray. “Right now there is no one worth voting for. Why are they holding elections? It will restore the same greedy warlords and reinforce their grip on power,” Jawed asks.
But it is Safia, a housewife and mother, who is able to see through the clutter of history and identify the issue at the heart of the matter. Thinking back over all the years she has spent in Kabul, trying to make sure her children survived the war to live in an Afghanistan that had a present and future, she says that for her, it isn’t so much an issue of who wins or loses or who comes to power. It is about something else. “Democracy,” says Safia, “we should start getting used to it, shouldn’t we?”
September 2005
Himal
On 18 September, more than 12 million people are expected to participate in Afghanistan’s first experiment in parliamentary democracy, when they vote for the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of Parliament) and 34 provincial councils. The term ‘experiment’ is appropriate, as the complete decimation of structures of a modern nation state during the 25 years of unrelenting war makes the holding of elections challenging, difficult as well as novel. The polling process will also be an exercise in bringing together innumerable variables that have been changing the face of Afghanistan in the past four years.
The elections are being held under the framework of the Bonn Agreement, signed in the wake of the US military victory in Afghanistan in 2001. The Bonn process had laid down a timetable for the recovery and reconstruction of the country. The roadmap included convening of an emergency loya jirga (grand council) for establishment of the transitional government, holding a constitutional loya jirga to adopt a new constitution, to be followed by elections for a fully representational government. Scheduled for June 2004, the elections were to be held for the office of president, seats in the Wolesi Jirga, the provincial councils, and the district councils finally leading to the establishment of the Meshrano Jirga or upper house through indirect election and nominations. However, given the enormity of the task and the fragile security situation, only the Presidential elections were held in October 2004, and polls for other institutions postponed for later.
While the announcement of the present round of elections has been welcomed by the international community, many political leaders as well as aware citizens point to the lack of adequate preparation and controversial electoral procedures. This has made some cautious and others cynical about the ‘experiment’ of elections coming up in a few days’ time.
A society in transition
Afghanistan is in a period of transition, with remarkable change underway in society. For some Afghan women, the transformation has been enormous. Many are back in the workforce while quite a few are contesting elections, fighting for their rights, and working for the development of their society. Yet, the majority still faces the same restrictions and constraints of old. Over three million children are back in school and over three million refugees have returned to the country. Urban centers see new businesses and enterprises coming up every day and the country now has an independent and growing media. At the same time, there are people with destroyed homes facing relentless poverty, drought and floods. Clear signs of Afghanistan’s bitter history are visible everywhere. War widows beg on the streets; children without limbs drag themselves from car to car; young girls are sold to pay off debts incurred in a drug run; poppy growers, with their fields destroyed, have no means of employment; old men pull carts, piled high with lumber; young fighters, their guns taken away, are now at a loss never having known any other way of life. There is also rage and hatred, against other ethnic groups, against the foreign aid worker who earns more in a day than most will see in a month.
The socio-economic indicators present a dismal picture. The country ranks 173rd on the Human Development Index, far below neighbouring countries – Pakistan (142), Tajikistan (116), Uzbekistan (107), Iran (101) and Turkmenistan (86). The literacy rate is 28.7 percent and nearly one out of two Afghans will not survive to the age of 40. The infant mortality rate is 115 (per thousand) and that of children under five years, 172. The maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births is 1,600.
Yet, talk to ordinary Afghans and their spirit is indomitable. Unlike the victim syndrome in many post-conflict areas, Afghans blame themselves for their own fate, hoping that time will give them a chance to make a better life and country. It is these citizens who will exercise their right to franchise in less than a month wishing for a peaceful, democratic state at long last.
The security dilemma
For the international community charged with conducting the polls, the elections are a major step in the road to transfer of power and giving rights back to the people. However, there are critics who believe the process should have been delayed until the country was better prepared for it. They are apprehensive that the elections may end up legitimising the illegal centers of power that exist all over the provinces and enshrining the bad precedents, such as the absence of voter lists and adequate means of vetting candidates. But the biggest worry is the lack of a relatively secure atmosphere needed for free and fair polling. As an independent observer of the electoral process observes, “It is important to do it right the first time around.” Cutting corners and making compromises harm the credibility of elections, and it will be difficult to change the norm, he says. Skeptics argue that the rush to complete the polls is merely to arrive at a benchmark international powers have set for themselves, rather than based on an assessment of the needs arising from the changing situation on the ground.
Nearly four years after the fall of the Taliban, the installation of the transitional government of Hamid Karzai and the deployment of international presence in the country (troops, UN agencies and innumerable ngos), the institutions of the Afghan state are yet to take firm root. Rebuilding a country, especially one where violence continues to dominate, has been an arduous process. Unfortunately, the emphasis placed by the international community on numbers and deadlines has often been to the detriment of actual capacity-building and greater community participation. This gives the state apparatus an inordinate power despite its obvious weakness.
An example is the ongoing fight against militancy. The international military intervention, in the wake of 9/11, was led by the US Coalition forces in 2001 and the US remains in charge of the command and control of a multinational force operating against the “enemies of Afghanistan”. However this ambiguously defined target has resulted in neglect of the equally important tasks of peacekeeping in secured areas, of ensuring protection against existing warlords who were equally brutal even if not identified as ‘Taliban’, and of ensuring security that would provide the space for implementing laws and ensuring justice. As a result, even previously secure areas have faced a security vacuum which was taken advantage by a regrouped Taliban and other armed groups and criminal elements. While the figures are contested, the country has seen as many as 1000 deaths in the last six months alone. Even though the Coalition Forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) publicly claim that the security situation has improved, this is doubtful. More independent international observers have noted that the violence now is the worst they have seen since 2001.
Col Jim Yonts, spokesman of the Coalition Forces Command, says, “Security has improved as a result of cooperation and coordination between the Afghan security forces, Coalition forces, local leadership and the Afghan people.” Maintaining that 60 percent of the weapons’ cache and explosive discoveries are now taking place through Afghans, Yonts adds the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army forces have increased in number and capacity. There is no significant terrorist presence or threat in areas where ISAF is operating, claims its spokesperson Major Andy Elmes.
Others are not as sanguine as the spokespersons of the security forces. Spokesperson for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), Adrian Edwards, says the security situation this year has been a matter of concern. The UN Security Council has expressed concern over the increased attacks by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other groups. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s special representative on Afghanistan told the Council recently that extremists were targeting pro-government and international forces, raising concerns for the forthcoming elections. Even the new American ambassador to Afghanistan, who arrived here from a posting in Iraq, expressed the international community’s concerns on security at his maiden press conference in August. Ronald Neumann was quoted as saying “there is certainly more violence and there are violent elements trying to come back.” The ambassador also said, “I think this is a situation that will probably be difficult for some time. But there is a strong international presence and there is a strong American presence, which is quite adequate to deal with the violence.”
Survival in this country remains a tenuous negotiation for citizens, especially outside the urban areas. Though the UN mandated process of DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the standing armies of the provincial leaders) is nearly complete, there are questions about its efficacy. After a quarter century of war, there is no real way to measure the amount of weapons in Afghanistan and this means that officials have to rely on the declarations made by the commanders. Meanwhile, the process of disarming ‘illegal’ armed groups has just begun. At the time of nominations for the elections, the candidature of 255 candidates was challenged on the grounds that they still possessed arms. They were threatened with disqualification unless they turned in a specified amount of weapons. At the time of the final announcement however, only 17 were barred. According to the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), “many who were provisionally excluded were let back on the candidate list with ‘undertakings’ of future compliance”.
The commanders of the disarmed groups have not been marginalized either. An example is Abdul Rasheed Dostum, the strongman of the North. Dostum was appointed chief of staff to the commander of the armed forces, i.e. President Hamid Karzai, earlier this year. Though his duties in that position remain unclear, the appointment came as a betrayal to many people who had believed in President Karzai’s promise to weed out warlords. Dostum, by all accounts, ran one of the most brutal regimes in the northern areas.
A June 2005 report on verification of political rights, carried out jointly by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the UNAMA, says “the widespread fears, feelings of mistrust and acts of self-censorship”, that the team found, were based on past patterns of behavior rather than current threats or violations. Nonetheless, these attitudes “could, however, have a significant impact in the coming months as the electoral competition intensifies.”
Responding to comments that elections ought to have been postponeddue to the fragile security situation, Adrian Edwards of UNAMA says that the debate between whether there should be rule of law first or elections first could go on and it would never have been possible to have a perfect election. He argues that that this is as right a time as any other to hold elections to take people out of an environment of conflict.
George wants the elections badly
Voting without voter lists
A report on the parliamentary polls prepared by a leading think tank, the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), states that the new Parliament will be “one important means for the people to have an active voice in government”. However, it cautions that while the elections are a golden opportunity, “they also pose a serious threat to the prospects for democracy if they fail”. A deeply flawed elections would betray the trust of the voting public, says the report. The AREU also points out that the parliamentary/provincial elections are far more susceptible to fraud, vote buying and intimidation than the presidential polls held in 2004. In these elections, AREU says, the margin of victory may be quite small, and a few votes stolen here and there may dramatically alter the delegation that each province sends to Parliament.
There are enough reasons why that is a real danger. Apart from direct intimidation and violence, the hurry to hold elections has also led to the adoption of short cuts which would not stand scrutiny elsewhere. For example, there has not been enough time to either carry out a census or register voters according to their area of residence. There are therefore no voter lists which polling staff could use to cross-check the eligibility of voters lining up to vote. This is the reason why the Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB) says it is printing 40 million ballots, nearly double the estimated number of voters. The JEMB is the independent electoral authority comprising of nine Afghan election commissioners appointed by President Hamid Karzai and four international electoral experts designated by UNAMA. At an estimated electorate of 12 million voting twice (for provincial and presidential elections) the ballots needed should have been a little over 24 million. However since no one knows how many people will choose to turn up at which polling station, there have to be enough ballots in each one just in case.
The bulwark against fraud is supposed to be the ‘indelible’ ink which will be used to mark the fingers of the voters, a method in use (and misuse) all over Southasia. This assumes that security in each and every polling station cannot be breached and that there will be no stuffing of ballot boxes, a guarantee that is difficult to ensure even in the more developed democracies of the region.
The lack of census data, the ICG points out, has also meant that there is no accurate estimate in the allocation of seats to each province. Therefore, the numbers that have been arrived at remain highly disputed. The electoral laws formulated for the parliamentary polls are also controversial. Though a large number of parties as well as sections of the international community counseled for the proportional representation system, the government proceeded with adopting the single non transferable vote (SNTV) system. Though this might seem like a more simple system to adopt, given the nascent nature of Afghanistan’s democracy, it is actually far more complicated since each constituency is a multi-seat constituency. The system does not bode well for political parties either. Any party seeking to secure votes for its multiple candidates from that constituency will have to calculate exactly how many voters it should encourage to vote for each candidate, a difficult science in the best possible circumstances and impossibility here.
The parties
The reason for the adoption of such an awkward system is said to be the antipathy of President Hamid Karzai towards political parties. Nearly four years into power, Karzai himself has neither joined nor launched a political party. While supporters of the president like to claim that he is trying to remain above the fray, critics allege Karzai wants to keep the political parties weakened since he himself has no political base of his own. Under the current system, political parties have no right to use a common symbol for their party candidates thus preventing them from effectively building up a cross-country support base.
One person who certainly thinks the electoral system has been designed to Karzai’s advantage is the ‘leader of the opposition’ Younis Qanooni. Leader of the newly formed New Afghanistan party (Afghanistan e Nawin) and a former member of the Hezb e Jamiat Islami Afghanistan, Qanooni was a cabinet minister in the interim and transitional governments. He feels that “the government implemented the SNTV system forcibly because it does not have a base”. A leader of the former Northern Alliance who challenged Karzai in the presidential elections, Qanooni says the JEMB is not independent and that the current system provides ample opportunities for fraud and cheating during the polls.
On the other hand, Qanooni fully supports holding the elections, claiming that it is the only mechanism against a government that “is the biggest threat to the country today.” Stressing the importance of Parliament, he says the upcoming legislation must seek to introduce fundamental reforms for the benefit of people. “Policies will need to be updated, the Constitution changed, the cabinet reconstituted and foreign aid will have to become more transparent. The balance of power will have to shift from the presidency to the parliament.”
It is this relationship between the presidency and the legislature that has been a matter of concern in some quarters. Under the Constitution, both houses of parliament will have the authority to pass, amend and review all laws. If the president disagrees he can ask them to reconsider, but the final binding authority rests with the Wolesi Jirga or lower house. The Wolesi Jirga can also approve or reject government proposals to obtain or grant loans, make decisions on the annual budget and state funded development programmes, set up commissions to investigate actions of the government and approve or reject individuals appointed by the president to government positions.
In the absence of a cohesive system of political parties, usually the source of organized support and opposition to the government, the search for a balance of power vis-à-vis the Afghan presidency is likely to be fairly chaotic. In the absence of a political party from which he can derive his authority, Karzai will have to not just persuade every political grouping in Parliament, but also every individual member to see things his way. This would considerably erode the authority of the government and may force him to compromise on key political issues against his better judgement.
A key issue on which Qanooni disagrees with the Karzai government is what he says are the latter’s efforts to bring Taliban leaders into the fold. This, he believes, is leading to increasing instability and insecurity in the country. “How can we bring the ideology of the Taliban and the government together? The Taliban believe the country is under occupation, they believe the current government is un-Islamic, they don’t believe in women’s rights, education. How can they be in government?” Qanooni claims that the only reason for the overtures to the Taliban was Karzai’s attempt to marginalise the former mujahideen leaders, who he sees as competition.
Though Qanooni does not mention the Northern Alliance, claiming his constituency cuts across all ethnic communities and power groups, it is clear that in the last two years, Karzai has effectively marginalised most of the leaders of the Northern Alliance, even while making overtures to other warlords and some of the more radical mujahideen leaders. The Panjshiris, who take their name from their military stronghold, the Panjshir valley in the Shomali belt north of Kabul, were the major anti-Taliban force at the time of the US operations against the Taliban. Though this strength allowed them to occupy key ministries in the immediate aftermath of the US invasion, most of them were later removed, leaving only the well-known public face of Afghanistan, the suave Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah.
The head of the Republican Party of Afghanistan, Sebgatullah Sanjar, also emphasises the importance of holding the upcoming elections. He says, “The main challenge to Afghan politics today is the absence of political organizations.” Sanjar, who supported Karzai in the presidential elections last year, carries the advantage of being a relatively unknown figure. Unlike most factional leaders, he has no apparent history of being directly involved in violence. Sanjar argues that even with all its flaws, Parliament will still provide the only public forum for political debate and to build an alternative leadership. He too believes that the proportional representational electoral system would have been more beneficial even while acknowledging that in several parts of the country his party candidates are unable to openly acknowledge their affiliation, so great is the mistrust of people towards political parties of all shades.
Also in the fray are a number of other political parties, most of them registered recently under a new law on parties, which are led by former leaders, both communist and their arch enemy the mujahideen. Abu Sayyaf, one of the radical Islamist leaders, who at one point was in the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, heads the Ittehad e Islami. Afghan Millad, a Pashtun-dominated party considered close to Karzai is also contesting the elections. Former communist leader and defence minister Shahnawaz Tanai heads the Movement of Peace party. Gulbuddin Hekmatayar’s Hizb e Islami saw a split recently, and a faction headed by Humayun Aria has been recognized as a registered political party.
The electoral campaign, such as it is, is nothing like the frenzied political activity that defines parliamentary politics in Southasia. Travelling and holding meetings remains a difficult task in the absence of security. The JEMB, in an attempt to provide somewhat of a level playing field, has provided all candidates with the opportunity to broadcast and telecast their messages on electronic media free of charge. Parliamentary candidates are allowed either 10 minutes time on radio or 5 minutes on TV and provincial council candidates are allowed 4 minutes on radio or 2 minutes on TV. They are also allowed to buy a total of four pages of space in a newspaper or magazine. Though candidates are allowed to hold meetings with the prior permission of the local police, large-scale political rallies are considered too dangerous. While in urban areas, most candidates either campaign through small meetings or loudspeaker fitted vehicles, the preferred methods of canvassing in the villages are by holding meetings with community leaders, addressing the communities at prayer meetings or hosting meals.
An independent woman candidate from Paktia province, Sharifa Zurmati Wardak initially received death threats while campaigning and drew back. However after some community leaders pledged their support, she once again picked up the courage to go out into her electoral district. During her last visit to the constituency however, she was advised to flee the border area where she was staying as she had become a well-known face through her posters. That which in any other country during elections would have been an advantage, had turned into a source of threat for Sharifa.
For Sharifa as for most other candidates contesting in this nascent parliamentary process, the issues on the stump are very basic: bringing peace to the country and working for development. While she and candidates like Sanjar play up the need for new leaders who are not tainted by bloody wars, older political leaders like Qanooni are campaigning on the slogan that the government has failed to deliver either peace or development. The situation here does not allow for more complex political platforms or detailed manifestos.
However, the cynicism that greets elections in the rest of Southasia is already visible among some here. Jawed, an educated urban voter has scant interest in the polls, believing it is far too early for legitimate candidates to come to the fray. “Right now there is no one worth voting for. Why are they holding elections? It will restore the same greedy warlords and reinforce their grip on power,” Jawed asks.
But it is Safia, a housewife and mother, who is able to see through the clutter of history and identify the issue at the heart of the matter. Thinking back over all the years she has spent in Kabul, trying to make sure her children survived the war to live in an Afghanistan that had a present and future, she says that for her, it isn’t so much an issue of who wins or loses or who comes to power. It is about something else. “Democracy,” says Safia, “we should start getting used to it, shouldn’t we?”
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