Media at risk under new Afghan law
April 24 Al Jazeera
By
Aunohita Mojumdar
Afghanistan's parliament is on the brink of passing a new media law that may considerably reduce the independence of the country's media.
The controversial amendments to the law, proposed by the religious and cultural affairs commission of the parliament, chaired by former regional commander Haji Mohammed Mohaqeq and supported by the government, will bring both private and state media under greater government control.
Proposed changes include an oversight committee that will scrutinise the functioning of the media including its content.
An earlier proposal to institute an independent commission to carry out this monitoring function has been scrapped in favour of a single body that will have officials from government ministries and departments but not media representatives.
Complaints relating to media content will be referred directly to the supreme court which, in Afghanistan, remains a conservative bastion.
Control of content will be guided through clauses which include prohibitions that prevent publicity of any other religion than Islam, prohibit the media from producing any content that is unislamic or jeopardises the stability of the nation or any false information which might disrupt public opinion.
While some of these clauses are seemingly innocuous, they are so wide-ranging as to allow them to be misused against media organisations not toeing the line.
Fact and falsehood
Interpretations of facts and falsehood, for example, are always contentious in a conflict zone.
The government's determination of what are facts will result in one-sided reportage. Already there have been several attempts to impose guidelines for reporting on the media with a wide-ranging list of subjects which should not be reported.
The recently passed amnesty bill, immunising all jihadis from prosecution also sought to introduce a clause which would force the media to honour the jihadis in any reportage. Both moves were dropped under pressure but may be reintroduced through this bill.
The growing tensions between the media and the government are evident in recent events. The government's decision to trade Taliban prisoners for an Italian reporter leaving an Afghan reporter Ajmal Naqshbandi to be murdered has angered and shocked Afghan journalists.
Tolo television
More recently the country's most popular channel Tolo TV has been locked in a standoff with the attorney general of Afghanistan after police raided the channel following allegations of "misquoting" by Tolo.
Tolo TV, owned by three Afghan-Australian brothers, hit back accusing the attorney general of having carried out an illegal action and calling for his removal from office.
"The potential crimes [of the attorney general] are of the utmost seriousness and directly affect [the] issue of rule of law and sustainability of democracy in Afghanistan, especially given that they may be perpetrated by a person holding the highest operational legal position in Afghanistan," Tolo said.
The information ministry's commission to look into the matter has asked Tolo to apologise saying the channel had "presented the attorney general's statements in a way that can lead to various interpretations and cause unnecessary public anguish. The way this news was broadcast, could be seen as ill-intentioned."
However, Zaid Mohseni, a director of Tolo, states that the commission's finding does not show how and where Tolo had reported inaccurately.
"We are not convinced there is a reason to apologise and we are looking into the matter," Mohseni told Al Jazeera.
The order is indeed ambiguous in that it refers to possible interpretations and mala fides, rather than any substantive breach of facts.
The row illustrates an increasing pattern of confrontation between Afghanistan's independent media and those in power.
As the fledgling post-conflict state comes into being, with old roles being challenged and the balance of power changing, there are few areas where the contradictions have emerged as sharply as in the area of media.
Tolo itself is no stranger to controversy, having pushed the boundaries of media content in Afghanistan with programming content that is often considered to be too forward by Afghan standards.
However, Tolo also acts as a shock absorber for most of the media outlets that also fall far short of the restrictions that conservative sections would like to impose on them.
The new media law will also reverse moves to make the state broadcaster a public service broadcaster, by bringing it under government control.
Abdul Karim Khurram, the information minister, said the government cannot afford not to have control over the state broadcaster since the county was at war.
Khurram also said he would like to ensure a ceiling on the use of foreign content in Afghan media. Channels such as Tolo are highly dependent on foreign content.
Afghanistan currently does not have the capacity to produce adequate programming to meet an increasing demand that has seen the establishment of seven different private channels in the past three years. Khurram's ministry recently banned Tolo TV from rebroadcasting Al Jazeera content.
Mohaqeq, chairman of the religious affairs commission, told this reporter that they would not want the government to use the RTA for propaganda but that the media needed to be brought under specific rules to prevent them from misusing their power to humiliate people.
The argument, which is also one forwarded by the government, has emerged as a uniting platform for those seeking to impose more curbs on media.
Resurgent conservatism as well as consolidation of power by former local commanders, an increasingly authoritative government and other power-brokers has seen increasing attacks on an independent Afghan media that had emerged as one of the strongest components of Afghanistan's attempts to form a democratic pluralistic state.
Source: Al Jazeera
April 25, 2007
Afghan schools' money problems
Afghan schools' money problems
BBC NEWS
By Aunohita Mojumdar Kabul
The return of five million Afghan children to school is one of the major success stories of post-conflict reconstruction in the country.
The figure is cited by the government and the donor community as one of the landmark achievements in a difficult process of rebuilding.
One person for whom the figure remains a source of concern, however, is Afghanistan's Education Minister Hanif Atmar.
"It is the greatest achievement in the history of this country" he says. "However, at best it represents 50-55% of our school-age children."
Ahead of Afghanistan's national budget, Mr Atmar expressed concern that, despite the major challenges ahead, funding for education funding will fall far short of what is needed.
"We will get 24% of what we asked for in the development budget," he predicted.
Planning problems
Most of the donor funding continues to be routed outside the government.
Donors often cite a lack of capacity in government departments to spend the money. They also argue that a lot of money given to the government gets siphoned off by corrupt officials.
The lack of funding through the government creates problems in forward planning.
"The ministry has no clear idea of how much money it is going to get from the external budget at the time of making annual plans because donor funding cycles are often different to the Afghan financial year," says a senior adviser to Mr Atmar.
"Multi-year funding would solve a part of this problem, but right now this is not happening.
"Although we now have a five-year strategy, it is difficult to plan implementation of programmes if we don't know there will be money to support it," the adviser says.
Mr Atmar argues that money spent on education by organisations other than the education ministry is largely wasted, with much of it being eaten away by overheads.
This is a contention supported by many donors.
The UK's Department For International Development (Dfid) estimates that the money given to the government and spent directly by it is eight times more productive than when spent by outside agencies.
Dfid itself routes more than 70% of its aid through the government.
Afghanistan's largest donor, USAid, spends only 7% of its annual budget through the government.
Spending money outside the government "undermines the state rebuilding project", says Mr Atmar, and "the state loses legitimacy".
"We have been invested with the responsibility to develop a sound strategy by the people of this country but we do not have the resources to implement it," he says.
'Decent space'
The strategy spelt out by Mr Atmar has many challenges.
According to the minister, only 40% of school children have "a decent space" to study.
The remaining 60% are in tents or dilapidated structures.
That has a particularly strong impact on the enrolment of girls as parents often want them to study in a more protective and sheltered area.
The problem enrolling of girls is further compounded by the lack of women teachers.
According to the international aid agency Oxfam, only about one quarter of the teachers in Afghanistan are women.
In many conservative parts of the country parents will not send their girls to school unless there are women teachers.
While at primary level there is one girl student for every two boys, this ratio drops to one girl for every five to six boys at secondary level.
Of the 143,000 school teachers on the government's payroll, 80% are not qualified, says Mr Atmar.
In the next five years, he hopes to increase the number of women teachers to 50% of the workforce.
He also wants to make sure that least 70% of the teachers pass competency tests by going through teacher training centres that he hopes to establish in the provinces.
The education ministry is also currently in the process of writing and printing text books for the secondary level curriculum, all of which costs money.
"We are trying to persuade donors to support the national budget or at least programmes under the national education strategy and not implement their own programmes," says the minister's adviser.
"In a 'post-conflict' situation such as in Afghanistan, it is important that the state takes on the responsibility to provide access to basic rights such as education as part of the state-building exercise, unlike under 'normal' development situations where the private sector can play a major role," he says.
"Some donors are now routing more of their money through the national budget which is encouraging, but it is still a fraction and not sufficient considering the needs."
Story from BBC NEWS
BBC NEWS
By Aunohita Mojumdar Kabul
The return of five million Afghan children to school is one of the major success stories of post-conflict reconstruction in the country.
The figure is cited by the government and the donor community as one of the landmark achievements in a difficult process of rebuilding.
One person for whom the figure remains a source of concern, however, is Afghanistan's Education Minister Hanif Atmar.
"It is the greatest achievement in the history of this country" he says. "However, at best it represents 50-55% of our school-age children."
Ahead of Afghanistan's national budget, Mr Atmar expressed concern that, despite the major challenges ahead, funding for education funding will fall far short of what is needed.
"We will get 24% of what we asked for in the development budget," he predicted.
Planning problems
Most of the donor funding continues to be routed outside the government.
Donors often cite a lack of capacity in government departments to spend the money. They also argue that a lot of money given to the government gets siphoned off by corrupt officials.
The lack of funding through the government creates problems in forward planning.
"The ministry has no clear idea of how much money it is going to get from the external budget at the time of making annual plans because donor funding cycles are often different to the Afghan financial year," says a senior adviser to Mr Atmar.
"Multi-year funding would solve a part of this problem, but right now this is not happening.
"Although we now have a five-year strategy, it is difficult to plan implementation of programmes if we don't know there will be money to support it," the adviser says.
Mr Atmar argues that money spent on education by organisations other than the education ministry is largely wasted, with much of it being eaten away by overheads.
This is a contention supported by many donors.
The UK's Department For International Development (Dfid) estimates that the money given to the government and spent directly by it is eight times more productive than when spent by outside agencies.
Dfid itself routes more than 70% of its aid through the government.
Afghanistan's largest donor, USAid, spends only 7% of its annual budget through the government.
Spending money outside the government "undermines the state rebuilding project", says Mr Atmar, and "the state loses legitimacy".
"We have been invested with the responsibility to develop a sound strategy by the people of this country but we do not have the resources to implement it," he says.
'Decent space'
The strategy spelt out by Mr Atmar has many challenges.
According to the minister, only 40% of school children have "a decent space" to study.
The remaining 60% are in tents or dilapidated structures.
That has a particularly strong impact on the enrolment of girls as parents often want them to study in a more protective and sheltered area.
The problem enrolling of girls is further compounded by the lack of women teachers.
According to the international aid agency Oxfam, only about one quarter of the teachers in Afghanistan are women.
In many conservative parts of the country parents will not send their girls to school unless there are women teachers.
While at primary level there is one girl student for every two boys, this ratio drops to one girl for every five to six boys at secondary level.
Of the 143,000 school teachers on the government's payroll, 80% are not qualified, says Mr Atmar.
In the next five years, he hopes to increase the number of women teachers to 50% of the workforce.
He also wants to make sure that least 70% of the teachers pass competency tests by going through teacher training centres that he hopes to establish in the provinces.
The education ministry is also currently in the process of writing and printing text books for the secondary level curriculum, all of which costs money.
"We are trying to persuade donors to support the national budget or at least programmes under the national education strategy and not implement their own programmes," says the minister's adviser.
"In a 'post-conflict' situation such as in Afghanistan, it is important that the state takes on the responsibility to provide access to basic rights such as education as part of the state-building exercise, unlike under 'normal' development situations where the private sector can play a major role," he says.
"Some donors are now routing more of their money through the national budget which is encouraging, but it is still a fraction and not sufficient considering the needs."
Story from BBC NEWS
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
Afghanistan aid 'must be spread'
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul,By in Kabul, FT.com sitePublished: Mar 19, 2007
Rory Stewart struggled with insurgents as a deputy governor in the coalition administration in Iraq and briefly worked with United Nations advisers in post-war Afghanistan. These days, the former British diplomat copes with resurgent Taliban forces as head of non-governmental organisation promoting the preservation and renovation of medieval buildings in Afghanistan.
Donor governments, he says, are making a mistake in concentrating aid on projects in southern Afghan provinces where the insurgency is strongest, rather than spreading funds across the impoverished country.
"You cannot deliver development to a population that does not want to work with you – and in some areas in the south we have lost the goodwill of the population," he says. "This cannot be regained through economic development. People cannot just be bought. The Russians invested a great deal in infrastructure, but it did not help them defeat the insurgency. Our best option is to focus on areas where we are welcome."
The focus on aid for southern provinces comes as the US and UK put more stress on economic development and reconstruction as important elements of counter-insurgency strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Military tactics alone have proved insufficient in eliminating armed resistance.
The UK Department for International Development has allocated a fifth of its budget for the next three years to the southern province of Helmand. The US Agency for International Development has concentrated more than half its budget on Helmand and three other southern provinces, according to Leon Waskin, mission director. Afghanistan has 34 provinces.
"The conflict that we see in the south is not going to be solved by military means alone," says Mr Waskin, arguing that increasing economic well-being will sap support for the insurgency.
But even with higher budgets, development agencies find it hard to implement projects in the south. "Throwing money doesn't help when it is not possible to travel to monitor project implementation," says the head of one NGO. Development groups have been forced to rely on unsupervised local workers.
The projects are easy targets for insurgents. Hundreds of Taliban fighters last month attacked the Kajaki dam in Helmand. The reconstruction of the dam, whose hydroelectric units are the main power source for the city of Kandahar, is one of the largest projects in the province, backed by USAID and DFID, but work has been halted by the fighting.
Projects in the south are less cost effective. "The costs of doing the same things are quite high," says a senior official at one agency.
Yet Hazarajat, a central highland region and the most secure area of the country, has seen little infrastructure development
The region, once home to the giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan demolished by the former Taliban government, remains focused on farming and animal husbandry. The Hazaras, who are believed to be of Turko-Mongolian origin, form a majority of the population of the region and are mainly Shia Muslims – which has in the past contributed towards their political and economic marginalisation.
Habiba Sarobi, governor of Bamiyan province and the only woman in such a position in the country, is disappointed. "[A] road is fundamental to Bamiyan," says Ms Sarobi. "Without it, even tourism cannot develop."
In the absence of paved roads, local farmers have difficulty marketing their produce and tourists keen to see the ruins at Bamiyan come by private plane or hire a jeep for an 11-hour drive from Kabul. A road could cut the trip by two-thirds.
A survey by the Asia Foundation found that nearly two-thirds of Hazarajat had not heard of foreign aid and cited poverty and unemployment as their biggest concerns.
The same survey showed that among the people of Afghanistan, Hazarajat residents had the highest faith in state institutions, such as the police, turned out in the largest numbers to vote and displayed some of the most liberal attitudes towards the rights of women.
Ms Sarobi and her constituents see the focus on the south almost as penalising them in favour of rebellious countrymen. "Some people might think it is a reward for bad behaviour."
AFGHANISTAN: Gov't bid to boost police in south
AFGHANISTAN: Gov't bid to boost police in south
KANDAHAR , 4 March 2007 (IRIN) - Abdul Bari has just quit his job. Recruited into the auxiliary police in Kandahar, part of a temporary supplementary force to meet Afghanistan’s shortfall of security forces in the south, the 23-year-old said the job was simply too difficult and dangerous. Despite the resurgence of pro-Taliban forces in the area, there has been little commensurate increase in security forces. Funding and support for the Afghan national police and the army are being stepped up only now, while an increase in the deployment of international forces has been incremental. The Afghan national army has experienced high rates of desertion and it has only half the force of 70,000 it was expected to reach by 2010. As a result, police in the volatile south have no choice but to take on anti-insurgency duties, which prompted the government to set up an auxiliary force. According to Interior Ministry spokesman Zemarai Bashary, the auxiliary police will comprise an additional force of 20,000 for two years for the six southern provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Zabul and Ghazni.
Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias. “We needed a temporary increase because we did not have enough police in the remote districts of the south,” Bashary said. However, critics say the force could create yet another source of long-term instability in the country as re-arming of local communities has proved counter-productive in the past. The auxiliary police are drawn from the community and deployed in their own towns and villages, as living with their families in their own areas is supposed to prevent them from deserting. In Helmand, more than 700 of the 1,050 mandated auxiliary police have been trained and deployed, while in Kandahar the original force of 1,300-plus is likely to be increased to 2,000. There are questions, however, over the integrity of the training these men receive as it is a fraction of what regular police are given, allowing for quicker deployment, but sceptics remain concerned over its quality. The International Crisis Group (ICG) says that after just 10 days of training the auxiliary police were given the same weapons and salary as the regular police. “Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias,” the ICG said.
Bashary says the auxiliary police are only mandated to carry out law-enforcement duties and not combat, although they must defend themselves if attacked. But for most policemen serving in the south, carrying out their duties involves confronting and usually engaging anti-government elements. For this reason Bari did not believe community policing was an advantage. “I quit because I was commissioned to serve in my own area where everyone in the community knew I was a policeman. I am a resident of Panjwayi district - control of which changes hands between the government and insurgents - so it is difficult and dangerous for me to serve in such an area,” he said. Moreover, for a salary of just US$70 a month, Abdul’s family thought the risks were not worth it. am/ds/at/ar/mw
KANDAHAR , 4 March 2007 (IRIN) - Abdul Bari has just quit his job. Recruited into the auxiliary police in Kandahar, part of a temporary supplementary force to meet Afghanistan’s shortfall of security forces in the south, the 23-year-old said the job was simply too difficult and dangerous. Despite the resurgence of pro-Taliban forces in the area, there has been little commensurate increase in security forces. Funding and support for the Afghan national police and the army are being stepped up only now, while an increase in the deployment of international forces has been incremental. The Afghan national army has experienced high rates of desertion and it has only half the force of 70,000 it was expected to reach by 2010. As a result, police in the volatile south have no choice but to take on anti-insurgency duties, which prompted the government to set up an auxiliary force. According to Interior Ministry spokesman Zemarai Bashary, the auxiliary police will comprise an additional force of 20,000 for two years for the six southern provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Zabul and Ghazni.
Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias. “We needed a temporary increase because we did not have enough police in the remote districts of the south,” Bashary said. However, critics say the force could create yet another source of long-term instability in the country as re-arming of local communities has proved counter-productive in the past. The auxiliary police are drawn from the community and deployed in their own towns and villages, as living with their families in their own areas is supposed to prevent them from deserting. In Helmand, more than 700 of the 1,050 mandated auxiliary police have been trained and deployed, while in Kandahar the original force of 1,300-plus is likely to be increased to 2,000. There are questions, however, over the integrity of the training these men receive as it is a fraction of what regular police are given, allowing for quicker deployment, but sceptics remain concerned over its quality. The International Crisis Group (ICG) says that after just 10 days of training the auxiliary police were given the same weapons and salary as the regular police. “Weak vetting and questions over command structures raise concerns that the new force will be little more than militias,” the ICG said.
Bashary says the auxiliary police are only mandated to carry out law-enforcement duties and not combat, although they must defend themselves if attacked. But for most policemen serving in the south, carrying out their duties involves confronting and usually engaging anti-government elements. For this reason Bari did not believe community policing was an advantage. “I quit because I was commissioned to serve in my own area where everyone in the community knew I was a policeman. I am a resident of Panjwayi district - control of which changes hands between the government and insurgents - so it is difficult and dangerous for me to serve in such an area,” he said. Moreover, for a salary of just US$70 a month, Abdul’s family thought the risks were not worth it. am/ds/at/ar/mw
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