Afghanistan adrift in misplaced aid
Asia Times/March 29,2008
KABUL - A map of Afghanistan dotted with colorful pins adorned the wall in the office of the aid agency official. Looking with relish at the embellished map, the official stuck in a handful more, noting with a sigh of satisfaction the increase in the number of "projects completed".
For several years, reconstruction in Afghanistan has been a "drawing board and drawing pin" approach, with aid delivery overwhelmingly focused on numbers, quick delivery, high visibility, meeting benchmarks, a production line approach to the rebuilding of a nation.
However, the short-term, low-cost approach of the donor community is coming under increasing criticism from development
experts, reputed international non-governmental organization (NGOs) and civil society.
In a report released this week by ACBAR, (an umbrella organization for NGOs working in Afghanistan), Oxfam, a member of ACBAR, called for a change of approach saying "too much of aid has been prescriptive and driven by donor priorities - rather than responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences".
While Afghanistan has received nearly US$15 billion in the period from 2002-2008, Oxfam points out that in the first two years after the ouster of the Taliban the per capita expenditure on rebuilding the shattered country was $57 per capita compared to $679 per capita in Bosnia. Even this money does not come without strings attached. Half of it is "tied aid" which refers to the aid that has to be spent in the purchase of goods and services from the donor country.
"Preferenced aid" delineates the select areas - both in terms of sector and geography that the donor selects. An estimated 40% has returned to the donor country in the form of corporate profits and consultant salaries.
A Corpwatch report in 2006 stated "many development experts find the process by which aid contracts and loans are awarded to be counterproductive. International and national aid agencies - including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and USAID - that distribute aid money to developing countries have, in effect, designed a system that is efficient in funneling money back to the wealthy donor countries, without providing sustainable development in poor states." Oxfam states that vast sums of the aid money are lost in corporate profits of contractors and sub-contractors, which can be as high as 50% on a single contract.
Only approximately 25-30% of all aid coming into the country is routed through the government, eroding its legitimacy, planning capacity and authority. Donor funding is also usually premised on an annual cycle making it impossible for the government and the NGOs to undertake multi-year planning, a necessary concomitant for sustainable development.
"The nature of our funding in Afghanistan is such that we survive on a cycle of a few months. Once the funding comes in, it takes time for the project to be started up and then it's time to do the donor reporting and raise money for the next year," said the head of an established NGO in Afghanistan.
Criticism of donors has seen a shift in recent months. Whereas most of the earlier censure was limited to scrutiny of the efficiency of donor organizations, recent criticism has questioned the underpinnings of the aid paradigm. Noting the links between development and security Oxfam notes "thus far aid has been insufficient and in many cases wasteful or ineffective" pointing out that "most Afghans still endure conditions of hardship and millions live in extreme poverty".
The perception of the sporadic and patchy nature of economic development is also captured in a 2007 public opinion survey conducted by the Asia Foundation. While 49% of people thought they were more prosperous than under the Taliban, the number was down from the 54% who thought so in 2006. Those who thought they were less prosperous had increased by 2%. According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population was below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption.
The Oxfam report points out that despite an overwhelming dependence of the country's population on agriculture (70% directly or indirectly), the sector has received only $400-500 million since 2001. International spending in Afghanistan is focussed overwhelmingly on military operations. The US military alone spends nearly $100 million a day on Afghanistan while the combined donor funding on aid is only $7 million of which a bulk goes to those provinces and areas where donors have their troops.
Disbursement is often very slow, making the projects ineffective. A study of the National Solidarity Program by ELBAG (an Action Aid initiative in evolving accountability through civil society participation in budgetary analysis) found that the program, considered one of the most effective aid delivery projects in Afghanistan was facing not just a shortfall of funds but also huge delays in disbursement, leading to problems in implementation.
The ELBAG report called for "greater emphasis in looking at Afghan priorities rather than donor priorities" and "reducing the amount of preferenced aid, reducing the gap between donor commitment and disbursement and routing more of the external budget trough the Afghan government".
It is not just the delivery mechanisms of aid that are faulty. Coordination among donors is almost non-existent leading to overlapping projects and waste. "Donors are failing to coordinate between themselves and with the government," Oxfam states. A recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group stated "disunity in Afghanistan is about not just structural issues or coordination but also priorities and preferences, goals, means and increasingly endgames, exit strategies and perhaps more importantly the reasons for being in the country".
Donors and donor countries have so far avoided any scrutiny of their effectiveness and aid delivery strategies. Oxfam points out that while there are 77 indicators for the government's performance in the London Compact, a joint Afghan international partnership, there are no benchmarks for the international community. "A national independent commission for aid effectiveness should be established to monitor aid practices, identify deficiencies and make recommendations."
While aid has made a significant difference to Afghan lives, Oxfam believes "major weaknesses have severely constrained its capacity to reduce poverty". Donors, the NGO argues, must take urgent steps to increase and improve their assistance to Afghanistan.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.)
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)
April 06, 2008
April 05, 2008
Sulabh in Kabul
Sulabh in Kabul
Civil Society/April 2008
Mohammad Younus sells cigarettes from a tray one of the busiest roads of Kabul city in the Deh Afghanan area. With a big market and many government offices, it is a good place to do business and Younus who came from Kandahar to Kabul three years ago to earn a living manages to make ends meet.
But Younus is a street salesman and does not have access to toilets in offices, shops or hotels. For the past few months he has been regularly using the new Sulabh toilet, one among five constructed by Sulabh International in the capital city with Rs 3 crore in aid from the Indian government.
Located in five of the most congested areas of the city, the Sulabh toilets are an important contribution to the reconstruction of sanitation facilities in this city. As the capital, Kabul became a much sought after prize – facing daily bombardments and attacks which reduced the city’s infrastructure to rubble during the successive waves of war.
Houses were destroyed or damaged, pipes broken and water sources contaminated. Yet the population pressure on the city has grown throughout this time. Internally displaced people migrated to Kabul in search of livelihoods during the years of conflict and the departure of the Taliban has meant the return of millions of refugees to Afghanistan.
A city with a population of under half a million before the war has had to absorb more than 4-5 million people even though its service delivery system was completely shattered.
While most cities in the developing world have areas with open sewers, in Kabul, the sewage flows down the street even in middle class and upper class neighbourhoods. Combined with the lack of paving and streets which are little more than potholed mud tracks, the mess of sewage and mud can turn entire roads into dank contaminated cesspools.
Laying sewer lines is a major challenge. Not only is it economically expensive, but a city wide sewerage system would require an overview that can determine land usage, something that needs delicate planning and enormous time.
In the International Year of Sanitation, the technology used by Sulabh seems especially relevant to rebuilding sanitation and restoring hygienic living conditions in Afghanistan. Dr Bindeshwar Pathak, Founder of the Sulabh Sanitation and Social Reform Movement, who was in Kabul last year for the inauguration of the completed project, says the technology is extremely well suited to Afghanistan. While the pit toilet for individual households is extremely cheap to build ($10-$500) and its contents can be turned into bio fertiliser, explains Dr Pathak, the biogas digester for use in public spaces has an added value in Afghanistan. With scant sources of electricity, even Kabul city remains bereft of power for large stretches of time. The biogas produced in Sulabh’s public toilets in Kabul helps power the lamps and heat water.
The hot water and lighting as well as the cooking fuel provided by the biogas plant in the Deh Afghanan toilet are a mater of pride for municipality employee Zainullah, the caretaker of the complex. “In winter we had about 700-800 men using the toilets and in summer this number was around 1200” he says. Sima Gul who is in the area for shopping uses the toilet to freshen up and relax for a few minutes; something that Afghanistan’s social customs do not allow women to do in public spaces. Fewer women have been using the toilet because of the conservative social customs and this toilet gets about 25 women a day.
“We would like to have more such facilities in Kabul, says Engineer Muzafar Pamir, the head of Policy and coordination in the Kabul Municipality. The generation of bio gas, the lack of requirement of sewage pipes and sewage treatment plants make it an ideal solution for an overburdened city where Pamir and his colleagues struggle to restore basic services.
Kabul is not the only city impressed by the program. Senior Indian diplomat Sandeep Kumar, who as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Kabul is in charge of administering India’s aid program here, says the embassy has been inundated with similar requests. “Given the success of this project many of the municipalities have asked that this be replicated in other provinces” he says, adding that the matter is under consideration. Kumar says the project has been unique in several ways. “Firstly it is a breakthrough in eco-friendly sanitation technology both in terms of its contribution to the revival of the crippled sanitation sector as well as adapting efficiently to the harsh climatic conditions in Kabul.” Kumar also points out that it is one of the few projects that has become self sustaining generating revenues of up to 10,000 Afghani daily for the Kabul municipality which helps in the sustainable operations and maintenance of the project.
The technology has been an eye opened not just for the residents of Kabul but even for Sulabh International itself. The toilets survive one of Kabul’s harshest winters when temperatures plummeted below – 25 degrees. “We had experience of just up to 2-3 degrees (cold) and not that of -20 to -30” notes Dr Pathak with some satisfaction. For the plants in Kabul extra precautions were taken to insulate the plants from the outside temperature using thermocol and glass wool.
A few minor problems were reported by users. Bio gas generation was not sufficient in winter (users are also fewer then) to heat the water, leading to the closure of the bathing space. The balance between insulation of the toilet from the cold weather and sufficient ventilation to ensure it is odour free is also yet to be established and some of the water pipes were damaged by the extremities of climate. However that the toilet was able to stay open and function through severe winter is itself a major advance.
“The lesson that we have learnt is that these biogas digesters can work very well even in harsh winter conditions like in Kabul Afghanistan” says Dr Pathak adding “henceforth if we get an opportunity, we can put up biogas digesters in cold climates in India and other parts of the world.”
Civil Society/April 2008
Mohammad Younus sells cigarettes from a tray one of the busiest roads of Kabul city in the Deh Afghanan area. With a big market and many government offices, it is a good place to do business and Younus who came from Kandahar to Kabul three years ago to earn a living manages to make ends meet.
But Younus is a street salesman and does not have access to toilets in offices, shops or hotels. For the past few months he has been regularly using the new Sulabh toilet, one among five constructed by Sulabh International in the capital city with Rs 3 crore in aid from the Indian government.
Located in five of the most congested areas of the city, the Sulabh toilets are an important contribution to the reconstruction of sanitation facilities in this city. As the capital, Kabul became a much sought after prize – facing daily bombardments and attacks which reduced the city’s infrastructure to rubble during the successive waves of war.
Houses were destroyed or damaged, pipes broken and water sources contaminated. Yet the population pressure on the city has grown throughout this time. Internally displaced people migrated to Kabul in search of livelihoods during the years of conflict and the departure of the Taliban has meant the return of millions of refugees to Afghanistan.
A city with a population of under half a million before the war has had to absorb more than 4-5 million people even though its service delivery system was completely shattered.
While most cities in the developing world have areas with open sewers, in Kabul, the sewage flows down the street even in middle class and upper class neighbourhoods. Combined with the lack of paving and streets which are little more than potholed mud tracks, the mess of sewage and mud can turn entire roads into dank contaminated cesspools.
Laying sewer lines is a major challenge. Not only is it economically expensive, but a city wide sewerage system would require an overview that can determine land usage, something that needs delicate planning and enormous time.
In the International Year of Sanitation, the technology used by Sulabh seems especially relevant to rebuilding sanitation and restoring hygienic living conditions in Afghanistan. Dr Bindeshwar Pathak, Founder of the Sulabh Sanitation and Social Reform Movement, who was in Kabul last year for the inauguration of the completed project, says the technology is extremely well suited to Afghanistan. While the pit toilet for individual households is extremely cheap to build ($10-$500) and its contents can be turned into bio fertiliser, explains Dr Pathak, the biogas digester for use in public spaces has an added value in Afghanistan. With scant sources of electricity, even Kabul city remains bereft of power for large stretches of time. The biogas produced in Sulabh’s public toilets in Kabul helps power the lamps and heat water.
The hot water and lighting as well as the cooking fuel provided by the biogas plant in the Deh Afghanan toilet are a mater of pride for municipality employee Zainullah, the caretaker of the complex. “In winter we had about 700-800 men using the toilets and in summer this number was around 1200” he says. Sima Gul who is in the area for shopping uses the toilet to freshen up and relax for a few minutes; something that Afghanistan’s social customs do not allow women to do in public spaces. Fewer women have been using the toilet because of the conservative social customs and this toilet gets about 25 women a day.
“We would like to have more such facilities in Kabul, says Engineer Muzafar Pamir, the head of Policy and coordination in the Kabul Municipality. The generation of bio gas, the lack of requirement of sewage pipes and sewage treatment plants make it an ideal solution for an overburdened city where Pamir and his colleagues struggle to restore basic services.
Kabul is not the only city impressed by the program. Senior Indian diplomat Sandeep Kumar, who as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Kabul is in charge of administering India’s aid program here, says the embassy has been inundated with similar requests. “Given the success of this project many of the municipalities have asked that this be replicated in other provinces” he says, adding that the matter is under consideration. Kumar says the project has been unique in several ways. “Firstly it is a breakthrough in eco-friendly sanitation technology both in terms of its contribution to the revival of the crippled sanitation sector as well as adapting efficiently to the harsh climatic conditions in Kabul.” Kumar also points out that it is one of the few projects that has become self sustaining generating revenues of up to 10,000 Afghani daily for the Kabul municipality which helps in the sustainable operations and maintenance of the project.
The technology has been an eye opened not just for the residents of Kabul but even for Sulabh International itself. The toilets survive one of Kabul’s harshest winters when temperatures plummeted below – 25 degrees. “We had experience of just up to 2-3 degrees (cold) and not that of -20 to -30” notes Dr Pathak with some satisfaction. For the plants in Kabul extra precautions were taken to insulate the plants from the outside temperature using thermocol and glass wool.
A few minor problems were reported by users. Bio gas generation was not sufficient in winter (users are also fewer then) to heat the water, leading to the closure of the bathing space. The balance between insulation of the toilet from the cold weather and sufficient ventilation to ensure it is odour free is also yet to be established and some of the water pipes were damaged by the extremities of climate. However that the toilet was able to stay open and function through severe winter is itself a major advance.
“The lesson that we have learnt is that these biogas digesters can work very well even in harsh winter conditions like in Kabul Afghanistan” says Dr Pathak adding “henceforth if we get an opportunity, we can put up biogas digesters in cold climates in India and other parts of the world.”
De dood versalaan in Kipkoet
De dood versalaan in Kipkoet
Trouw
Wakhan - Het is prachtig in die vergeten uithoek van Afghanistan, maar ook berekoud en onherbergzaam. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris wil geen arts zich hier vestigen”, zegt de verantwoordelijk ambtenaar. Maar Christel Bosman kwam wel.
Als arts behandelt Christel Bosman zwangere vrouwen en baby’s. In haar vrije tijd koopt ze boeken en muziek via internet, bekijkt ze de laatste mode bij Wehkamp en luistert naar Marco Borsato, Daniel Bedingfield, gospel en klassieke muziek. Niks bijzonders, behalve dat ze dit alles doet in een van de meest afgelegen uithoeken van Afghanistan.
Al anderhalf jaar is ze dokter in een dorp op de bergrug Wakhan, een Afghaanse landtong, die zich tussen Pakistan en Tadjikistan uitstrekt naar China. Het adembenemende landschap met zijn diepe valleien en de grote diversiteit aan planten en dieren is nog niet ontdekt door het toerisme en de handel. Maar deze ongerepte schoonheid heeft een prijs. Er is stromend water noch elektriciteit en er zijn slechts enkele verharde wegen. Op deze hoogte met zijn grote temperatuurverschillen en de schrale wind over het Pamir-gebergte is bijna niets te verbouwen.
Behalve Christel en de Britse arts Alex Duncan en zijn gezin – die de medische post hebben opgezet – is er in dit gebied geen vreemdeling te bekennen. Waarom zou een jonge Amsterdamse ervoor kiezen om haar flonkerende stad te verwisselen voor een arm Afghaans dorp?
Vanwege haar sociale betrokkenheid. Die was al tijdens Bosmans studie medicijnen een grote drijfveer. „Ik wilde hoe dan ook de wereld in”, zegt ze. „Ik studeerde drie jaar tropische geneeskunde en wilde zo ver mogelijk weg. In 1998 werkte ik in een asielzoekerscentrum bij Deventer. Daar kwamen Afghanen met wie ik zo goed kon opschieten dat ik in dat land aan de slag wilde.”
De medische post van Kipkoet werd vier jaar geleden opgericht door Ora International, dat zichzelf omschrijft als ’een niet-confessionele christelijke hulp- en ontwikkelingsorganisatie ten dienste van mensen in nood in de hele wereld’. De dokters hebben het geloof als inspiratiebron, maar zeggen niet uit te zijn op de bekering van de bevolking. Hun doel is medische zorg geven in dit ontoegankelijke gebied.
Dokter Abdul Momin Jalaly, verantwoordelijk voor de publieke gezondheidszorg in de provincie, vertelt hoe moeilijk het is om hier aan artsen te komen. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris is niemand bereid zich hier te vestigen, omdat het zo afgelegen is.”
Aanvankelijk was de medische post bedoeld voor de aanpak van het grote aantal opiumverslavingen. Opium is overal te krijgen, maar er was geen enkele medische hulp. Ook nu nog zijn de artsen de enigen in de wijde omtrek en hun agenda is overbelast. „Hier dokter zijn, betekent dat je nooit kunt stoppen met werken”, zegt Bosman. De post is dan ook altijd open . „Wat moet je anders zeggen tegen een patiënt die een dag heeft gelopen om hier te komen. Kom maar terug als we open zijn?”
Een grote bron van zorg is de hoge sterfte onder zuigelingen en moeders. De sterfte onder kleine kinderen is wel gedaald van een geschatte 40 procent in 2002 tot 21 procent in 2006, alleen vanwege een aantal simpele maatregelen. Zo worden kinderen onder de vijf jaar geregeld gewogen om hun ontwikkeling te volgen. Wat ook helpt, is het bestrijden van hardnekkige mythes die moeders ervan weerhouden om borstvoeding te geven. De dokters adviseren de vrouwen bovendien hoe ze hun kindje extra kunnen voeden, als er risico bestaat op ondervoeding.
Moedersterfte is een nog groter probleem. Met de sterfte van 6500 van de 100.000 moeders heeft de provincie Badakshan verreweg de hoogste moedersterfte ter wereld. De oorzaak zijn vaak ’simpele’ complicaties. „Meestal is het de combinatie van hoge bloeddruk en complicaties bij de geboorte die uitmondt in zwaar bloedverlies”, vertelt Bosman. „In Nederland doe je dan een bloedtransfusie. Maar waar haal ik hier bloed vandaan?” De dichtstbijzijnde bloedbank is in de provinciehoofdstad Faizabad, op twee dagen rijden.
Bosman vertelt het geëmotioneerd; onlangs verloor ze om deze reden Sahib Daulat. Na de geboorte van haar kindje bleef de nageboorte van de placenta uit. De familie wachtte vier dagen voordat ze Bosman inschakelde. Toen was het bloedverlies al zo groot dat de vrouw twee dagen later overleed.
Een modern ziekenhuis of een bloedbank zullen voor dit dorp waarschijnlijk nooit dichtbij zijn. Maar er zijn wel maatregelen te nemen die kunnen helpen. Zo traint het team 45 vrouwen in de behandeling van veelvoorkomende aandoeningen en in het doen van hygiënische bevallingen. Er is een vaccinatiecampagne begonnen voor kleine kinderen en jonge vrouwen. Wat ook helpt tegen het hoge sterftecijfer, zijn vroege opsporing van ziektebeelden, gynaecologisch advies en informatie over een gezonder eetpatroon.
„We hebben goede hoop dat het sterftecijfer in de komende jaren verder daalt”, zegt Bosman. Ze wil graag nog drie tot vier jaar in het gebied blijven, ondanks het vertrek van haar Britse collega over een jaar. „Ik ben hier omdat ik christen ben. God riep me om hier te zijn. Wil ik getrouwd zijn, kinderen krijgen, een gezin stichten? Natuurlijk wil ik dat en de kans dat ik hier een leuke levenspartner vind, is nihil. Maar het is belangrijker om hier te zijn dan om voor een gemakkelijker leven te kiezen. Het verschil dat we hier maken, schenkt me grote voldoening.”
Bosman heeft haar hoop gevestigd op een Amerikaanse verpleegkundige die onlangs interesse toonde om te komen helpen. Een ambulance die ook als mobiele kliniek kan dienen, is een droom waarvoor voorlopig nog geen geld zal zijn.
Het leven in Kipkoet is spartaans. „Het is zwaar”, zegt Bosman. „Alleen als het niet te droog is en niet vriest, kan ik in de buurt aan water komen.” De temperatuur kan in de winter dalen tot 25 graden onder nul, waarbij de gevoelstemperatuur in de wind nog tien graden lager ligt. In de winter krijgt het dorp drie tot vier uur zon en stoken de mensen dieselkachels. Bosman heeft internet, de enige elektriciteit komt van zonnepanelen en windmolens. Er groeien slechts enkele groentes. De dokters vullen hun menu aan met voorverpakt, houdbaar voedsel. Eens per jaar slaan ze een voorraad in.
„Wat ik vooral mis, is informatie en dynamiek”, zegt Bosman, zittend in haar kleine kamer, tussen haar boeken en dvd’s, op een klein bankstel. Afgelopen januari ging ze weer even naar Nederland. Hete douches en goed eten spelen dan een hoofdrol, maar ook hier laat ze haar werk niet los. Ze geeft presentaties om fondsen te werven en haalt geld binnen door lokale Afghaanse producten aan de man te brengen.
„Het leven in Kipkoet gaat zo traag. Als ik uitga, wil ik graag kleuren zien, mensen ontmoeten en lekker veel eten. Laatst heb ik vijf dagen in het winkelcentrum van Dubai rondgelopen. Niet om te kopen, maar alleen om te kijken. In Nederland hield ik niet zo van winkelen, maar hier voel ik het gemis.”
Trouw
Wakhan - Het is prachtig in die vergeten uithoek van Afghanistan, maar ook berekoud en onherbergzaam. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris wil geen arts zich hier vestigen”, zegt de verantwoordelijk ambtenaar. Maar Christel Bosman kwam wel.
Als arts behandelt Christel Bosman zwangere vrouwen en baby’s. In haar vrije tijd koopt ze boeken en muziek via internet, bekijkt ze de laatste mode bij Wehkamp en luistert naar Marco Borsato, Daniel Bedingfield, gospel en klassieke muziek. Niks bijzonders, behalve dat ze dit alles doet in een van de meest afgelegen uithoeken van Afghanistan.
Al anderhalf jaar is ze dokter in een dorp op de bergrug Wakhan, een Afghaanse landtong, die zich tussen Pakistan en Tadjikistan uitstrekt naar China. Het adembenemende landschap met zijn diepe valleien en de grote diversiteit aan planten en dieren is nog niet ontdekt door het toerisme en de handel. Maar deze ongerepte schoonheid heeft een prijs. Er is stromend water noch elektriciteit en er zijn slechts enkele verharde wegen. Op deze hoogte met zijn grote temperatuurverschillen en de schrale wind over het Pamir-gebergte is bijna niets te verbouwen.
Behalve Christel en de Britse arts Alex Duncan en zijn gezin – die de medische post hebben opgezet – is er in dit gebied geen vreemdeling te bekennen. Waarom zou een jonge Amsterdamse ervoor kiezen om haar flonkerende stad te verwisselen voor een arm Afghaans dorp?
Vanwege haar sociale betrokkenheid. Die was al tijdens Bosmans studie medicijnen een grote drijfveer. „Ik wilde hoe dan ook de wereld in”, zegt ze. „Ik studeerde drie jaar tropische geneeskunde en wilde zo ver mogelijk weg. In 1998 werkte ik in een asielzoekerscentrum bij Deventer. Daar kwamen Afghanen met wie ik zo goed kon opschieten dat ik in dat land aan de slag wilde.”
De medische post van Kipkoet werd vier jaar geleden opgericht door Ora International, dat zichzelf omschrijft als ’een niet-confessionele christelijke hulp- en ontwikkelingsorganisatie ten dienste van mensen in nood in de hele wereld’. De dokters hebben het geloof als inspiratiebron, maar zeggen niet uit te zijn op de bekering van de bevolking. Hun doel is medische zorg geven in dit ontoegankelijke gebied.
Dokter Abdul Momin Jalaly, verantwoordelijk voor de publieke gezondheidszorg in de provincie, vertelt hoe moeilijk het is om hier aan artsen te komen. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris is niemand bereid zich hier te vestigen, omdat het zo afgelegen is.”
Aanvankelijk was de medische post bedoeld voor de aanpak van het grote aantal opiumverslavingen. Opium is overal te krijgen, maar er was geen enkele medische hulp. Ook nu nog zijn de artsen de enigen in de wijde omtrek en hun agenda is overbelast. „Hier dokter zijn, betekent dat je nooit kunt stoppen met werken”, zegt Bosman. De post is dan ook altijd open . „Wat moet je anders zeggen tegen een patiënt die een dag heeft gelopen om hier te komen. Kom maar terug als we open zijn?”
Een grote bron van zorg is de hoge sterfte onder zuigelingen en moeders. De sterfte onder kleine kinderen is wel gedaald van een geschatte 40 procent in 2002 tot 21 procent in 2006, alleen vanwege een aantal simpele maatregelen. Zo worden kinderen onder de vijf jaar geregeld gewogen om hun ontwikkeling te volgen. Wat ook helpt, is het bestrijden van hardnekkige mythes die moeders ervan weerhouden om borstvoeding te geven. De dokters adviseren de vrouwen bovendien hoe ze hun kindje extra kunnen voeden, als er risico bestaat op ondervoeding.
Moedersterfte is een nog groter probleem. Met de sterfte van 6500 van de 100.000 moeders heeft de provincie Badakshan verreweg de hoogste moedersterfte ter wereld. De oorzaak zijn vaak ’simpele’ complicaties. „Meestal is het de combinatie van hoge bloeddruk en complicaties bij de geboorte die uitmondt in zwaar bloedverlies”, vertelt Bosman. „In Nederland doe je dan een bloedtransfusie. Maar waar haal ik hier bloed vandaan?” De dichtstbijzijnde bloedbank is in de provinciehoofdstad Faizabad, op twee dagen rijden.
Bosman vertelt het geëmotioneerd; onlangs verloor ze om deze reden Sahib Daulat. Na de geboorte van haar kindje bleef de nageboorte van de placenta uit. De familie wachtte vier dagen voordat ze Bosman inschakelde. Toen was het bloedverlies al zo groot dat de vrouw twee dagen later overleed.
Een modern ziekenhuis of een bloedbank zullen voor dit dorp waarschijnlijk nooit dichtbij zijn. Maar er zijn wel maatregelen te nemen die kunnen helpen. Zo traint het team 45 vrouwen in de behandeling van veelvoorkomende aandoeningen en in het doen van hygiënische bevallingen. Er is een vaccinatiecampagne begonnen voor kleine kinderen en jonge vrouwen. Wat ook helpt tegen het hoge sterftecijfer, zijn vroege opsporing van ziektebeelden, gynaecologisch advies en informatie over een gezonder eetpatroon.
„We hebben goede hoop dat het sterftecijfer in de komende jaren verder daalt”, zegt Bosman. Ze wil graag nog drie tot vier jaar in het gebied blijven, ondanks het vertrek van haar Britse collega over een jaar. „Ik ben hier omdat ik christen ben. God riep me om hier te zijn. Wil ik getrouwd zijn, kinderen krijgen, een gezin stichten? Natuurlijk wil ik dat en de kans dat ik hier een leuke levenspartner vind, is nihil. Maar het is belangrijker om hier te zijn dan om voor een gemakkelijker leven te kiezen. Het verschil dat we hier maken, schenkt me grote voldoening.”
Bosman heeft haar hoop gevestigd op een Amerikaanse verpleegkundige die onlangs interesse toonde om te komen helpen. Een ambulance die ook als mobiele kliniek kan dienen, is een droom waarvoor voorlopig nog geen geld zal zijn.
Het leven in Kipkoet is spartaans. „Het is zwaar”, zegt Bosman. „Alleen als het niet te droog is en niet vriest, kan ik in de buurt aan water komen.” De temperatuur kan in de winter dalen tot 25 graden onder nul, waarbij de gevoelstemperatuur in de wind nog tien graden lager ligt. In de winter krijgt het dorp drie tot vier uur zon en stoken de mensen dieselkachels. Bosman heeft internet, de enige elektriciteit komt van zonnepanelen en windmolens. Er groeien slechts enkele groentes. De dokters vullen hun menu aan met voorverpakt, houdbaar voedsel. Eens per jaar slaan ze een voorraad in.
„Wat ik vooral mis, is informatie en dynamiek”, zegt Bosman, zittend in haar kleine kamer, tussen haar boeken en dvd’s, op een klein bankstel. Afgelopen januari ging ze weer even naar Nederland. Hete douches en goed eten spelen dan een hoofdrol, maar ook hier laat ze haar werk niet los. Ze geeft presentaties om fondsen te werven en haalt geld binnen door lokale Afghaanse producten aan de man te brengen.
„Het leven in Kipkoet gaat zo traag. Als ik uitga, wil ik graag kleuren zien, mensen ontmoeten en lekker veel eten. Laatst heb ik vijf dagen in het winkelcentrum van Dubai rondgelopen. Niet om te kopen, maar alleen om te kijken. In Nederland hield ik niet zo van winkelen, maar hier voel ik het gemis.”
UN: End abuse of Afghan women
UN: End abuse of Afghan women
Al Jazeera/march 21, 2008
Violence against women in Afghanistan has reached "endemic" proportions,
says one UN official [AP]
Jamila was married off when she was seven years old. Subjected to brutal beatings for nine years by her husband, she approached her father-in-law for help. For this "shame," a family member shot her in the leg.
During a rare visit to her parental home, she sought a divorce. A jirga, or assembly of local elders who act as informal dispute-resolution mechanisms in the absence of a formal justice system in many parts of Afghanistan, rejected her plea and sent her back to her marital home.
Jamila, whose real name and location cannot be revealed for her own safety, was punished once again, this time by her father-in-law, who beat her, cut off one nostril, shaved her head and tied her with a rope before throwing her outside the house.
Andre Huber, the director of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in Afghanistan, says mistreatment and abuse of women persists because cases such as Jamila's are rarely reported.
"Violence against women exists in every continent, every country and every culture, and Afghanistan makes no exception, but the problem here in Afghanistan is that most of the cases remain unreported due to the severe restrictions women face in seeking justice," he told Al Jazeera.
"Female victims are often denied equal access to justice because traditionally they rarely register cases themselves."
'Endemic' violence
Even when women do manage to report the violence, the act of reporting may itself increase the abuse against them, either from family members, as in the case of Jamila, or from officials of the criminal justice system.
The UN says more Afghan girls are returning
to school, but violence persists [AP]
A United Nations Development Fund for Women (Unifem) report cites documented cases of women who were killed after returning home.
"The initial violence is compounded by further violations of the victim as she approaches or comes into contact with different institutions of the State of community," the report stated.
"When the women or girls seek recourse from the government, they are further molested by the government representatives" and "most of the time women who report incidents of violence to the police end up in prison themselves".
However, Jamila's case is different in that she actually divorced her husband, who is now serving a three-year jail sentence. Documentation of the violence against her, as well as a follow-up by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, made this possible.
Social, religious norms
An earlier report by the UN's Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also found that the majority of women prisoners in Afghanistan were being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms.
Christina Orguz, UNODC's country director, said that most of the "criminals" would have been considered and treated as victims elsewhere.
Najia Zewari, a senior national program officer at Unifem in Afghanistan, said there is a social intolerance towards women who do not belong to a family unit.
"Women are more vulnerable if they are not attached to a group, family or tribe," she said.
She added that any intervention on the issue of violence against women needs to be sustainable.
"We cannot create another monster by taking people out of the family."
Few options
The lack of representation of women in decision-making positions (only one cabinet minister is a woman and there are no vocal women in leadership positions), reinforces stereotypes that limit a woman's role to the household.
Women's rights advocates say this also engenders hostility to women who participate in civil society and public life.
Afghanistan has one of the world's highest
maternal mortality rates [GALLO/GETTY]
Suzana Paklar, the head of Medica Mondiale, an NGO that provides support to women in war and crises zones, told Al Jazeera: "There is systematic oppression of women based on the deep-rooted belief that women have a lesser value."
A woman is perceived as an 'it' rather than a 'she,' Paklar said, adding that the problem in addressing the issue of violence against women in Afghanistan is that "we don't have real options to offer women".
"There is nothing really functional as protection," she said.
The strong shame associated with a woman leaving her home, even if as a victim of abuse, makes reintegrating into society and family nearly impossible.
If she returns home, the victim may be killed. If she does not return home, it is likely she will face more violence as a result of being an 'unattached woman'.
Currently, Afghanistan has only short-stay provisions for emergency cases, most of which do not allow women to keep their children.
Matrix of repression
A recent editorial in the government-owned Kabul Times offered a stark reminder of the widespread acceptance of violence against women in Afghanistan. The editorial, which ran four days after International Women's Day on March 8, was titled "A few reasons for violence against women."
"We always condemn men who beat their wives or sisters … but overlook what some women do to invoke men's ire. To begin with, there are numerous obstinate, groggy, nagging, quarrelsome, stingy and arguing women in this country who disturb the peace in their families. When they get charged they go on and on till they provoke their husbands to beat them black and blue."
The apparent justification of violence against women was written by Abdul Haq, the English-language newspaper's editor-in-chief. The acting editor, S. Ghiassi, told Al Jazeera that Haq could not comment on the issue because he was ill and hospitalised.
Root causes
A Unifem study, based on a primary database of violence covering 21 districts over a year-and-a-half during which 1,011 cases were registered, found that most of the cases of violence were a result of forced marriages.
Afghan women celebrate International
Women's Day [AP]
The report also stated that the incidence of forced marriages is as high as 70 to 80 per cent, while 57 per cent of marriages are estimated to be before the legal age of 16.
The widespread prevalence of child marriage compelled Hamid Karzai, the nation's president, to publicly address this issue on International Women's Day, calling on religious elders to end this practice and the social custom of giving away girls as a means of settling disputes and debts.
Afghanistan also suffers one of the world's highest maternal mortality rates - one woman dies every 29 minutes during child birth – and a female literacy rate that stands at 15.8 per cent, nearly half that of men.
Campaign for change
Several groups, including the SDC, the governments of Norway and Italy, and the UN are fighting violence against women by setting up a trust fund for projects that raise legal aid awareness, provide psychosocial aid and build safe houses and shelters.
As part of the initiative, Unifem and Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs opened its second referral centre in the northern Parwan province last week. The referral centre will ensure that women seeking help from authorities are not automatically arrested pending investigation.
Reports from the first referral centre indicate that the initiative has made some gains.
"Not one of the women who went there ended up in custody," Zaweri said. The next step, Unifem and its partners said, will be the introduction of specific legislation for the elimination of violence against women.
A draft of the proposed law has been sent to the Ministry of Justice for review.
Al Jazeera/march 21, 2008
Violence against women in Afghanistan has reached "endemic" proportions,
says one UN official [AP]
Jamila was married off when she was seven years old. Subjected to brutal beatings for nine years by her husband, she approached her father-in-law for help. For this "shame," a family member shot her in the leg.
During a rare visit to her parental home, she sought a divorce. A jirga, or assembly of local elders who act as informal dispute-resolution mechanisms in the absence of a formal justice system in many parts of Afghanistan, rejected her plea and sent her back to her marital home.
Jamila, whose real name and location cannot be revealed for her own safety, was punished once again, this time by her father-in-law, who beat her, cut off one nostril, shaved her head and tied her with a rope before throwing her outside the house.
Andre Huber, the director of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in Afghanistan, says mistreatment and abuse of women persists because cases such as Jamila's are rarely reported.
"Violence against women exists in every continent, every country and every culture, and Afghanistan makes no exception, but the problem here in Afghanistan is that most of the cases remain unreported due to the severe restrictions women face in seeking justice," he told Al Jazeera.
"Female victims are often denied equal access to justice because traditionally they rarely register cases themselves."
'Endemic' violence
Even when women do manage to report the violence, the act of reporting may itself increase the abuse against them, either from family members, as in the case of Jamila, or from officials of the criminal justice system.
The UN says more Afghan girls are returning
to school, but violence persists [AP]
A United Nations Development Fund for Women (Unifem) report cites documented cases of women who were killed after returning home.
"The initial violence is compounded by further violations of the victim as she approaches or comes into contact with different institutions of the State of community," the report stated.
"When the women or girls seek recourse from the government, they are further molested by the government representatives" and "most of the time women who report incidents of violence to the police end up in prison themselves".
However, Jamila's case is different in that she actually divorced her husband, who is now serving a three-year jail sentence. Documentation of the violence against her, as well as a follow-up by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, made this possible.
Social, religious norms
An earlier report by the UN's Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also found that the majority of women prisoners in Afghanistan were being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms.
Christina Orguz, UNODC's country director, said that most of the "criminals" would have been considered and treated as victims elsewhere.
Najia Zewari, a senior national program officer at Unifem in Afghanistan, said there is a social intolerance towards women who do not belong to a family unit.
"Women are more vulnerable if they are not attached to a group, family or tribe," she said.
She added that any intervention on the issue of violence against women needs to be sustainable.
"We cannot create another monster by taking people out of the family."
Few options
The lack of representation of women in decision-making positions (only one cabinet minister is a woman and there are no vocal women in leadership positions), reinforces stereotypes that limit a woman's role to the household.
Women's rights advocates say this also engenders hostility to women who participate in civil society and public life.
Afghanistan has one of the world's highest
maternal mortality rates [GALLO/GETTY]
Suzana Paklar, the head of Medica Mondiale, an NGO that provides support to women in war and crises zones, told Al Jazeera: "There is systematic oppression of women based on the deep-rooted belief that women have a lesser value."
A woman is perceived as an 'it' rather than a 'she,' Paklar said, adding that the problem in addressing the issue of violence against women in Afghanistan is that "we don't have real options to offer women".
"There is nothing really functional as protection," she said.
The strong shame associated with a woman leaving her home, even if as a victim of abuse, makes reintegrating into society and family nearly impossible.
If she returns home, the victim may be killed. If she does not return home, it is likely she will face more violence as a result of being an 'unattached woman'.
Currently, Afghanistan has only short-stay provisions for emergency cases, most of which do not allow women to keep their children.
Matrix of repression
A recent editorial in the government-owned Kabul Times offered a stark reminder of the widespread acceptance of violence against women in Afghanistan. The editorial, which ran four days after International Women's Day on March 8, was titled "A few reasons for violence against women."
"We always condemn men who beat their wives or sisters … but overlook what some women do to invoke men's ire. To begin with, there are numerous obstinate, groggy, nagging, quarrelsome, stingy and arguing women in this country who disturb the peace in their families. When they get charged they go on and on till they provoke their husbands to beat them black and blue."
The apparent justification of violence against women was written by Abdul Haq, the English-language newspaper's editor-in-chief. The acting editor, S. Ghiassi, told Al Jazeera that Haq could not comment on the issue because he was ill and hospitalised.
Root causes
A Unifem study, based on a primary database of violence covering 21 districts over a year-and-a-half during which 1,011 cases were registered, found that most of the cases of violence were a result of forced marriages.
Afghan women celebrate International
Women's Day [AP]
The report also stated that the incidence of forced marriages is as high as 70 to 80 per cent, while 57 per cent of marriages are estimated to be before the legal age of 16.
The widespread prevalence of child marriage compelled Hamid Karzai, the nation's president, to publicly address this issue on International Women's Day, calling on religious elders to end this practice and the social custom of giving away girls as a means of settling disputes and debts.
Afghanistan also suffers one of the world's highest maternal mortality rates - one woman dies every 29 minutes during child birth – and a female literacy rate that stands at 15.8 per cent, nearly half that of men.
Campaign for change
Several groups, including the SDC, the governments of Norway and Italy, and the UN are fighting violence against women by setting up a trust fund for projects that raise legal aid awareness, provide psychosocial aid and build safe houses and shelters.
As part of the initiative, Unifem and Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs opened its second referral centre in the northern Parwan province last week. The referral centre will ensure that women seeking help from authorities are not automatically arrested pending investigation.
Reports from the first referral centre indicate that the initiative has made some gains.
"Not one of the women who went there ended up in custody," Zaweri said. The next step, Unifem and its partners said, will be the introduction of specific legislation for the elimination of violence against women.
A draft of the proposed law has been sent to the Ministry of Justice for review.
Living in Kabul
Living in Kabul
Civil Society/March 2008
“Is it safe to go to Kabul?” friends and acquaintances and would-be visitors often ask? The question though natural, often strikes me as odd. How does one answer it as a denizen of the city of a war-torn country? My usual response is to say its safe unless one is unlucky to be in the wrong place at the wrong time- the same response I would give while reporting on Kashmir in earlier years.
Alternatively I remark that I am usually more scared of the men than the bombs. Facetious though the remark may sound, there is certainly a core of truth in it. On a daily basis, nothing impacts on me more than the identity of being a woman.
Being a journalist in Afghanistan today is an enormous privilege. Seeing a country being built brick by brick both literally and figuratively is a unique journalistic experience- as one sees the emergence of new trends, cultures, economic development, institutions being built or not being built as the case may be.
Living in Kabul is not quite as easy. Electric supply can be as intermittent as two hours every fourth day in freezing winter, a time when heating, hot water and even light are the most essential in temperatures that vary between minus 15 to minus 25 degrees. Of course many parts of India also lack this basic necessity. But try running an entire capital city, and one which is attempting to rebuild a country on sporadic bursts of power? Try imagining- not the occasional power cuts at home, which we all face, but going to an office with no electricity? How do you charge laptops, cell phones, work in the evening? Most people who can afford it, and this includes almost all expatriates, rely on heavy generator sets to provide them electricity. This of course comes at a price: fumes, noise and frequent breakdowns unless you can afford the high costs of high maintenance.
In winter our rooms are warmed with wood stoves and it is only after four and a half years that I can claim to have somewhat mastered the art of lighting a successful wood fire- previous winters having been spent intermittently opening windows to air the room of smoke and closing them again to try and keep out the cold!
Though living conditions may resemble the poorer quarters or third world countries, costs of living are higher than most of the first world, because goods and services are still at a premium.
Six years into the rebuilding of Afghanistan, especially its urban centres still reply completely on imported goods including even milk and butter and fruit. Even though there is an abundance of all three in the country, the difficulties of processing and packaging and distribution as well as the complete absence of an industrial base make difficult to access locally produced goods.
So why stay on in this difficult country. Most foreigners asked this question are stumped for a rationale answer, mentioning only the intensity of the country. The ‘intensity’, difficult to explain to someone who hasn’t experienced it, is something that draws you in like an inexplicable attraction- an atmosphere where everything is experienced at a heightened level of experience. The light, the colours, the warmth and cold and most of all the emotions. Initial days there left me feeling like my life, my little personal world with its small joys, travails and sorrows was very trivial. That feeling has given way now to a more measured emption- but still one that accentuates every emotion, every detail, perhaps because of the absence of normality or what we call normality.
The normal is the unusual here and it is those expatriates who do ‘normal’ things who are seen as extraordinary. An Indian diplomat, Sandeep Kumar, stands out because he frequents the Afghan gyms, paints and travels in taxis. Deborah Rodriguez, an American became a bestselling author with her account of how she set up a beauty parlour, married an Afghan and coped with life here. Saska and Gay le Clerc are woman restaurateurs. The task is not easy. Saska and Le Clerc have to import a lot of their basic food.
Imported goods are sold at very high prices to the expatriate community and the Afghan elite while the poorer citizens get pushed to the margins. Take for example the price of housing. The scarcity of good housing- substantive number of houses were completely or partially destroyed in years of bombing, mortar shelling and gunfire and the advent of a cash rich expatriate community has resulted in enormously high rents that are unaffordable for most Afghans who get pushed to more remote areas of the city and ‘kuccha houses’ without any plumbing.
It is not just the economy of Afghanistan that is the tale of two cities. Expatriate seem to live in a bubble of their own partially by choice and partially by circumstance. Most internationals working for international organisations are bound by a clutch of security regulations. Houses with barbed wire and bomb shelters and high walls. Guards at the door, sandbags outside. Travel in armoured cars or atleast large SUVs – often with armed guards. Expatriates are also prohibited from walking in the street, going to areas or locations that are not ‘cleared’ by their security apparatus in advance and usually also prohibited from consorting with Afghans who are not ‘cleared’. Afghans are usually treated as suspect unless proven otherwise under this security regimen under which private security companies also seal off roads and access to ‘ordinary’ locals, prevent local taxies from many routes and cordon off half the road in front of the houses and offices of the more rich and powerful.
The divide is further accentuated in the social sphere. Most restaurants are either predominantly frequented by either Afghans or expats and few see the presence of both purely because ‘expat’ restaurants are way too expensive(a simple sandwhich in a simple café costs usually $7 to $10). Even where they are affordable, many restaurants hang signs outside saying ‘no locals’, ‘no Afghans’ or ‘foreign passports only’. The rationale is that they are forbidden from serving liquor to Afghans under the country’s laws and get raided by the police if locals are found outside. Whatever the reason, the result is an apartheid that appears to have become accepted.
It would be wrong to blame just the expatriate community for this separation however. Afghan society does not lend itself easily to a great deal of tolerance in socialising, especially where the presence of women is concerned.
Though the Taliban alone are usually equated with denial of rights to women, the truth is that they were only the most extreme manifestation of existing customs. In most parts of the country women still need permission to leave the house(the degree of strictness of course varies with geography, ethnicity and individual family values).
Women are largely seen as possessions and women’s role outside the family home is ill-understood. The fact that more than 50% of the women in Afghanistan’s largest jail are there for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for having run away from home, illustrates best the opinion of those in authority towards women stepping outside the family structure. Though a small number of women are joining the workforce(especially in urban centres), they are often subject to harassment.
While this view of women is not limited to Afghanistan, the polarisation of views seems far more acute here. War, displacement, extreme conservatism overlaid with exposure to TV’s pop culture and its display of women combined with a move towards more progressive liberal values has created a confused value system that has a strong streak of hostility towards women in public spaces. Where the creed of treating women as property comes face to face with the commodification of women, the result is a debate that centres around the apparent contradiction of a women in burkha or a bikini. Subsumed in this superficial dispute are the real rights of women to participate in public space- both as participants and decision makers.
The hostility that this confrontation creates also it difficult even for women expatriates to function with comfort, even though they enjoy layers of safety and insulation denied to their Afghan counterparts.
As an Indian woman I usually straddle a schizophrenic identity. Indians are the most loved nationality in Afghanistan, being seen rightly or wrongly as selfless friends with no agenda. Being a woman counters most of that advantage.
To summarise life in Kabul: as a journalist it is fascinating, living is difficult and being a woman can be depressing.
Civil Society/March 2008
“Is it safe to go to Kabul?” friends and acquaintances and would-be visitors often ask? The question though natural, often strikes me as odd. How does one answer it as a denizen of the city of a war-torn country? My usual response is to say its safe unless one is unlucky to be in the wrong place at the wrong time- the same response I would give while reporting on Kashmir in earlier years.
Alternatively I remark that I am usually more scared of the men than the bombs. Facetious though the remark may sound, there is certainly a core of truth in it. On a daily basis, nothing impacts on me more than the identity of being a woman.
Being a journalist in Afghanistan today is an enormous privilege. Seeing a country being built brick by brick both literally and figuratively is a unique journalistic experience- as one sees the emergence of new trends, cultures, economic development, institutions being built or not being built as the case may be.
Living in Kabul is not quite as easy. Electric supply can be as intermittent as two hours every fourth day in freezing winter, a time when heating, hot water and even light are the most essential in temperatures that vary between minus 15 to minus 25 degrees. Of course many parts of India also lack this basic necessity. But try running an entire capital city, and one which is attempting to rebuild a country on sporadic bursts of power? Try imagining- not the occasional power cuts at home, which we all face, but going to an office with no electricity? How do you charge laptops, cell phones, work in the evening? Most people who can afford it, and this includes almost all expatriates, rely on heavy generator sets to provide them electricity. This of course comes at a price: fumes, noise and frequent breakdowns unless you can afford the high costs of high maintenance.
In winter our rooms are warmed with wood stoves and it is only after four and a half years that I can claim to have somewhat mastered the art of lighting a successful wood fire- previous winters having been spent intermittently opening windows to air the room of smoke and closing them again to try and keep out the cold!
Though living conditions may resemble the poorer quarters or third world countries, costs of living are higher than most of the first world, because goods and services are still at a premium.
Six years into the rebuilding of Afghanistan, especially its urban centres still reply completely on imported goods including even milk and butter and fruit. Even though there is an abundance of all three in the country, the difficulties of processing and packaging and distribution as well as the complete absence of an industrial base make difficult to access locally produced goods.
So why stay on in this difficult country. Most foreigners asked this question are stumped for a rationale answer, mentioning only the intensity of the country. The ‘intensity’, difficult to explain to someone who hasn’t experienced it, is something that draws you in like an inexplicable attraction- an atmosphere where everything is experienced at a heightened level of experience. The light, the colours, the warmth and cold and most of all the emotions. Initial days there left me feeling like my life, my little personal world with its small joys, travails and sorrows was very trivial. That feeling has given way now to a more measured emption- but still one that accentuates every emotion, every detail, perhaps because of the absence of normality or what we call normality.
The normal is the unusual here and it is those expatriates who do ‘normal’ things who are seen as extraordinary. An Indian diplomat, Sandeep Kumar, stands out because he frequents the Afghan gyms, paints and travels in taxis. Deborah Rodriguez, an American became a bestselling author with her account of how she set up a beauty parlour, married an Afghan and coped with life here. Saska and Gay le Clerc are woman restaurateurs. The task is not easy. Saska and Le Clerc have to import a lot of their basic food.
Imported goods are sold at very high prices to the expatriate community and the Afghan elite while the poorer citizens get pushed to the margins. Take for example the price of housing. The scarcity of good housing- substantive number of houses were completely or partially destroyed in years of bombing, mortar shelling and gunfire and the advent of a cash rich expatriate community has resulted in enormously high rents that are unaffordable for most Afghans who get pushed to more remote areas of the city and ‘kuccha houses’ without any plumbing.
It is not just the economy of Afghanistan that is the tale of two cities. Expatriate seem to live in a bubble of their own partially by choice and partially by circumstance. Most internationals working for international organisations are bound by a clutch of security regulations. Houses with barbed wire and bomb shelters and high walls. Guards at the door, sandbags outside. Travel in armoured cars or atleast large SUVs – often with armed guards. Expatriates are also prohibited from walking in the street, going to areas or locations that are not ‘cleared’ by their security apparatus in advance and usually also prohibited from consorting with Afghans who are not ‘cleared’. Afghans are usually treated as suspect unless proven otherwise under this security regimen under which private security companies also seal off roads and access to ‘ordinary’ locals, prevent local taxies from many routes and cordon off half the road in front of the houses and offices of the more rich and powerful.
The divide is further accentuated in the social sphere. Most restaurants are either predominantly frequented by either Afghans or expats and few see the presence of both purely because ‘expat’ restaurants are way too expensive(a simple sandwhich in a simple café costs usually $7 to $10). Even where they are affordable, many restaurants hang signs outside saying ‘no locals’, ‘no Afghans’ or ‘foreign passports only’. The rationale is that they are forbidden from serving liquor to Afghans under the country’s laws and get raided by the police if locals are found outside. Whatever the reason, the result is an apartheid that appears to have become accepted.
It would be wrong to blame just the expatriate community for this separation however. Afghan society does not lend itself easily to a great deal of tolerance in socialising, especially where the presence of women is concerned.
Though the Taliban alone are usually equated with denial of rights to women, the truth is that they were only the most extreme manifestation of existing customs. In most parts of the country women still need permission to leave the house(the degree of strictness of course varies with geography, ethnicity and individual family values).
Women are largely seen as possessions and women’s role outside the family home is ill-understood. The fact that more than 50% of the women in Afghanistan’s largest jail are there for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for having run away from home, illustrates best the opinion of those in authority towards women stepping outside the family structure. Though a small number of women are joining the workforce(especially in urban centres), they are often subject to harassment.
While this view of women is not limited to Afghanistan, the polarisation of views seems far more acute here. War, displacement, extreme conservatism overlaid with exposure to TV’s pop culture and its display of women combined with a move towards more progressive liberal values has created a confused value system that has a strong streak of hostility towards women in public spaces. Where the creed of treating women as property comes face to face with the commodification of women, the result is a debate that centres around the apparent contradiction of a women in burkha or a bikini. Subsumed in this superficial dispute are the real rights of women to participate in public space- both as participants and decision makers.
The hostility that this confrontation creates also it difficult even for women expatriates to function with comfort, even though they enjoy layers of safety and insulation denied to their Afghan counterparts.
As an Indian woman I usually straddle a schizophrenic identity. Indians are the most loved nationality in Afghanistan, being seen rightly or wrongly as selfless friends with no agenda. Being a woman counters most of that advantage.
To summarise life in Kabul: as a journalist it is fascinating, living is difficult and being a woman can be depressing.
Between the verses
Between the verses
In the rush to ‘define’, have we forgotten Southasia’s long history of blurring the boundaries of love, of the distinction between the platonic and the sexual?
Himal/March 2008
jessica schnabel
Young men wander hand in hand, giggle together, sit on each other’s laps. At weddings and parties they dance together sensuously, usually without any woman around. In many places, such overt displays of physical bonding between the same sex would be immediately slotted as homosexual. Whether viewed with liberal acceptance or castigated with opprobrium, it would first be categorised. Yet in the scene sketched here, most of the young men are intensely interested in girls, not boys.
In today’s Kabul, whether due to the unforgiving taboos on overt displays of heterosexual behaviour, or having grown up under the Taliban regime, which managed to make women disappear from sight, intense displays of physical affection between men are the norm, even more so than in other Southasian cities and towns. Despite the extreme sexual repression that continues to exist in Afghanistan, this ‘permission’ to exhibit physical tenderness towards the same sex simultaneously challenges the stereotypes of homosexual, heterosexual and even bisexual identities, which often form the core of gender politics elsewhere.
Though there has been considerable documentation of the denial of women’s rights in Afghanistan, as well as some cursory examination into issues of gay identities, the behavioural norm that blurs the distinction between sexual and platonic relationships remains almost completely unexplored. This continues in spite of the fact that there is a long history of such relationships in official records and cultural traditions of the region. Take, for example, two widely known works of literature, the Baburnama (Book of Babur) and the works of the 13th-centruy poet Rumi. The former was written by an emperor who came from Uzbekistan to make Hindustan his home, but all his life longed for Kabul, for its resemblance to his childhood home. The latter, though born in Balkh in northern Afghanistan, ultimately left the region for Turkey.
Zahiruddin Muhammed Babur, who lived between 1483 and 1530, was the founder of the Mughal dynasty in the Subcontinent. In his astonishingly frank autobiography, the Baburnama, he provides an extensive record his longing for a young boy. Unfortunately, this infatuation also coincided with his marriage. Though wed at the age of 17, to one Ayisheh Sultan Begum, he soon loses both his interest in and fondness for his wife. “Once every month or forty days,” the emperor recalls, “my mother, the khanim, drove me to her [Ayisheh] with all the severity of a quartermaster.” Readers are never told exactly what the results were of these disciplinarian efforts. And, of course, as is the norm with the history of kings, we know even less of Ayisheh’s feelings. What we do know, however, is of Babur’s real interest. “During this time there was a boy from the camp market named Baburi,” he writes.
Even his name was amazingly appropriate. I developed a strange inclination for him – rather I made myself miserable over him.
Before this experience I had never felt a desire for anyone, nor did I listen to talk of love and affection or speak of such things. At that time I used to compose single lines and couplets in Persian. I composed the following lines there:
‘May no one be so distraught and devastated by love as I;
May no beloved be so pitiless and careless as you.’
Occasionally Baburi came to me, but I was so bashful that I could not look him in the face, much less converse with him. In my excitement and agitation I could not thank him for coming, much less complain of his leaving. Who could bear to demand the ceremonies of fealty?
Another time, coming suddenly across the subject of his affections, Babur recalls being so embarrassed that he nearly went to pieces.
In the throes of love, in the foment of youth and madness, I wandered bareheaded and barefoot around the lanes and streets and through gardens and orchard, paying no attention to acquaintances and strangers, oblivious to self and others.
When I fell in love I became mad and crazed. I knew not this to be part of loving beauties.
Sometimes I went out alone like a madman to the hills and wilderness, sometimes I roamed through the orchards and lanes of town, neither walking nor sitting within my own volition, restless in going and staying.
I have no strength to go, no power to stay. You have snared us in this state, my heart.
What appears to have been a passing infatuation ends here, however, and little more is heard of Babur’s love and longing. Much of the rest of the Baburnama is instead devoted to more ‘manly’ pursuits, particularly Babur’s extensive military expeditions.
Inside the unsayable
Preceding Babur by three centuries was Jelaluddin Balkhi, commonly known as Rumi, the mystic Sufi poet. Unlike Babur, love was not a passing infatuation for Rumi, but rather formed a core of both his life and work. Born in 1207, Rumi married young and had a family. But it was not until 1244 that he came across what was to be his strongest and most abiding relationship – with the wandering dervish, Shams of Tabrizi.
Writing of this friendship, the translator and Rumi scholar Coleman Barks says: “We cannot say much about love at first sight. It happens and we live in the wake of a new life. Dante and Beatrice. Rumi and Shams. Part of the love mystery explored in Rumi’s poetry is how presences flow together, evolve, and create in tandem.” Describing his own intense relationship with Rumi’s poems, Barks writes: “I loved the unpredictable spontaneity, the push-pull of great tenderness and great loneliness, of living beyond psychology, of drifting at ease inside the unsayable.”
Much is now made of Rumi’s role in bridging cultures. As a Sufi poet whose verse transcended the narrow boundaries of not just one religion but also the more narrow interpretation of man’s relationship with god, Rumi is now held up as an example of the religious tolerance that existed.
His poetry is often quoted and used to buttress the more liberal interpretations of religion and tolerance, especially since he came from a region that has recently seen a great deal of intolerance.
But even today, little is said of Rumi’s role in blurring the boundaries of love. Soon after they met, Shams and Rumi became inseparable. “Their friendship is one of the mysteries,” Barks writes. “They spent months together without any human needs, transported into a region of pure conversation. This ecstatic connection caused difficulties in the religious community.” As a teacher of religion, after all, Rumi would have been expected to be beyond ‘worldly’ longings, while his students are also said to have felt neglected by this obsession with Shams. Shams eventually disappeared, only to be brought back at Rumi’s urging. “Shams stayed in Rumi’s home and was married to a young girl who had been brought up in the family. Again the long mystical conversation (sohbet) began and again the jealousies grew.” Shams disappeared again, this time probably murdered by Rumi’s own family.
In despair Rumi travelled to Damascus, realising only then: “Why should I seek? I am the same as he. His essence speaks through me. I have been looking for myself.” Yet even so, Rumi needed his muse. Barks states, somewhat obliquely, “After Shams’ death and Rumi’s emotional ‘merging’ with him another companion was found. Saladin Zarkub.” And, after Zarkub, there was another, Husam Chelebi – all of them male. It was to Shams, however, that Rumi addressed his most intense poems, included in a masterwork collectively referred to as “The Shams”. “There’s no more wine; my bowl is broken,” Rumi laments, “I am terribly sick, and only Shams can cure me.
Do you know Shams, the prince of seeing,
who lifts the utterly drowned up out of the ocean
and revives them, so that the shore looks like
multiple marriages are going on at once,
easy laughing here, a formal toast,
a procession without music.
Shams is a trumpet note of light
that starts the atoms spinning,
a wind that comes at dawn
tasting of bread and salt.
Contemporary history does not say whether the love of Rumi for Shams, or of Babur for Baburi, ever had a physical element. If this were so, these couples would perhaps be called homosexual. But what if it were not so? In the narrow categorisations of homosexual, heterosexual and bisexual, where would these friendships fit in – traversing the space between sexual and platonic, between friendship and love? Babur and Shams may well have also been homosexual. Or, like the boys of Kabul today, it might be just that they were uninhibited and intensely attached to others of the same sex.
What enables young men in Afghanistan today to hold swinging hands as they walk together is a lack of awareness that such behaviour is nowadays stereotyped as ‘gay’. Caught in something of a time warp, isolated by three decades’ of fighting, Afghanistan, in a paradoxical way, provides some spaces and freedoms that are a direct result of its years of social seclusion. Now on the path of assimilation into the ‘global community’, perhaps it will not be long before Afghan youth, like others in the region, become aware of ‘modern’ behavioural codes, and the displays of physical affection that are now the norm will quickly be labelled as ‘deviant’.
In the rush to ‘define’, have we forgotten Southasia’s long history of blurring the boundaries of love, of the distinction between the platonic and the sexual?
Himal/March 2008
jessica schnabel
Young men wander hand in hand, giggle together, sit on each other’s laps. At weddings and parties they dance together sensuously, usually without any woman around. In many places, such overt displays of physical bonding between the same sex would be immediately slotted as homosexual. Whether viewed with liberal acceptance or castigated with opprobrium, it would first be categorised. Yet in the scene sketched here, most of the young men are intensely interested in girls, not boys.
In today’s Kabul, whether due to the unforgiving taboos on overt displays of heterosexual behaviour, or having grown up under the Taliban regime, which managed to make women disappear from sight, intense displays of physical affection between men are the norm, even more so than in other Southasian cities and towns. Despite the extreme sexual repression that continues to exist in Afghanistan, this ‘permission’ to exhibit physical tenderness towards the same sex simultaneously challenges the stereotypes of homosexual, heterosexual and even bisexual identities, which often form the core of gender politics elsewhere.
Though there has been considerable documentation of the denial of women’s rights in Afghanistan, as well as some cursory examination into issues of gay identities, the behavioural norm that blurs the distinction between sexual and platonic relationships remains almost completely unexplored. This continues in spite of the fact that there is a long history of such relationships in official records and cultural traditions of the region. Take, for example, two widely known works of literature, the Baburnama (Book of Babur) and the works of the 13th-centruy poet Rumi. The former was written by an emperor who came from Uzbekistan to make Hindustan his home, but all his life longed for Kabul, for its resemblance to his childhood home. The latter, though born in Balkh in northern Afghanistan, ultimately left the region for Turkey.
Zahiruddin Muhammed Babur, who lived between 1483 and 1530, was the founder of the Mughal dynasty in the Subcontinent. In his astonishingly frank autobiography, the Baburnama, he provides an extensive record his longing for a young boy. Unfortunately, this infatuation also coincided with his marriage. Though wed at the age of 17, to one Ayisheh Sultan Begum, he soon loses both his interest in and fondness for his wife. “Once every month or forty days,” the emperor recalls, “my mother, the khanim, drove me to her [Ayisheh] with all the severity of a quartermaster.” Readers are never told exactly what the results were of these disciplinarian efforts. And, of course, as is the norm with the history of kings, we know even less of Ayisheh’s feelings. What we do know, however, is of Babur’s real interest. “During this time there was a boy from the camp market named Baburi,” he writes.
Even his name was amazingly appropriate. I developed a strange inclination for him – rather I made myself miserable over him.
Before this experience I had never felt a desire for anyone, nor did I listen to talk of love and affection or speak of such things. At that time I used to compose single lines and couplets in Persian. I composed the following lines there:
‘May no one be so distraught and devastated by love as I;
May no beloved be so pitiless and careless as you.’
Occasionally Baburi came to me, but I was so bashful that I could not look him in the face, much less converse with him. In my excitement and agitation I could not thank him for coming, much less complain of his leaving. Who could bear to demand the ceremonies of fealty?
Another time, coming suddenly across the subject of his affections, Babur recalls being so embarrassed that he nearly went to pieces.
In the throes of love, in the foment of youth and madness, I wandered bareheaded and barefoot around the lanes and streets and through gardens and orchard, paying no attention to acquaintances and strangers, oblivious to self and others.
When I fell in love I became mad and crazed. I knew not this to be part of loving beauties.
Sometimes I went out alone like a madman to the hills and wilderness, sometimes I roamed through the orchards and lanes of town, neither walking nor sitting within my own volition, restless in going and staying.
I have no strength to go, no power to stay. You have snared us in this state, my heart.
What appears to have been a passing infatuation ends here, however, and little more is heard of Babur’s love and longing. Much of the rest of the Baburnama is instead devoted to more ‘manly’ pursuits, particularly Babur’s extensive military expeditions.
Inside the unsayable
Preceding Babur by three centuries was Jelaluddin Balkhi, commonly known as Rumi, the mystic Sufi poet. Unlike Babur, love was not a passing infatuation for Rumi, but rather formed a core of both his life and work. Born in 1207, Rumi married young and had a family. But it was not until 1244 that he came across what was to be his strongest and most abiding relationship – with the wandering dervish, Shams of Tabrizi.
Writing of this friendship, the translator and Rumi scholar Coleman Barks says: “We cannot say much about love at first sight. It happens and we live in the wake of a new life. Dante and Beatrice. Rumi and Shams. Part of the love mystery explored in Rumi’s poetry is how presences flow together, evolve, and create in tandem.” Describing his own intense relationship with Rumi’s poems, Barks writes: “I loved the unpredictable spontaneity, the push-pull of great tenderness and great loneliness, of living beyond psychology, of drifting at ease inside the unsayable.”
Much is now made of Rumi’s role in bridging cultures. As a Sufi poet whose verse transcended the narrow boundaries of not just one religion but also the more narrow interpretation of man’s relationship with god, Rumi is now held up as an example of the religious tolerance that existed.
His poetry is often quoted and used to buttress the more liberal interpretations of religion and tolerance, especially since he came from a region that has recently seen a great deal of intolerance.
But even today, little is said of Rumi’s role in blurring the boundaries of love. Soon after they met, Shams and Rumi became inseparable. “Their friendship is one of the mysteries,” Barks writes. “They spent months together without any human needs, transported into a region of pure conversation. This ecstatic connection caused difficulties in the religious community.” As a teacher of religion, after all, Rumi would have been expected to be beyond ‘worldly’ longings, while his students are also said to have felt neglected by this obsession with Shams. Shams eventually disappeared, only to be brought back at Rumi’s urging. “Shams stayed in Rumi’s home and was married to a young girl who had been brought up in the family. Again the long mystical conversation (sohbet) began and again the jealousies grew.” Shams disappeared again, this time probably murdered by Rumi’s own family.
In despair Rumi travelled to Damascus, realising only then: “Why should I seek? I am the same as he. His essence speaks through me. I have been looking for myself.” Yet even so, Rumi needed his muse. Barks states, somewhat obliquely, “After Shams’ death and Rumi’s emotional ‘merging’ with him another companion was found. Saladin Zarkub.” And, after Zarkub, there was another, Husam Chelebi – all of them male. It was to Shams, however, that Rumi addressed his most intense poems, included in a masterwork collectively referred to as “The Shams”. “There’s no more wine; my bowl is broken,” Rumi laments, “I am terribly sick, and only Shams can cure me.
Do you know Shams, the prince of seeing,
who lifts the utterly drowned up out of the ocean
and revives them, so that the shore looks like
multiple marriages are going on at once,
easy laughing here, a formal toast,
a procession without music.
Shams is a trumpet note of light
that starts the atoms spinning,
a wind that comes at dawn
tasting of bread and salt.
Contemporary history does not say whether the love of Rumi for Shams, or of Babur for Baburi, ever had a physical element. If this were so, these couples would perhaps be called homosexual. But what if it were not so? In the narrow categorisations of homosexual, heterosexual and bisexual, where would these friendships fit in – traversing the space between sexual and platonic, between friendship and love? Babur and Shams may well have also been homosexual. Or, like the boys of Kabul today, it might be just that they were uninhibited and intensely attached to others of the same sex.
What enables young men in Afghanistan today to hold swinging hands as they walk together is a lack of awareness that such behaviour is nowadays stereotyped as ‘gay’. Caught in something of a time warp, isolated by three decades’ of fighting, Afghanistan, in a paradoxical way, provides some spaces and freedoms that are a direct result of its years of social seclusion. Now on the path of assimilation into the ‘global community’, perhaps it will not be long before Afghan youth, like others in the region, become aware of ‘modern’ behavioural codes, and the displays of physical affection that are now the norm will quickly be labelled as ‘deviant’.
Afghanistan 2007
Afghanistan 2007
South Asia Journal
Afghanistan completed its sixth year since the removal of the Taliban with an erratic record of post conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Though designated as a ‘post-conflict’ country since November 2001, the country continued to see pitched battles with Taliban in large parts of Southern Afghanistan as well as intermittent incidents of violence in others parts of the country. The capital Kabul saw explosions, suicide bombings and rocket attacks and Taliban activities crept closer to the capital. The province of Ghazni was used as a base by the Taliban for their kidnapping of the Korean hostages, an event which also allowed the Taliban to openly hold a press conference, the first since 2001.
In several parts of the South, the Taliban were able to hold districts for varying lengths of time until the government and international forces were able to take control again. There were repeated calls for more troops contribution from the NATO countries, but numbers continued to fall short of what was required given the magnitude of problem. The resource constraint as well as operational methods used by some of the countries also led to heavy reliance on air power and concurrently high rates of civilian casualties. While no exact numbers were made public, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour expressed concern over the civilian casualties during her visit to Afghanistan, terming it “alarming.”
The year also saw a change in the command and control structure of NATO-led ISAF. The rotational system of command where a single NATO member country assumed command was replaced and the ISAF troops will henceforth be commanded an American general in perpetuity.
Other developments on the security front saw the Afghan National Army grow at a slow incremental rate and this year saw greater emphasis on the need for building up the Afghan National Police. Alarmingly, the call for rearming village communities as a means of meeting the shortfall of regular forces, both international and national, continued to gain ground. The first step saw the deployment of the auxiliary police, drawn from the local community and under the command of local commanders. The auxiliary police were deployed with less training than the regular forces.
While government and international forces claimed that they had turned the corner and forced the Taliban to adopt desperate strategies like suicide bombings there appeared to be no let up in the violence. A major suicide bombing in the relatively peaceful province of Baghlan towards the end of the year shocked the country claiming the lives of several parliamentarians visiting the province, including the spokesman of the United National Front and former Minister of Commerce, Syed Mustafa Kazemi.
The United National Front emerged as the political opposition to the government this year, bringing together members of the Northern Alliance, as well as powerful former commanders and members of the royal family who had not played an overt political part in recent years. The year also saw the death of the last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who had returned to the country as the ‘father of the nation’.
The country’s parliament, dominated by members of the United National Front also continued to function as an opposition, coming into regular confrontation with the government. The most visible conflict arose after the parliament dismissed two ministers for non performance. While President Hamid Karzai accepted one dismissal he challenged the other seeking and obtaining a Supreme Court decision against it. However Parliament refused to accept it, claiming that the government was trying to subvert parliamentary prerogative, and the country saw the bizarre spectacle of a foreign minister who dealt with foreign countries and the international community while parliament refused to accept his authority.
The parliament also succeeded in passing a resolution seeking to grant amnesty to all those who had participated in the ‘jehad’ of the last few decades, immunizing warlords and their followers from any prosecution for war crimes or criminal acts. The amnesty, though criticised by the international community, was made into legislation with presidential assent with minor changes. Despite having accepted the plan for transitional justice, the government dragged its feet on implementing any part of it.
President Karzai’s apparent ‘weakness’ was the subject of some criticism from some of the international partners who also drew attention to the inefficiency and corruption in governance. The Afghan government on its part continued seeking greater ownership over the aid being routed into this country. With an estimated 75% of the aid flowing into the ‘external’ budget(i.e. not through the government), the government argued that it can neither build capacity nor assert its authority without control over resources. The international aid community however argued that lack of capacity and endemic corruption in the government prevents it from routing its resources through the government. A significant portion of the aid through the external budget however flows out of the country leading to resentment in the local population. An assessment of the $1.36 billion spent in the Afghan year1384 revealed that the local impact was 31.2%.
Whatever the arguments, the limited efficacy of the aid delivered to Afghanistan so far is clearly visible on the ground. The conflict with the Taliban and the violence occupy the major portion of attention on Afghanistan and the more insidious violence gets much less notice. Though larger numbers of children enrolled in schools and health services improved in some parts of the country, the 2007 National Human Development Report revealed that human development indicators were lower than what was estimated at the time the reconstruction began.
Afghanistan’s HDI ranking was 174, only above the three lowest countries of Niger, Sierra Leone and Mali. The NHDR for 2007, the second since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, reveals a literacy rate of 23.5%, down from the 2004 assessment which put it at 28.7%. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared to 44.5 in the past. International aid still fell woefully short of requirements, while government revenues remained at a dismal 7% of the GDP. Disbursement of aid over 2002-2005 was $83 per capita, even though the Afghan government estimated at a minimum of $168 per capita was needed for minimal stablisation.
According to the latest National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population remains below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption and only 31% has access to safe drinking water. The rate of infant mortality has dropped from 165 per 1000 to 135 per 1000, but the maternal mortality ratio has remained unchanged at 1600 per 100,000 live births, one of the highest in the world.
The situation of women in Afghanistan remains one of the most dismal and the country has a Gender Development Index which ranks it alongside Niger. Despite the removal of the Taliban who were seen as one of the most important reasons for oppression of women, the situation of women has improved only tangentially. Though the country has one of the highest number of women parliamentarians thanks to reservation of seats in the first parliamentary elections, the women parliamentarians are severely disempowered to exercise their roles. There are few women in public service and even fewer in high office. Women’s rights has remained more a token declaration with token representation in the form of one woman cabinet minister and one woman governor.
Violence against women continued in many horrific forms, most patently in the domestic sphere with considerable evidence of forced marriages including child marriages and domestic violence. The practice of suicides and self immolations by women desperate to escape their marriage received some public attention but apart from sporadic and isolated efforts there was little to signal the engagement of either the international community or the Afghan government on this issue. Those working in the area of gender rights continued their effort to reverse or mitigate the worst impacts of customary law and practice which treat women as property. The conflation of several trends – the customary practices, war, the displacement of populations, the return of refugees, the advent of the consumer culture and its commodification of women and the attempts to introduce a more liberal approach – sees an increasingly confrontational approach on the issue of women’s role, rights and participation in the public space.
The country recorded a high growth rate but the economic progress has been patchy and uneven, its inequality hidden behind a façade of glitzy malls in capital cities, new shops and businesses, palatial houses and plenty of hot money that prop up an artificial economy.
Much of the ostentatious wealth was attributed to the narco-economy. The year saw a record opium cultivation. With this Afghanistan, already the world’s single largest supplier of opium, also surpassed any other country in history to have produced opium on such a large scale. An increased acreage of 17% combined with good weather conditions forecasts an increase in opium production by 34%. There were continuing differences of opinion within the international community on the best counter narcotics strategy. At the level of implementation, actions continued to be carried out in selective areas to crackdown on opium farmers with very little enforcement on interdiction, or high value targets like drug traffickers.
Attention continued to be drawn to the linkages between criminals, drug traffickers, terrorists and anti-government elements but yielded little results with security operations continuing in a fractured manner- the US Coalition forces responsible for the war against terror, the NATO-led ISAF responsible for counter insurgency and the police entrusted to deal with counter narcotics. One southern district of Helmund alone accounting for an increase of 48% in opium cultivation.
Helmund proved to be a critical location in more ways than one. The Musa Qala district shot into the limelight following an ‘agreement’ for a ceasefire. The deal, ostensibly between the government authorities and the local tribal elders, resulted in NATO withdrawing its forces from the area in exchange for a guarantee of peace and no Taliban activities in a demarcated area. The agreement, sold as a new way of engaging the tribal community fell through soon however with the area becoming a safe haven for the Taliban. It was only pitched battles at the end of the year that resulted in the government forces supported by NATO’s British troops taking back control.
The need for engaging communities however was given some precedence this year in different forms. A peace jirga between tribal elders from the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan along with government officials and parliamentarians resulted in the first Pak-Afghan peace jirga taking discussions on violence and peace beyond the government to government talks. There were other attempts to engage the communities at the local and provincial level by international organisations as well as NGOs.
The concept of bringing the moderate Taliban back into the fold also gained momentum with renewed calls for holding negotiations. While no details of specific talks were made public, there was continuing anecdotal evidence of overtures between parts of the Taliban and anti government leaderships and the authorities at various levels.
Negotiations with the Taliban led to successful outcomes on atleast two occasions The ICRC mediated between the Taliban and Korean authorities for the release of the Korean hostages and the UN agencies successfully negotiated days of tranquillity that allowed them to carry out much needed vaccinations campaigns in difficult areas of the South after the Taliban assured them of safe passage.
While events on the ground did not provide a cheerful outlook in 2007, one of the most significant shifts was in the overall perception, especially of the international community, that efforts for aid, development and reconstruction needed to be oriented much more towards the Afghan community.
2008 will tell whether this realisation actually results in concrete results and greater cohesiveness of effort that will bring about substantial changes in the lives of Afghans. ‘Afghanisation’ of the process of helping Afghans in the seventh year of rebuilding their country will be a remarkable step forward.
South Asia Journal
Afghanistan completed its sixth year since the removal of the Taliban with an erratic record of post conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Though designated as a ‘post-conflict’ country since November 2001, the country continued to see pitched battles with Taliban in large parts of Southern Afghanistan as well as intermittent incidents of violence in others parts of the country. The capital Kabul saw explosions, suicide bombings and rocket attacks and Taliban activities crept closer to the capital. The province of Ghazni was used as a base by the Taliban for their kidnapping of the Korean hostages, an event which also allowed the Taliban to openly hold a press conference, the first since 2001.
In several parts of the South, the Taliban were able to hold districts for varying lengths of time until the government and international forces were able to take control again. There were repeated calls for more troops contribution from the NATO countries, but numbers continued to fall short of what was required given the magnitude of problem. The resource constraint as well as operational methods used by some of the countries also led to heavy reliance on air power and concurrently high rates of civilian casualties. While no exact numbers were made public, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour expressed concern over the civilian casualties during her visit to Afghanistan, terming it “alarming.”
The year also saw a change in the command and control structure of NATO-led ISAF. The rotational system of command where a single NATO member country assumed command was replaced and the ISAF troops will henceforth be commanded an American general in perpetuity.
Other developments on the security front saw the Afghan National Army grow at a slow incremental rate and this year saw greater emphasis on the need for building up the Afghan National Police. Alarmingly, the call for rearming village communities as a means of meeting the shortfall of regular forces, both international and national, continued to gain ground. The first step saw the deployment of the auxiliary police, drawn from the local community and under the command of local commanders. The auxiliary police were deployed with less training than the regular forces.
While government and international forces claimed that they had turned the corner and forced the Taliban to adopt desperate strategies like suicide bombings there appeared to be no let up in the violence. A major suicide bombing in the relatively peaceful province of Baghlan towards the end of the year shocked the country claiming the lives of several parliamentarians visiting the province, including the spokesman of the United National Front and former Minister of Commerce, Syed Mustafa Kazemi.
The United National Front emerged as the political opposition to the government this year, bringing together members of the Northern Alliance, as well as powerful former commanders and members of the royal family who had not played an overt political part in recent years. The year also saw the death of the last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who had returned to the country as the ‘father of the nation’.
The country’s parliament, dominated by members of the United National Front also continued to function as an opposition, coming into regular confrontation with the government. The most visible conflict arose after the parliament dismissed two ministers for non performance. While President Hamid Karzai accepted one dismissal he challenged the other seeking and obtaining a Supreme Court decision against it. However Parliament refused to accept it, claiming that the government was trying to subvert parliamentary prerogative, and the country saw the bizarre spectacle of a foreign minister who dealt with foreign countries and the international community while parliament refused to accept his authority.
The parliament also succeeded in passing a resolution seeking to grant amnesty to all those who had participated in the ‘jehad’ of the last few decades, immunizing warlords and their followers from any prosecution for war crimes or criminal acts. The amnesty, though criticised by the international community, was made into legislation with presidential assent with minor changes. Despite having accepted the plan for transitional justice, the government dragged its feet on implementing any part of it.
President Karzai’s apparent ‘weakness’ was the subject of some criticism from some of the international partners who also drew attention to the inefficiency and corruption in governance. The Afghan government on its part continued seeking greater ownership over the aid being routed into this country. With an estimated 75% of the aid flowing into the ‘external’ budget(i.e. not through the government), the government argued that it can neither build capacity nor assert its authority without control over resources. The international aid community however argued that lack of capacity and endemic corruption in the government prevents it from routing its resources through the government. A significant portion of the aid through the external budget however flows out of the country leading to resentment in the local population. An assessment of the $1.36 billion spent in the Afghan year1384 revealed that the local impact was 31.2%.
Whatever the arguments, the limited efficacy of the aid delivered to Afghanistan so far is clearly visible on the ground. The conflict with the Taliban and the violence occupy the major portion of attention on Afghanistan and the more insidious violence gets much less notice. Though larger numbers of children enrolled in schools and health services improved in some parts of the country, the 2007 National Human Development Report revealed that human development indicators were lower than what was estimated at the time the reconstruction began.
Afghanistan’s HDI ranking was 174, only above the three lowest countries of Niger, Sierra Leone and Mali. The NHDR for 2007, the second since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, reveals a literacy rate of 23.5%, down from the 2004 assessment which put it at 28.7%. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared to 44.5 in the past. International aid still fell woefully short of requirements, while government revenues remained at a dismal 7% of the GDP. Disbursement of aid over 2002-2005 was $83 per capita, even though the Afghan government estimated at a minimum of $168 per capita was needed for minimal stablisation.
According to the latest National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population remains below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption and only 31% has access to safe drinking water. The rate of infant mortality has dropped from 165 per 1000 to 135 per 1000, but the maternal mortality ratio has remained unchanged at 1600 per 100,000 live births, one of the highest in the world.
The situation of women in Afghanistan remains one of the most dismal and the country has a Gender Development Index which ranks it alongside Niger. Despite the removal of the Taliban who were seen as one of the most important reasons for oppression of women, the situation of women has improved only tangentially. Though the country has one of the highest number of women parliamentarians thanks to reservation of seats in the first parliamentary elections, the women parliamentarians are severely disempowered to exercise their roles. There are few women in public service and even fewer in high office. Women’s rights has remained more a token declaration with token representation in the form of one woman cabinet minister and one woman governor.
Violence against women continued in many horrific forms, most patently in the domestic sphere with considerable evidence of forced marriages including child marriages and domestic violence. The practice of suicides and self immolations by women desperate to escape their marriage received some public attention but apart from sporadic and isolated efforts there was little to signal the engagement of either the international community or the Afghan government on this issue. Those working in the area of gender rights continued their effort to reverse or mitigate the worst impacts of customary law and practice which treat women as property. The conflation of several trends – the customary practices, war, the displacement of populations, the return of refugees, the advent of the consumer culture and its commodification of women and the attempts to introduce a more liberal approach – sees an increasingly confrontational approach on the issue of women’s role, rights and participation in the public space.
The country recorded a high growth rate but the economic progress has been patchy and uneven, its inequality hidden behind a façade of glitzy malls in capital cities, new shops and businesses, palatial houses and plenty of hot money that prop up an artificial economy.
Much of the ostentatious wealth was attributed to the narco-economy. The year saw a record opium cultivation. With this Afghanistan, already the world’s single largest supplier of opium, also surpassed any other country in history to have produced opium on such a large scale. An increased acreage of 17% combined with good weather conditions forecasts an increase in opium production by 34%. There were continuing differences of opinion within the international community on the best counter narcotics strategy. At the level of implementation, actions continued to be carried out in selective areas to crackdown on opium farmers with very little enforcement on interdiction, or high value targets like drug traffickers.
Attention continued to be drawn to the linkages between criminals, drug traffickers, terrorists and anti-government elements but yielded little results with security operations continuing in a fractured manner- the US Coalition forces responsible for the war against terror, the NATO-led ISAF responsible for counter insurgency and the police entrusted to deal with counter narcotics. One southern district of Helmund alone accounting for an increase of 48% in opium cultivation.
Helmund proved to be a critical location in more ways than one. The Musa Qala district shot into the limelight following an ‘agreement’ for a ceasefire. The deal, ostensibly between the government authorities and the local tribal elders, resulted in NATO withdrawing its forces from the area in exchange for a guarantee of peace and no Taliban activities in a demarcated area. The agreement, sold as a new way of engaging the tribal community fell through soon however with the area becoming a safe haven for the Taliban. It was only pitched battles at the end of the year that resulted in the government forces supported by NATO’s British troops taking back control.
The need for engaging communities however was given some precedence this year in different forms. A peace jirga between tribal elders from the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan along with government officials and parliamentarians resulted in the first Pak-Afghan peace jirga taking discussions on violence and peace beyond the government to government talks. There were other attempts to engage the communities at the local and provincial level by international organisations as well as NGOs.
The concept of bringing the moderate Taliban back into the fold also gained momentum with renewed calls for holding negotiations. While no details of specific talks were made public, there was continuing anecdotal evidence of overtures between parts of the Taliban and anti government leaderships and the authorities at various levels.
Negotiations with the Taliban led to successful outcomes on atleast two occasions The ICRC mediated between the Taliban and Korean authorities for the release of the Korean hostages and the UN agencies successfully negotiated days of tranquillity that allowed them to carry out much needed vaccinations campaigns in difficult areas of the South after the Taliban assured them of safe passage.
While events on the ground did not provide a cheerful outlook in 2007, one of the most significant shifts was in the overall perception, especially of the international community, that efforts for aid, development and reconstruction needed to be oriented much more towards the Afghan community.
2008 will tell whether this realisation actually results in concrete results and greater cohesiveness of effort that will bring about substantial changes in the lives of Afghans. ‘Afghanisation’ of the process of helping Afghans in the seventh year of rebuilding their country will be a remarkable step forward.
Life here is bleak
Life here is bleak
Times of India/February 12, 2008
Escalating violence in Afghanistan and the attention that it commands worldwide has obscured the far more dangerous but insidious phenomenon of a resurgence of political, social and cultural intolerance inside the country. Occupied with the overt aspects of the spread of the Taliban- territorially and in terms of their military capacity- the international community has paid little attention to the slow but steady growth of fundamentalism.
This trend is making itself visible in different ways: through increasing curbs on women, restrictions on moral and social codes of behaviour, controls on a vibrant and independent media, curtailment of rights and restorative justice, intolerance of political opposition and increasing hostility towards foreigners.
Though most of these phenomena are popularly associated with the Taliban and their ideology, Afghanistan today clearly shows that fundamentalism is not limited solely to a narrow political grouping. It never was.
In the run up to 9/11 and thereafter, the Taliban, stripped of their utility as an easy means of accessing the region’s energy, were slowly and steadily turned into global pariahs. Their interpretation of Islam was seen as a horrific violation of human rights, especially evident in their treatment of women. There was little attempt to understand the roots of their ideology, since it was much easier to treat the Taliban as an alien phenomenon, a tumour, that could be surgically removed. Ergo, it was assumed the removal of the Taliban would also remove the ideology, with Afghans rushing to embrace democratic freedoms. Nothing could be further from the truth.
While the Taliban certainly alienated large sections of the population with their strict interpretation of codes of behaviour, in some areas of the country and in some aspects their interpretation only differed in minor degree with behaviour that had been traditionally practiced. Customary law, portions of which would be considered barbaric in modern jurisprudence, has governed Afghanistan’s rule of law and according to current data, 80% of the country’s cases are still resolved through it.
Even in the government’s judicial system, the application of law is often guided if not governed by custom. Take for example Afghanistan’s largest prison, the Pul e Charkhi prison on the outskirts of Kabul. A UNODC study of the population of women prisoners revealed that half the women prisoners were incarcerated for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for running away from abusive situations.
The women, most of whom were victims of abuse, were being treated as perpetrators for having left home. Treated as property in an extremely patriarchal system, a woman is a possession who cannot leave home without permission.
Afghanistan’s parliament also attempted to pass a legislation requiring women in public office to have a mehram or male escort from the close family members to accompany them when abroad. The upper house of parliament sought to reduce the age of majority of girls to 13. Both moves were fortunately thwarted.
On the issue of ‘human rights’, the pursuance of reparation for war crimes is being dismissed easily and simplistically as a ‘western’ and hence alien concept, while the country’s parliament accorded amnesty to all those who participated in the conflict of the last decades, a move endorsed by President Karzai. The international community which worked to remove the Taliban from power has been strangely silent on these moves.
This is not to say that there is little difference between life under the Taliban and now. Far from it. The Taliban’s interpretation represented an extreme end of the fundamentalism. The intolerance that characterised their approach has however not disappeared.
Despite an overt veneer of liberal institutions of democracy Afghanistan today faces the likelihood of an increasing confrontation between forces of intolerance and a more democratic polity that will be increasingly posited as a ‘clash of civilisations’ by those keen to cling to old structures of power.
References to Afghanistan’s age-old culture and its traditions notwithstanding, it is clear that thirty years of war have had an enormous impact in shaping both. There is perhaps not a single tradition or practice that has not been shaped by the tumult. Whether it is the traditions practiced by those who stayed behind in this country, modified and affected by war, the traditions of those who were internally displaced, moving from one cultural milieu to another, the practices modified by those who spent years in refugee camps , or the educated and the elite who managed to carve out new lives for themselves in developed countries, Afghanistan’s traditions have been either preserved, changed and destroyed in not one, but many ways. Now, as the different trends come together there is antagonism and hostility.
Understanding and dealing with the growth of ‘Talibanisation’ will mean looking at both the complexities as well as the origins of intolerance. Unfortunately, while the Western world treats the phenomenon simplistically, viewing the defeat of the ‘Taliban’ as an end, countries with greater experience of pluralities and complexities, like India, choose to adopt a hands off approach in terms of their political and social engagement. India appears to lack the confidence to play a role, cowed down by the overwhelming economic and political wherewithal demonstrated by countries like the US in Afghanistan. If ‘Talibanisation’ does spread in the neighbourhood, South Block can always blame Pakistan.
Times of India/February 12, 2008
Escalating violence in Afghanistan and the attention that it commands worldwide has obscured the far more dangerous but insidious phenomenon of a resurgence of political, social and cultural intolerance inside the country. Occupied with the overt aspects of the spread of the Taliban- territorially and in terms of their military capacity- the international community has paid little attention to the slow but steady growth of fundamentalism.
This trend is making itself visible in different ways: through increasing curbs on women, restrictions on moral and social codes of behaviour, controls on a vibrant and independent media, curtailment of rights and restorative justice, intolerance of political opposition and increasing hostility towards foreigners.
Though most of these phenomena are popularly associated with the Taliban and their ideology, Afghanistan today clearly shows that fundamentalism is not limited solely to a narrow political grouping. It never was.
In the run up to 9/11 and thereafter, the Taliban, stripped of their utility as an easy means of accessing the region’s energy, were slowly and steadily turned into global pariahs. Their interpretation of Islam was seen as a horrific violation of human rights, especially evident in their treatment of women. There was little attempt to understand the roots of their ideology, since it was much easier to treat the Taliban as an alien phenomenon, a tumour, that could be surgically removed. Ergo, it was assumed the removal of the Taliban would also remove the ideology, with Afghans rushing to embrace democratic freedoms. Nothing could be further from the truth.
While the Taliban certainly alienated large sections of the population with their strict interpretation of codes of behaviour, in some areas of the country and in some aspects their interpretation only differed in minor degree with behaviour that had been traditionally practiced. Customary law, portions of which would be considered barbaric in modern jurisprudence, has governed Afghanistan’s rule of law and according to current data, 80% of the country’s cases are still resolved through it.
Even in the government’s judicial system, the application of law is often guided if not governed by custom. Take for example Afghanistan’s largest prison, the Pul e Charkhi prison on the outskirts of Kabul. A UNODC study of the population of women prisoners revealed that half the women prisoners were incarcerated for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for running away from abusive situations.
The women, most of whom were victims of abuse, were being treated as perpetrators for having left home. Treated as property in an extremely patriarchal system, a woman is a possession who cannot leave home without permission.
Afghanistan’s parliament also attempted to pass a legislation requiring women in public office to have a mehram or male escort from the close family members to accompany them when abroad. The upper house of parliament sought to reduce the age of majority of girls to 13. Both moves were fortunately thwarted.
On the issue of ‘human rights’, the pursuance of reparation for war crimes is being dismissed easily and simplistically as a ‘western’ and hence alien concept, while the country’s parliament accorded amnesty to all those who participated in the conflict of the last decades, a move endorsed by President Karzai. The international community which worked to remove the Taliban from power has been strangely silent on these moves.
This is not to say that there is little difference between life under the Taliban and now. Far from it. The Taliban’s interpretation represented an extreme end of the fundamentalism. The intolerance that characterised their approach has however not disappeared.
Despite an overt veneer of liberal institutions of democracy Afghanistan today faces the likelihood of an increasing confrontation between forces of intolerance and a more democratic polity that will be increasingly posited as a ‘clash of civilisations’ by those keen to cling to old structures of power.
References to Afghanistan’s age-old culture and its traditions notwithstanding, it is clear that thirty years of war have had an enormous impact in shaping both. There is perhaps not a single tradition or practice that has not been shaped by the tumult. Whether it is the traditions practiced by those who stayed behind in this country, modified and affected by war, the traditions of those who were internally displaced, moving from one cultural milieu to another, the practices modified by those who spent years in refugee camps , or the educated and the elite who managed to carve out new lives for themselves in developed countries, Afghanistan’s traditions have been either preserved, changed and destroyed in not one, but many ways. Now, as the different trends come together there is antagonism and hostility.
Understanding and dealing with the growth of ‘Talibanisation’ will mean looking at both the complexities as well as the origins of intolerance. Unfortunately, while the Western world treats the phenomenon simplistically, viewing the defeat of the ‘Taliban’ as an end, countries with greater experience of pluralities and complexities, like India, choose to adopt a hands off approach in terms of their political and social engagement. India appears to lack the confidence to play a role, cowed down by the overwhelming economic and political wherewithal demonstrated by countries like the US in Afghanistan. If ‘Talibanisation’ does spread in the neighbourhood, South Block can always blame Pakistan.
After Serena, not so serene
After Serena, not so serene
Hard News/February 2008
An attack on Kabul's swish Serena Hotel earlier this week may have seemed like yet another incident of violence to most outside observers. But for those living in Afghanistan it represented yet another level of escalation in the ongoing violent conflict. It was not that the attack was on the rich and elite of Kabul city, nor that the attack targeted expatriates in contrast to the daily attacks which kill Afghans everyday, but that it breached one of the most fortified sites in the capital, the poshest hotel in Kabul, rebuilt by the Mumbai-based firm Shapoorji Pallonji. The attack showed the reach of the anti-government elements. This was no straightforward suicide bombing, the one phenomenon against which most security agencies say they have no defence. This was an armed attack which allowed the entry of gunmen who managed to carry out a shooting spree before they were stopped.
Though Afghanistan has been a 'post conflict' State for more than six years since the ouster of the Taliban in the American-led attack, violence has worsened in many parts of the country while parts of southern Afghanistan are embattled by continuous conflict. Sporadically, districts of the southern provinces slip out of the tenuous hold of the Hamid Karzai government into the control of the Taliban — till yet another pitched battle frees the area. Kabul the capital, relatively incident free in the first two years after the removal of the Taliban, now sees sporadic incidents of violence in the form of rocket attacks, shootings, kidnappings, bomb explosions and suicide bombings that seem to be increasing their penetrating power.
Unlike Iraq, the 'invasion' of Afghanistan had considerable support among sections of the Afghan population. However, like Iraq, America's military intervention there had more to do with its own politics and rather less to do with Afghanistan. The direct military response to 9/11, saw the removal of the Taliban, the regime which had lent support and shelter to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives. That the Taliban also had a wretched human rights record and a worse record on women's rights helped build the case for the military intervention.
Unfortunately, the inability to broaden this narrow objective has meant that much of what has happened in Afgha-nistan in the past six years has had more to do with donor-driven interests and less with the ground reality in the country.
It is no one's case that Afghanistan has not benefited from six years of 'reconstruction'. In a country where almost all infrastructure and economy had been destroyed, gains, though incremental, are clearly visible. Hundreds of schoolchildren including young girls going to school, millions of refugees returning to the country, greater access to health and the buzz of new construction. A new Constitution was introduced, a presidential election and a parliamentary election were held with less disruption than any of the Bihar polls. Visitors to Kabul might be forgiven for thinking the country has turned around, and all that is needed to spread the prosperity is time. They would be wrong.
Along with the incremental growth over the last six years are very serious systemic flaws that are even now creating new problems and making the State dysfunctional. The issue is not that progress has been slow in a very difficult place, but that many of the policies of the international (western) community are intrinsically unsound. At best, this has resulted in a short-sighted approach, putting immediate gains before sustainable goals. At worst, the interests of Afghanistan have been subverted to the interests of the international community — whether it is in terms of withholding resources or in prioritising needs.
Nothing illustrates this with as much damning evidence as the security sector. In 2001, the Bonn agreement, that provided the framework for rebuilding of the country, did not make a peace accord, but focussed on establishing a working government. Subsequently, military operations continued in areas where the Taliban and Al Qaeda were thought to be hiding, under America's Operation Enduring Freedom a part of the 'war on global terrorism'. UN mandated NATO forces, which had a broader mandate of helping secure Afghanistan, were confined to the narrow geographical boundary of Kabul. It was not until 2004 that they would begin to expand, their further expansion coinciding with the regrouping of anti-government elements, including the Taliban. At no time was the military focused on the stabilisation of Afghanistan or on securing areas that were 'cleared' of the Taliban. The result: after every military defeat the Taliban would melt away, only to return as soon as the foreign troops left, thus leaving the local population with no support, security or stakes in the military operations.
Even now, security operations in the country are compartmentalised into three distinct slots. The global war against terror is led by the US-led Coalition Forces (largely US troops under US command and control), the counter— insurgency war is waged by NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, (largely NATO troops) and the war against drugs is led by the Afghan police. This approach rests on a naïve presumption of the lack of interlinkages between the three problems, undermining the efforts to deal with each of them. The compartmentalisation has also resulted in very different tactical approaches to the military operations being conducted, resulting in confusion and controversy.
The reluctance of the western nations to put boots on the ground has also resulted in sparse deployment of troops. The upshot is heavy reliance on air power with its concomitant “collateral damage”, the euphemism for the killing of civilians. The consequence of this is increasing public hostility which is bolstered by the UN's apparent inability to take a firm stand on this issue. Despite some sporadic statements calling for an end to the high civilian casualties, no effort has been made to document or investigate these charges in a systematic manner, an effort that would go a long way to restore public confidence in the government and the international community, as well as blunt the edge of public anger fuelled by injustice.
While the disinclination of troop-contributing countries to contribute greater numbers has some validity, it is less evident why the western nations failed to pursue the one goal that would have helped reduce Afghanistan's dependence on them — the building up of Afghanistan's forces, both the army and the police. Instead of focussing on strengthening the legitimate use of force, the international community, faced with growing instability, has now endorsed the rearming of communities through the auxiliary police, a euphemism for giving guns and power back to the very same commanders who they spent five years trying to disarm. The consequences of this short-sighted approach will be visible in Afghanistan in the coming months and years.
Last but not the least, is the pendulum approach to the 'Taliban'. Though anti-government forces are of different kinds, the demonisation of the Taliban and efforts to apportion a monolithic identity to all anti-government forces has led to a limited understanding of the problems of power-sharing in this complex land. Six years after the Taliban were ousted from power, the pendulum of policy swings between making peace with the Taliban as the only way forward to deporting those who are talking to them.
The writer is a senior journalist based in Kabul
Hard News/February 2008
An attack on Kabul's swish Serena Hotel earlier this week may have seemed like yet another incident of violence to most outside observers. But for those living in Afghanistan it represented yet another level of escalation in the ongoing violent conflict. It was not that the attack was on the rich and elite of Kabul city, nor that the attack targeted expatriates in contrast to the daily attacks which kill Afghans everyday, but that it breached one of the most fortified sites in the capital, the poshest hotel in Kabul, rebuilt by the Mumbai-based firm Shapoorji Pallonji. The attack showed the reach of the anti-government elements. This was no straightforward suicide bombing, the one phenomenon against which most security agencies say they have no defence. This was an armed attack which allowed the entry of gunmen who managed to carry out a shooting spree before they were stopped.
Though Afghanistan has been a 'post conflict' State for more than six years since the ouster of the Taliban in the American-led attack, violence has worsened in many parts of the country while parts of southern Afghanistan are embattled by continuous conflict. Sporadically, districts of the southern provinces slip out of the tenuous hold of the Hamid Karzai government into the control of the Taliban — till yet another pitched battle frees the area. Kabul the capital, relatively incident free in the first two years after the removal of the Taliban, now sees sporadic incidents of violence in the form of rocket attacks, shootings, kidnappings, bomb explosions and suicide bombings that seem to be increasing their penetrating power.
Unlike Iraq, the 'invasion' of Afghanistan had considerable support among sections of the Afghan population. However, like Iraq, America's military intervention there had more to do with its own politics and rather less to do with Afghanistan. The direct military response to 9/11, saw the removal of the Taliban, the regime which had lent support and shelter to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives. That the Taliban also had a wretched human rights record and a worse record on women's rights helped build the case for the military intervention.
Unfortunately, the inability to broaden this narrow objective has meant that much of what has happened in Afgha-nistan in the past six years has had more to do with donor-driven interests and less with the ground reality in the country.
It is no one's case that Afghanistan has not benefited from six years of 'reconstruction'. In a country where almost all infrastructure and economy had been destroyed, gains, though incremental, are clearly visible. Hundreds of schoolchildren including young girls going to school, millions of refugees returning to the country, greater access to health and the buzz of new construction. A new Constitution was introduced, a presidential election and a parliamentary election were held with less disruption than any of the Bihar polls. Visitors to Kabul might be forgiven for thinking the country has turned around, and all that is needed to spread the prosperity is time. They would be wrong.
Along with the incremental growth over the last six years are very serious systemic flaws that are even now creating new problems and making the State dysfunctional. The issue is not that progress has been slow in a very difficult place, but that many of the policies of the international (western) community are intrinsically unsound. At best, this has resulted in a short-sighted approach, putting immediate gains before sustainable goals. At worst, the interests of Afghanistan have been subverted to the interests of the international community — whether it is in terms of withholding resources or in prioritising needs.
Nothing illustrates this with as much damning evidence as the security sector. In 2001, the Bonn agreement, that provided the framework for rebuilding of the country, did not make a peace accord, but focussed on establishing a working government. Subsequently, military operations continued in areas where the Taliban and Al Qaeda were thought to be hiding, under America's Operation Enduring Freedom a part of the 'war on global terrorism'. UN mandated NATO forces, which had a broader mandate of helping secure Afghanistan, were confined to the narrow geographical boundary of Kabul. It was not until 2004 that they would begin to expand, their further expansion coinciding with the regrouping of anti-government elements, including the Taliban. At no time was the military focused on the stabilisation of Afghanistan or on securing areas that were 'cleared' of the Taliban. The result: after every military defeat the Taliban would melt away, only to return as soon as the foreign troops left, thus leaving the local population with no support, security or stakes in the military operations.
Even now, security operations in the country are compartmentalised into three distinct slots. The global war against terror is led by the US-led Coalition Forces (largely US troops under US command and control), the counter— insurgency war is waged by NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, (largely NATO troops) and the war against drugs is led by the Afghan police. This approach rests on a naïve presumption of the lack of interlinkages between the three problems, undermining the efforts to deal with each of them. The compartmentalisation has also resulted in very different tactical approaches to the military operations being conducted, resulting in confusion and controversy.
The reluctance of the western nations to put boots on the ground has also resulted in sparse deployment of troops. The upshot is heavy reliance on air power with its concomitant “collateral damage”, the euphemism for the killing of civilians. The consequence of this is increasing public hostility which is bolstered by the UN's apparent inability to take a firm stand on this issue. Despite some sporadic statements calling for an end to the high civilian casualties, no effort has been made to document or investigate these charges in a systematic manner, an effort that would go a long way to restore public confidence in the government and the international community, as well as blunt the edge of public anger fuelled by injustice.
While the disinclination of troop-contributing countries to contribute greater numbers has some validity, it is less evident why the western nations failed to pursue the one goal that would have helped reduce Afghanistan's dependence on them — the building up of Afghanistan's forces, both the army and the police. Instead of focussing on strengthening the legitimate use of force, the international community, faced with growing instability, has now endorsed the rearming of communities through the auxiliary police, a euphemism for giving guns and power back to the very same commanders who they spent five years trying to disarm. The consequences of this short-sighted approach will be visible in Afghanistan in the coming months and years.
Last but not the least, is the pendulum approach to the 'Taliban'. Though anti-government forces are of different kinds, the demonisation of the Taliban and efforts to apportion a monolithic identity to all anti-government forces has led to a limited understanding of the problems of power-sharing in this complex land. Six years after the Taliban were ousted from power, the pendulum of policy swings between making peace with the Taliban as the only way forward to deporting those who are talking to them.
The writer is a senior journalist based in Kabul
Afghanistan gets ready for tourists
Afghanistan gets ready for tourists
Al Jazeera/January 2008
Afiyat Khan, a former mujahideen soldier, survived numerous gun battles and the US invasion of his country, but nothing had prepared him for the challenge of climbing the Italian Alps in 2005.
"I didn't know there was something called equipment and mountaineering gear. It was also very expensive," said the 28-year-old amateur mountaineer from the village of Qazideh in Afghanistan's Badakshan province.
Khan was one of a handful of Afghans selected by Mountain Wilderness, a Rome-based organisation, for the first mountaineering training course in Europe for Afghans.
Headed by Carlo Alberto Pinelli, the well-known Italian mountaineer, Mountain Wilderness has for the past few years offered environment-friendly mountaineering courses for Afghan youngsters in the hope that they will work as guides in the mountain areas.
Soon after the fall of the Taliban, Mountain Wilderness organised the Oxus Mission: Mountains for Peace, with the aim of reopening some of Afghanistan's mountains to tourism.
Isolated region
In the 1970's, the stunningly beautiful wilderness of the Badakshan province, along the Wakhan land corridor in the Hindu Kush bordering the Oxus River, was a big draw for mountaineers from all over the world.
"I had heard many tales from my father, the headman of our village, who would accompany foreign tourists into the mountains," Khan told Al Jazeera.
Morning sets across the Badakshan mountain
range [Anne Feenstra]
But in 1979, Soviet troops crossed the Oxus River bordering the Wakhan Corridor, from Tajikistan, bringing regional tourism to an end.
Three decades of war put an end to adventure travel in this exotic land, making climbing, trekking, hiking and other outdoor sports a hazardous activity even now.
The area was so inaccessible that Badakshan became the only province in the country where the Taliban could not gain a foothold during their rule of the country; the terrain was a natural barrier against the movement of mechanised infantry and material.
The province paid a price for this. As the only "opposition" stronghold it was also completely cut off from the Taliban "government".
The international borders - the Tajik north and Pakistan to the west - were sealed even to the normal traffic of goods and locals that comprised the economy.
This pushed the region into severe economic deprivation, forcing it to rely completely on an agro-pastoral economy and humanitarian aid from international agencies.
Mountaineering
But Afiyat Khan is one of a growing number of Afghans hoping to resuscitate the country's defunct mountaineering tourism industry.
The Hindu Kush Wakhan Corridor in
northern Afghanistan.
He is currently working as a master mason on a visitor's centre and gate house project financed by the Asian Development Bank in coordination with the ministry of agriculture for the proposed Wakhan Pamir national park in the village of Qala-e-Panja.
The project is expected to reap the benefits of safety and security not found elsewhere in Afghanistan and become a big draw for the more adventurous tourists.
Expatriate workers in Afghanistan have already been making their way inwards during the short season that lasts from late June to mid-September, before temperatures plummet.
Plans to designate the Wakhan Pamir area and the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan as natural reserves are also currently under consideration by officials in Kabul for the first time since the 1979 Soviet invasion.
Dad Mohammad Baheer, the deputy executive director general of the National Environment Protection Agency, said the Wakhan Pamir is one of four top priority areas for the government's environment conservation projects.
He said: "Plans to declare the area a natural reserve were interrupted by the war but currently, the Wildlife Conservation Society, an international organisation, is mapping its bio-diversity."
International aid
The Aga Khan Foundation, in coordination with the Norwegian Action Committee, has also been working with the local population to train guides and help set up simple guest houses along the roads leading to Wakhan.
The two agencies have also pursued eco-tourism initiatives for the Wakhan corridor.
Mehboob Aziz, a coordinator for eco-tourism projects in the town of Ishkashim at the beginning of the Wakhan corridor, recently returned from "an exposure trip" of Afghans to the adjoining region of the Wakhan in Pakistan.
"We are trying to encourage tourists to cross the borders as opposed to the terrorists," he said referring to the influx of insurgents across Afghanistan's southern border.
The group he supervised was taught "food preparation and basic hygiene for tourists", concepts he says the people of Wakhan are not familiar with.
Arts and music festival
Aziz says 115 tourists visited the Wakhan mountain passes in 2006. That figure rose to more than 145 in 2007.
Aziz hopes that the first Wakhan Pamir arts and music festival, held last November, and the construction of new guest houses, will encourage more tourists to visit the area.
Afiyat Khan is himself toying with the idea of either opening a guest house or a shop to sell local handicrafts to tourists.
He said: "When the tourists come I would like to work full time as a tourist guide. I want to be there to travel with them into the heart of my area."
"Hopefully, one day, I will also be able to climb Afghanistan's highest peak, Noshaq."
Al Jazeera/January 2008
Afiyat Khan, a former mujahideen soldier, survived numerous gun battles and the US invasion of his country, but nothing had prepared him for the challenge of climbing the Italian Alps in 2005.
"I didn't know there was something called equipment and mountaineering gear. It was also very expensive," said the 28-year-old amateur mountaineer from the village of Qazideh in Afghanistan's Badakshan province.
Khan was one of a handful of Afghans selected by Mountain Wilderness, a Rome-based organisation, for the first mountaineering training course in Europe for Afghans.
Headed by Carlo Alberto Pinelli, the well-known Italian mountaineer, Mountain Wilderness has for the past few years offered environment-friendly mountaineering courses for Afghan youngsters in the hope that they will work as guides in the mountain areas.
Soon after the fall of the Taliban, Mountain Wilderness organised the Oxus Mission: Mountains for Peace, with the aim of reopening some of Afghanistan's mountains to tourism.
Isolated region
In the 1970's, the stunningly beautiful wilderness of the Badakshan province, along the Wakhan land corridor in the Hindu Kush bordering the Oxus River, was a big draw for mountaineers from all over the world.
"I had heard many tales from my father, the headman of our village, who would accompany foreign tourists into the mountains," Khan told Al Jazeera.
Morning sets across the Badakshan mountain
range [Anne Feenstra]
But in 1979, Soviet troops crossed the Oxus River bordering the Wakhan Corridor, from Tajikistan, bringing regional tourism to an end.
Three decades of war put an end to adventure travel in this exotic land, making climbing, trekking, hiking and other outdoor sports a hazardous activity even now.
The area was so inaccessible that Badakshan became the only province in the country where the Taliban could not gain a foothold during their rule of the country; the terrain was a natural barrier against the movement of mechanised infantry and material.
The province paid a price for this. As the only "opposition" stronghold it was also completely cut off from the Taliban "government".
The international borders - the Tajik north and Pakistan to the west - were sealed even to the normal traffic of goods and locals that comprised the economy.
This pushed the region into severe economic deprivation, forcing it to rely completely on an agro-pastoral economy and humanitarian aid from international agencies.
Mountaineering
But Afiyat Khan is one of a growing number of Afghans hoping to resuscitate the country's defunct mountaineering tourism industry.
The Hindu Kush Wakhan Corridor in
northern Afghanistan.
He is currently working as a master mason on a visitor's centre and gate house project financed by the Asian Development Bank in coordination with the ministry of agriculture for the proposed Wakhan Pamir national park in the village of Qala-e-Panja.
The project is expected to reap the benefits of safety and security not found elsewhere in Afghanistan and become a big draw for the more adventurous tourists.
Expatriate workers in Afghanistan have already been making their way inwards during the short season that lasts from late June to mid-September, before temperatures plummet.
Plans to designate the Wakhan Pamir area and the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan as natural reserves are also currently under consideration by officials in Kabul for the first time since the 1979 Soviet invasion.
Dad Mohammad Baheer, the deputy executive director general of the National Environment Protection Agency, said the Wakhan Pamir is one of four top priority areas for the government's environment conservation projects.
He said: "Plans to declare the area a natural reserve were interrupted by the war but currently, the Wildlife Conservation Society, an international organisation, is mapping its bio-diversity."
International aid
The Aga Khan Foundation, in coordination with the Norwegian Action Committee, has also been working with the local population to train guides and help set up simple guest houses along the roads leading to Wakhan.
The two agencies have also pursued eco-tourism initiatives for the Wakhan corridor.
Mehboob Aziz, a coordinator for eco-tourism projects in the town of Ishkashim at the beginning of the Wakhan corridor, recently returned from "an exposure trip" of Afghans to the adjoining region of the Wakhan in Pakistan.
"We are trying to encourage tourists to cross the borders as opposed to the terrorists," he said referring to the influx of insurgents across Afghanistan's southern border.
The group he supervised was taught "food preparation and basic hygiene for tourists", concepts he says the people of Wakhan are not familiar with.
Arts and music festival
Aziz says 115 tourists visited the Wakhan mountain passes in 2006. That figure rose to more than 145 in 2007.
Aziz hopes that the first Wakhan Pamir arts and music festival, held last November, and the construction of new guest houses, will encourage more tourists to visit the area.
Afiyat Khan is himself toying with the idea of either opening a guest house or a shop to sell local handicrafts to tourists.
He said: "When the tourists come I would like to work full time as a tourist guide. I want to be there to travel with them into the heart of my area."
"Hopefully, one day, I will also be able to climb Afghanistan's highest peak, Noshaq."
The Wakhan Corridor
THE WAKHAN CORRIDOR
Outlook Traveller/January 2008
Aunohita Mojumdar travels to the lost valleys on our imaginary frontier with Afghanistan
A lush field of wheat ripening to gold. Beyond that an ancient river celebrated in the Puranas and early Greek texts—a river that flows now across four countries, its colours changing from silver-grey to sparkling deep blues and greens, bordered by sandy beaches of many colours. Beyond that the surrounding mountains, the distant Pamirs in the east, Karakoram in the north and the steep looming peaks of the Hindukush in the south. Jagged cliffs with glaciers, gradual inclines, gentle browns, greys, rocky sides with an explosion of surrealistic colours. In the wide valley below, a people who can be both gentle and strong, survivors, living off a hard land that yields little, waiting for tourists to bring some relief to the struggle for survival. Welcome to Wakhan. Welcome to Afghanistan.
A conflict zone which yields a daily diet of reports about violence is not quite the inspiration regular tourists need to pack their bags for Afghanistan. But an increasing number of foreigners working in Afghanistan and a small trail of foreign tourists are now exploring the safer parts of the country, becoming the first travellers in decades to discover spots of unparalleled beauty, a warm and hospitable people, and unique cultures.
The Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip of land that juts out of eastern Afghanistan like a pointing finger, bordered by Tajikistan and in the north and Pakistan in the south until it reaches China. Its shape is not incidental—it was a political construct to separate the Russian empire from the British during the ‘Great Game’.
Look at any map of India and examine the crown of Kashmir. North, above Gilgit, you can see a small strip of territory that borders Afghanistan. This border is notional, of course, since the territory is not under Indian control. But if it were, Wakhan is where India and Afghanistan would meet.Known locally as the Bam-e-Duniya or ‘roof of the world’, the area is where three mountain ranges—the Pamir, the Hindu¬kush and the Karakoram—converge to form the Pamir Knot. As the origin of the Oxus, which runs along the corridor separating Tajikistan from Afghanistan, it drew travellers, adventurers and explorers trying to discover the origin of the mighty river, which runs 2,500km into the Aral Sea.
Once a buzzing thoroughfare on the Silk Route, Wakhan has been completely isolated in three decades of war. The Soviets used the Amu Darya to cross into Afghanistan and even after their withdrawal the ensuing civil conflict ensured that the area was largely abandoned to its fate. With the international borders sealed off, the narrow corridor was forced to rely on supplies through the Afghan mainland, a tortuous process in the forbidding terrain. In fact the terrain is so hostile that Badakshan province (of which Wakhan is a part) was the only province in Afghanistan that remained impregnable to the Taliban. This remoteness has always been both a blessing and a curse. The isolation continues to be a cause of economic deprivation but also results in a stunning wilderness, unblemished by the residue of war and untrammelled tourism. With only one major arterial road, most of Wakhan has to be accessed on small tracks or roads open for only a few short months. It is much more usual to see mules, donkeys, camels and yaks being used for transportation here than motorised transport.
During my visit in early October, we stayed at Qala-e-Panja, a large village from where the route branches off between the bigger and smaller Pamir. Located on the banks of the Panj river, the village spans a small but wide valley ringed by mountains. There is no electricity and there are no shops. Few houses own generators and one or two own four-wheel vehicles. Across the river Tajikistan’s power lines and well-asphalted road power provide a striking contrast. But on both sides of the river the landscape is the same, with autumn turning the trees a vivid yellow, red, orange, brown and russet. Through the day the colours of the surrounding mountains change as the sun runs across the circumference, lighting up each mountainside, every one of a different texture and colour.On the banks of the river is a huge mound of stones, the ruined Qala of the former Mir, the ruler of the area. Battles between rival Mirs and changes of government resulted in a decline of the family fortunes. Closer towards the village is a hunting lodge of the former king, Zahir Shah, whose passion for hunting has led to such lodges dotting the entire country.
Down in the village wheat is being harvested. Unlike most other parts of Afghanistan where women cover their faces in public, men and women work side by side in the fields, turning their curious gaze on the outsiders. The Shia Ismaeli’s gentle observance of religion belies the rigidities of much of Afghanistan, where a strong conservative culture keeps outsiders at bay. Ethnically, too, the inhabitants of the Wakhan Corridor are very different, comprising the Wakhi in lower Wakhan and the Kyrghyz in the higher areas with their distinct languages. Overtures meet with first a cautious and then increasingly friendly response. Requests from me to photograph the women, usually refused in many rural areas, are smilingly accepted. By the end of a 10-day stay I am being summoned to photograph women all over the village till I run out of space on my small digital camera.
In the village where we stay the guesthouse is the first of its kind for travellers. Encouraging this are the combined efforts by the Norwegian Action Committee and the Aga Khan Foundation to introduce eco-friendly tourism that will help the local economy. With financing from the NAC and expertise from the AKF, a series of guesthouses have been set up along the corridor up to the last motorable point of Sarhad-e-Broghil, from where the way forward is on yaks, donkeys, horses or camels. Trekking routes and itineraries have been identified by the AKF.
In Qala-e-Panja the guesthouse is owned by the Shah, one of the two hereditary leaders of the Shia Ismaelis, whose religious position has now transcended into a political leadership. The rooms are bare but functional and the eco-tourism training includes lessons in hygiene and toilet facilities, which has resulted in all guesthouses having their own western-style toilet.
Laundry comes in the way of two young girls—Daulatmand and Barfaq—who quickly turn into friends. Amazingly Daulatmand, who looks like she is 16 but has a child of one, still goes to school along with a considerable number of other young girls and boys. I soon begin receiving gifts of delicate beadwork—most women wear intricate chokers, as well as kohl or ‘surma’, which the area is famous for.
In the higher reaches the Kyrghyz depend entirely on their herds of goats and sheep, the rarest of which is named after the famous traveller Marco Polo. The Marco Polo is not the only exotic species. A 1977 wildlife survey, the last before war erupted, revealed the presence of snow leopards, the Himalayan lynx, bears and the Siberian Ibex. The Wildlife Conservation Society is currently undertaking a survey to map the flora and fauna of the area. Plans to declare the area a natural reserve are being revived and the Wakhan Pamir may soon be declared one of Afghanistan’s first national parks along with the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan.
In the village of Qala-e-Panja, the visitor’s centre for the national park is already under construction. Working as a mason on the building is Afiyat Khan. His real passion, however, is mountain climbing and he is among a handful of young Afghans who are becoming pioneers in the revival of this adventure sport. Mountain Wilderness, an Italian organisation, has conducted training courses here for Afghans to enable them to become guides. Afiyat hopes the visitor’s centre is yet another step towards drawing more adventure tourists to the area so he can earn his living through tourism rather than the trowel. There is no reason why it shouldn’t. Despite a short warm season, the weather in the area is ideal, according to mountaineers like the accomplished Carlo Alberto Pinelli. The short distance from the road to the base camp is another attraction. The biggest lure, however, will be the fact the area is relatively virgin and unexplored.Mehboob Aziz, who oversees the eco-tourism program of the Aga Khan
Foundation here is hopeful that tourism will emerge as an alternative source of livelihood for the area. Afghan guides and guesthouse owners have been taken on exposure visits across the border into the Wakhi area of Pakistan. Aziz hopes there will be more tourists coming via Tajikistan and, indeed, many visitors have opted for that route —flying into Dushanbe allows you to travel on smooth roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim. The Afghan Ishkashim marks the beginning of the Wakhan Corridor. “Tourists rather than terrorists are being encouraged to cross the border here,” jokes Aziz. If they do come in larger numbers, they could help turn around the lives of a peaceful community. l
THE INFORMATIONGETTING THERE Fly to Kabul and take a domestic flight to Faizabad using Ariana Airlines or travel by road via Kunduz after checking route safety. From Faizabad, a bumpy road suggests a break at Ishkashim, the beginning of the Wakhan. Alternately enter from Tajikistan: fly to Dushanbe and drive on better roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim, crossing into Afghanistan across the Oxus river. All road travel must be with a good four-wheel drive (you will need to ford rivers) with spare parts and petrol. The nearest petrol station is in Ishkashim though a few litres can be cadged in Khandud, 82km inside the Wakhan corridor. Vehicles cost $120-150 a day.
WHERE TO STAY Guesthouses offering simple basic fare and basic hygiene including a toilet are available at Ishkashim, Qazi Deh, Khandud, Qala-e-Panja, Gozkhun, Sargaz and Sarhad-e-Broghil. Rooms typically cost $25 per person per night—not as high as it seems in Afghanistan’s post conflict economy. Longer stays can be negotiated.
WHAT TO SEE & DO Breathe in the glorious natural beauty, go for walks—perfectly safe— but with the help of local guides. Visit the friendly locals, drink endless cups of tea with naan. Visit the shrines dotting the landscape, walk along the Oxus river, visit the locals, climb mountains, go trekking and hiking on foot or using animals or both.
TOUR OPERATORSThe Aga Khan Foundation makes it very clear that it is in no way a travel or tourism company but its exceedingly charming employees who work to promote eco-tourism will help any visitors as a gesture of goodwill until the time that Afghan Tourism develops its own capacity. Contact Asif Soroush in Faizabad (+93-799431933) or Mehboob Aziz in Ishkasim (799418060).At least two tour companies operate in Afghanistan currently. They can take care of permits, travel, stay, interpreters and other logistics including security where required. The first is Afghan Logistics (702-77408/ 70288668/799391462, 24-hour satellite phone: 0088-216-2116-4294, www.afghanlogisticstours.com). The second, more high-end company, is The Great Game Travel Company Limited (799-686688, 799-489120, www.greatgametravel.co.uk).
WHEN TO GOBest during the short summer, which lasts from late June till mid September.
WHAT TO PACK Warm clothing, including a high-altitude sleeping bag. If you’re going trekking or mountaineering, all gear must be brought along. Satellite phone, extra phone batteries, camera and extra film and additional batteries, good torches, sun screen, fresh vegetables (locals are always happy to cook for you for a consideration), fruit and canned food. Carry sufficient bottled water to tide you over until you discover a clean water source. Carry everything you might need, from shampoo to rubber bands. Remember, there are no shops though you can always get anything the villagers themselves use—either as a loan, on rent or by buying it.
PERMITS/SAFETY Permission to travel into Wakhan must be obtained from the border police at Ishkasim, currently Commander Waheed (+93-799139962). Make sure the commander is in town or arrange to have letters of approval prepared in advance. The Wakhan is perfectly safe with no hint of the Taliban or conflicts, but like any other remote area, it’s always good to check the current security situation before travelling.
TIPS Wear loose clothing—such as full-sleeved salwar kameez and a headscarf. Ask permission before photographing. Ask permission before speaking to women if the tourist is a man. Don’t drink alcohol publicly.
RESOURCES > Culture, Information and Tourism Department, Faizabad (+93-799863931)> For information, look up http://www.wakhan.org/, www.akdn.org
For trekking and mountaineering, consult Peaks of Silver and Jade by Carlo Alberto Pinelli and Gianni Predan
Outlook Traveller/January 2008
Aunohita Mojumdar travels to the lost valleys on our imaginary frontier with Afghanistan
A lush field of wheat ripening to gold. Beyond that an ancient river celebrated in the Puranas and early Greek texts—a river that flows now across four countries, its colours changing from silver-grey to sparkling deep blues and greens, bordered by sandy beaches of many colours. Beyond that the surrounding mountains, the distant Pamirs in the east, Karakoram in the north and the steep looming peaks of the Hindukush in the south. Jagged cliffs with glaciers, gradual inclines, gentle browns, greys, rocky sides with an explosion of surrealistic colours. In the wide valley below, a people who can be both gentle and strong, survivors, living off a hard land that yields little, waiting for tourists to bring some relief to the struggle for survival. Welcome to Wakhan. Welcome to Afghanistan.
A conflict zone which yields a daily diet of reports about violence is not quite the inspiration regular tourists need to pack their bags for Afghanistan. But an increasing number of foreigners working in Afghanistan and a small trail of foreign tourists are now exploring the safer parts of the country, becoming the first travellers in decades to discover spots of unparalleled beauty, a warm and hospitable people, and unique cultures.
The Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip of land that juts out of eastern Afghanistan like a pointing finger, bordered by Tajikistan and in the north and Pakistan in the south until it reaches China. Its shape is not incidental—it was a political construct to separate the Russian empire from the British during the ‘Great Game’.
Look at any map of India and examine the crown of Kashmir. North, above Gilgit, you can see a small strip of territory that borders Afghanistan. This border is notional, of course, since the territory is not under Indian control. But if it were, Wakhan is where India and Afghanistan would meet.Known locally as the Bam-e-Duniya or ‘roof of the world’, the area is where three mountain ranges—the Pamir, the Hindu¬kush and the Karakoram—converge to form the Pamir Knot. As the origin of the Oxus, which runs along the corridor separating Tajikistan from Afghanistan, it drew travellers, adventurers and explorers trying to discover the origin of the mighty river, which runs 2,500km into the Aral Sea.
Once a buzzing thoroughfare on the Silk Route, Wakhan has been completely isolated in three decades of war. The Soviets used the Amu Darya to cross into Afghanistan and even after their withdrawal the ensuing civil conflict ensured that the area was largely abandoned to its fate. With the international borders sealed off, the narrow corridor was forced to rely on supplies through the Afghan mainland, a tortuous process in the forbidding terrain. In fact the terrain is so hostile that Badakshan province (of which Wakhan is a part) was the only province in Afghanistan that remained impregnable to the Taliban. This remoteness has always been both a blessing and a curse. The isolation continues to be a cause of economic deprivation but also results in a stunning wilderness, unblemished by the residue of war and untrammelled tourism. With only one major arterial road, most of Wakhan has to be accessed on small tracks or roads open for only a few short months. It is much more usual to see mules, donkeys, camels and yaks being used for transportation here than motorised transport.
During my visit in early October, we stayed at Qala-e-Panja, a large village from where the route branches off between the bigger and smaller Pamir. Located on the banks of the Panj river, the village spans a small but wide valley ringed by mountains. There is no electricity and there are no shops. Few houses own generators and one or two own four-wheel vehicles. Across the river Tajikistan’s power lines and well-asphalted road power provide a striking contrast. But on both sides of the river the landscape is the same, with autumn turning the trees a vivid yellow, red, orange, brown and russet. Through the day the colours of the surrounding mountains change as the sun runs across the circumference, lighting up each mountainside, every one of a different texture and colour.On the banks of the river is a huge mound of stones, the ruined Qala of the former Mir, the ruler of the area. Battles between rival Mirs and changes of government resulted in a decline of the family fortunes. Closer towards the village is a hunting lodge of the former king, Zahir Shah, whose passion for hunting has led to such lodges dotting the entire country.
Down in the village wheat is being harvested. Unlike most other parts of Afghanistan where women cover their faces in public, men and women work side by side in the fields, turning their curious gaze on the outsiders. The Shia Ismaeli’s gentle observance of religion belies the rigidities of much of Afghanistan, where a strong conservative culture keeps outsiders at bay. Ethnically, too, the inhabitants of the Wakhan Corridor are very different, comprising the Wakhi in lower Wakhan and the Kyrghyz in the higher areas with their distinct languages. Overtures meet with first a cautious and then increasingly friendly response. Requests from me to photograph the women, usually refused in many rural areas, are smilingly accepted. By the end of a 10-day stay I am being summoned to photograph women all over the village till I run out of space on my small digital camera.
In the village where we stay the guesthouse is the first of its kind for travellers. Encouraging this are the combined efforts by the Norwegian Action Committee and the Aga Khan Foundation to introduce eco-friendly tourism that will help the local economy. With financing from the NAC and expertise from the AKF, a series of guesthouses have been set up along the corridor up to the last motorable point of Sarhad-e-Broghil, from where the way forward is on yaks, donkeys, horses or camels. Trekking routes and itineraries have been identified by the AKF.
In Qala-e-Panja the guesthouse is owned by the Shah, one of the two hereditary leaders of the Shia Ismaelis, whose religious position has now transcended into a political leadership. The rooms are bare but functional and the eco-tourism training includes lessons in hygiene and toilet facilities, which has resulted in all guesthouses having their own western-style toilet.
Laundry comes in the way of two young girls—Daulatmand and Barfaq—who quickly turn into friends. Amazingly Daulatmand, who looks like she is 16 but has a child of one, still goes to school along with a considerable number of other young girls and boys. I soon begin receiving gifts of delicate beadwork—most women wear intricate chokers, as well as kohl or ‘surma’, which the area is famous for.
In the higher reaches the Kyrghyz depend entirely on their herds of goats and sheep, the rarest of which is named after the famous traveller Marco Polo. The Marco Polo is not the only exotic species. A 1977 wildlife survey, the last before war erupted, revealed the presence of snow leopards, the Himalayan lynx, bears and the Siberian Ibex. The Wildlife Conservation Society is currently undertaking a survey to map the flora and fauna of the area. Plans to declare the area a natural reserve are being revived and the Wakhan Pamir may soon be declared one of Afghanistan’s first national parks along with the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan.
In the village of Qala-e-Panja, the visitor’s centre for the national park is already under construction. Working as a mason on the building is Afiyat Khan. His real passion, however, is mountain climbing and he is among a handful of young Afghans who are becoming pioneers in the revival of this adventure sport. Mountain Wilderness, an Italian organisation, has conducted training courses here for Afghans to enable them to become guides. Afiyat hopes the visitor’s centre is yet another step towards drawing more adventure tourists to the area so he can earn his living through tourism rather than the trowel. There is no reason why it shouldn’t. Despite a short warm season, the weather in the area is ideal, according to mountaineers like the accomplished Carlo Alberto Pinelli. The short distance from the road to the base camp is another attraction. The biggest lure, however, will be the fact the area is relatively virgin and unexplored.Mehboob Aziz, who oversees the eco-tourism program of the Aga Khan
Foundation here is hopeful that tourism will emerge as an alternative source of livelihood for the area. Afghan guides and guesthouse owners have been taken on exposure visits across the border into the Wakhi area of Pakistan. Aziz hopes there will be more tourists coming via Tajikistan and, indeed, many visitors have opted for that route —flying into Dushanbe allows you to travel on smooth roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim. The Afghan Ishkashim marks the beginning of the Wakhan Corridor. “Tourists rather than terrorists are being encouraged to cross the border here,” jokes Aziz. If they do come in larger numbers, they could help turn around the lives of a peaceful community. l
THE INFORMATIONGETTING THERE Fly to Kabul and take a domestic flight to Faizabad using Ariana Airlines or travel by road via Kunduz after checking route safety. From Faizabad, a bumpy road suggests a break at Ishkashim, the beginning of the Wakhan. Alternately enter from Tajikistan: fly to Dushanbe and drive on better roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim, crossing into Afghanistan across the Oxus river. All road travel must be with a good four-wheel drive (you will need to ford rivers) with spare parts and petrol. The nearest petrol station is in Ishkashim though a few litres can be cadged in Khandud, 82km inside the Wakhan corridor. Vehicles cost $120-150 a day.
WHERE TO STAY Guesthouses offering simple basic fare and basic hygiene including a toilet are available at Ishkashim, Qazi Deh, Khandud, Qala-e-Panja, Gozkhun, Sargaz and Sarhad-e-Broghil. Rooms typically cost $25 per person per night—not as high as it seems in Afghanistan’s post conflict economy. Longer stays can be negotiated.
WHAT TO SEE & DO Breathe in the glorious natural beauty, go for walks—perfectly safe— but with the help of local guides. Visit the friendly locals, drink endless cups of tea with naan. Visit the shrines dotting the landscape, walk along the Oxus river, visit the locals, climb mountains, go trekking and hiking on foot or using animals or both.
TOUR OPERATORSThe Aga Khan Foundation makes it very clear that it is in no way a travel or tourism company but its exceedingly charming employees who work to promote eco-tourism will help any visitors as a gesture of goodwill until the time that Afghan Tourism develops its own capacity. Contact Asif Soroush in Faizabad (+93-799431933) or Mehboob Aziz in Ishkasim (799418060).At least two tour companies operate in Afghanistan currently. They can take care of permits, travel, stay, interpreters and other logistics including security where required. The first is Afghan Logistics (702-77408/ 70288668/799391462, 24-hour satellite phone: 0088-216-2116-4294, www.afghanlogisticstours.com). The second, more high-end company, is The Great Game Travel Company Limited (799-686688, 799-489120, www.greatgametravel.co.uk).
WHEN TO GOBest during the short summer, which lasts from late June till mid September.
WHAT TO PACK Warm clothing, including a high-altitude sleeping bag. If you’re going trekking or mountaineering, all gear must be brought along. Satellite phone, extra phone batteries, camera and extra film and additional batteries, good torches, sun screen, fresh vegetables (locals are always happy to cook for you for a consideration), fruit and canned food. Carry sufficient bottled water to tide you over until you discover a clean water source. Carry everything you might need, from shampoo to rubber bands. Remember, there are no shops though you can always get anything the villagers themselves use—either as a loan, on rent or by buying it.
PERMITS/SAFETY Permission to travel into Wakhan must be obtained from the border police at Ishkasim, currently Commander Waheed (+93-799139962). Make sure the commander is in town or arrange to have letters of approval prepared in advance. The Wakhan is perfectly safe with no hint of the Taliban or conflicts, but like any other remote area, it’s always good to check the current security situation before travelling.
TIPS Wear loose clothing—such as full-sleeved salwar kameez and a headscarf. Ask permission before photographing. Ask permission before speaking to women if the tourist is a man. Don’t drink alcohol publicly.
RESOURCES > Culture, Information and Tourism Department, Faizabad (+93-799863931)> For information, look up http://www.wakhan.org/, www.akdn.org
For trekking and mountaineering, consult Peaks of Silver and Jade by Carlo Alberto Pinelli and Gianni Predan
Afghanistan needs Muslim aid effort
Afghanistan needs Muslim aid effort
Al Jazeera/December 31
In the second of a two-part exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Daan Everts, the special civilian representative of Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer, Nato secretary-general, criticises Arab and Islamic countries for not doing enough in rehabilitating Afghanistan.
Everts, who officially demits his office on December 31, also says the Taliban could have a played a political role in Afghanistan.
Al Jazeera: You have mentioned the American point of view several times. Do you feel reconstruction in Afghanistan has been circumscribed by American political interests?
Everts: No. I am much more positive than others about US involvement in Afghanistan. Certainly, they have gone further on the road to integrating civilian and military efforts. They are of course dominant and you can't blame them because they provide the bulk of forces and the bulk of the financial aid.
So there may be criticism sometimes about ways and behaviour but I would be the last to throw a stone seeing that the efforts of others are so marginal in comparison.
Do you feel Europeans are too politically coy about expressing their views because they are so dominated by the US?
Part one of interview with Daan Everts
Nation building key in AfghanistanI don't know what explains the relatively junior role of the EU. There is this issue of internal decision-making; it is not easy to get 27 nations on one line. America, of course, was psychologically much more motivated to move and act in Afghanistan. Anything that can be linked to 9/11 can be counted on to generate huge political interest.
The EU does express its views but it doesn't have the clout. It is fractured not just because of the EU decision-making process but also by this regionalised provincial pre-occupation of member states – that has not helped a strong European presentation on issues.
More worrisome, I think, is the absence of others – non-European, non-American actors. I find that somewhat dismaying. Afghanistan is a geopolitically important country that can only become more important, being right at the cross-roads – the axis of central Asia, south Asia, west and the east. It has a strategic location and vast resources of minerals and energy - it is all here.
But I see no strong effort in the non-Western world to join the overall stabilisation effort. The whole task of trying to bring the country back on its feet and restoring security – by tackling the forces of the extremism and intolerance – why is this burden not more widely shared. Where is the Muslim world?
Sure, they provide some assistance. But why is there not more international interest? Why is it not a big priority with the UN?
The whole of Afghanistan does not seem to figure in the top of the priorities list in New York. I have been disappointed by the lack of focus from non-Western players. Maybe they consider this too much of America's business. But this is not good because Afghanistan's future is an issue of worldwide concern. I would like more of the UN to be here - like the UN police- and other countries to become stakeholders here and not sit on the fence watching.
So having more of a Muslim participation in the overall stabilisation - not just handing out some cash - but a larger presence in the international support effort would be beneficial. This also calls for de-emphasising the Western role here and to heighten the UN world-wide character and the Afghan ownership.
It is not easy to ask people not to be proud of what they do or claim success and it is probably needed for the home constituency. To be self-effacing is rare especially for prominent states but that is what is called for.
This is a real test case of cooperation between the non-Muslim and Muslim world, both of them in defence of modern Islam and against a very regressive variant that is a threat to mainstream Islam.
That's why we expect a lot more support from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) or the Arab League. They should see the great joint interest here to bring stability to Afghanistan; and to throw the Taliban back to where they belong, in the middle ages.
They should take a greater interest and a larger share. That would be perfectly all right. Take co-ownership.
This is ironic that we are here in defence of mainstream Islam. This is the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. And in the hours of need why are non-Muslim states taking the main share of the burden?
There are some efforts, of course, financially, but political support has been very lukewarm, maybe because it is perceived as US dominated intervention. But this is not right. This is UN-mandated.
Of course there is this fundamental mistake of mixing it up with Iraq – the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission is a very different venture – Muslim nations should make that distinction.
Do you think the Taliban should have been involved in the reconciliation conferences in Bonn in 2001?
This is a hard question. There are two views on it. The easy position is they should have been there – and you would not have driven them underground and into insurgency. Whether at the time of Bonn - an extremely emotional time after 9/11 - you could have had them in the Bonn conference and whether the Afghan side would have accepted them, I don't know.
On the other hand when I see how former enemies and opponents sit together in this Afghan parliament and in this government – you have communists and war lords – they are able to live together [and] work together. It wouldn't be beyond comprehension if you could have had the Taliban there – maybe not in Bonn but subsequently.
What we hear from the Taliban – directly and indirectly - is 'give us an opportunity to open an office, have a political wing, a future role in elections'. One should not be afraid of it because what we see is that support for Taliban has always been very low even in the south – so we could bring them in the tent. Some say Bonn could have done it. But at that time for the hardliners that may have been a bridge too far.
But the Taliban were less about power sharing and more about deal making. Does the international community prefer to back individuals rather than a more equitable power sharing formula?
Yes, politics and governance are extremely personalised. This has been encouraged by the electoral system of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) – it reinforced individualised dynamics. I don't think that has been helpful – it would have been better to have allowed more organised structures, more political actors like parties.
That has been done elsewhere with good results. [In Afghanistan], the result has been an extremely chaotic parliament. There are 248 talking heads with very little discipline and little organised deliberations that are meant to produce legislation which the country so badly needs.
We deliberately did this. To reinforce presidential position and power you weaken the parliament – understandable from the US perspective who felt that the country, given its history and shattered state of economy, needed a strong hand.
This approach is very personalised and very centred on one person to be in command. I think it is asking too much of someone to do everything - to take on the whole of the international representation and being a sort of father of the nation and making all sorts of difficult decisions - that is very hard.
Like being everything to everyone …
Yes, but then you cannot be effective in governance. That is a structural choice which can be reconsidered. It needs another loya jirga [grand tribal council] to make constitutional adjustments.
Al Jazeera/December 31
In the second of a two-part exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Daan Everts, the special civilian representative of Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer, Nato secretary-general, criticises Arab and Islamic countries for not doing enough in rehabilitating Afghanistan.
Everts, who officially demits his office on December 31, also says the Taliban could have a played a political role in Afghanistan.
Al Jazeera: You have mentioned the American point of view several times. Do you feel reconstruction in Afghanistan has been circumscribed by American political interests?
Everts: No. I am much more positive than others about US involvement in Afghanistan. Certainly, they have gone further on the road to integrating civilian and military efforts. They are of course dominant and you can't blame them because they provide the bulk of forces and the bulk of the financial aid.
So there may be criticism sometimes about ways and behaviour but I would be the last to throw a stone seeing that the efforts of others are so marginal in comparison.
Do you feel Europeans are too politically coy about expressing their views because they are so dominated by the US?
Part one of interview with Daan Everts
Nation building key in AfghanistanI don't know what explains the relatively junior role of the EU. There is this issue of internal decision-making; it is not easy to get 27 nations on one line. America, of course, was psychologically much more motivated to move and act in Afghanistan. Anything that can be linked to 9/11 can be counted on to generate huge political interest.
The EU does express its views but it doesn't have the clout. It is fractured not just because of the EU decision-making process but also by this regionalised provincial pre-occupation of member states – that has not helped a strong European presentation on issues.
More worrisome, I think, is the absence of others – non-European, non-American actors. I find that somewhat dismaying. Afghanistan is a geopolitically important country that can only become more important, being right at the cross-roads – the axis of central Asia, south Asia, west and the east. It has a strategic location and vast resources of minerals and energy - it is all here.
But I see no strong effort in the non-Western world to join the overall stabilisation effort. The whole task of trying to bring the country back on its feet and restoring security – by tackling the forces of the extremism and intolerance – why is this burden not more widely shared. Where is the Muslim world?
Sure, they provide some assistance. But why is there not more international interest? Why is it not a big priority with the UN?
The whole of Afghanistan does not seem to figure in the top of the priorities list in New York. I have been disappointed by the lack of focus from non-Western players. Maybe they consider this too much of America's business. But this is not good because Afghanistan's future is an issue of worldwide concern. I would like more of the UN to be here - like the UN police- and other countries to become stakeholders here and not sit on the fence watching.
So having more of a Muslim participation in the overall stabilisation - not just handing out some cash - but a larger presence in the international support effort would be beneficial. This also calls for de-emphasising the Western role here and to heighten the UN world-wide character and the Afghan ownership.
It is not easy to ask people not to be proud of what they do or claim success and it is probably needed for the home constituency. To be self-effacing is rare especially for prominent states but that is what is called for.
This is a real test case of cooperation between the non-Muslim and Muslim world, both of them in defence of modern Islam and against a very regressive variant that is a threat to mainstream Islam.
That's why we expect a lot more support from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) or the Arab League. They should see the great joint interest here to bring stability to Afghanistan; and to throw the Taliban back to where they belong, in the middle ages.
They should take a greater interest and a larger share. That would be perfectly all right. Take co-ownership.
This is ironic that we are here in defence of mainstream Islam. This is the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. And in the hours of need why are non-Muslim states taking the main share of the burden?
There are some efforts, of course, financially, but political support has been very lukewarm, maybe because it is perceived as US dominated intervention. But this is not right. This is UN-mandated.
Of course there is this fundamental mistake of mixing it up with Iraq – the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission is a very different venture – Muslim nations should make that distinction.
Do you think the Taliban should have been involved in the reconciliation conferences in Bonn in 2001?
This is a hard question. There are two views on it. The easy position is they should have been there – and you would not have driven them underground and into insurgency. Whether at the time of Bonn - an extremely emotional time after 9/11 - you could have had them in the Bonn conference and whether the Afghan side would have accepted them, I don't know.
On the other hand when I see how former enemies and opponents sit together in this Afghan parliament and in this government – you have communists and war lords – they are able to live together [and] work together. It wouldn't be beyond comprehension if you could have had the Taliban there – maybe not in Bonn but subsequently.
What we hear from the Taliban – directly and indirectly - is 'give us an opportunity to open an office, have a political wing, a future role in elections'. One should not be afraid of it because what we see is that support for Taliban has always been very low even in the south – so we could bring them in the tent. Some say Bonn could have done it. But at that time for the hardliners that may have been a bridge too far.
But the Taliban were less about power sharing and more about deal making. Does the international community prefer to back individuals rather than a more equitable power sharing formula?
Yes, politics and governance are extremely personalised. This has been encouraged by the electoral system of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) – it reinforced individualised dynamics. I don't think that has been helpful – it would have been better to have allowed more organised structures, more political actors like parties.
That has been done elsewhere with good results. [In Afghanistan], the result has been an extremely chaotic parliament. There are 248 talking heads with very little discipline and little organised deliberations that are meant to produce legislation which the country so badly needs.
We deliberately did this. To reinforce presidential position and power you weaken the parliament – understandable from the US perspective who felt that the country, given its history and shattered state of economy, needed a strong hand.
This approach is very personalised and very centred on one person to be in command. I think it is asking too much of someone to do everything - to take on the whole of the international representation and being a sort of father of the nation and making all sorts of difficult decisions - that is very hard.
Like being everything to everyone …
Yes, but then you cannot be effective in governance. That is a structural choice which can be reconsidered. It needs another loya jirga [grand tribal council] to make constitutional adjustments.
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