Eurasianet, March 15, 2010
Sakina is angry. "Who is Karzai to forgive the deaths in my family?" she fumes. "Was his home looted? Was his son killed? What gives him the right to forgive on my behalf? He has no right." The source of Sakina’s ire is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s reconciliation initiative.
As part of the reconciliation effort, Karzai is supporting an amnesty law that offers blanket immunity to all parties responsible for atrocities committed in Afghanistan over the past three decades, including Taliban militants. Forgiving the Taliban is not something that Sakina is capable of at this point in time. The middle-aged widow from Dasht-e Barchi, a poor neighborhood of west Kabul, lost her husband and niece in the conflict, and feels that Karzai’s administration is taking away her right to justice.
"He wants to give the Taliban money, land and privileges. [And] to me, a victim, he gives a widows’ pension of 300 afs [afghanis] a month [$6]," continued Sakina. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In Afghanistan’s legislative process, a draft law must be ratified by parliament, signed by the president, and then published in an official gazette before it takes effect. The actual process is sometimes far murkier. Parliament passed a controversial amnesty law - offering immunity to all those involved in past, present and future hostilities, including war crimes or crimes against humanity - in 2007. But the initiative generated considerable opposition from Karzai’s international allies and human rights groups who saw it as an attempt by former commanders-turned-MPs to give themselves immunity. Thus, the Reconciliation and General Amnesty Law was not immediately published.
In January of this year, however, news spread that the law had been quietly printed in December of 2008. With the international community now behind Karzai’s reconciliation strategy, the government is now apparently hoping that the amnesty law will be accepted without creating too much of a stir.
So far, the international community’s muted response suggests Karzai’s timing may have been right on. But growing opposition from within Afghanistan, led by human rights and civil society groups, also indicates that the president’s reconciliation efforts may soon hit a brick wall.
Opponents of the amnesty law contend that it is unconstitutional. According to a paper prepared jointly by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, a body mandated by the Afghan constitution, and the International Center for Transitional Justice, the amnesty law contradicts Kabul’s obligations under international law to prosecute serious crimes such as torture, rape, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Article 7 of the Afghan constitution spells out the country’s obligations to abide by international treaties covering war crimes.
Activists describe as especially problematic the "blanket" amnesty from prosecution, which does not make exceptions for war crimes such as rape, torture and genocide; grants immunity for crimes that may be committed in the future; and benefits former combatants who voted for the bill in their current roles as MPs.
As worded, the law covers "all political factions and hostile parties who were involved in a way or another in hostilities before establishing of the interim administration [in 2001]," as well as "those individuals and groups who are still in opposition to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and cease enmity after the enforcement of this resolution and join the process of national reconciliation and respect the constitution and other laws and abide them." Without a cut-off date, the law offers those committing crimes impunity to continue doing so until they please.
As a concession to victims of war crimes, the law provides for individuals to make claims against alleged assailants for specific crimes. However, human rights groups point out that the lack of security and rule of law in Afghanistan makes it almost impossible for individuals to gather evidence and pursue criminal cases against powerful parties involved in the war. "It is fantasy to think that an individual can take on a major war criminal alone," Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, said in a March 10 statement. "In practice, individuals have severely limited access to the justice system in Afghanistan," he pointed out, adding that the state should not transfer its obligation to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations to individuals.
The government should immediately suspend the law, argued the Transitional Justice Coordination Group (TJCG), a coalition of 24 Afghan civil society organizations. Group leaders say that, rather than promoting reconciliation and stability, the law, by granting blanket amnesty, "promotes impunity and prevents genuine reconciliation." The coalition seeks "accountability not amnesia for past and present crimes as a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation and peace," the group said in a March 10 statement. "The government of Afghanistan does not have the right to usurp the rights of victims."
The stated purpose of the law is "strengthening the reconciliation and national stability." But the TJCG coalition, human rights groups and analysts view the amnesty law as a political maneuver. "Short-term expediency in the form of reconciliation with the Taliban should not trump the rights of the Afghan people," Amnesty International said in a statement issued in early February. "The legislation is simply an effort to pervert the course of justice under the faulty guise of providing security."
"The existence of this law is as much a test of the principles of Afghanistan’s international backers, such as the United States, as it is of Karzai," said Adams of Human Rights Watch. "Will they stand with abusive warlords and insurgents, or will they stand with the Afghan people?"
"It is not for the government to decide," Azaryuon Matin of Human Rights Focus, a member of the TJCG coalition, told EurasiaNet. "Why have they not consulted with civil society [organizations]? If they sacrifice justice, democracy and human rights, there will be no way for rule of law, for human rights, no way for peace."
April 13, 2010
Afghan Women Fear Violence in National 'Peace'
Wenews, March 7, 2010
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Women's rights activists here fear a "peace deal" brewing with the Taliban may bring more violence into their lives.
To avert that, they are focused on the peace "jirga"--a gathering of traditional leaders--planned for this spring or summer.
Hundreds of women belonging to more than 70 women's organizations are battling for more than quota-style representation at the upcoming jirga.
"Before the jirga we have to make sure the right women get into the process," said Nargis Nehan, director of Equality for Peace and Democracy, a civil society group working with women and young people in Kabul. "Women must not be there just as a women's group, but must be represented through tribal groups, civil society groups, parliament, the private sector and government."
Nehan is also a representative to a regional peace commission set up a year ago by female peace activists in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India that has convened twice, once in Kabul and once in New Delhi.
"Will the right women be there?" asked Palwasha Hassan, a founding member of Afghan Women's Network and country director of a Canadian funded pro-democracy group, in a recent interview.
Hassan was recently nominated by President Hamid Karzai to head the women's ministry, but she was rejected by a parliament that appeared hostile to her liberal background.
Since the beginning of this year, architects of national reconciliation have increasingly assumed that negotiations with the Taliban are necessary to end a conflict characterized by intensifying fighting and spreading violence.
However, Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific director, says that's dangerous for women.
"The Taliban established a terrible record of violating human rights during their rule and they have done nothing since then to indicate they will act differently if they return to power," Zarifi said in a statement in January, issued ahead of a conference in London for donor nations and the Afghan government to discuss a new strategy for Afghanistan.
Similar Deals Increased Violations
Similar deals with the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan, Amnesty said, led to increased human rights violations. Under successive deals in areas of Pakistan's northwest frontier, ceasefires and government troops allowed Taliban forces to move in and occupy areas where they have banned girls' education, banned music and instituted summary justice like flogging, beating and even executions for those who flout their restrictions.
In addition to planning a peace jirga, early steps toward national reconciliation include the institution of an internationally funded trust fund to pay off foot soldiers of the insurgent movement.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for the inclusion of women in any peace negotiation, but Afghan women fear little, or hollow, enforcement.
More international attention is being paid to whether insurgent leaders will be present at the peace jirga than whether women will find a place. Women, after all, pose no threat to security.
Only one Afghan woman, for instance--Arzo Qanih, a member of the Afghan Women's Network--was invited to attend the London peace-planning conference in January.
"Women's engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery," Qanih told the gathering. "It is a critical precursor to success." In any negotiations, she said, women's rights must be protected.
Increasingly Insecure Environment
Afghan women face an increasingly insecure environment with a growing trend of violence against women in public life, according to a July 2009 report by the U.N.'s human rights office in Afghanistan.
Violence against women, the report found, was being perpetrated not just by anti-government forces, but also by "local traditional and religious power-holders, women's own families and communities and in some instances government authorities."
In a December report, Human Rights Watch also flagged the weakening of women's rights. "The insecurity Afghans face comes not only from the insurgency, but also from abuses by so-far untouchable government officials and warlords," the report said.
The Afghan government has promised that any peace treaty will respect the constitution's guarantees of equality for women.
Since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, women have entered the work force, joined electoral politics and taken jobs in the government.
Under the constitution, Afghan women have the same rights to voting, education and political participation as men. An article of the constitution mandates at least two female representatives from each of the country's 34 provinces.
The shakiness of such provisions was highlighted in August 2009, however, when Karzai, backed by Parliament, signed off on a Shia personal status law that subordinates women. Provisions that required a wife to ask permission to leave the house except on urgent business and a requirement that a wife have sex with her husband at least once every four days were dropped amid local and international outcry.
But the law still permits husbands to deny food and sustenance to their wives if they refuse to obey their husbands' sexual demands, grants guardianship of children exclusively to their fathers and grandfathers and requires women to get permission from their husbands to work, according to Human Rights Watch.
Fragility of Women's Gains
In February, a presidential electoral ordinance sought to reduce the representation of women in parliament from a minimum of two seats in each province of the country to a maximum of two seats. The final law restored the earlier, minimum, provision, but underscored the fragility of the gains women fought to be enshrined by the constitution, ratified in 2004.
Hassan's rejection by Parliament adds to the unease.
Women's activist circles have been buzzing over what they understood to be hostile questions Hassan faced in parliament, which gets little press coverage and for which there are no readily accessible record of proceedings.
In an interview with Women's eNews, Hassan said members of parliament questioned her knowledge of Islam, whether she would enforce 'hijab' (head covering for a woman) and the need for 'mehram' (male escort for women traveling outside their homes) and whether she repudiated "Western" precepts on the freedoms of women.
She said the hostile questions also came from female legislators, one of whom asked Hassan why she had instituted shelters for battered or abandoned women, which the MP characterized as "places of ill-repute."
When Hassan was rejected by Parliament, the Afghan Women's Network issued a statement calling it "very disappointing."
List of Demands
The Network has drawn up a list of demands addressed to the Afghan government and its international supporters. These include representation by women in the National Security Council and other bodies making decisions on peace and security; a share in the new trust fund for reintegration; and assurances that "reconciliation and reintegration will not take place at the expense of human rights."
Representation by women at these different levels is needed to ensure representation of women's rights in all levels of policymaking, including development issues, the group said in a Jan. 29 statement.
On Feb. 3, the New York-based U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women--CEDAW--expressed regret about the exclusion of women from the London peace conference.
"Afghan women must be full and equal participants in decision-making at all levels in the process of peace building, reconciliation, rebuilding and development of their country," CEDAW said, calling on the Afghan government as well as its international allies to ensure this.
"The numbers of women coming together is increasing," Nehan said. "Seven years ago we were ignored and that's a fact," she added, referring to the 2002 institution of the Afghan interim administration when women were excluded from decision-making positions. "Now we can't be ignored and that's a fact."
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Women's rights activists here fear a "peace deal" brewing with the Taliban may bring more violence into their lives.
To avert that, they are focused on the peace "jirga"--a gathering of traditional leaders--planned for this spring or summer.
Hundreds of women belonging to more than 70 women's organizations are battling for more than quota-style representation at the upcoming jirga.
"Before the jirga we have to make sure the right women get into the process," said Nargis Nehan, director of Equality for Peace and Democracy, a civil society group working with women and young people in Kabul. "Women must not be there just as a women's group, but must be represented through tribal groups, civil society groups, parliament, the private sector and government."
Nehan is also a representative to a regional peace commission set up a year ago by female peace activists in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India that has convened twice, once in Kabul and once in New Delhi.
"Will the right women be there?" asked Palwasha Hassan, a founding member of Afghan Women's Network and country director of a Canadian funded pro-democracy group, in a recent interview.
Hassan was recently nominated by President Hamid Karzai to head the women's ministry, but she was rejected by a parliament that appeared hostile to her liberal background.
Since the beginning of this year, architects of national reconciliation have increasingly assumed that negotiations with the Taliban are necessary to end a conflict characterized by intensifying fighting and spreading violence.
However, Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific director, says that's dangerous for women.
"The Taliban established a terrible record of violating human rights during their rule and they have done nothing since then to indicate they will act differently if they return to power," Zarifi said in a statement in January, issued ahead of a conference in London for donor nations and the Afghan government to discuss a new strategy for Afghanistan.
Similar Deals Increased Violations
Similar deals with the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan, Amnesty said, led to increased human rights violations. Under successive deals in areas of Pakistan's northwest frontier, ceasefires and government troops allowed Taliban forces to move in and occupy areas where they have banned girls' education, banned music and instituted summary justice like flogging, beating and even executions for those who flout their restrictions.
In addition to planning a peace jirga, early steps toward national reconciliation include the institution of an internationally funded trust fund to pay off foot soldiers of the insurgent movement.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for the inclusion of women in any peace negotiation, but Afghan women fear little, or hollow, enforcement.
More international attention is being paid to whether insurgent leaders will be present at the peace jirga than whether women will find a place. Women, after all, pose no threat to security.
Only one Afghan woman, for instance--Arzo Qanih, a member of the Afghan Women's Network--was invited to attend the London peace-planning conference in January.
"Women's engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery," Qanih told the gathering. "It is a critical precursor to success." In any negotiations, she said, women's rights must be protected.
Increasingly Insecure Environment
Afghan women face an increasingly insecure environment with a growing trend of violence against women in public life, according to a July 2009 report by the U.N.'s human rights office in Afghanistan.
Violence against women, the report found, was being perpetrated not just by anti-government forces, but also by "local traditional and religious power-holders, women's own families and communities and in some instances government authorities."
In a December report, Human Rights Watch also flagged the weakening of women's rights. "The insecurity Afghans face comes not only from the insurgency, but also from abuses by so-far untouchable government officials and warlords," the report said.
The Afghan government has promised that any peace treaty will respect the constitution's guarantees of equality for women.
Since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, women have entered the work force, joined electoral politics and taken jobs in the government.
Under the constitution, Afghan women have the same rights to voting, education and political participation as men. An article of the constitution mandates at least two female representatives from each of the country's 34 provinces.
The shakiness of such provisions was highlighted in August 2009, however, when Karzai, backed by Parliament, signed off on a Shia personal status law that subordinates women. Provisions that required a wife to ask permission to leave the house except on urgent business and a requirement that a wife have sex with her husband at least once every four days were dropped amid local and international outcry.
But the law still permits husbands to deny food and sustenance to their wives if they refuse to obey their husbands' sexual demands, grants guardianship of children exclusively to their fathers and grandfathers and requires women to get permission from their husbands to work, according to Human Rights Watch.
Fragility of Women's Gains
In February, a presidential electoral ordinance sought to reduce the representation of women in parliament from a minimum of two seats in each province of the country to a maximum of two seats. The final law restored the earlier, minimum, provision, but underscored the fragility of the gains women fought to be enshrined by the constitution, ratified in 2004.
Hassan's rejection by Parliament adds to the unease.
Women's activist circles have been buzzing over what they understood to be hostile questions Hassan faced in parliament, which gets little press coverage and for which there are no readily accessible record of proceedings.
In an interview with Women's eNews, Hassan said members of parliament questioned her knowledge of Islam, whether she would enforce 'hijab' (head covering for a woman) and the need for 'mehram' (male escort for women traveling outside their homes) and whether she repudiated "Western" precepts on the freedoms of women.
She said the hostile questions also came from female legislators, one of whom asked Hassan why she had instituted shelters for battered or abandoned women, which the MP characterized as "places of ill-repute."
When Hassan was rejected by Parliament, the Afghan Women's Network issued a statement calling it "very disappointing."
List of Demands
The Network has drawn up a list of demands addressed to the Afghan government and its international supporters. These include representation by women in the National Security Council and other bodies making decisions on peace and security; a share in the new trust fund for reintegration; and assurances that "reconciliation and reintegration will not take place at the expense of human rights."
Representation by women at these different levels is needed to ensure representation of women's rights in all levels of policymaking, including development issues, the group said in a Jan. 29 statement.
On Feb. 3, the New York-based U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women--CEDAW--expressed regret about the exclusion of women from the London peace conference.
"Afghan women must be full and equal participants in decision-making at all levels in the process of peace building, reconciliation, rebuilding and development of their country," CEDAW said, calling on the Afghan government as well as its international allies to ensure this.
"The numbers of women coming together is increasing," Nehan said. "Seven years ago we were ignored and that's a fact," she added, referring to the 2002 institution of the Afghan interim administration when women were excluded from decision-making positions. "Now we can't be ignored and that's a fact."
Of ‘collateral damage’ and danger of ‘reductionist’ view
Deccan Herald, March 7, 2010
The weekend calm was shattered by the sound of a blast as the house shook. It was early morning Friday – the weekend here in Afghanistan – and there was no mistaking the sound. This was one of several times it had happened over the past few years – and each time it has been followed by an eerie stillness. Not this time, however. Minutes? Seconds? Later as we tried to determine the direction of the blast, we could hear what sounded like small explosions followed by gunfire.
Though Kabul has seen many explosions over the past years - remote controlled explosions and suicide bombers - the complex and well–coordinated attacks involving bombs and direct engagement have been fewer. However, the frequency of that too has been increasing. Complex and sophisticated attacks were used against the Serena Hotel, several government offices, the two guest houses attacked last week and the UN guest house with which we share our compound wall.
Since 2003 when I have been living here, the city has transformed. While in 2003 and 2004 one counted the number of new shops and buildings which seemed to spring up almost one every day, now one counts the number of new cement bollards blocking off large chunks of the street, new barbed wire fences and yet another Kabul street cut off to ordinary citizens in order to protect the international community or the Afghan elite.
Curfews, armoured cars, door to door armed escorts, safe houses, bunkers, bans on walking and shopping, armed guards - new rules for living in the conflict zone are added with every fresh incident for foreigners working with international organisations. With the intensifying conflict spreading closer and closer, Kabul resembles a city under siege in many ways and the international community assembles itself in ever tighter bubbles of sanitised protection - which prove their ephemeral nature from time to time.
Living here as an Indian woman journalist I seem to straddle several worlds. Yet I have never felt as Indian as I do now living here. The saga of the bonhomie between Indians and Afghans is now well established. Most people in India now know the tales of Afghans’ obsession with Bollywood movies, the film songs blaring from the shops and taxis, the avid viewers of the Hindi serial ‘Saas bhi kabhi bahu thi’ dubbed, in Afghanistan, in the most widely spoken Afghan language, Dari. India is seen as a friend.
Being an Indian means being greeted with warmth, with hospitality, sometimes with a barrage of tirades against Pakistan for its role in having supported the Taliban and having fuelled groups that have contributed to the violence in this country. That, especially, is the discourse in the Afghan government which blames the continuing conflict in Afghanistan entirely on Pakistan’s continuing support to armed groups of insurgents.
‘Collateral damage’
But for millions of Afghans across this country, violence comes in many forms. While armed opposition groups which include but are not confined to the Taliban perpetrate random and targeted acts of violence, especially in the volatile provinces in the South and Southeast, the presence of armed groups and the lack of rule of law cuts much wider and deeper. Afghans face violence at the hands of the groups of militias who are still to be disarmed, at the hands of predatory commanders and war lords some of whom are supported by the international community, at the hands of the government’s security forces who are supposed to protect them. They become ‘collateral damage’ from aerial bombings carried out in civilian areas by international forces. They are abused by the unofficial groups being armed to take on the task of providing stability by an international community eager to exit, and lacking the patience to see through the slow and steady growth of a national army and national police that is well-trained, armed and capable of establishing the necessary command and control structures.
Growing public discontent with the deployment of troops by western nations which see a rapidly rising toll of deaths amongst their soldiers (937 US troops died till the first of this month in Afghan-related operations), threatening even the survival of their governments (the Dutch government of Prime Minister Balkanende collapsed last month on the question of extending the deployment of Dutch troops), has meant that many western nations are now looking for a face-saving compromise: a measure of stability that will secure their own interests and allow them to exit Afghanistan gracefully. To do this they are willing to make some compromises.
Short-term measures for stability: building security institutions without adequate oversight, bypassing the government in delivering governance as well as development, propping up traditional justice mechanisms and, most significantly, questioning whether democracy is suited to Afghanistan.
‘Reductionist’ view
In a recent interview with this correspondent, the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Jayant Prasad, spoke of his concerns on these issues, and what he termed the “danger” of the “reductionist view of civilian goals in Afghanistan.” “Some in the international community are reticent about sustaining the Afghan Constitution in its present form, or sustaining democracy, women’s rights, embracing a kind of racist view of Afghans that they will never embrace democracy or gender equality,” Prasad said. “Of course whatever we do in Afghanistan has to be done in accord with the genius of the Afghan people and their traditions, by combining the wisdom of the past with a vision for the future. But to say that we abandon the project started in 2001 in Bonn that was pegged to the Afghan Constitution, would be unfortunate.”
Being an Indian here does not provide all the answers. However, it does bring an appreciation of the challenges. We too struggle with the contradictions and congruences of tradition and modernity, of a pluralistic society and the threat of social and political polarisations. We suffer from economic inequities and grapple with ways to imbibe external influences without losing sight of our roots.
Being an Indian here does not give me the right to preach solutions to Afghans. However it does give me the strength to debate issues – whether it is relating to women and their role, media freedoms, the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. It allows me to raise questions about what being an Afghan means today, because the same questions of identity and nationhood are being asked and answered in India even today. But much of this remains at the individual level, with the region, including India, curiously content to let the western nations continue taking the lead in strategies that may further destabilise Afghanistan.
I sit here writing this a week from the terrible attack that claimed the lives of six Indians and left at least 10 injured. It is again a Friday and the city is still. But underneath the quiet there is an expectancy that things will unravel further in ways we cannot imagine now. If that happens, we in the region – Indians, Pakistani, Central Asians and Iranians - will pay the price along with the Afghans.
The weekend calm was shattered by the sound of a blast as the house shook. It was early morning Friday – the weekend here in Afghanistan – and there was no mistaking the sound. This was one of several times it had happened over the past few years – and each time it has been followed by an eerie stillness. Not this time, however. Minutes? Seconds? Later as we tried to determine the direction of the blast, we could hear what sounded like small explosions followed by gunfire.
Though Kabul has seen many explosions over the past years - remote controlled explosions and suicide bombers - the complex and well–coordinated attacks involving bombs and direct engagement have been fewer. However, the frequency of that too has been increasing. Complex and sophisticated attacks were used against the Serena Hotel, several government offices, the two guest houses attacked last week and the UN guest house with which we share our compound wall.
Since 2003 when I have been living here, the city has transformed. While in 2003 and 2004 one counted the number of new shops and buildings which seemed to spring up almost one every day, now one counts the number of new cement bollards blocking off large chunks of the street, new barbed wire fences and yet another Kabul street cut off to ordinary citizens in order to protect the international community or the Afghan elite.
Curfews, armoured cars, door to door armed escorts, safe houses, bunkers, bans on walking and shopping, armed guards - new rules for living in the conflict zone are added with every fresh incident for foreigners working with international organisations. With the intensifying conflict spreading closer and closer, Kabul resembles a city under siege in many ways and the international community assembles itself in ever tighter bubbles of sanitised protection - which prove their ephemeral nature from time to time.
Living here as an Indian woman journalist I seem to straddle several worlds. Yet I have never felt as Indian as I do now living here. The saga of the bonhomie between Indians and Afghans is now well established. Most people in India now know the tales of Afghans’ obsession with Bollywood movies, the film songs blaring from the shops and taxis, the avid viewers of the Hindi serial ‘Saas bhi kabhi bahu thi’ dubbed, in Afghanistan, in the most widely spoken Afghan language, Dari. India is seen as a friend.
Being an Indian means being greeted with warmth, with hospitality, sometimes with a barrage of tirades against Pakistan for its role in having supported the Taliban and having fuelled groups that have contributed to the violence in this country. That, especially, is the discourse in the Afghan government which blames the continuing conflict in Afghanistan entirely on Pakistan’s continuing support to armed groups of insurgents.
‘Collateral damage’
But for millions of Afghans across this country, violence comes in many forms. While armed opposition groups which include but are not confined to the Taliban perpetrate random and targeted acts of violence, especially in the volatile provinces in the South and Southeast, the presence of armed groups and the lack of rule of law cuts much wider and deeper. Afghans face violence at the hands of the groups of militias who are still to be disarmed, at the hands of predatory commanders and war lords some of whom are supported by the international community, at the hands of the government’s security forces who are supposed to protect them. They become ‘collateral damage’ from aerial bombings carried out in civilian areas by international forces. They are abused by the unofficial groups being armed to take on the task of providing stability by an international community eager to exit, and lacking the patience to see through the slow and steady growth of a national army and national police that is well-trained, armed and capable of establishing the necessary command and control structures.
Growing public discontent with the deployment of troops by western nations which see a rapidly rising toll of deaths amongst their soldiers (937 US troops died till the first of this month in Afghan-related operations), threatening even the survival of their governments (the Dutch government of Prime Minister Balkanende collapsed last month on the question of extending the deployment of Dutch troops), has meant that many western nations are now looking for a face-saving compromise: a measure of stability that will secure their own interests and allow them to exit Afghanistan gracefully. To do this they are willing to make some compromises.
Short-term measures for stability: building security institutions without adequate oversight, bypassing the government in delivering governance as well as development, propping up traditional justice mechanisms and, most significantly, questioning whether democracy is suited to Afghanistan.
‘Reductionist’ view
In a recent interview with this correspondent, the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Jayant Prasad, spoke of his concerns on these issues, and what he termed the “danger” of the “reductionist view of civilian goals in Afghanistan.” “Some in the international community are reticent about sustaining the Afghan Constitution in its present form, or sustaining democracy, women’s rights, embracing a kind of racist view of Afghans that they will never embrace democracy or gender equality,” Prasad said. “Of course whatever we do in Afghanistan has to be done in accord with the genius of the Afghan people and their traditions, by combining the wisdom of the past with a vision for the future. But to say that we abandon the project started in 2001 in Bonn that was pegged to the Afghan Constitution, would be unfortunate.”
Being an Indian here does not provide all the answers. However, it does bring an appreciation of the challenges. We too struggle with the contradictions and congruences of tradition and modernity, of a pluralistic society and the threat of social and political polarisations. We suffer from economic inequities and grapple with ways to imbibe external influences without losing sight of our roots.
Being an Indian here does not give me the right to preach solutions to Afghans. However it does give me the strength to debate issues – whether it is relating to women and their role, media freedoms, the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. It allows me to raise questions about what being an Afghan means today, because the same questions of identity and nationhood are being asked and answered in India even today. But much of this remains at the individual level, with the region, including India, curiously content to let the western nations continue taking the lead in strategies that may further destabilise Afghanistan.
I sit here writing this a week from the terrible attack that claimed the lives of six Indians and left at least 10 injured. It is again a Friday and the city is still. But underneath the quiet there is an expectancy that things will unravel further in ways we cannot imagine now. If that happens, we in the region – Indians, Pakistani, Central Asians and Iranians - will pay the price along with the Afghans.
PRESIDENT KARZAI MODIFYING ELECTION LAW IN HIS FAVOR -- A EURASIANET Q & A WITH GRANT KIPPEN, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS COMMISSION
Eurasianet, March 04, 2010
President Hamid Karzai has taken action to substantially curtail the independence of Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission before parliamentary elections scheduled for this September.
The ECC gained prominence in 2009 after it uncovered widespread fraud during the presidential elections last August. Citing "clear and convincing evidence of fraud," the ECC forced the invalidation of over a million votes cast in favor of Karzai. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Though Karzai eventually secured reelection, the voting irregularities considerably damaged the president’s image, as well as undermined the image of the government-appointed Independent Election Commission. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In February, calling for the removal of "foreign interference" from the Afghan electoral process, Karzai used a loophole in the constitution to force through legislation that allows him to appoint all five board members of the ECC. Prior to the introduction of the new rule, the United Nations had appointed three of the five board members. Thus, the ECC essentially came under presidential control, a development that stands to significantly diminish its ability to play a non-partisan role in Afghanistan’s democratic development.
The Canadian chairman of the previous ECC, Grant Kippen, a veteran of Afghan electoral processes, remained unflappable during the August elections despite "considerable domestic political pressure and interference" from Karzai’s government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Now, in an email interview with EurasiaNet, Kippen, who is now in Canada, speaks out for the first time about his frustrations, describing government pressure and noting that the government-appointed Independent Election Commission (IEC) did not follow the law.
EurasiaNet. What do you think was the contribution of the Electoral Complaints Commission to the electoral process and the credibility of the August 2009 presidential elections?
Kippen: For me personally, I think the greatest contribution to the process was that the ECC did its job properly as it is defined under the election law. We had over 3,000 complaints that were investigated and adjudicated during the elections process, which was no small feat. ? Contrary to how many people perceived the ECC, we were an Afghan electoral body where the vast majority of the staff were Afghans, which should be an enormous source of pride for the Afghan people.
EurasiaNet: The new electoral law introduced by President Karzai has a controversial clause that ends the right of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (the top UN official in Afghanistan) to appoint three members to the ECC and gives the president the sole right to appoint members. What is your view of this change? Will it impact the credibility of future elections?
Kippen: While it is important to recognize and respect the sovereignty of the government of Afghanistan to enact its own laws, it would be misleading to think that "Afghanizing" the ECC will automatically ensure a better quality complaints adjudication process. I think there are few people who would argue with the statement that there were serious problems with the electoral process last year. In order to address these problems, however, there should be an open, objective and public assessment completed about what went wrong. Only after that assessment can we properly identify the changes that should be made. Amending the election law prior to such an assessment is like putting a cart before the horse.
EurasiaNet: President Karzai argued that he was removing foreign interference from the elections in changing the law, pointing to the ECC’s role last August. How do you react to this charge that there was interference?
Kippen: The ECC went to great lengths throughout the entire electoral cycle to ensure that all candidates and their campaign teams, both for presidential and provincial council [polls], were fully informed about the role and processes of the ECC. During the audit and recount, we met or had communications with both President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah’s campaign teams on almost a daily basis, in addition to placing all our information in the public domain through our website and the media. While I can understand President Karzai’s frustration with the ECC decision that resulted in a second round being required, the ECC was not subjected to any international pressure, but did have to deal with considerable domestic political pressure and interference. [One of two Afghan ECC commissioners] Maulawi [Mustafa] Barakzai’s resignation was a direct result of domestic political pressure. Fahim Hakim, the ECC’s other Afghan commissioner, was also subjected to intense domestic pressure.
EurasiaNet: The IEC clearly did not implement all the decisions of the ECC as it was legally bound to do and yet the international community, especially the United States and the UN, signed off on the process, saying the IEC had upheld the constitution and the laws. Didn’t this set the stage for further erosion of these institutions and laws?
Kippen: It is unfortunate that the IEC did not respect the election law by fully implementing the ECC decisions. I would ask why the government of Afghanistan allowed this to happen.
EurasiaNet: There was a lot of talk on the need for electoral reforms following the presidential elections. What major areas did you think needed reform?
Kippen: I wouldn’t want to prejudge such an assessment, but one of the areas for major reform is within the IEC itself, as they repeatedly during the elections last year failed to discharge their responsibilities as defined under the law.
Another area requiring major reform is educating all major stakeholder groups about their roles and responsibilities during the election process. By stakeholder groups I mean candidates, their supporters, public officials (national, provincial and district level; police, border police, governors, army, etc., ministry officials particularly at the provincial and district level). One of the major reasons for electoral violations was that many of the people within these stakeholder groups didn’t have even a basic level of knowledge about the process itself.
EurasiaNet: Much attention has centered on the process of conducting elections and the flaws therein. Would you say that the problems are a result of a larger neglect of the entire electoral process and the lack of support given to the institutions in the period between elections?
Kippen: I completely agree. The four years between the 2005 [parliamentary] and 2009 [presidential] elections were squandered in terms of building up the knowledge and skill sets of people in the major stakeholder groups identified above. More attention and effort also needed to be spent on voter education, which was a recommendation contained in many of the observer group reports from 2005 (and [the first presidential elections in] 2004) but which was not funded or implemented.
EurasiaNet: Now there is talk of democracy perhaps not being the right form of governance for Afghanistan; talk of democracy being an "imposed" western notion. How do you view this?
Kippen: The whole point behind this process is to build strong democratic institutions and processes so that Afghans can build the kind of democracy that works for them. But first we need to make sure that these institutions and processes are independent and robust enough to allow Afghans to elect their representatives, as is their right under the constitution, without fear of intimidation or reprisal.
EurasiaNet: How do you look back at your contribution? Do you feel you were used to whitewash a bad process? Or do you feel you contributed to a more credible election? In the light of the charges leveled against the ECC, do you feel disappointed? Hurt? Misused?
Kippen: I am enormously proud of the work of the ECC, and in particular of the professionalism, dedication and contribution that all our staff (both Afghan and international) made last year. At the end of the day, the ECC did its job as defined under the election law (despite some fairly major challenges) and this should be a source of pride for all Afghans.
EurasiaNet: What are the long-term implications of this erosion of the credibility of the electoral process? On institutions? On governance? On the ongoing conflict?
Kippen: It just highlights the fact that building out sustainable democratic institutions and processes is a long-term endeavor.
EurasiaNet: What might be the best way forward from here?
Kippen: I think a new narrative is required to move forward. By this I mean that both the Afghan government and the international community need to develop a new approach and stop this blame game that has been going on since last fall. There needs to be a renewed focus and commitment to improving the process in advance of the next elections. The responsibility is a shared one.
President Hamid Karzai has taken action to substantially curtail the independence of Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission before parliamentary elections scheduled for this September.
The ECC gained prominence in 2009 after it uncovered widespread fraud during the presidential elections last August. Citing "clear and convincing evidence of fraud," the ECC forced the invalidation of over a million votes cast in favor of Karzai. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Though Karzai eventually secured reelection, the voting irregularities considerably damaged the president’s image, as well as undermined the image of the government-appointed Independent Election Commission. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In February, calling for the removal of "foreign interference" from the Afghan electoral process, Karzai used a loophole in the constitution to force through legislation that allows him to appoint all five board members of the ECC. Prior to the introduction of the new rule, the United Nations had appointed three of the five board members. Thus, the ECC essentially came under presidential control, a development that stands to significantly diminish its ability to play a non-partisan role in Afghanistan’s democratic development.
The Canadian chairman of the previous ECC, Grant Kippen, a veteran of Afghan electoral processes, remained unflappable during the August elections despite "considerable domestic political pressure and interference" from Karzai’s government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Now, in an email interview with EurasiaNet, Kippen, who is now in Canada, speaks out for the first time about his frustrations, describing government pressure and noting that the government-appointed Independent Election Commission (IEC) did not follow the law.
EurasiaNet. What do you think was the contribution of the Electoral Complaints Commission to the electoral process and the credibility of the August 2009 presidential elections?
Kippen: For me personally, I think the greatest contribution to the process was that the ECC did its job properly as it is defined under the election law. We had over 3,000 complaints that were investigated and adjudicated during the elections process, which was no small feat. ? Contrary to how many people perceived the ECC, we were an Afghan electoral body where the vast majority of the staff were Afghans, which should be an enormous source of pride for the Afghan people.
EurasiaNet: The new electoral law introduced by President Karzai has a controversial clause that ends the right of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (the top UN official in Afghanistan) to appoint three members to the ECC and gives the president the sole right to appoint members. What is your view of this change? Will it impact the credibility of future elections?
Kippen: While it is important to recognize and respect the sovereignty of the government of Afghanistan to enact its own laws, it would be misleading to think that "Afghanizing" the ECC will automatically ensure a better quality complaints adjudication process. I think there are few people who would argue with the statement that there were serious problems with the electoral process last year. In order to address these problems, however, there should be an open, objective and public assessment completed about what went wrong. Only after that assessment can we properly identify the changes that should be made. Amending the election law prior to such an assessment is like putting a cart before the horse.
EurasiaNet: President Karzai argued that he was removing foreign interference from the elections in changing the law, pointing to the ECC’s role last August. How do you react to this charge that there was interference?
Kippen: The ECC went to great lengths throughout the entire electoral cycle to ensure that all candidates and their campaign teams, both for presidential and provincial council [polls], were fully informed about the role and processes of the ECC. During the audit and recount, we met or had communications with both President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah’s campaign teams on almost a daily basis, in addition to placing all our information in the public domain through our website and the media. While I can understand President Karzai’s frustration with the ECC decision that resulted in a second round being required, the ECC was not subjected to any international pressure, but did have to deal with considerable domestic political pressure and interference. [One of two Afghan ECC commissioners] Maulawi [Mustafa] Barakzai’s resignation was a direct result of domestic political pressure. Fahim Hakim, the ECC’s other Afghan commissioner, was also subjected to intense domestic pressure.
EurasiaNet: The IEC clearly did not implement all the decisions of the ECC as it was legally bound to do and yet the international community, especially the United States and the UN, signed off on the process, saying the IEC had upheld the constitution and the laws. Didn’t this set the stage for further erosion of these institutions and laws?
Kippen: It is unfortunate that the IEC did not respect the election law by fully implementing the ECC decisions. I would ask why the government of Afghanistan allowed this to happen.
EurasiaNet: There was a lot of talk on the need for electoral reforms following the presidential elections. What major areas did you think needed reform?
Kippen: I wouldn’t want to prejudge such an assessment, but one of the areas for major reform is within the IEC itself, as they repeatedly during the elections last year failed to discharge their responsibilities as defined under the law.
Another area requiring major reform is educating all major stakeholder groups about their roles and responsibilities during the election process. By stakeholder groups I mean candidates, their supporters, public officials (national, provincial and district level; police, border police, governors, army, etc., ministry officials particularly at the provincial and district level). One of the major reasons for electoral violations was that many of the people within these stakeholder groups didn’t have even a basic level of knowledge about the process itself.
EurasiaNet: Much attention has centered on the process of conducting elections and the flaws therein. Would you say that the problems are a result of a larger neglect of the entire electoral process and the lack of support given to the institutions in the period between elections?
Kippen: I completely agree. The four years between the 2005 [parliamentary] and 2009 [presidential] elections were squandered in terms of building up the knowledge and skill sets of people in the major stakeholder groups identified above. More attention and effort also needed to be spent on voter education, which was a recommendation contained in many of the observer group reports from 2005 (and [the first presidential elections in] 2004) but which was not funded or implemented.
EurasiaNet: Now there is talk of democracy perhaps not being the right form of governance for Afghanistan; talk of democracy being an "imposed" western notion. How do you view this?
Kippen: The whole point behind this process is to build strong democratic institutions and processes so that Afghans can build the kind of democracy that works for them. But first we need to make sure that these institutions and processes are independent and robust enough to allow Afghans to elect their representatives, as is their right under the constitution, without fear of intimidation or reprisal.
EurasiaNet: How do you look back at your contribution? Do you feel you were used to whitewash a bad process? Or do you feel you contributed to a more credible election? In the light of the charges leveled against the ECC, do you feel disappointed? Hurt? Misused?
Kippen: I am enormously proud of the work of the ECC, and in particular of the professionalism, dedication and contribution that all our staff (both Afghan and international) made last year. At the end of the day, the ECC did its job as defined under the election law (despite some fairly major challenges) and this should be a source of pride for all Afghans.
EurasiaNet: What are the long-term implications of this erosion of the credibility of the electoral process? On institutions? On governance? On the ongoing conflict?
Kippen: It just highlights the fact that building out sustainable democratic institutions and processes is a long-term endeavor.
EurasiaNet: What might be the best way forward from here?
Kippen: I think a new narrative is required to move forward. By this I mean that both the Afghan government and the international community need to develop a new approach and stop this blame game that has been going on since last fall. There needs to be a renewed focus and commitment to improving the process in advance of the next elections. The responsibility is a shared one.
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS BREWS IN KABUL OVER NEW GOVERNMENT MEDIA RESTRICTIONS
Eurasianet. March 3, 2010
Afghan journalists have a mixed reaction to a government ban on live broadcast coverage of Islamic militant terror attacks. Many in Kabul say the ban places Afghan media outlets on the slippery slope of state censorship. Some journalists, however, see the restrictions as a reasonable response to a set of threatening and extraordinary circumstances, while others are remaining silent out of concern that criticism of the government could invite official retaliation.
The Afghan Government’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), the nation’s intelligence agency, issued an order March 1 banning media from broadcasting live images of terror attacks. Officials justified the ban by arguing that live images of property damage and loss of life abetted the Taliban insurgency. Journalists violating the ban will be subject to arrest, along with the confiscation of their equipment.
The prohibition applies to both national and international media outlets. Its imposition followed a February 26 attack on two guest houses in the center of Kabul city that left at least 22 people dead and over 40 wounded. The insurgents stormed the guest houses and held off government security forces for several hours during the sophisticated and well-coordinated operation. Local media provided live coverage of the attack as it was playing out. The coverage was a PR disaster for the government, creating an impression that security forces were not as combat-capable as their Taliban opponents. The incident led to the resignation of senior police personnel in Kabul, although the resignations were not immediately accepted amid an ongoing official investigation.
Representatives of President Hamid Karzai’s administration have come out forcefully in support of the ban. Waheed Omar, a presidential aide, said the government wanted to ensure two things: "the protection of the lives of the journalists; and a mechanism that will ensure that the enemy does not use live broadcasts to plan, or to get instructions to their people at the scene, which makes not only the security forces vulnerable, but also civilians and journalists."
The ban is not the first attempt by the government to curb media coverage of the insurgency. Most recently, the NDS banned reporting on any incidents of violence during the polling hours of the 2009 presidential election.
The March 1 ban met with immediate criticism from journalist groups, including the Committee for Protection of Afghan Journalists and the Afghan National Journalists Union. Media-related non-governmental organizations, as well as a large number of media outlet owners and reporters, also came out against the restrictions.
"NDS, like most of security/intelligence agencies, puts its mission ahead of any other consideration. They [NDS officials] forget that they are bound to the same Constitution that is ensuring the freedom of information/expression" said Shahir Zahine the chairman of the Killid Media Group and a media activist.
Like Zahine, many journalists are basing their opposition on constitutional grounds. Article 34 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution specifically states: "Freedom of Expression shall be inviolable. Every Afghan has the right to express his thought through speech, writing, illustration or other means by observing the provisions stated in this constitution. Every Afghan has the right to print or publish materials without prior submission to the state authorities in accordance with the law."
"I don’t know why they [NDS officials] have instituted a ban that violates all laws," said Mujeeb Khalvatgar, a media activist.
In a possible prelude to a constitutional challenge, Zahine said he would instruct journalists working for the Killid Media Group to ignore the ban. Khalvatgar likewise stated that he was advocating non-compliance.
Acceptance of the ban, other journalists contended, could encourage the government to impose additional restrictions in the future. Ultimately, some worried, the Karzai administration may harbor desires to snuff out independent media voices.
"I think the media should not accept the ban" said Waheed Hashemi, the executive director of Nai, an Afghan media group supporting free media. "This time they want to ban live coverage. Next time they will say don’t report at all on the attacks."
Not all journalists are so adamantly opposed to the NDS restrictions. Some say that government worries about the impact of such images are legitimate, but add that officials are not addressing those concerns in the proper way. Barry Salaam, who heads a radio station, Good Morning Afghanistan, said that "NDS has a valid point to make, but they don’t know how to make it." Salaam added that it was important for Afghan media outlets to ensure that they do not inadvertently become propaganda mouthpieces for anyone, including the Taliban. "We must protect the very basis of freedom of expression and should not endanger it by irresponsible reporting."
Salaam said media outlets had to be careful in covering security-related issues, and report only "as much as our audience needs." Khalvatgar, however, argued that Salaam’s position could open the door for self-censorship. "It is not what the audience needs to know, but what they have to know. It is not a need, but an obligation."
Some media outlets are wary of taking a public position for fear of attracting the ire of the security agencies, or being denied future access to government information. "The Afghan media already have problems in accessing information and it will become more difficult to get access. The NDS can create problems for us, especially in provinces where they can stop us because they are armed" said Danish Karokhel, the director of Pajhwok an independent Afghan news agency.
Karokhel also expressed concern that the NDS restrictions would create an uneven playing field between local and international media outlets, since foreign journalists may well ignore the ban. US officials have questioned the wisdom of such reporting restrictions, and have indicated that they will raise the issue with Karzai administration officials.
Moby Capital, a media group that owns the hugely popular outlets Tolo TV and Arman FM, has yet to take a position on the restrictions, said Mohammad Abdullah, a lawyer and host on Tolo TV. The head of Tolo news, Mujahid Kakar, was reported as saying that any order concerning news coverage in Afghanistan should come through the Ministry of Information and Culture. Without commenting on the pros and cons of the restrictions, he was quoted as saying that any government order that appeared to contravene the Constitution was problematic.
The Ministry of Information and Culture itself has remained silent on the controversy. The new information minister, Sayed Makhdoom Raheen, is largely seen as more supportive of media independence.
Media activists said they intend to convene meetings of journalists over the next few days in an attempt to formulate a unified response to the NDS restrictions. "We, as media actors, need to get together and made our point to the parliament/government and to the public. We need to reclaim the space that is our due and is given to us by law" said Zahine.
Afghan journalists have a mixed reaction to a government ban on live broadcast coverage of Islamic militant terror attacks. Many in Kabul say the ban places Afghan media outlets on the slippery slope of state censorship. Some journalists, however, see the restrictions as a reasonable response to a set of threatening and extraordinary circumstances, while others are remaining silent out of concern that criticism of the government could invite official retaliation.
The Afghan Government’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), the nation’s intelligence agency, issued an order March 1 banning media from broadcasting live images of terror attacks. Officials justified the ban by arguing that live images of property damage and loss of life abetted the Taliban insurgency. Journalists violating the ban will be subject to arrest, along with the confiscation of their equipment.
The prohibition applies to both national and international media outlets. Its imposition followed a February 26 attack on two guest houses in the center of Kabul city that left at least 22 people dead and over 40 wounded. The insurgents stormed the guest houses and held off government security forces for several hours during the sophisticated and well-coordinated operation. Local media provided live coverage of the attack as it was playing out. The coverage was a PR disaster for the government, creating an impression that security forces were not as combat-capable as their Taliban opponents. The incident led to the resignation of senior police personnel in Kabul, although the resignations were not immediately accepted amid an ongoing official investigation.
Representatives of President Hamid Karzai’s administration have come out forcefully in support of the ban. Waheed Omar, a presidential aide, said the government wanted to ensure two things: "the protection of the lives of the journalists; and a mechanism that will ensure that the enemy does not use live broadcasts to plan, or to get instructions to their people at the scene, which makes not only the security forces vulnerable, but also civilians and journalists."
The ban is not the first attempt by the government to curb media coverage of the insurgency. Most recently, the NDS banned reporting on any incidents of violence during the polling hours of the 2009 presidential election.
The March 1 ban met with immediate criticism from journalist groups, including the Committee for Protection of Afghan Journalists and the Afghan National Journalists Union. Media-related non-governmental organizations, as well as a large number of media outlet owners and reporters, also came out against the restrictions.
"NDS, like most of security/intelligence agencies, puts its mission ahead of any other consideration. They [NDS officials] forget that they are bound to the same Constitution that is ensuring the freedom of information/expression" said Shahir Zahine the chairman of the Killid Media Group and a media activist.
Like Zahine, many journalists are basing their opposition on constitutional grounds. Article 34 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution specifically states: "Freedom of Expression shall be inviolable. Every Afghan has the right to express his thought through speech, writing, illustration or other means by observing the provisions stated in this constitution. Every Afghan has the right to print or publish materials without prior submission to the state authorities in accordance with the law."
"I don’t know why they [NDS officials] have instituted a ban that violates all laws," said Mujeeb Khalvatgar, a media activist.
In a possible prelude to a constitutional challenge, Zahine said he would instruct journalists working for the Killid Media Group to ignore the ban. Khalvatgar likewise stated that he was advocating non-compliance.
Acceptance of the ban, other journalists contended, could encourage the government to impose additional restrictions in the future. Ultimately, some worried, the Karzai administration may harbor desires to snuff out independent media voices.
"I think the media should not accept the ban" said Waheed Hashemi, the executive director of Nai, an Afghan media group supporting free media. "This time they want to ban live coverage. Next time they will say don’t report at all on the attacks."
Not all journalists are so adamantly opposed to the NDS restrictions. Some say that government worries about the impact of such images are legitimate, but add that officials are not addressing those concerns in the proper way. Barry Salaam, who heads a radio station, Good Morning Afghanistan, said that "NDS has a valid point to make, but they don’t know how to make it." Salaam added that it was important for Afghan media outlets to ensure that they do not inadvertently become propaganda mouthpieces for anyone, including the Taliban. "We must protect the very basis of freedom of expression and should not endanger it by irresponsible reporting."
Salaam said media outlets had to be careful in covering security-related issues, and report only "as much as our audience needs." Khalvatgar, however, argued that Salaam’s position could open the door for self-censorship. "It is not what the audience needs to know, but what they have to know. It is not a need, but an obligation."
Some media outlets are wary of taking a public position for fear of attracting the ire of the security agencies, or being denied future access to government information. "The Afghan media already have problems in accessing information and it will become more difficult to get access. The NDS can create problems for us, especially in provinces where they can stop us because they are armed" said Danish Karokhel, the director of Pajhwok an independent Afghan news agency.
Karokhel also expressed concern that the NDS restrictions would create an uneven playing field between local and international media outlets, since foreign journalists may well ignore the ban. US officials have questioned the wisdom of such reporting restrictions, and have indicated that they will raise the issue with Karzai administration officials.
Moby Capital, a media group that owns the hugely popular outlets Tolo TV and Arman FM, has yet to take a position on the restrictions, said Mohammad Abdullah, a lawyer and host on Tolo TV. The head of Tolo news, Mujahid Kakar, was reported as saying that any order concerning news coverage in Afghanistan should come through the Ministry of Information and Culture. Without commenting on the pros and cons of the restrictions, he was quoted as saying that any government order that appeared to contravene the Constitution was problematic.
The Ministry of Information and Culture itself has remained silent on the controversy. The new information minister, Sayed Makhdoom Raheen, is largely seen as more supportive of media independence.
Media activists said they intend to convene meetings of journalists over the next few days in an attempt to formulate a unified response to the NDS restrictions. "We, as media actors, need to get together and made our point to the parliament/government and to the public. We need to reclaim the space that is our due and is given to us by law" said Zahine.
Tattered parachute
Himal, March 2010
Afghanisation’ has emerged as the buzz word from the London Conference on Afghanistan, held in January, one of only six international conferences held outside Afghanistan since 2001 to determine the country’s future. Following the gathering, it is now being claimed that the Kabul government has laid out its priorities for the first time. Henceforth, goes the argument, governance in Afghanistan will be Afghan-led, security will be ‘Afghanised’ and Kabul will take the lead in the process of reconciliation and reintegration with the armed insurgency. But to long-term observers of Afghanistan, the ‘new’ emphasis sounded very much like the old scriptures. Is this sudden emphasis on ‘Afghanisation’ just a coded reference to an exit strategy?
In fact, it was London and the same Labour government that, in 2006, hosted a conference that initiated the policy document called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). While far from perfect, that blueprint was and remains the seminal document identifying Afghanistan’s needs. It was finalised, adopted and endorsed by the international community in 2008 in Paris, along with pledges to route more funds through the Afghan government, allow Kabul to determine priority areas and plans for spending, and build and strengthen institutions that would allow Afghans to govern themselves. In other words, ‘Afghanisation’.
The supposedly new aspects at the 2010 London Conference were thus not the Afghanisation plans. Rather, the fresh issues revolved around a timeline for beginning the handover of responsibility for security to Afghan forces, allowing for the withdrawal of international troops. A ‘peace and reconciliation’ programme that would create the conditions allowing for this withdrawal was also an important consideration – sounding suspiciously like an exit strategy, rather than the professed long-term commitment. Western countries have tried to minimise the impact of their intention to withdraw troops by saying they would first build up the Afghanistan’s police and army forces. It is clear, however, that the troop-contributing countries are loath to wait until these two bodies are fully up and running. A week before he hosted the London Conference, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband appeared before the US Senate to emphasise that “however much national security forces are built up, they will not have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan … local community-based initiatives are inevitable.” He concluded that the international community would need to consider supporting the latter initiatives in some circumstances.
This ‘new’ peace and reconciliation/reintegration strategy smacks of the same expediency – a chance to allow the international community to depart gracefully. In these instances, ‘reintegration’ refers to plans to buy off Taliban foot-soldiers who, it is felt, are in the insurgency mainly for economic reasons; while ‘reconciliation’ is seen as a settlement with the leadership of the Taliban based on a series of political concessions, which have not been defined to date. There is certainly little new in the reintegration proposal, as a national commission has been attempting to do just that since 2005, with limited success. Similarly, political reconciliation with the Taliban leadership remain nebulous, with the militants clearly maintaining that the Afghan state, in its current form – designed as a democratic Islamic republic with a modern Constitution and equal rights for all citizens – is unacceptable.
Worryingly, many influential sections within Western policymaking have begun questioning whether a ‘Western-style’ democracy is suitable for a ‘tribal nation’, while paying rhetorical homage to the Afghan Constitution. One hears such rhetoric in drawing-room conversations amongst internationals tasked with constructing policy for the country. A concrete example, however, is the emphasis on traditional justice mechanisms from the most influential partners. In a strategy document released by the US government at the end of January, President Barack Obama’s administration stated that it was “neither necessary nor effective to replace traditional justice mechanism with formal institutions”, adding that it would “help create space for traditional justice mechanisms to re-emerge in areas cleared of the Taliban”. While it is true that the formal justice system is not accessible to the majority of citizens currently, the traditional justice mechanisms based on customary law are deeply problematic. The Pashtunwali code, for example, includes the use of women as barter to settle debts, resolve disputes and as retributive payments. This is not only in the case of criminal law, but also in civil disputes. Laws also allow for retributive killings of family members of the person who has committed a crime.
Writing recently for the respected Afghan Analysts Network recently, Anders Fange, the country director of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, argued that one of the two fundamental mistakes made by the international committee was its “obsession to impose an essentially western state model and political organisation, completely ignoring the fact … that Afghanistan is a predominantly traditional society where a more unpretentious version would have been more appropriate and sustainable.” Fange argued that the loya jirga system of local gatherings, which would appoint representatives for decision-making, would probably have been better than the general elections. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that traditional mechanisms, which were only partially representative, have been vitiated by years of war,
with community leaders being sidelined or subverted by the ongoing conflict and the emergence of money and muscle power.
This reading also does not even recognise that the current form of democracy in Afghanistan does not resemble any Western-style democracy, nor even any democracy in Southasia. As things stand, the Afghan system forbids participation by political parties, while its combination of system of single, non-transferable votes, along with its multi-seat constituencies, is designed to ensure political fragmentation and non-representational politics. The rights enshrined in the Constitution, the laws as well as the criminal and civil codes are not yet understood by the majority of those implementing them. In these circumstances, the contention that Afghanistan has had too much, rather than too little, democracy seems designed to allow Western |countries to look the other way while a beleaguered government in Kabul compromises on hard-won human rights and civil liberties.
On the next train out
If evidence were needed of the West’s short-term focus with an eye firmly on the door, it is clear in the stated goals of the ‘civilian surge’ made public by the recent US strategy paper, in which Washington states that it intends to pour aid into provinces where its troops are based, as well as use civilians as “force multipliers”. Both of these intentions run contrary to the best principles of aid delivery and humanitarian assistance, which must be independent, neutral and driven by needs, as underscored by the UN’s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) for Afghanistan for 2010, launched in November 2009. According to Robert Watkins, the UN’s resident humanitarian coordinator in Afghanistan, the plan had received only two percent of promised funding by mid-February. The HAP map, which identifies the needs according to area, clearly shows that the provinces most in need of humanitarian assistance are not the ones being identified by the international community for aid.
NGOs working in the field have also repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the militarisation of aid. Past experiences have shown that the use of military resources for delivering aid and humanitarian assistance, as well as the use of civilians to further military objectives, has endangered the role of real humanitarian personnel, in addition to developing non-sustainable projects. Those focused on short-term benefits, including perceived short-term gains such as the militaristic efforts at winning hearts and minds, have ignored this plea. In fact, the trend towards short-term spending with an emphasis on the pursuit of military and political objectives is likely to deepen.
Meanwhile, the UN, which has a coordinating role in Afghanistan, has been unable to exercise its muscle. Indeed, it remains in a state of unprecedented crisis following the unseemly wrangling over the August 2009 presidential elections. While the spectacular falling-out between the UN’s top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and his deputy, Peter Galbraith, ended with the acrimonious departure of the latter, the fissures have helped those not keen on a strong UN role. The UN’s freefall during the elections has, however, only attenuated a crisis caused by confusion over its broader role and functions. Its political mandate, which includes supporting the Afghan state-building project, has mired the organisation’s country team in the political chaos, eroding its ability to play a neutral role in the intensifying conflict.
This crisis goes far beyond the remit of the country team, however. A stronger UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) depends partially on the skills of the UN leadership within Afghanistan, but even more so on the ability of the UN leadership in New York to give its mission some teeth. That has been singularly lacking. In his hunt to find a successor to the beleaguered Eide, who is expected to leave at the end of February, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could do no better than appoint an official, the Swedish diplomat Stephen De Mistura, who first turned down the job. Clearly the last thing the UN team in Afghanistan needed for its morale was a reluctant envoy to lead them.
The UN’s role is likely to be further circumscribed in the near future. Presenting the HAP, the UN has admitted that increasing insecurity has meant that there would be greater dependence on NGOs and other non-UN actors to deliver humanitarian assistance. Decreasing access and diminished authority, following the chaos of the August elections in which the UN was in a supporting role, has compromised its ability to play the role of politically neutral referee – and the Afghan government has taken advantage of this. On 17 February, President Hamid Karzai signed off on an ordinance that rescinded the UN’s right to appoint independent members to the Electoral Complaints Commission, the only body that successfully challenged the electoral fraud in the August elections (see Himal December 2009, “Is it over?”).
The UN is in a catch-22 situation. While a strong envoy might help to re-energise the organisation’s mission in Afghanistan, it would almost certainly be rejected by the Karzai government. Following the worst attack on the UN, on its guest house in Kabul city in October, in which five staffers and lost their lives, the organisation withdrew (temporarily, it said) over 600 staffers. Asked about the impact of this withdrawal, President Karzai has said that it would have “no impact”, adding “they may or may not return. Afghanistan won’t notice it. We wish them well wherever they are.”
Increasing hostility between President Karzai and the international community has turned him from an international favourite into a barely tolerated partner. Having created and backed a system in which all power is centralised in the presidency, the international community is at a loss now that President Karzai is no longer amenable to their suggestions. Under the circumstances, instead of creating institutions and processes that could balance the sharing of power and decentralise administrative authority, there is a danger that the international community, especially the US, might be headed for more quick-fix solutions. Indeed, written into its stabilisation strategy are proposals for the direct finding of select governors and ministries. While this could well help to bypass a recalcitrant President Karzai, it will end up creating parallel structures of governance and multiple sources of concentrated power, thus further deepening the reigning culture of poor accountability. These individuals, paid directly by the donors, are likely to be answerable to the main funders and not to Kabul, further weakening any effort to build institutions. Yet for those looking for a quick exit, that could prove to be the answer rather than the problem.
Afghanisation’ has emerged as the buzz word from the London Conference on Afghanistan, held in January, one of only six international conferences held outside Afghanistan since 2001 to determine the country’s future. Following the gathering, it is now being claimed that the Kabul government has laid out its priorities for the first time. Henceforth, goes the argument, governance in Afghanistan will be Afghan-led, security will be ‘Afghanised’ and Kabul will take the lead in the process of reconciliation and reintegration with the armed insurgency. But to long-term observers of Afghanistan, the ‘new’ emphasis sounded very much like the old scriptures. Is this sudden emphasis on ‘Afghanisation’ just a coded reference to an exit strategy?
In fact, it was London and the same Labour government that, in 2006, hosted a conference that initiated the policy document called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). While far from perfect, that blueprint was and remains the seminal document identifying Afghanistan’s needs. It was finalised, adopted and endorsed by the international community in 2008 in Paris, along with pledges to route more funds through the Afghan government, allow Kabul to determine priority areas and plans for spending, and build and strengthen institutions that would allow Afghans to govern themselves. In other words, ‘Afghanisation’.
The supposedly new aspects at the 2010 London Conference were thus not the Afghanisation plans. Rather, the fresh issues revolved around a timeline for beginning the handover of responsibility for security to Afghan forces, allowing for the withdrawal of international troops. A ‘peace and reconciliation’ programme that would create the conditions allowing for this withdrawal was also an important consideration – sounding suspiciously like an exit strategy, rather than the professed long-term commitment. Western countries have tried to minimise the impact of their intention to withdraw troops by saying they would first build up the Afghanistan’s police and army forces. It is clear, however, that the troop-contributing countries are loath to wait until these two bodies are fully up and running. A week before he hosted the London Conference, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband appeared before the US Senate to emphasise that “however much national security forces are built up, they will not have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan … local community-based initiatives are inevitable.” He concluded that the international community would need to consider supporting the latter initiatives in some circumstances.
This ‘new’ peace and reconciliation/reintegration strategy smacks of the same expediency – a chance to allow the international community to depart gracefully. In these instances, ‘reintegration’ refers to plans to buy off Taliban foot-soldiers who, it is felt, are in the insurgency mainly for economic reasons; while ‘reconciliation’ is seen as a settlement with the leadership of the Taliban based on a series of political concessions, which have not been defined to date. There is certainly little new in the reintegration proposal, as a national commission has been attempting to do just that since 2005, with limited success. Similarly, political reconciliation with the Taliban leadership remain nebulous, with the militants clearly maintaining that the Afghan state, in its current form – designed as a democratic Islamic republic with a modern Constitution and equal rights for all citizens – is unacceptable.
Worryingly, many influential sections within Western policymaking have begun questioning whether a ‘Western-style’ democracy is suitable for a ‘tribal nation’, while paying rhetorical homage to the Afghan Constitution. One hears such rhetoric in drawing-room conversations amongst internationals tasked with constructing policy for the country. A concrete example, however, is the emphasis on traditional justice mechanisms from the most influential partners. In a strategy document released by the US government at the end of January, President Barack Obama’s administration stated that it was “neither necessary nor effective to replace traditional justice mechanism with formal institutions”, adding that it would “help create space for traditional justice mechanisms to re-emerge in areas cleared of the Taliban”. While it is true that the formal justice system is not accessible to the majority of citizens currently, the traditional justice mechanisms based on customary law are deeply problematic. The Pashtunwali code, for example, includes the use of women as barter to settle debts, resolve disputes and as retributive payments. This is not only in the case of criminal law, but also in civil disputes. Laws also allow for retributive killings of family members of the person who has committed a crime.
Writing recently for the respected Afghan Analysts Network recently, Anders Fange, the country director of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, argued that one of the two fundamental mistakes made by the international committee was its “obsession to impose an essentially western state model and political organisation, completely ignoring the fact … that Afghanistan is a predominantly traditional society where a more unpretentious version would have been more appropriate and sustainable.” Fange argued that the loya jirga system of local gatherings, which would appoint representatives for decision-making, would probably have been better than the general elections. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that traditional mechanisms, which were only partially representative, have been vitiated by years of war,
with community leaders being sidelined or subverted by the ongoing conflict and the emergence of money and muscle power.
This reading also does not even recognise that the current form of democracy in Afghanistan does not resemble any Western-style democracy, nor even any democracy in Southasia. As things stand, the Afghan system forbids participation by political parties, while its combination of system of single, non-transferable votes, along with its multi-seat constituencies, is designed to ensure political fragmentation and non-representational politics. The rights enshrined in the Constitution, the laws as well as the criminal and civil codes are not yet understood by the majority of those implementing them. In these circumstances, the contention that Afghanistan has had too much, rather than too little, democracy seems designed to allow Western |countries to look the other way while a beleaguered government in Kabul compromises on hard-won human rights and civil liberties.
On the next train out
If evidence were needed of the West’s short-term focus with an eye firmly on the door, it is clear in the stated goals of the ‘civilian surge’ made public by the recent US strategy paper, in which Washington states that it intends to pour aid into provinces where its troops are based, as well as use civilians as “force multipliers”. Both of these intentions run contrary to the best principles of aid delivery and humanitarian assistance, which must be independent, neutral and driven by needs, as underscored by the UN’s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) for Afghanistan for 2010, launched in November 2009. According to Robert Watkins, the UN’s resident humanitarian coordinator in Afghanistan, the plan had received only two percent of promised funding by mid-February. The HAP map, which identifies the needs according to area, clearly shows that the provinces most in need of humanitarian assistance are not the ones being identified by the international community for aid.
NGOs working in the field have also repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the militarisation of aid. Past experiences have shown that the use of military resources for delivering aid and humanitarian assistance, as well as the use of civilians to further military objectives, has endangered the role of real humanitarian personnel, in addition to developing non-sustainable projects. Those focused on short-term benefits, including perceived short-term gains such as the militaristic efforts at winning hearts and minds, have ignored this plea. In fact, the trend towards short-term spending with an emphasis on the pursuit of military and political objectives is likely to deepen.
Meanwhile, the UN, which has a coordinating role in Afghanistan, has been unable to exercise its muscle. Indeed, it remains in a state of unprecedented crisis following the unseemly wrangling over the August 2009 presidential elections. While the spectacular falling-out between the UN’s top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and his deputy, Peter Galbraith, ended with the acrimonious departure of the latter, the fissures have helped those not keen on a strong UN role. The UN’s freefall during the elections has, however, only attenuated a crisis caused by confusion over its broader role and functions. Its political mandate, which includes supporting the Afghan state-building project, has mired the organisation’s country team in the political chaos, eroding its ability to play a neutral role in the intensifying conflict.
This crisis goes far beyond the remit of the country team, however. A stronger UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) depends partially on the skills of the UN leadership within Afghanistan, but even more so on the ability of the UN leadership in New York to give its mission some teeth. That has been singularly lacking. In his hunt to find a successor to the beleaguered Eide, who is expected to leave at the end of February, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could do no better than appoint an official, the Swedish diplomat Stephen De Mistura, who first turned down the job. Clearly the last thing the UN team in Afghanistan needed for its morale was a reluctant envoy to lead them.
The UN’s role is likely to be further circumscribed in the near future. Presenting the HAP, the UN has admitted that increasing insecurity has meant that there would be greater dependence on NGOs and other non-UN actors to deliver humanitarian assistance. Decreasing access and diminished authority, following the chaos of the August elections in which the UN was in a supporting role, has compromised its ability to play the role of politically neutral referee – and the Afghan government has taken advantage of this. On 17 February, President Hamid Karzai signed off on an ordinance that rescinded the UN’s right to appoint independent members to the Electoral Complaints Commission, the only body that successfully challenged the electoral fraud in the August elections (see Himal December 2009, “Is it over?”).
The UN is in a catch-22 situation. While a strong envoy might help to re-energise the organisation’s mission in Afghanistan, it would almost certainly be rejected by the Karzai government. Following the worst attack on the UN, on its guest house in Kabul city in October, in which five staffers and lost their lives, the organisation withdrew (temporarily, it said) over 600 staffers. Asked about the impact of this withdrawal, President Karzai has said that it would have “no impact”, adding “they may or may not return. Afghanistan won’t notice it. We wish them well wherever they are.”
Increasing hostility between President Karzai and the international community has turned him from an international favourite into a barely tolerated partner. Having created and backed a system in which all power is centralised in the presidency, the international community is at a loss now that President Karzai is no longer amenable to their suggestions. Under the circumstances, instead of creating institutions and processes that could balance the sharing of power and decentralise administrative authority, there is a danger that the international community, especially the US, might be headed for more quick-fix solutions. Indeed, written into its stabilisation strategy are proposals for the direct finding of select governors and ministries. While this could well help to bypass a recalcitrant President Karzai, it will end up creating parallel structures of governance and multiple sources of concentrated power, thus further deepening the reigning culture of poor accountability. These individuals, paid directly by the donors, are likely to be answerable to the main funders and not to Kabul, further weakening any effort to build institutions. Yet for those looking for a quick exit, that could prove to be the answer rather than the problem.
Tattered parachute
Himal, March 2010
Afghanisation’ has emerged as the buzz word from the London Conference on Afghanistan, held in January, one of only six international conferences held outside Afghanistan since 2001 to determine the country’s future. Following the gathering, it is now being claimed that the Kabul government has laid out its priorities for the first time. Henceforth, goes the argument, governance in Afghanistan will be Afghan-led, security will be ‘Afghanised’ and Kabul will take the lead in the process of reconciliation and reintegration with the armed insurgency. But to long-term observers of Afghanistan, the ‘new’ emphasis sounded very much like the old scriptures. Is this sudden emphasis on ‘Afghanisation’ just a coded reference to an exit strategy?
In fact, it was London and the same Labour government that, in 2006, hosted a conference that initiated the policy document called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). While far from perfect, that blueprint was and remains the seminal document identifying Afghanistan’s needs. It was finalised, adopted and endorsed by the international community in 2008 in Paris, along with pledges to route more funds through the Afghan government, allow Kabul to determine priority areas and plans for spending, and build and strengthen institutions that would allow Afghans to govern themselves. In other words, ‘Afghanisation’.
The supposedly new aspects at the 2010 London Conference were thus not the Afghanisation plans. Rather, the fresh issues revolved around a timeline for beginning the handover of responsibility for security to Afghan forces, allowing for the withdrawal of international troops. A ‘peace and reconciliation’ programme that would create the conditions allowing for this withdrawal was also an important consideration – sounding suspiciously like an exit strategy, rather than the professed long-term commitment. Western countries have tried to minimise the impact of their intention to withdraw troops by saying they would first build up the Afghanistan’s police and army forces. It is clear, however, that the troop-contributing countries are loath to wait until these two bodies are fully up and running. A week before he hosted the London Conference, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband appeared before the US Senate to emphasise that “however much national security forces are built up, they will not have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan … local community-based initiatives are inevitable.” He concluded that the international community would need to consider supporting the latter initiatives in some circumstances.
This ‘new’ peace and reconciliation/reintegration strategy smacks of the same expediency – a chance to allow the international community to depart gracefully. In these instances, ‘reintegration’ refers to plans to buy off Taliban foot-soldiers who, it is felt, are in the insurgency mainly for economic reasons; while ‘reconciliation’ is seen as a settlement with the leadership of the Taliban based on a series of political concessions, which have not been defined to date. There is certainly little new in the reintegration proposal, as a national commission has been attempting to do just that since 2005, with limited success. Similarly, political reconciliation with the Taliban leadership remain nebulous, with the militants clearly maintaining that the Afghan state, in its current form – designed as a democratic Islamic republic with a modern Constitution and equal rights for all citizens – is unacceptable.
Worryingly, many influential sections within Western policymaking have begun questioning whether a ‘Western-style’ democracy is suitable for a ‘tribal nation’, while paying rhetorical homage to the Afghan Constitution. One hears such rhetoric in drawing-room conversations amongst internationals tasked with constructing policy for the country. A concrete example, however, is the emphasis on traditional justice mechanisms from the most influential partners. In a strategy document released by the US government at the end of January, President Barack Obama’s administration stated that it was “neither necessary nor effective to replace traditional justice mechanism with formal institutions”, adding that it would “help create space for traditional justice mechanisms to re-emerge in areas cleared of the Taliban”. While it is true that the formal justice system is not accessible to the majority of citizens currently, the traditional justice mechanisms based on customary law are deeply problematic. The Pashtunwali code, for example, includes the use of women as barter to settle debts, resolve disputes and as retributive payments. This is not only in the case of criminal law, but also in civil disputes. Laws also allow for retributive killings of family members of the person who has committed a crime.
Writing recently for the respected Afghan Analysts Network recently, Anders Fange, the country director of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, argued that one of the two fundamental mistakes made by the international committee was its “obsession to impose an essentially western state model and political organisation, completely ignoring the fact … that Afghanistan is a predominantly traditional society where a more unpretentious version would have been more appropriate and sustainable.” Fange argued that the loya jirga system of local gatherings, which would appoint representatives for decision-making, would probably have been better than the general elections. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that traditional mechanisms, which were only partially representative, have been vitiated by years of war,
with community leaders being sidelined or subverted by the ongoing conflict and the emergence of money and muscle power.
This reading also does not even recognise that the current form of democracy in Afghanistan does not resemble any Western-style democracy, nor even any democracy in Southasia. As things stand, the Afghan system forbids participation by political parties, while its combination of system of single, non-transferable votes, along with its multi-seat constituencies, is designed to ensure political fragmentation and non-representational politics. The rights enshrined in the Constitution, the laws as well as the criminal and civil codes are not yet understood by the majority of those implementing them. In these circumstances, the contention that Afghanistan has had too much, rather than too little, democracy seems designed to allow Western |countries to look the other way while a beleaguered government in Kabul compromises on hard-won human rights and civil liberties.
On the next train out
If evidence were needed of the West’s short-term focus with an eye firmly on the door, it is clear in the stated goals of the ‘civilian surge’ made public by the recent US strategy paper, in which Washington states that it intends to pour aid into provinces where its troops are based, as well as use civilians as “force multipliers”. Both of these intentions run contrary to the best principles of aid delivery and humanitarian assistance, which must be independent, neutral and driven by needs, as underscored by the UN’s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) for Afghanistan for 2010, launched in November 2009. According to Robert Watkins, the UN’s resident humanitarian coordinator in Afghanistan, the plan had received only two percent of promised funding by mid-February. The HAP map, which identifies the needs according to area, clearly shows that the provinces most in need of humanitarian assistance are not the ones being identified by the international community for aid.
NGOs working in the field have also repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the militarisation of aid. Past experiences have shown that the use of military resources for delivering aid and humanitarian assistance, as well as the use of civilians to further military objectives, has endangered the role of real humanitarian personnel, in addition to developing non-sustainable projects. Those focused on short-term benefits, including perceived short-term gains such as the militaristic efforts at winning hearts and minds, have ignored this plea. In fact, the trend towards short-term spending with an emphasis on the pursuit of military and political objectives is likely to deepen.
Meanwhile, the UN, which has a coordinating role in Afghanistan, has been unable to exercise its muscle. Indeed, it remains in a state of unprecedented crisis following the unseemly wrangling over the August 2009 presidential elections. While the spectacular falling-out between the UN’s top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and his deputy, Peter Galbraith, ended with the acrimonious departure of the latter, the fissures have helped those not keen on a strong UN role. The UN’s freefall during the elections has, however, only attenuated a crisis caused by confusion over its broader role and functions. Its political mandate, which includes supporting the Afghan state-building project, has mired the organisation’s country team in the political chaos, eroding its ability to play a neutral role in the intensifying conflict.
This crisis goes far beyond the remit of the country team, however. A stronger UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) depends partially on the skills of the UN leadership within Afghanistan, but even more so on the ability of the UN leadership in New York to give its mission some teeth. That has been singularly lacking. In his hunt to find a successor to the beleaguered Eide, who is expected to leave at the end of February, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could do no better than appoint an official, the Swedish diplomat Stephen De Mistura, who first turned down the job. Clearly the last thing the UN team in Afghanistan needed for its morale was a reluctant envoy to lead them.
The UN’s role is likely to be further circumscribed in the near future. Presenting the HAP, the UN has admitted that increasing insecurity has meant that there would be greater dependence on NGOs and other non-UN actors to deliver humanitarian assistance. Decreasing access and diminished authority, following the chaos of the August elections in which the UN was in a supporting role, has compromised its ability to play the role of politically neutral referee – and the Afghan government has taken advantage of this. On 17 February, President Hamid Karzai signed off on an ordinance that rescinded the UN’s right to appoint independent members to the Electoral Complaints Commission, the only body that successfully challenged the electoral fraud in the August elections (see Himal December 2009, “Is it over?”).
The UN is in a catch-22 situation. While a strong envoy might help to re-energise the organisation’s mission in Afghanistan, it would almost certainly be rejected by the Karzai government. Following the worst attack on the UN, on its guest house in Kabul city in October, in which five staffers and lost their lives, the organisation withdrew (temporarily, it said) over 600 staffers. Asked about the impact of this withdrawal, President Karzai has said that it would have “no impact”, adding “they may or may not return. Afghanistan won’t notice it. We wish them well wherever they are.”
Increasing hostility between President Karzai and the international community has turned him from an international favourite into a barely tolerated partner. Having created and backed a system in which all power is centralised in the presidency, the international community is at a loss now that President Karzai is no longer amenable to their suggestions. Under the circumstances, instead of creating institutions and processes that could balance the sharing of power and decentralise administrative authority, there is a danger that the international community, especially the US, might be headed for more quick-fix solutions. Indeed, written into its stabilisation strategy are proposals for the direct finding of select governors and ministries. While this could well help to bypass a recalcitrant President Karzai, it will end up creating parallel structures of governance and multiple sources of concentrated power, thus further deepening the reigning culture of poor accountability. These individuals, paid directly by the donors, are likely to be answerable to the main funders and not to Kabul, further weakening any effort to build institutions. Yet for those looking for a quick exit, that could prove to be the answer rather than the problem.
Afghanisation’ has emerged as the buzz word from the London Conference on Afghanistan, held in January, one of only six international conferences held outside Afghanistan since 2001 to determine the country’s future. Following the gathering, it is now being claimed that the Kabul government has laid out its priorities for the first time. Henceforth, goes the argument, governance in Afghanistan will be Afghan-led, security will be ‘Afghanised’ and Kabul will take the lead in the process of reconciliation and reintegration with the armed insurgency. But to long-term observers of Afghanistan, the ‘new’ emphasis sounded very much like the old scriptures. Is this sudden emphasis on ‘Afghanisation’ just a coded reference to an exit strategy?
In fact, it was London and the same Labour government that, in 2006, hosted a conference that initiated the policy document called the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). While far from perfect, that blueprint was and remains the seminal document identifying Afghanistan’s needs. It was finalised, adopted and endorsed by the international community in 2008 in Paris, along with pledges to route more funds through the Afghan government, allow Kabul to determine priority areas and plans for spending, and build and strengthen institutions that would allow Afghans to govern themselves. In other words, ‘Afghanisation’.
The supposedly new aspects at the 2010 London Conference were thus not the Afghanisation plans. Rather, the fresh issues revolved around a timeline for beginning the handover of responsibility for security to Afghan forces, allowing for the withdrawal of international troops. A ‘peace and reconciliation’ programme that would create the conditions allowing for this withdrawal was also an important consideration – sounding suspiciously like an exit strategy, rather than the professed long-term commitment. Western countries have tried to minimise the impact of their intention to withdraw troops by saying they would first build up the Afghanistan’s police and army forces. It is clear, however, that the troop-contributing countries are loath to wait until these two bodies are fully up and running. A week before he hosted the London Conference, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband appeared before the US Senate to emphasise that “however much national security forces are built up, they will not have a monopoly of force in a country like Afghanistan … local community-based initiatives are inevitable.” He concluded that the international community would need to consider supporting the latter initiatives in some circumstances.
This ‘new’ peace and reconciliation/reintegration strategy smacks of the same expediency – a chance to allow the international community to depart gracefully. In these instances, ‘reintegration’ refers to plans to buy off Taliban foot-soldiers who, it is felt, are in the insurgency mainly for economic reasons; while ‘reconciliation’ is seen as a settlement with the leadership of the Taliban based on a series of political concessions, which have not been defined to date. There is certainly little new in the reintegration proposal, as a national commission has been attempting to do just that since 2005, with limited success. Similarly, political reconciliation with the Taliban leadership remain nebulous, with the militants clearly maintaining that the Afghan state, in its current form – designed as a democratic Islamic republic with a modern Constitution and equal rights for all citizens – is unacceptable.
Worryingly, many influential sections within Western policymaking have begun questioning whether a ‘Western-style’ democracy is suitable for a ‘tribal nation’, while paying rhetorical homage to the Afghan Constitution. One hears such rhetoric in drawing-room conversations amongst internationals tasked with constructing policy for the country. A concrete example, however, is the emphasis on traditional justice mechanisms from the most influential partners. In a strategy document released by the US government at the end of January, President Barack Obama’s administration stated that it was “neither necessary nor effective to replace traditional justice mechanism with formal institutions”, adding that it would “help create space for traditional justice mechanisms to re-emerge in areas cleared of the Taliban”. While it is true that the formal justice system is not accessible to the majority of citizens currently, the traditional justice mechanisms based on customary law are deeply problematic. The Pashtunwali code, for example, includes the use of women as barter to settle debts, resolve disputes and as retributive payments. This is not only in the case of criminal law, but also in civil disputes. Laws also allow for retributive killings of family members of the person who has committed a crime.
Writing recently for the respected Afghan Analysts Network recently, Anders Fange, the country director of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, argued that one of the two fundamental mistakes made by the international committee was its “obsession to impose an essentially western state model and political organisation, completely ignoring the fact … that Afghanistan is a predominantly traditional society where a more unpretentious version would have been more appropriate and sustainable.” Fange argued that the loya jirga system of local gatherings, which would appoint representatives for decision-making, would probably have been better than the general elections. However, this argument does not take into account the fact that traditional mechanisms, which were only partially representative, have been vitiated by years of war,
with community leaders being sidelined or subverted by the ongoing conflict and the emergence of money and muscle power.
This reading also does not even recognise that the current form of democracy in Afghanistan does not resemble any Western-style democracy, nor even any democracy in Southasia. As things stand, the Afghan system forbids participation by political parties, while its combination of system of single, non-transferable votes, along with its multi-seat constituencies, is designed to ensure political fragmentation and non-representational politics. The rights enshrined in the Constitution, the laws as well as the criminal and civil codes are not yet understood by the majority of those implementing them. In these circumstances, the contention that Afghanistan has had too much, rather than too little, democracy seems designed to allow Western |countries to look the other way while a beleaguered government in Kabul compromises on hard-won human rights and civil liberties.
On the next train out
If evidence were needed of the West’s short-term focus with an eye firmly on the door, it is clear in the stated goals of the ‘civilian surge’ made public by the recent US strategy paper, in which Washington states that it intends to pour aid into provinces where its troops are based, as well as use civilians as “force multipliers”. Both of these intentions run contrary to the best principles of aid delivery and humanitarian assistance, which must be independent, neutral and driven by needs, as underscored by the UN’s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) for Afghanistan for 2010, launched in November 2009. According to Robert Watkins, the UN’s resident humanitarian coordinator in Afghanistan, the plan had received only two percent of promised funding by mid-February. The HAP map, which identifies the needs according to area, clearly shows that the provinces most in need of humanitarian assistance are not the ones being identified by the international community for aid.
NGOs working in the field have also repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of the militarisation of aid. Past experiences have shown that the use of military resources for delivering aid and humanitarian assistance, as well as the use of civilians to further military objectives, has endangered the role of real humanitarian personnel, in addition to developing non-sustainable projects. Those focused on short-term benefits, including perceived short-term gains such as the militaristic efforts at winning hearts and minds, have ignored this plea. In fact, the trend towards short-term spending with an emphasis on the pursuit of military and political objectives is likely to deepen.
Meanwhile, the UN, which has a coordinating role in Afghanistan, has been unable to exercise its muscle. Indeed, it remains in a state of unprecedented crisis following the unseemly wrangling over the August 2009 presidential elections. While the spectacular falling-out between the UN’s top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and his deputy, Peter Galbraith, ended with the acrimonious departure of the latter, the fissures have helped those not keen on a strong UN role. The UN’s freefall during the elections has, however, only attenuated a crisis caused by confusion over its broader role and functions. Its political mandate, which includes supporting the Afghan state-building project, has mired the organisation’s country team in the political chaos, eroding its ability to play a neutral role in the intensifying conflict.
This crisis goes far beyond the remit of the country team, however. A stronger UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) depends partially on the skills of the UN leadership within Afghanistan, but even more so on the ability of the UN leadership in New York to give its mission some teeth. That has been singularly lacking. In his hunt to find a successor to the beleaguered Eide, who is expected to leave at the end of February, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could do no better than appoint an official, the Swedish diplomat Stephen De Mistura, who first turned down the job. Clearly the last thing the UN team in Afghanistan needed for its morale was a reluctant envoy to lead them.
The UN’s role is likely to be further circumscribed in the near future. Presenting the HAP, the UN has admitted that increasing insecurity has meant that there would be greater dependence on NGOs and other non-UN actors to deliver humanitarian assistance. Decreasing access and diminished authority, following the chaos of the August elections in which the UN was in a supporting role, has compromised its ability to play the role of politically neutral referee – and the Afghan government has taken advantage of this. On 17 February, President Hamid Karzai signed off on an ordinance that rescinded the UN’s right to appoint independent members to the Electoral Complaints Commission, the only body that successfully challenged the electoral fraud in the August elections (see Himal December 2009, “Is it over?”).
The UN is in a catch-22 situation. While a strong envoy might help to re-energise the organisation’s mission in Afghanistan, it would almost certainly be rejected by the Karzai government. Following the worst attack on the UN, on its guest house in Kabul city in October, in which five staffers and lost their lives, the organisation withdrew (temporarily, it said) over 600 staffers. Asked about the impact of this withdrawal, President Karzai has said that it would have “no impact”, adding “they may or may not return. Afghanistan won’t notice it. We wish them well wherever they are.”
Increasing hostility between President Karzai and the international community has turned him from an international favourite into a barely tolerated partner. Having created and backed a system in which all power is centralised in the presidency, the international community is at a loss now that President Karzai is no longer amenable to their suggestions. Under the circumstances, instead of creating institutions and processes that could balance the sharing of power and decentralise administrative authority, there is a danger that the international community, especially the US, might be headed for more quick-fix solutions. Indeed, written into its stabilisation strategy are proposals for the direct finding of select governors and ministries. While this could well help to bypass a recalcitrant President Karzai, it will end up creating parallel structures of governance and multiple sources of concentrated power, thus further deepening the reigning culture of poor accountability. These individuals, paid directly by the donors, are likely to be answerable to the main funders and not to Kabul, further weakening any effort to build institutions. Yet for those looking for a quick exit, that could prove to be the answer rather than the problem.
LOYAL POLITICAL OPPOSITION FEELING LEFT OUT IN THE COLD
Eurasianet, February 18, 2010
Violence in Afghanistan pays and offering the criticism of loyal opposition does not. So thinks Abdullah Abdullah, the losing presidential candidate in Afghanistan’s 2009 election. In an interview with EurasiaNet in Kabul, Abdullah derided Afghan government plans to contain the Taliban insurgency, complaining that new policies could end up undermining democratization and increasing the chances of renewed inter-ethnic strife.
Abdullah -- who has maintained a low profile since losing to President Hamid Karzai in 2009’s fraud-marred presidential vote -- was in Kabul recently to launch a movement that will press for a wide array of reforms, including the establishment of a genuinely independent election commission and the promotion of broader representation of ethnic minorities in government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Abdullah asserted that the legitimate demands of those who had chosen to oppose Karzai administration policies by using non-violent, democratic means are now being ignored. To compound the indignity, the international community does not appear interested in addressing this issue, he added.
"There are groups like the Taliban that have opted for violence. [What about] those who don’t want to use violence as a means of [securing] their rights? What are their choices?" Abdullah asked. "If the international community watches that and doesn’t do things that are needed, then what is left?"
"There are a few thousand people [insurgents] who are fighting, but there are millions of people in this country who have many other priorities and demands," Abdullah continued. "One of those demands for example is for an independent election commission. This government ? [is] talking about bribing the Taliban and bringing them back. So you see this imbalance and the international community is also witness to this imbalance."
The reconciliation strategy developed by the international community and Afghan government is severely flawed, Abdullah contended. Any reconciliation has to be localized, he said, adding that ideas about "a broader reconciliation" were "an illusion." Ideologically, Taliban leaders are "not there to be part of the democratic system, but to destroy it, and bring it down and replace it." He questioned why the international community appeared to lack an institutional memory about the Taliban’s behavior in power during the 1990s. "They have to explain it" he said.
As for the tactic of offering payments to rank-and-file insurgents to lay down their arms and renounce violence, Abdullah is skeptical that it can work. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
He hinted that such payments might do more to destabilize society than they would to curb violence.
"Buying the Taliban [is] really, really dangerous and can lead to insecurity" he said. The so-called reintegration payments could have the unintended consequence of creating "a new marketplace." In such an environment, people would have an incentive to find guns and go into the mountains in order to claim reintegration money, he said. Abdullah also wondered if Afghanistan’s infamously corrupt bureaucracy had the capacity to properly administer a reintegration program.
During the Taliban’s time in power in Kabul, Abdullah was a leader of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, which provided the main armed opposition to the imposition of the radical Islamic movement’s social agenda
Currrently, non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan are being marginalized, Abdullah asserted. He pointed to the fact that key cabinet and administrative positions are being filled by a disproportionately high number of Pashtuns. "This is too much for the country. The rest of the people are being ignored," Abdullah said. He stressed that he was not trying to speak on behalf of any single ethnic group, but was merely trying to act as an advocate for greater inclusiveness in the political process.
Abdullah claimed that leaders of armed insurgent groups, such as the notorious Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had successfully used violence to gain bargaining leverage. Kabul is now swirling with rumors that negotiations are underway to bring Hekmatyar into the government. If that happens, it would only enhance the Pashtun domination of the levers of power, Abdullah asserted.
These days, Abdullah commands an influential following within the country’s parliament. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the legislature has obstructed Karzai’s efforts to appoint his cabinet. Many appointees are still awaiting confirmation, and Abdullah admitted that a group of 50 or so MPs (out of the parliament’s 249 overall members) who are fiercely loyal to him had played a key roll in blocking the president’s strategy.
"We decided what to do and got what we wanted - more or less," Abdullah explained. "Our decision was not to vote for the cabinet. We knew we don’t have an overall majority, but it (our decision) was important in the rejection of 70 percent of the ministers."
Until recently, Abdullah had been reluctant to try to form his own political party. But now he is touting a group of parties and interest groups that calls itself the "Coalition for Change and Hope." He said the coalition, which has formed a secretariat, would contest the next parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2010.
On February 17, Karzai signed a decree to remove the international presence from the Electoral Complaints Commission, an institution that blew the whistle on some egregious examples of fraud during the 2009 presidential vote. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Abdullah maintained that unless better, more expansive restraints were placed on incumbent authorities, electoral fraud would become an institutionalized practice. "I will still encourage them [members of the Coalition for Change and Hope] to participate [in the parliamentary elections] because this is the only process that I believe in, the democratic process, but I hope that we will get it right," he said.
Violence in Afghanistan pays and offering the criticism of loyal opposition does not. So thinks Abdullah Abdullah, the losing presidential candidate in Afghanistan’s 2009 election. In an interview with EurasiaNet in Kabul, Abdullah derided Afghan government plans to contain the Taliban insurgency, complaining that new policies could end up undermining democratization and increasing the chances of renewed inter-ethnic strife.
Abdullah -- who has maintained a low profile since losing to President Hamid Karzai in 2009’s fraud-marred presidential vote -- was in Kabul recently to launch a movement that will press for a wide array of reforms, including the establishment of a genuinely independent election commission and the promotion of broader representation of ethnic minorities in government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Abdullah asserted that the legitimate demands of those who had chosen to oppose Karzai administration policies by using non-violent, democratic means are now being ignored. To compound the indignity, the international community does not appear interested in addressing this issue, he added.
"There are groups like the Taliban that have opted for violence. [What about] those who don’t want to use violence as a means of [securing] their rights? What are their choices?" Abdullah asked. "If the international community watches that and doesn’t do things that are needed, then what is left?"
"There are a few thousand people [insurgents] who are fighting, but there are millions of people in this country who have many other priorities and demands," Abdullah continued. "One of those demands for example is for an independent election commission. This government ? [is] talking about bribing the Taliban and bringing them back. So you see this imbalance and the international community is also witness to this imbalance."
The reconciliation strategy developed by the international community and Afghan government is severely flawed, Abdullah contended. Any reconciliation has to be localized, he said, adding that ideas about "a broader reconciliation" were "an illusion." Ideologically, Taliban leaders are "not there to be part of the democratic system, but to destroy it, and bring it down and replace it." He questioned why the international community appeared to lack an institutional memory about the Taliban’s behavior in power during the 1990s. "They have to explain it" he said.
As for the tactic of offering payments to rank-and-file insurgents to lay down their arms and renounce violence, Abdullah is skeptical that it can work. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
He hinted that such payments might do more to destabilize society than they would to curb violence.
"Buying the Taliban [is] really, really dangerous and can lead to insecurity" he said. The so-called reintegration payments could have the unintended consequence of creating "a new marketplace." In such an environment, people would have an incentive to find guns and go into the mountains in order to claim reintegration money, he said. Abdullah also wondered if Afghanistan’s infamously corrupt bureaucracy had the capacity to properly administer a reintegration program.
During the Taliban’s time in power in Kabul, Abdullah was a leader of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, which provided the main armed opposition to the imposition of the radical Islamic movement’s social agenda
Currrently, non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan are being marginalized, Abdullah asserted. He pointed to the fact that key cabinet and administrative positions are being filled by a disproportionately high number of Pashtuns. "This is too much for the country. The rest of the people are being ignored," Abdullah said. He stressed that he was not trying to speak on behalf of any single ethnic group, but was merely trying to act as an advocate for greater inclusiveness in the political process.
Abdullah claimed that leaders of armed insurgent groups, such as the notorious Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had successfully used violence to gain bargaining leverage. Kabul is now swirling with rumors that negotiations are underway to bring Hekmatyar into the government. If that happens, it would only enhance the Pashtun domination of the levers of power, Abdullah asserted.
These days, Abdullah commands an influential following within the country’s parliament. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the legislature has obstructed Karzai’s efforts to appoint his cabinet. Many appointees are still awaiting confirmation, and Abdullah admitted that a group of 50 or so MPs (out of the parliament’s 249 overall members) who are fiercely loyal to him had played a key roll in blocking the president’s strategy.
"We decided what to do and got what we wanted - more or less," Abdullah explained. "Our decision was not to vote for the cabinet. We knew we don’t have an overall majority, but it (our decision) was important in the rejection of 70 percent of the ministers."
Until recently, Abdullah had been reluctant to try to form his own political party. But now he is touting a group of parties and interest groups that calls itself the "Coalition for Change and Hope." He said the coalition, which has formed a secretariat, would contest the next parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2010.
On February 17, Karzai signed a decree to remove the international presence from the Electoral Complaints Commission, an institution that blew the whistle on some egregious examples of fraud during the 2009 presidential vote. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Abdullah maintained that unless better, more expansive restraints were placed on incumbent authorities, electoral fraud would become an institutionalized practice. "I will still encourage them [members of the Coalition for Change and Hope] to participate [in the parliamentary elections] because this is the only process that I believe in, the democratic process, but I hope that we will get it right," he said.
Civilian Deaths Mar Start of Offensive in Afghanistan
Sphere, AOL, February 14, 2010
The spectacular ground assault by 15,000 international and Afghan troops in southern Helmand province enters its third day amid early challenges and growing concern among Afghans about the offensive's goals and the chances of achieving them.
Operation Moshtarak (which means "together" in the Dari language) claimed its first civilian casualties on Sunday when two rockets fired at insurgents by NATO troops missed their target and killed 12 people.
International troops have come under intense fire in the town of Marjah, the offensive's prime objective, and are encountering Taliban mines, improvised explosive devices and boobytraps there and in the nearby center of Nad Ali.
The civilian casualties included 10 members from one family, Afghan President Hamid Karzai's office said. Karzai had urged international forces before the operation began to "exercise absolute caution to avoid harming civilians" and "to continue to consult the local people, fully coordinate their actions and to avoid using air power in areas where civilians can be at risk."
The top commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has made reducing civilian casualties a priority, apologized to Karzai for the incident and suspended use of the rockets responsible.
Former Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, who was Karzai's rival in August's presidential elections, described the assault in Helmand as "necessary" and "the right part of the strategy."
"Without changing the momentum and turning the tide against the Taliban militarily, one can only expect worsening of the situation," he told AOL News. But Abdullah added that the operation's success depends on the follow-up.
"It is for the Afghan government to win the trust of the people so that people are not afraid that the Taliban will come back; so that they are not faced with Afghan officials who are worse than the Taliban," Abdullah said. "Re-grouping (of the Taliban) does not happen automatically but with bad governance and injustices it might happen."
Drawing on his own experience in fighting a guerrilla war -- Abdullah was closely associated with the Northern Alliance -- he said insurgents need sanctuaries where they can rest and get medical care. In this case, Abdullah said, those hideouts are in Pakistan -- and they need to be tackled.
But the first objective is to win the hearts and minds of Afghanis, and McChrystal is hardly alone in noting that avoiding civilian deaths is key to that process. Haroun Mir, director of Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), called that "a challenge" for the international forces.
Orzala Ashraf, an activist who has been working on women's rights and human rights issues in Afghanistan for more than a decade, warned "if there is the death of even one child inside Helmand, they will be responsible for that death."
Ashraf also questioned the strategic value of the operation, suggesting that the Taliban would merely melt away into the surrounding areas.
"Are these districts up in the air without any connection to the neighboring areas? Are the Taliban surrendering? They will be killed or they will escape and they will continue to fight," Ashraf said. She also predicted the Taliban would retaliate by striking elsewhere as they had done in the past.
There has been skepticism across the board about the Karzai government's ability to establish control over the region after the military phase of Operation Moshtarak ends.
"In the aftermath, will the Afghan government be able to provide services? Or will there be corrupt officials who carry out vendettas instead of providing justice? Will President Karzai act differently this time? We don't know," said Mir, who felt the operation could either become an example of success or a "failed case."
The cost of the failure would be high indeed. The ratio of international and Afghan forces to the Taliban -- 15,000 troops compared to an estimated 1,000 Taliban fighters -- has not gone unnoticed in the Afghan public.
"This is a show," said Ashraf, expressing an opinion that is shared by others in Afghan politics who did not want to be quoted. Some feel the military surge is geared more toward the domestic audience in the U.S. and Britain than to the realities Afghans face.
The sheer extent of the operation, and the imbalance of forces on the two sides, raises the stakes on failure, Ashraf points out. An unraveling of military gains in the two small districts now being contested would give a huge boost to the Taliban. More significantly, it would shift public perceptions, giving Afghans the idea that the Taliban can win even in the face of overwhelming odds. That makes Operation Moshtarak a must-win engagement for the joint Afghan and international forces.
The spectacular ground assault by 15,000 international and Afghan troops in southern Helmand province enters its third day amid early challenges and growing concern among Afghans about the offensive's goals and the chances of achieving them.
Operation Moshtarak (which means "together" in the Dari language) claimed its first civilian casualties on Sunday when two rockets fired at insurgents by NATO troops missed their target and killed 12 people.
International troops have come under intense fire in the town of Marjah, the offensive's prime objective, and are encountering Taliban mines, improvised explosive devices and boobytraps there and in the nearby center of Nad Ali.
The civilian casualties included 10 members from one family, Afghan President Hamid Karzai's office said. Karzai had urged international forces before the operation began to "exercise absolute caution to avoid harming civilians" and "to continue to consult the local people, fully coordinate their actions and to avoid using air power in areas where civilians can be at risk."
The top commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has made reducing civilian casualties a priority, apologized to Karzai for the incident and suspended use of the rockets responsible.
Former Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, who was Karzai's rival in August's presidential elections, described the assault in Helmand as "necessary" and "the right part of the strategy."
"Without changing the momentum and turning the tide against the Taliban militarily, one can only expect worsening of the situation," he told AOL News. But Abdullah added that the operation's success depends on the follow-up.
"It is for the Afghan government to win the trust of the people so that people are not afraid that the Taliban will come back; so that they are not faced with Afghan officials who are worse than the Taliban," Abdullah said. "Re-grouping (of the Taliban) does not happen automatically but with bad governance and injustices it might happen."
Drawing on his own experience in fighting a guerrilla war -- Abdullah was closely associated with the Northern Alliance -- he said insurgents need sanctuaries where they can rest and get medical care. In this case, Abdullah said, those hideouts are in Pakistan -- and they need to be tackled.
But the first objective is to win the hearts and minds of Afghanis, and McChrystal is hardly alone in noting that avoiding civilian deaths is key to that process. Haroun Mir, director of Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), called that "a challenge" for the international forces.
Orzala Ashraf, an activist who has been working on women's rights and human rights issues in Afghanistan for more than a decade, warned "if there is the death of even one child inside Helmand, they will be responsible for that death."
Ashraf also questioned the strategic value of the operation, suggesting that the Taliban would merely melt away into the surrounding areas.
"Are these districts up in the air without any connection to the neighboring areas? Are the Taliban surrendering? They will be killed or they will escape and they will continue to fight," Ashraf said. She also predicted the Taliban would retaliate by striking elsewhere as they had done in the past.
There has been skepticism across the board about the Karzai government's ability to establish control over the region after the military phase of Operation Moshtarak ends.
"In the aftermath, will the Afghan government be able to provide services? Or will there be corrupt officials who carry out vendettas instead of providing justice? Will President Karzai act differently this time? We don't know," said Mir, who felt the operation could either become an example of success or a "failed case."
The cost of the failure would be high indeed. The ratio of international and Afghan forces to the Taliban -- 15,000 troops compared to an estimated 1,000 Taliban fighters -- has not gone unnoticed in the Afghan public.
"This is a show," said Ashraf, expressing an opinion that is shared by others in Afghan politics who did not want to be quoted. Some feel the military surge is geared more toward the domestic audience in the U.S. and Britain than to the realities Afghans face.
The sheer extent of the operation, and the imbalance of forces on the two sides, raises the stakes on failure, Ashraf points out. An unraveling of military gains in the two small districts now being contested would give a huge boost to the Taliban. More significantly, it would shift public perceptions, giving Afghans the idea that the Taliban can win even in the face of overwhelming odds. That makes Operation Moshtarak a must-win engagement for the joint Afghan and international forces.
DECODING REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION
Eurasianet, February 9, 2010
"Reintegration" and "reconciliation" are two buzzwords that are driving stabilization efforts in Afghanistan these days. But the terms mean different things to different stakeholders in the process.
"Reintegration" denotes the laying down of arms by rank-and-file Taliban militants in exchange for guarantees of safety, immunity and employment. It rests on the rationale that many Taliban grunts are motivated not by ideological or theological factors, but are instead driven to fight by economic necessity, i.e. poverty. According to Mohammed Masoom Stanakzai, an Afghan presidential advisor and vice chairman of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, the reintegration process must address three issues: guaranteeing the security of those Taliban elements who lay down their arms; providing them with economic livelihoods; and ensuring they do not rejoin the insurgency.
"Reconciliation," meanwhile, refers to plans to hold talks with insurgent leaders - or elements driven by ideological motives -- with the aim of trying to reach a political settlement that could put an end to the fighting.
Newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool (formerly the national security adviser) claimed on February 1 that the international community had, for the first time, backed Kabul’s vision, which includes both political reconciliation and reintegration components.
But some observers suggest Rasool may have been jumping the gun with his assessment. It is true that the reintegration concept enjoys broad international support, but the same cannot be said for President Hamid Karzai’s notion of reconciliation, which he sketched at a January international conference in London. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012910.shtml
Despite general agreement on the need for some sort of political reconciliation at some point, there is still no consensus on many aspects of a process to find a political settlement. At a security meeting in Munich on February 7, Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the United State would not speak directly with Taliban representatives at this time, but he did not dismiss the Afghan government’s efforts to reach out to militant leaders who have no affiliation with the al Qaeda terrorist organization.
Western leaders have referred frequently to the need for an "Afghan-led" reconciliation process. But their calls have concealed an inability to agree on the process’ basic parameters. For several years, Karzai has issued calls to all insurgents and their leaders to "return home," naming specifically Mullah Mohammed Omar. Yet the Taliban supremo remains outside the pale of potential negotiating partners for the US government.
The diverging views of the US and Afghan governments were on display at the London conference. There, Karzai was touting his plan to create a "National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration." Western leaders, meanwhile, pledged $140 million to an Afghan-led "Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund" that conspicuously avoided initiatives aimed at promoting reconciliation.
Even the reintegration initiative is fragmented. The United States, for example, insists on forming its own parallel Taliban-reintegration fund to be administered by the Defense Department, via American commanders in the field. This program, dubbed the Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund, could potentially complicate Afghan reintegration efforts, especially through duplication of effort.
At his February 1 news conference, Rasool tried to play down tactical differences between the Afghan government and the international community. He maintained that the peace process could unfold in two stages: reintegration could be pursued vigorously, while the second step, the process of talking to the Taliban leadership, could proceed cautiously, in close consultation with the international community.
A central element of Karzai’s reconciliation plan is the convening of a grand peace jirga, or tribal council. Such a concept appears to be flawed, however, in that it assumes that the Taliban movement has a well-developed, top-down command & control structure in place. Scholars and political analysts doubt that the Taliban is so unified. It is a broad movement incorporating bands of militants with disparate agendas, they add. The de-centralized nature of the Taliban leadership makes it difficult to engage the movement, as any representatives that attend discussions would have difficulty making the claim that they speak for all militant elements.
Beyond the engagement question, the Afghan government must address some significant structural issues before the stabilization process can expect to bear fruit. Among the big-picture notions that Afghan leaders must clarify are; what values will define a post-war Afghan state?
Afghan women’s rights advocates in particular are worried about the possible implications of reconciliation efforts. Many believe that the Karzai administration would be willing to curtail women’s rights in order to placate ultra-traditionalist Taliban leaders. To alleviate this concern, any debate about the Afghan government’s potential negotiating partners should be accompanied by discussion about what kind of government might reconciliation efforts produce.
"Reintegration" and "reconciliation" are two buzzwords that are driving stabilization efforts in Afghanistan these days. But the terms mean different things to different stakeholders in the process.
"Reintegration" denotes the laying down of arms by rank-and-file Taliban militants in exchange for guarantees of safety, immunity and employment. It rests on the rationale that many Taliban grunts are motivated not by ideological or theological factors, but are instead driven to fight by economic necessity, i.e. poverty. According to Mohammed Masoom Stanakzai, an Afghan presidential advisor and vice chairman of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, the reintegration process must address three issues: guaranteeing the security of those Taliban elements who lay down their arms; providing them with economic livelihoods; and ensuring they do not rejoin the insurgency.
"Reconciliation," meanwhile, refers to plans to hold talks with insurgent leaders - or elements driven by ideological motives -- with the aim of trying to reach a political settlement that could put an end to the fighting.
Newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool (formerly the national security adviser) claimed on February 1 that the international community had, for the first time, backed Kabul’s vision, which includes both political reconciliation and reintegration components.
But some observers suggest Rasool may have been jumping the gun with his assessment. It is true that the reintegration concept enjoys broad international support, but the same cannot be said for President Hamid Karzai’s notion of reconciliation, which he sketched at a January international conference in London. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012910.shtml
Despite general agreement on the need for some sort of political reconciliation at some point, there is still no consensus on many aspects of a process to find a political settlement. At a security meeting in Munich on February 7, Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the United State would not speak directly with Taliban representatives at this time, but he did not dismiss the Afghan government’s efforts to reach out to militant leaders who have no affiliation with the al Qaeda terrorist organization.
Western leaders have referred frequently to the need for an "Afghan-led" reconciliation process. But their calls have concealed an inability to agree on the process’ basic parameters. For several years, Karzai has issued calls to all insurgents and their leaders to "return home," naming specifically Mullah Mohammed Omar. Yet the Taliban supremo remains outside the pale of potential negotiating partners for the US government.
The diverging views of the US and Afghan governments were on display at the London conference. There, Karzai was touting his plan to create a "National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration." Western leaders, meanwhile, pledged $140 million to an Afghan-led "Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund" that conspicuously avoided initiatives aimed at promoting reconciliation.
Even the reintegration initiative is fragmented. The United States, for example, insists on forming its own parallel Taliban-reintegration fund to be administered by the Defense Department, via American commanders in the field. This program, dubbed the Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund, could potentially complicate Afghan reintegration efforts, especially through duplication of effort.
At his February 1 news conference, Rasool tried to play down tactical differences between the Afghan government and the international community. He maintained that the peace process could unfold in two stages: reintegration could be pursued vigorously, while the second step, the process of talking to the Taliban leadership, could proceed cautiously, in close consultation with the international community.
A central element of Karzai’s reconciliation plan is the convening of a grand peace jirga, or tribal council. Such a concept appears to be flawed, however, in that it assumes that the Taliban movement has a well-developed, top-down command & control structure in place. Scholars and political analysts doubt that the Taliban is so unified. It is a broad movement incorporating bands of militants with disparate agendas, they add. The de-centralized nature of the Taliban leadership makes it difficult to engage the movement, as any representatives that attend discussions would have difficulty making the claim that they speak for all militant elements.
Beyond the engagement question, the Afghan government must address some significant structural issues before the stabilization process can expect to bear fruit. Among the big-picture notions that Afghan leaders must clarify are; what values will define a post-war Afghan state?
Afghan women’s rights advocates in particular are worried about the possible implications of reconciliation efforts. Many believe that the Karzai administration would be willing to curtail women’s rights in order to placate ultra-traditionalist Taliban leaders. To alleviate this concern, any debate about the Afghan government’s potential negotiating partners should be accompanied by discussion about what kind of government might reconciliation efforts produce.
DECODING REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION
Eurasianet, February 9, 2010
"Reintegration" and "reconciliation" are two buzzwords that are driving stabilization efforts in Afghanistan these days. But the terms mean different things to different stakeholders in the process.
"Reintegration" denotes the laying down of arms by rank-and-file Taliban militants in exchange for guarantees of safety, immunity and employment. It rests on the rationale that many Taliban grunts are motivated not by ideological or theological factors, but are instead driven to fight by economic necessity, i.e. poverty. According to Mohammed Masoom Stanakzai, an Afghan presidential advisor and vice chairman of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, the reintegration process must address three issues: guaranteeing the security of those Taliban elements who lay down their arms; providing them with economic livelihoods; and ensuring they do not rejoin the insurgency.
"Reconciliation," meanwhile, refers to plans to hold talks with insurgent leaders - or elements driven by ideological motives -- with the aim of trying to reach a political settlement that could put an end to the fighting.
Newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool (formerly the national security adviser) claimed on February 1 that the international community had, for the first time, backed Kabul’s vision, which includes both political reconciliation and reintegration components.
But some observers suggest Rasool may have been jumping the gun with his assessment. It is true that the reintegration concept enjoys broad international support, but the same cannot be said for President Hamid Karzai’s notion of reconciliation, which he sketched at a January international conference in London. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012910.shtml
Despite general agreement on the need for some sort of political reconciliation at some point, there is still no consensus on many aspects of a process to find a political settlement. At a security meeting in Munich on February 7, Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the United State would not speak directly with Taliban representatives at this time, but he did not dismiss the Afghan government’s efforts to reach out to militant leaders who have no affiliation with the al Qaeda terrorist organization.
Western leaders have referred frequently to the need for an "Afghan-led" reconciliation process. But their calls have concealed an inability to agree on the process’ basic parameters. For several years, Karzai has issued calls to all insurgents and their leaders to "return home," naming specifically Mullah Mohammed Omar. Yet the Taliban supremo remains outside the pale of potential negotiating partners for the US government.
The diverging views of the US and Afghan governments were on display at the London conference. There, Karzai was touting his plan to create a "National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration." Western leaders, meanwhile, pledged $140 million to an Afghan-led "Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund" that conspicuously avoided initiatives aimed at promoting reconciliation.
Even the reintegration initiative is fragmented. The United States, for example, insists on forming its own parallel Taliban-reintegration fund to be administered by the Defense Department, via American commanders in the field. This program, dubbed the Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund, could potentially complicate Afghan reintegration efforts, especially through duplication of effort.
At his February 1 news conference, Rasool tried to play down tactical differences between the Afghan government and the international community. He maintained that the peace process could unfold in two stages: reintegration could be pursued vigorously, while the second step, the process of talking to the Taliban leadership, could proceed cautiously, in close consultation with the international community.
A central element of Karzai’s reconciliation plan is the convening of a grand peace jirga, or tribal council. Such a concept appears to be flawed, however, in that it assumes that the Taliban movement has a well-developed, top-down command & control structure in place. Scholars and political analysts doubt that the Taliban is so unified. It is a broad movement incorporating bands of militants with disparate agendas, they add. The de-centralized nature of the Taliban leadership makes it difficult to engage the movement, as any representatives that attend discussions would have difficulty making the claim that they speak for all militant elements.
Beyond the engagement question, the Afghan government must address some significant structural issues before the stabilization process can expect to bear fruit. Among the big-picture notions that Afghan leaders must clarify are; what values will define a post-war Afghan state?
Afghan women’s rights advocates in particular are worried about the possible implications of reconciliation efforts. Many believe that the Karzai administration would be willing to curtail women’s rights in order to placate ultra-traditionalist Taliban leaders. To alleviate this concern, any debate about the Afghan government’s potential negotiating partners should be accompanied by discussion about what kind of government might reconciliation efforts produce.
"Reintegration" and "reconciliation" are two buzzwords that are driving stabilization efforts in Afghanistan these days. But the terms mean different things to different stakeholders in the process.
"Reintegration" denotes the laying down of arms by rank-and-file Taliban militants in exchange for guarantees of safety, immunity and employment. It rests on the rationale that many Taliban grunts are motivated not by ideological or theological factors, but are instead driven to fight by economic necessity, i.e. poverty. According to Mohammed Masoom Stanakzai, an Afghan presidential advisor and vice chairman of the Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, the reintegration process must address three issues: guaranteeing the security of those Taliban elements who lay down their arms; providing them with economic livelihoods; and ensuring they do not rejoin the insurgency.
"Reconciliation," meanwhile, refers to plans to hold talks with insurgent leaders - or elements driven by ideological motives -- with the aim of trying to reach a political settlement that could put an end to the fighting.
Newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasool (formerly the national security adviser) claimed on February 1 that the international community had, for the first time, backed Kabul’s vision, which includes both political reconciliation and reintegration components.
But some observers suggest Rasool may have been jumping the gun with his assessment. It is true that the reintegration concept enjoys broad international support, but the same cannot be said for President Hamid Karzai’s notion of reconciliation, which he sketched at a January international conference in London. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012910.shtml
Despite general agreement on the need for some sort of political reconciliation at some point, there is still no consensus on many aspects of a process to find a political settlement. At a security meeting in Munich on February 7, Richard Holbrooke, the Obama Administration’s special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the United State would not speak directly with Taliban representatives at this time, but he did not dismiss the Afghan government’s efforts to reach out to militant leaders who have no affiliation with the al Qaeda terrorist organization.
Western leaders have referred frequently to the need for an "Afghan-led" reconciliation process. But their calls have concealed an inability to agree on the process’ basic parameters. For several years, Karzai has issued calls to all insurgents and their leaders to "return home," naming specifically Mullah Mohammed Omar. Yet the Taliban supremo remains outside the pale of potential negotiating partners for the US government.
The diverging views of the US and Afghan governments were on display at the London conference. There, Karzai was touting his plan to create a "National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Reintegration." Western leaders, meanwhile, pledged $140 million to an Afghan-led "Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund" that conspicuously avoided initiatives aimed at promoting reconciliation.
Even the reintegration initiative is fragmented. The United States, for example, insists on forming its own parallel Taliban-reintegration fund to be administered by the Defense Department, via American commanders in the field. This program, dubbed the Commanders’ Emergency Response Fund, could potentially complicate Afghan reintegration efforts, especially through duplication of effort.
At his February 1 news conference, Rasool tried to play down tactical differences between the Afghan government and the international community. He maintained that the peace process could unfold in two stages: reintegration could be pursued vigorously, while the second step, the process of talking to the Taliban leadership, could proceed cautiously, in close consultation with the international community.
A central element of Karzai’s reconciliation plan is the convening of a grand peace jirga, or tribal council. Such a concept appears to be flawed, however, in that it assumes that the Taliban movement has a well-developed, top-down command & control structure in place. Scholars and political analysts doubt that the Taliban is so unified. It is a broad movement incorporating bands of militants with disparate agendas, they add. The de-centralized nature of the Taliban leadership makes it difficult to engage the movement, as any representatives that attend discussions would have difficulty making the claim that they speak for all militant elements.
Beyond the engagement question, the Afghan government must address some significant structural issues before the stabilization process can expect to bear fruit. Among the big-picture notions that Afghan leaders must clarify are; what values will define a post-war Afghan state?
Afghan women’s rights advocates in particular are worried about the possible implications of reconciliation efforts. Many believe that the Karzai administration would be willing to curtail women’s rights in order to placate ultra-traditionalist Taliban leaders. To alleviate this concern, any debate about the Afghan government’s potential negotiating partners should be accompanied by discussion about what kind of government might reconciliation efforts produce.
Exit west, enter chaos
Times of India Crest Edition, February 6, 2010
Kabul will once again be the backdrop of an intense power struggle. The West wants a power-sharing deal between the Taliban and Karzai, but Karzai doesn’t really stand a chance When Nadir returned to his homeland from the West, following the collapse of the Taliban, one of his first ventures was a restaurant at one of the most popular picnic spots frequented by Afghans. Sitting there and sipping tea, overlooking the waters of the placid lake, it was easy for him to believe that his dream of peace and, perhaps , prosperity was possible. Well, that dream died several years ago.
The restaurant had to be abandoned , not because of the worsening conflict or the resurgent Taliban, but because of the threat from a local commander (who still calls the shots in the area; Nadir's name has been changed to ensure his safety).
While 'strategic imperatives' and the 'war against terror' occupy much of the space in the mental map of Afghanistan that observers outside the country carry around with them, for Afghan citizens the daily diet of violence comes in myriad forms.
Large pockets of southern Afghanistan face the brunt of the intensifying conflict between the progovernment forces and the anti-government armed groups.
In many other areas, the threat emanates from the local commander, the predatory muscleman or the rapacious leader. It also comes from a police force and an army, both of which are under-trained , underpaid and lack effective command and control structures . Terror comes as well from international troops trying to flush out the insurgents through aerial bombing . Remarkably, too, the unraveling of social, political and economic structures has vitiated the lives of Afghan citizens.
Though suicide bombings and mountain warfare encapsulate the most common public images of the country, detailed surveys of Afghans reveal a contrary picture. In an Asia Foundation survey last year, 17 per cent said they had directly experienced some form of violence in the previous year. Of this group, only 9 per cent said they had experienced violence from Taliban.
Worryingly, an equal proportion said they had experienced violence from the international military forces, while another 7 per cent attributed the violence to actions of the national police and the national army.
An overwhelming proportion said they were victims of crime and lawlessness . The survey, it must be underlined , does not record actual occurrences , but the perceptions of Afghans.
An overwhelming focus on 'stability' in the past eight years has led to the neglect of the needs of Afghanistan's extraordinary citizens as predatory individuals were put back in power for quick fix solutions, and pernicious practices tolerated in the name of strategy.
Now, it appears likely that the desire of influential western troop-contributing countries to make a hasty exit will result in sacrifices of hardwon rights, civil liberties and democratic practices.
'Reintegration and Reconciliation' and 'Afghanisation' are the new buzz - words, most recently bandied about in the London Conference, where western nations laid out their plans to begin handover of security operations to Afghan forces.
Despite paeans to the Constitution of Afghanistan, civil society groups fear that even the minimal rights to life, liberty, equality and safety for all sections of the population that have been won at great cost, remain extremely vulnerable and may be the first point of compromise.
The signs are already there. The initial signals include rearming of communities to ensure quick and cheap 'security' - even though it was the population's hatred for armed militias that had earlier led the way to the rise of the Taliban; increasing rhetoric about the suitability of 'Democracy' for the Afghan temperament, even though Afghans have had their own brand of participatory decision making for thousands of years; and a focus on supporting 'traditional justice systems' , which, women fear, will revert them to customary law practices that are biased against them. The constitution, the government and the parliament have proven themselves inadequate defences against a growing trend of conservatism that is dovetailing smoothly into an ideology of political compromise that might save the face of the West as they look for an exit.
You only have to ask the brave Afghan women who took to the streets to protest against a Shia personal law introduced by the government that necessitated submission to the husband in bed and permission for leaving the house. Or, the young student and journalist, Pervez Kambakhsh, who now lives in asylum - after he was sentenced to death (the sentence was commuted to 20 years and he was finally pardoned by the President) for downloading an article on the role of women in Islam. Or the women who ran away from violent abusive marriages only to find themselves in the Pule Charkhi prison outside Kabul for having violated social custom.
Most countries have taken decades to develop and strengthen jurisprudence that reflects basic human rights and values. But Afghanistan could well be on the brink of a path of reversal.
If further rights are eroded through a combination of increasingly violent conservatism in Afghanistan , the growing impatience of the West and the refusal of regional countries like India to take a stand, it will all have been done in the name of the new magic words - 'Afghanisation' and 'Afghan leadership.'
Kabul will once again be the backdrop of an intense power struggle. The West wants a power-sharing deal between the Taliban and Karzai, but Karzai doesn’t really stand a chance When Nadir returned to his homeland from the West, following the collapse of the Taliban, one of his first ventures was a restaurant at one of the most popular picnic spots frequented by Afghans. Sitting there and sipping tea, overlooking the waters of the placid lake, it was easy for him to believe that his dream of peace and, perhaps , prosperity was possible. Well, that dream died several years ago.
The restaurant had to be abandoned , not because of the worsening conflict or the resurgent Taliban, but because of the threat from a local commander (who still calls the shots in the area; Nadir's name has been changed to ensure his safety).
While 'strategic imperatives' and the 'war against terror' occupy much of the space in the mental map of Afghanistan that observers outside the country carry around with them, for Afghan citizens the daily diet of violence comes in myriad forms.
Large pockets of southern Afghanistan face the brunt of the intensifying conflict between the progovernment forces and the anti-government armed groups.
In many other areas, the threat emanates from the local commander, the predatory muscleman or the rapacious leader. It also comes from a police force and an army, both of which are under-trained , underpaid and lack effective command and control structures . Terror comes as well from international troops trying to flush out the insurgents through aerial bombing . Remarkably, too, the unraveling of social, political and economic structures has vitiated the lives of Afghan citizens.
Though suicide bombings and mountain warfare encapsulate the most common public images of the country, detailed surveys of Afghans reveal a contrary picture. In an Asia Foundation survey last year, 17 per cent said they had directly experienced some form of violence in the previous year. Of this group, only 9 per cent said they had experienced violence from Taliban.
Worryingly, an equal proportion said they had experienced violence from the international military forces, while another 7 per cent attributed the violence to actions of the national police and the national army.
An overwhelming proportion said they were victims of crime and lawlessness . The survey, it must be underlined , does not record actual occurrences , but the perceptions of Afghans.
An overwhelming focus on 'stability' in the past eight years has led to the neglect of the needs of Afghanistan's extraordinary citizens as predatory individuals were put back in power for quick fix solutions, and pernicious practices tolerated in the name of strategy.
Now, it appears likely that the desire of influential western troop-contributing countries to make a hasty exit will result in sacrifices of hardwon rights, civil liberties and democratic practices.
'Reintegration and Reconciliation' and 'Afghanisation' are the new buzz - words, most recently bandied about in the London Conference, where western nations laid out their plans to begin handover of security operations to Afghan forces.
Despite paeans to the Constitution of Afghanistan, civil society groups fear that even the minimal rights to life, liberty, equality and safety for all sections of the population that have been won at great cost, remain extremely vulnerable and may be the first point of compromise.
The signs are already there. The initial signals include rearming of communities to ensure quick and cheap 'security' - even though it was the population's hatred for armed militias that had earlier led the way to the rise of the Taliban; increasing rhetoric about the suitability of 'Democracy' for the Afghan temperament, even though Afghans have had their own brand of participatory decision making for thousands of years; and a focus on supporting 'traditional justice systems' , which, women fear, will revert them to customary law practices that are biased against them. The constitution, the government and the parliament have proven themselves inadequate defences against a growing trend of conservatism that is dovetailing smoothly into an ideology of political compromise that might save the face of the West as they look for an exit.
You only have to ask the brave Afghan women who took to the streets to protest against a Shia personal law introduced by the government that necessitated submission to the husband in bed and permission for leaving the house. Or, the young student and journalist, Pervez Kambakhsh, who now lives in asylum - after he was sentenced to death (the sentence was commuted to 20 years and he was finally pardoned by the President) for downloading an article on the role of women in Islam. Or the women who ran away from violent abusive marriages only to find themselves in the Pule Charkhi prison outside Kabul for having violated social custom.
Most countries have taken decades to develop and strengthen jurisprudence that reflects basic human rights and values. But Afghanistan could well be on the brink of a path of reversal.
If further rights are eroded through a combination of increasingly violent conservatism in Afghanistan , the growing impatience of the West and the refusal of regional countries like India to take a stand, it will all have been done in the name of the new magic words - 'Afghanisation' and 'Afghan leadership.'
Exit west, enter chaos
Times of India Crest Edition, February 6, 2010
Kabul will once again be the backdrop of an intense power struggle. The West wants a power-sharing deal between the Taliban and Karzai, but Karzai doesn’t really stand a chance When Nadir returned to his homeland from the West, following the collapse of the Taliban, one of his first ventures was a restaurant at one of the most popular picnic spots frequented by Afghans. Sitting there and sipping tea, overlooking the waters of the placid lake, it was easy for him to believe that his dream of peace and, perhaps , prosperity was possible. Well, that dream died several years ago.
The restaurant had to be abandoned , not because of the worsening conflict or the resurgent Taliban, but because of the threat from a local commander (who still calls the shots in the area; Nadir's name has been changed to ensure his safety).
While 'strategic imperatives' and the 'war against terror' occupy much of the space in the mental map of Afghanistan that observers outside the country carry around with them, for Afghan citizens the daily diet of violence comes in myriad forms.
Large pockets of southern Afghanistan face the brunt of the intensifying conflict between the progovernment forces and the anti-government armed groups.
In many other areas, the threat emanates from the local commander, the predatory muscleman or the rapacious leader. It also comes from a police force and an army, both of which are under-trained , underpaid and lack effective command and control structures . Terror comes as well from international troops trying to flush out the insurgents through aerial bombing . Remarkably, too, the unraveling of social, political and economic structures has vitiated the lives of Afghan citizens.
Though suicide bombings and mountain warfare encapsulate the most common public images of the country, detailed surveys of Afghans reveal a contrary picture. In an Asia Foundation survey last year, 17 per cent said they had directly experienced some form of violence in the previous year. Of this group, only 9 per cent said they had experienced violence from Taliban.
Worryingly, an equal proportion said they had experienced violence from the international military forces, while another 7 per cent attributed the violence to actions of the national police and the national army.
An overwhelming proportion said they were victims of crime and lawlessness . The survey, it must be underlined , does not record actual occurrences , but the perceptions of Afghans.
An overwhelming focus on 'stability' in the past eight years has led to the neglect of the needs of Afghanistan's extraordinary citizens as predatory individuals were put back in power for quick fix solutions, and pernicious practices tolerated in the name of strategy.
Now, it appears likely that the desire of influential western troop-contributing countries to make a hasty exit will result in sacrifices of hardwon rights, civil liberties and democratic practices.
'Reintegration and Reconciliation' and 'Afghanisation' are the new buzz - words, most recently bandied about in the London Conference, where western nations laid out their plans to begin handover of security operations to Afghan forces.
Despite paeans to the Constitution of Afghanistan, civil society groups fear that even the minimal rights to life, liberty, equality and safety for all sections of the population that have been won at great cost, remain extremely vulnerable and may be the first point of compromise.
The signs are already there. The initial signals include rearming of communities to ensure quick and cheap 'security' - even though it was the population's hatred for armed militias that had earlier led the way to the rise of the Taliban; increasing rhetoric about the suitability of 'Democracy' for the Afghan temperament, even though Afghans have had their own brand of participatory decision making for thousands of years; and a focus on supporting 'traditional justice systems' , which, women fear, will revert them to customary law practices that are biased against them. The constitution, the government and the parliament have proven themselves inadequate defences against a growing trend of conservatism that is dovetailing smoothly into an ideology of political compromise that might save the face of the West as they look for an exit.
You only have to ask the brave Afghan women who took to the streets to protest against a Shia personal law introduced by the government that necessitated submission to the husband in bed and permission for leaving the house. Or, the young student and journalist, Pervez Kambakhsh, who now lives in asylum - after he was sentenced to death (the sentence was commuted to 20 years and he was finally pardoned by the President) for downloading an article on the role of women in Islam. Or the women who ran away from violent abusive marriages only to find themselves in the Pule Charkhi prison outside Kabul for having violated social custom.
Most countries have taken decades to develop and strengthen jurisprudence that reflects basic human rights and values. But Afghanistan could well be on the brink of a path of reversal.
If further rights are eroded through a combination of increasingly violent conservatism in Afghanistan , the growing impatience of the West and the refusal of regional countries like India to take a stand, it will all have been done in the name of the new magic words - 'Afghanisation' and 'Afghan leadership.'
Kabul will once again be the backdrop of an intense power struggle. The West wants a power-sharing deal between the Taliban and Karzai, but Karzai doesn’t really stand a chance When Nadir returned to his homeland from the West, following the collapse of the Taliban, one of his first ventures was a restaurant at one of the most popular picnic spots frequented by Afghans. Sitting there and sipping tea, overlooking the waters of the placid lake, it was easy for him to believe that his dream of peace and, perhaps , prosperity was possible. Well, that dream died several years ago.
The restaurant had to be abandoned , not because of the worsening conflict or the resurgent Taliban, but because of the threat from a local commander (who still calls the shots in the area; Nadir's name has been changed to ensure his safety).
While 'strategic imperatives' and the 'war against terror' occupy much of the space in the mental map of Afghanistan that observers outside the country carry around with them, for Afghan citizens the daily diet of violence comes in myriad forms.
Large pockets of southern Afghanistan face the brunt of the intensifying conflict between the progovernment forces and the anti-government armed groups.
In many other areas, the threat emanates from the local commander, the predatory muscleman or the rapacious leader. It also comes from a police force and an army, both of which are under-trained , underpaid and lack effective command and control structures . Terror comes as well from international troops trying to flush out the insurgents through aerial bombing . Remarkably, too, the unraveling of social, political and economic structures has vitiated the lives of Afghan citizens.
Though suicide bombings and mountain warfare encapsulate the most common public images of the country, detailed surveys of Afghans reveal a contrary picture. In an Asia Foundation survey last year, 17 per cent said they had directly experienced some form of violence in the previous year. Of this group, only 9 per cent said they had experienced violence from Taliban.
Worryingly, an equal proportion said they had experienced violence from the international military forces, while another 7 per cent attributed the violence to actions of the national police and the national army.
An overwhelming proportion said they were victims of crime and lawlessness . The survey, it must be underlined , does not record actual occurrences , but the perceptions of Afghans.
An overwhelming focus on 'stability' in the past eight years has led to the neglect of the needs of Afghanistan's extraordinary citizens as predatory individuals were put back in power for quick fix solutions, and pernicious practices tolerated in the name of strategy.
Now, it appears likely that the desire of influential western troop-contributing countries to make a hasty exit will result in sacrifices of hardwon rights, civil liberties and democratic practices.
'Reintegration and Reconciliation' and 'Afghanisation' are the new buzz - words, most recently bandied about in the London Conference, where western nations laid out their plans to begin handover of security operations to Afghan forces.
Despite paeans to the Constitution of Afghanistan, civil society groups fear that even the minimal rights to life, liberty, equality and safety for all sections of the population that have been won at great cost, remain extremely vulnerable and may be the first point of compromise.
The signs are already there. The initial signals include rearming of communities to ensure quick and cheap 'security' - even though it was the population's hatred for armed militias that had earlier led the way to the rise of the Taliban; increasing rhetoric about the suitability of 'Democracy' for the Afghan temperament, even though Afghans have had their own brand of participatory decision making for thousands of years; and a focus on supporting 'traditional justice systems' , which, women fear, will revert them to customary law practices that are biased against them. The constitution, the government and the parliament have proven themselves inadequate defences against a growing trend of conservatism that is dovetailing smoothly into an ideology of political compromise that might save the face of the West as they look for an exit.
You only have to ask the brave Afghan women who took to the streets to protest against a Shia personal law introduced by the government that necessitated submission to the husband in bed and permission for leaving the house. Or, the young student and journalist, Pervez Kambakhsh, who now lives in asylum - after he was sentenced to death (the sentence was commuted to 20 years and he was finally pardoned by the President) for downloading an article on the role of women in Islam. Or the women who ran away from violent abusive marriages only to find themselves in the Pule Charkhi prison outside Kabul for having violated social custom.
Most countries have taken decades to develop and strengthen jurisprudence that reflects basic human rights and values. But Afghanistan could well be on the brink of a path of reversal.
If further rights are eroded through a combination of increasingly violent conservatism in Afghanistan , the growing impatience of the West and the refusal of regional countries like India to take a stand, it will all have been done in the name of the new magic words - 'Afghanisation' and 'Afghan leadership.'
KABUL OBSERVERS DOWNBEAT ON LONDON CONFERENCE
Eurasianet, January 29, 2010
Observers and humanitarian aid workers in Kabul are giving lackluster reviews to the London conference on Afghanistan.
Participants at the London gathering on January 28 touted a peace and reintegration program that hopes to induce Taliban militants to lay down their arms. To do that, foreign donors and the Afghan government rolled out what they described as a $500 million Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund. Skeptics have already dubbed it the Taliban Trust Fund.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai stoked some controversy in London with an appeal for a so-called "peace jirga," or broadly inclusive reconciliation conference, which would seek to engage the Taliban leadership. US and NATO officials are at present reluctant to reach out to top-tier militants. The London conference also mulled a timetable for the transfer of security responsibilities from foreign forces to Afghan military and police units.
In Kabul, the London conference results generated little enthusiasm. Instead, analysts remained concerned that the country’s fragile democratization process was being undermined by the international community’s preoccupation with a questionable security plan. To some, Western leaders seem more concerned about setting a timetable for withdrawal, something that would resonate with domestic political constituents, than with establishing a realizable and sustainable development blueprint for Afghanistan.
"The London conference was not about Afghanistan, but about [UK Prime Minister] Gordon Brown’s reelection campaign," said Aziz Hakimi, a political analyst who heads an NGO working on building civil society capacity in Kabul.
For many in Kabul, the most divisive issue discussed in London was the peace and reconciliation plan. Women’s groups and human rights activists offered the most vocal criticism of what they perceived as an attempt to forgive and forget the Taliban’s past behavior.
Prior to the conference, a meeting of Afghan women facilitated by UNIFEM and the Institute of Inclusive Security demanded guaranteed protection of women’s rights in all reconciliation initiatives. The group expressed concern at reconciliation proposals and the lack of consultation and consideration of the needs and views of civilians. A statement emphasized that there should be "no compromise on human rights" and that any reintegration should be based on "justice and respect for human rights."
A female delegate in London, Arzo Qanih, one of two civil society representatives at the conference, told the gathering: "Women in Afghanistan are critical partners for peace. Women’s engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery: it is a critical precursor to success."
Waliullah Rahmani, director of the Kabul Centre for Strategic Studies, suggested that the Afghan government’s security agenda could have ominous implications for civil society development in the country. Achieving "security by any means and at any cost" could result in the sacrifice of hard won civil rights attained at the cost of human lives, he said.
"The Taliban do not believe in the concept of citizenship and democracy and human rights and security will come at a cost. This is not good for the entire population. A broader approach is required," he added.
Hakimi, the Kabul NGO activist, criticized the reconciliation fund, saying, "the international community talks about corruption and then wants to make payments to the insurgents. Is this not bribery?"
Hakimi added that paying insurgents to lay down their weapons was a simplistic approach. "So far Karzai has been mute on the political claims of the Taliban. The whole policy is very fuzzy," Hakimi said.
Meanwhile, Taliban leaders weren’t exactly leaping at the opportunity to engage the Afghan government in a political dialogue. One major Taliban group, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, lambasted plans for reconciliation. Western powers "announce that they will provide money, employment and opportunity to have a comfortable life abroad, for those Mujahideen [holy warriors] who agree to part ways with Jihad. They think that Mujahideen have taken up arms to gain money or grab power or were compelled to turn to arms. This is baseless and futile," read a statement posted on the Internet on January 28.
Other Taliban representatives indicated that militant leaders were adopting a wait-and-see approach.
It’s unlikely that many key Taliban elements can be coaxed to sit down at a negotiating table, said Rahmani of the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. "It is necessary to have a strategy to deal with different groups in different ways. The top-ranking Taliban is irreconcilable."
Kabul-based observers were also skeptical about the idea that Afghan government institutions would be able to assume responsibility for the country’s security in the near future. Rapidly expanding Afghan military and police forces would likely dangerously undermine command-and-control capabilities. "I am not sure the Afghan army will be ready to take over the role," said Hakimi.
Shahmahmood Miakhel, chief of party at the United States Institute of Peace in Kabul, said the London conference’s success or failure would be determined in large measure by how the Karzai administration "progresses on governance. Both [improvements in governance and security] need to happen at the same time."
Observers and humanitarian aid workers in Kabul are giving lackluster reviews to the London conference on Afghanistan.
Participants at the London gathering on January 28 touted a peace and reintegration program that hopes to induce Taliban militants to lay down their arms. To do that, foreign donors and the Afghan government rolled out what they described as a $500 million Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund. Skeptics have already dubbed it the Taliban Trust Fund.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai stoked some controversy in London with an appeal for a so-called "peace jirga," or broadly inclusive reconciliation conference, which would seek to engage the Taliban leadership. US and NATO officials are at present reluctant to reach out to top-tier militants. The London conference also mulled a timetable for the transfer of security responsibilities from foreign forces to Afghan military and police units.
In Kabul, the London conference results generated little enthusiasm. Instead, analysts remained concerned that the country’s fragile democratization process was being undermined by the international community’s preoccupation with a questionable security plan. To some, Western leaders seem more concerned about setting a timetable for withdrawal, something that would resonate with domestic political constituents, than with establishing a realizable and sustainable development blueprint for Afghanistan.
"The London conference was not about Afghanistan, but about [UK Prime Minister] Gordon Brown’s reelection campaign," said Aziz Hakimi, a political analyst who heads an NGO working on building civil society capacity in Kabul.
For many in Kabul, the most divisive issue discussed in London was the peace and reconciliation plan. Women’s groups and human rights activists offered the most vocal criticism of what they perceived as an attempt to forgive and forget the Taliban’s past behavior.
Prior to the conference, a meeting of Afghan women facilitated by UNIFEM and the Institute of Inclusive Security demanded guaranteed protection of women’s rights in all reconciliation initiatives. The group expressed concern at reconciliation proposals and the lack of consultation and consideration of the needs and views of civilians. A statement emphasized that there should be "no compromise on human rights" and that any reintegration should be based on "justice and respect for human rights."
A female delegate in London, Arzo Qanih, one of two civil society representatives at the conference, told the gathering: "Women in Afghanistan are critical partners for peace. Women’s engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery: it is a critical precursor to success."
Waliullah Rahmani, director of the Kabul Centre for Strategic Studies, suggested that the Afghan government’s security agenda could have ominous implications for civil society development in the country. Achieving "security by any means and at any cost" could result in the sacrifice of hard won civil rights attained at the cost of human lives, he said.
"The Taliban do not believe in the concept of citizenship and democracy and human rights and security will come at a cost. This is not good for the entire population. A broader approach is required," he added.
Hakimi, the Kabul NGO activist, criticized the reconciliation fund, saying, "the international community talks about corruption and then wants to make payments to the insurgents. Is this not bribery?"
Hakimi added that paying insurgents to lay down their weapons was a simplistic approach. "So far Karzai has been mute on the political claims of the Taliban. The whole policy is very fuzzy," Hakimi said.
Meanwhile, Taliban leaders weren’t exactly leaping at the opportunity to engage the Afghan government in a political dialogue. One major Taliban group, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, lambasted plans for reconciliation. Western powers "announce that they will provide money, employment and opportunity to have a comfortable life abroad, for those Mujahideen [holy warriors] who agree to part ways with Jihad. They think that Mujahideen have taken up arms to gain money or grab power or were compelled to turn to arms. This is baseless and futile," read a statement posted on the Internet on January 28.
Other Taliban representatives indicated that militant leaders were adopting a wait-and-see approach.
It’s unlikely that many key Taliban elements can be coaxed to sit down at a negotiating table, said Rahmani of the Kabul Center for Strategic Studies. "It is necessary to have a strategy to deal with different groups in different ways. The top-ranking Taliban is irreconcilable."
Kabul-based observers were also skeptical about the idea that Afghan government institutions would be able to assume responsibility for the country’s security in the near future. Rapidly expanding Afghan military and police forces would likely dangerously undermine command-and-control capabilities. "I am not sure the Afghan army will be ready to take over the role," said Hakimi.
Shahmahmood Miakhel, chief of party at the United States Institute of Peace in Kabul, said the London conference’s success or failure would be determined in large measure by how the Karzai administration "progresses on governance. Both [improvements in governance and security] need to happen at the same time."
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