India appears to have become hostage to its own rhetoric on Afghanistan
Times of India, April 17, 2010
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Washington visit is being viewed as a having yielded some gains for Indian foreign policy, having secured an apparent endorsement of the Indian role in Afghanistan. The implication, both overt and covert, has been that India scored a win over Pakistan given the latter’s attempts to curtail India’s presence in the country. The perspective is not new. The success and failure of the Indian role and presence in Afghanistan since 2001 has been largely interpreted through the Indian ability to influence the international community on Pakistan. Bringing pressure on elements within Pakistan and the Pakistani establishment, which are supportive of insurgents with a totalitarian worldview is certainly a valid concern and gains have been made in this area.
However, by restricting its role and influence to this narrow interest, Indian foreign policy is losing sight of the bigger picture. The wider strategic interests of the international community that includes Western countries as well as regional players have been ignored as have crucial decisions impacting on the stability of Afghanistan. By focusing mainly on Pakistan, the Indian government scores brownie points domestically, but ignores the long-term interests of the region and India in particular.
Though differences between the US and India on Afghanistan is now acknowledged, a realisation of these differences remains limited to the difference of perception on how to deal with Pakistan. South Block has repeatedly stressed that India and the US share the same goal in Afghanistan, i.e. stability of the country. While it is difficult to fault such admirable ambitions, a more mature foreign policy position would require looking at the details of the ‘stability’ that has remained elusive in Afghanistan after nine years of a US-dominated policy. There is universal acknowledgement now that security in the country is at its worst since 2001 even as the Western countries are moving towards a disengagement of troops. Beyond a general commitment against terrorism, the US notion of ‘stability’ may look very different from that envisaged by India.
Unfortunately for India and the region, Indian policy in Afghanistan continues to be stuck in the past, relying on bilateralism, the historicity of Indo-Afghan friendship and the ‘feel good’ factor, rather than recognising new realities. Though there is plenty of goodwill for India, which is seen, rightly or wrongly, as a disinterested benefactor with no axe to grind, the Indian government appears to be either unwilling or unable to leverage this in the pursuit of larger strategic interests of both India and the region, ceding policy-making on stabilisation entirely to the western countries engaged in Afghanistan, particularly the US. The costs of this myopia are now becoming visible.
The Western troop surge and the accompanying civilian surge is directed towards an exit strategy — now being euphemistically termed the ‘transition’ strategy. This end goal is not without a cost, given the impatience to exit. In the pursuit of its core interests — which have been publicly and clearly defined as degradation of the capabilities of the al Qaeda and the supportive Taliban in order to prevent them from attacking the US, the Obama administration is supporting several steps in the area of security and stability that have
long-term implications for the region.
Since building Afghan national forces is painstaking and time-consuming, British and American forces are rearming tribal and community militias despite clear concerns that such a step, without clear and accountable chains of command and control will rebound with a vengeance. They are encouraging the rapid build-up of the Afghan army and police, a move that is also viewed by some experts as a dangerous acceleration that would erode institutional stability of the armed forces. The recent emphasis on reconciliation with the insurgent groups also has its genesis in the need to bring the ongoing conflict to a manageable level that would allow the Western troops to exit gracefully. Almost all the steps are designed for shortterm stability and may, in all likelihood, lead to long-term instability in Afghanistan and region.
So why are South Block’s astute mandarins and the political leadership in India still viewing their role in Afghanistan through rose-tinted glasses? Not only has India not engaged in decision making on these issues, it is completely absent from policy making on a spectrum of issues in Afghanistan. It directs its efforts in Afghanistan bilaterally on the grounds that it does not have a political agenda in Afghanistan, as if India’s neglect of multilateral strategising would make these multifarious interests disappear. Whilst projecting itself as a key regional player, India has also neglected its relationship with key players Russia and Iran who are crucial to Afghanistan’s and the region’s stability.
It is no wonder then that when decisions are taken by the Afghan government and the international community — on Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan or on making compromises with the Taliban — India finds itself out of the loop, unable to exercise its clout, its muscles having rusted from disuse.
Astute international diplomats are aware that little more is required to please the Indian establishment than the occasional rant against Pakistan, enough to keep the Indian government happy. Shrewd Afghan politicians are aware that rhetoric on the mutual goodwill and stroking the Indian establishment’s ego goes a long way, while real decisions are taken in consonance with the Afghan government’s Western allies.
Signs of the Indian establishment’s inability to comprehend Afghanistan’s enormous strategic interest are evident. Despite the presence of five consulates, the Indian embassy in Kabul has less than a handful of staff who can engage at the diplomatic level on the multilateral arena that is Afghanistan, falling far short of requirements in this complex and fast-changing environment. It is true that India will not be able to shape or influence all strategic decisions in Afghanistan given other overweening interests. The pity is that it is not even trying
May 04, 2010
Afghanistan aid groups say NATO threatens their neutrality
Afghanistan aid groups say NATO threatens their neutrality
21 April 2010 | Panos
Humanitarian groups in Afghanistan say NATO's involvement in development aid threatens to undermine the neutrality, reputation, and safety of aid workers.
The French aid group Solidarites, has worked in Afghanistan for 30 years. In the dusty streets and weather-beaten compounds of Kabul, Bamiyan, and Samangan, it was common to see signs and boards advertising their development work on water and sanitation. Not any more. "We now maintain a low profile" says Hassan El Sayed, the group's country director.
Intensifying conflict has forced aid groups to spend more money on travel and security. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) says the Taliban and other armed opposition groups exert varying degrees of influence over 80 per cent of the country. This growing insecurity has made it harder for humanitarians to reach vulnerable populations.
Military delivering aid
More worryingly, say NGOs, international military forces are becoming increasingly involved in delivering aid and humanitarian assistance in a bid to win hearts and minds. "When military actors try to do things we do, then actors that would target military would target us. This forces us to be low-profile," says Sayed. Solidarites, like many non-profit groups feels their safety and neutrality is increasingly under threat by the blurring of lines between military and humanitarian aid. "We have no branding or identity on our vehicles," says Farhana Faruqi Stocker, the country director of Afghan Aid, "and no signs on our compounds."
Military forces are spending money on development and humanitarian aid directly, through 26 civilian–military provincial reconstruction teams,(PRTs), the first of which was set up in 2003.These teams of military staff, diplomats, and civilian experts in reconstruction are located on military bases. Each PRT is manned by the troops of NATO countries and led by a single NATO member country.
Robert Watkins, the UN Deputy Special Representative and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator has criticised this mode of delivering aid saying it "gives the wrong signal to communities who then perceive all aid to be associated with the military." "This has led to threats of violence against the humanitarian community and hampered their ability to deliver needed services," he said in a press conference in Kabul last month.
No direct targetting
When one of Solidarites' drivers was wounded by a roadside bomb in July last year, Sayed felt sure it was not a result of direct targeting, since the NGO is well known in the area in which the accident took place. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) NGOs were involved in 172 incidents in 2009, with armed opposition groups behind most of these. Fifty-nine NGO staff were kidnapped even though most were released unharmed. All those killed were Afghan nationals, whom ANSO says, remain more exposed than their international counterparts.
Nevertheless ANSO maintains that "the Taliban and most armed opposition groups still do not systematically target NGOs."When NGOs have been attacked or threatened by armed groups, it has usually been a result of the perception that the NGO lacked neutrality, they say. "NGOs working in all provinces would be well served to adhere to humanitarian principles as AOG are harshly unforgiving to those who do not."
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) says it is involved in humanitarian aid in "extremis circumstances" only. Its spokesman Brigadier General Eric Tremblay says, "humanitarian aid is distributed on the basis of need and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality."
Lack of neutrality
NGOs however insist that the international military by definition cannot be seen as a neutral actor. Many NGOs have also refused to go into areas that have recently been ‘cleared' through operations by international military forces. In a public campaign over the past year, Oxfam, Care, Save the Children UK and other international NGOs with long experience in Afghanistan have said the militarisation of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict.
"Humanitarian aid has to be independent, neutral and impartial" says Hassan El Sayed of Solidarites. "Can you imagine how we would be perceived if we arrive after US tanks?" Most of the principled NGOs would not be able to go into these areas, he says.
Laurent Saillard, the Director of Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella body for Afghan NGOs, agrees. "What gives the NGOs their capacity to work is the quality of their relationship with the community. What guarantees the security is not the military or their operations. This is a myth. It is complete propaganda. NGOs don't buy it and have never asked ISAF or the US army for their security."
The trend of donors routing aid resources to support their military strategy appears likely to continue. The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) recently told the BBC the military and civilian efforts needed to be combined as security is such a huge problem. In its recent document on Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, the US government described its desire to have civilians acting as ‘force multipliers", and it emphasised its intention to route its (aid) money through the provincial reconstruction teams in conflict zones.
"I can understand why they do it. The deployment is unpopular and the body bags are coming back" says another NGO worker, who asked not to be named. Donor countries see aid as a means of pacifying the anger provoked by military operations, but NGOs insist that they will continue to try and carve out a neutral space, however limited.
All our journalism is free to reproduce, unless otherwise noted. Please get in touch with media@panos.org.uk for more information or to let us know that you've reproduced something
21 April 2010 | Panos
Humanitarian groups in Afghanistan say NATO's involvement in development aid threatens to undermine the neutrality, reputation, and safety of aid workers.
The French aid group Solidarites, has worked in Afghanistan for 30 years. In the dusty streets and weather-beaten compounds of Kabul, Bamiyan, and Samangan, it was common to see signs and boards advertising their development work on water and sanitation. Not any more. "We now maintain a low profile" says Hassan El Sayed, the group's country director.
Intensifying conflict has forced aid groups to spend more money on travel and security. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) says the Taliban and other armed opposition groups exert varying degrees of influence over 80 per cent of the country. This growing insecurity has made it harder for humanitarians to reach vulnerable populations.
Military delivering aid
More worryingly, say NGOs, international military forces are becoming increasingly involved in delivering aid and humanitarian assistance in a bid to win hearts and minds. "When military actors try to do things we do, then actors that would target military would target us. This forces us to be low-profile," says Sayed. Solidarites, like many non-profit groups feels their safety and neutrality is increasingly under threat by the blurring of lines between military and humanitarian aid. "We have no branding or identity on our vehicles," says Farhana Faruqi Stocker, the country director of Afghan Aid, "and no signs on our compounds."
Military forces are spending money on development and humanitarian aid directly, through 26 civilian–military provincial reconstruction teams,(PRTs), the first of which was set up in 2003.These teams of military staff, diplomats, and civilian experts in reconstruction are located on military bases. Each PRT is manned by the troops of NATO countries and led by a single NATO member country.
Robert Watkins, the UN Deputy Special Representative and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator has criticised this mode of delivering aid saying it "gives the wrong signal to communities who then perceive all aid to be associated with the military." "This has led to threats of violence against the humanitarian community and hampered their ability to deliver needed services," he said in a press conference in Kabul last month.
No direct targetting
When one of Solidarites' drivers was wounded by a roadside bomb in July last year, Sayed felt sure it was not a result of direct targeting, since the NGO is well known in the area in which the accident took place. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) NGOs were involved in 172 incidents in 2009, with armed opposition groups behind most of these. Fifty-nine NGO staff were kidnapped even though most were released unharmed. All those killed were Afghan nationals, whom ANSO says, remain more exposed than their international counterparts.
Nevertheless ANSO maintains that "the Taliban and most armed opposition groups still do not systematically target NGOs."When NGOs have been attacked or threatened by armed groups, it has usually been a result of the perception that the NGO lacked neutrality, they say. "NGOs working in all provinces would be well served to adhere to humanitarian principles as AOG are harshly unforgiving to those who do not."
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) says it is involved in humanitarian aid in "extremis circumstances" only. Its spokesman Brigadier General Eric Tremblay says, "humanitarian aid is distributed on the basis of need and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality."
Lack of neutrality
NGOs however insist that the international military by definition cannot be seen as a neutral actor. Many NGOs have also refused to go into areas that have recently been ‘cleared' through operations by international military forces. In a public campaign over the past year, Oxfam, Care, Save the Children UK and other international NGOs with long experience in Afghanistan have said the militarisation of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict.
"Humanitarian aid has to be independent, neutral and impartial" says Hassan El Sayed of Solidarites. "Can you imagine how we would be perceived if we arrive after US tanks?" Most of the principled NGOs would not be able to go into these areas, he says.
Laurent Saillard, the Director of Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella body for Afghan NGOs, agrees. "What gives the NGOs their capacity to work is the quality of their relationship with the community. What guarantees the security is not the military or their operations. This is a myth. It is complete propaganda. NGOs don't buy it and have never asked ISAF or the US army for their security."
The trend of donors routing aid resources to support their military strategy appears likely to continue. The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) recently told the BBC the military and civilian efforts needed to be combined as security is such a huge problem. In its recent document on Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, the US government described its desire to have civilians acting as ‘force multipliers", and it emphasised its intention to route its (aid) money through the provincial reconstruction teams in conflict zones.
"I can understand why they do it. The deployment is unpopular and the body bags are coming back" says another NGO worker, who asked not to be named. Donor countries see aid as a means of pacifying the anger provoked by military operations, but NGOs insist that they will continue to try and carve out a neutral space, however limited.
All our journalism is free to reproduce, unless otherwise noted. Please get in touch with media@panos.org.uk for more information or to let us know that you've reproduced something
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