Himal, April 2011
Early in March, Marc Grossman, the newly appointed US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, completed a tour of several countries. Dropping in on Jeddah, Kabul, Islamabad and Brussels, this was his first tour of the countries the US considers crucial to the ‘Af-Pak’ portfolio. This was also Grossman’s first tour since he took over the post left empty by the sudden death of the US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, on 13 December. The most notable public outcome of the visits was a back-and-forth exchange with Pakistani journalists on the issue of Raymond Davis, the US contractor charged with murder in Pakistan and released after paying ‘blood’ money (see accompanying story by Urooj Zia). The other notable aspect during this trip was Grossman’s near-verbatim repetition of policies described earlier by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a recent speech to the Asia Society, during which she announced Grossman’s appointment. Though early days yet, it seems unlikely that the new incumbent, a diplomat brought out of retirement, will be making the waves his predecessor did.
With his forceful personality and penchant for persuasive bullying, Holbrooke grabbed headlines wherever he went. Prior to his appointment, he had been given credit for pushing through the US policy in the Balkans, by getting Slobodan Milosevic on board for the Dayton Accords. In Kabul, however, this headstrong approach proved less helpful. Among the notable contributions Holbrooke made to American relations with the Afghan leadership was his infamous showdown with President Hamid Karzai following the August 2009 presidential elections. The fallout, which is purported to have involved a shouting match, was over Holbrooke’s criticism of the rigging of polling booths by Karzai supporters, and his insistence on the need for a second round of elections to establish credibility. Seen from the Afghan authorities’ point of view, this was nothing short of betrayal; Karzai’s supporters felt the US, which had no compunction in dumping democratic principles whenever it suited them, was using the charade of democracy to weaken him.
Holbrooke was not solely responsible for this state of affairs. But he did exemplify the falling-out between President Karzai and the US administration that had been set in motion even before Barack Obama took office, when, as a visiting senator, the future president expressed doubts on Karzai’s leadership. Afghan leaders are extremely sensitive to perceptions about loss of face and public humiliation. While Holbrooke’s bullying tactics might have worked with weaker bullies such as Milosevic, his handling of the Afghan leadership backfired. Though the US-Karzai relationship recovered to some extent, it never regained the previous warmth. In retrospect, the appointment of Holbrooke to the position was a miscalculation on the part of the Obama administration. The latter should have been forewarned by the fate of British leader Paddy Ashdown (another Balkans hand), whose appointment as a special envoy in Afghanistan was scuppered once tales of his heavy-handed approach preceded his appointment.
Yet even now, in the aftermath of Holbrooke’s death, the Obama administration does not seem to have grasped the need for a more politically sensitive approach. The current US ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, a straight-talking former army general, is known for his dismal opinion of President Karzai, made public through leaked embassy cables as far back as January 2010. In the cables, Eikenberry said that President Karzai ‘is not an adequate strategic partner’ and ‘continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden’. Nonetheless, Eikenberry has been kept in his position, a sensitive post that requires working closely with the Afghan leadership. While tough diplomacy might be thought of as a requirement in Afghanistan, it is through these episodes that the US has lost on the swings what it gains on the roundabouts. Public fallouts have been followed with private capitulation, a fact that many Afghan leaders have caught onto quite quickly. Many Afghan leaders have honed the act of public outrage into a fine art that maximises their own political capital, usually allowing them to extract greater concessions from the US administration.
While Holbrooke’s personal style might have tripped him up in the complex political waters of Afghanistan, it seems unlikely that even his more low-key successor will be able to make much progress. The concept of Af-Pak itself is of nebulous value, and the role of the Af-Pak representative encapsulates much that is wrong with US policy towards the area and the wider region.
Unsound conjunction
Whether weighed in terms of looking for a common approach towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, or a solution to the Afghan conflict, the US approach falls short. Undoubtedly the role and concerns of Pakistan are a major factor in Afghanistan. The role of a section of the Pakistani state in providing support to forces of insurgency, the contiguous areas on the Durand Line where much of the military battle is taking place, and the political entwining of Afghanistan and Pakistan, make it imperative to pay attention to and deal with Pakistan for any future stability in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan, while a dominant player, is not the only one shaping the political canvas of Afghanistan. The complex balance of power in the region – which, apart from Pakistan, includes Iran, the Central Asian states, Russia and India – requires a far more holistic approach than can be encapsulated in the ‘Af-Pak’ strategy of the US.
Beyond describing a geographical region, ‘Af-Pak’ has little coherence as a concept. Insurgent groups operate in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, challenging the authority of the state apparatus in both countries with differing degrees of success, and the use of terror as a tool by many of these groups is also taking a heavy toll on citizens in both countries. However, Pakistan and Afghanistan, with very different sets of political and social factors as well as very different state and governance structures, require almost diametrically opposite approaches – whether militarily or politically.
In Afghanistan, US policy has centred on the ‘transition’, which will allow the US to withdraw troops from active combat and frontlines and disengage with nation-building. But in Pakistan, the problem is one of intrusive US political and military diplomacy. In Afghanistan, the US is attempting to shore up a weak state structure, often by empowering individuals rather than institutions. Pakistan has a strong state structure, with the problem there being one of balance of power, both between the military and the civilian authorities, and between the army and the ISI. The Afghan state currently lacks the ability to deliver governance, whereas in Pakistan the issue is one of priorities set by the state.
The genesis of the term Af-Pak is commonly attributed to Holbrooke himself. Holbrooke, who earlier had ambitions to become the secretary of state under President Obama, settled subsequently for the role of special representative. Soon after he took the office, in 2009, he explained the construct:
First of all, we often call the problem Af-Pak, as in Afghanistan-Pakistan. This is not just an effort to save eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theatre of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate. On the eastern side, it’s the sovereign territory of Pakistan. But it is on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located.
The term certainly had its genesis in US politics rather than the politics of the region it encompasses; neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan have had much use for the term, with its reductive connotations. As former President Pervez Musharraf said:
I am totally against the term ‘Af-Pak’. I do not support the word itself for two reasons: First, the strategy puts Pakistan on the same level as Afghanistan. We are not. Afghanistan has no government and the country is completely destabilized. Pakistan is not. Second, and this is much more important, is that there is an Indian element in the whole game.
Holbrooke himself was forced to admit that the term had backfired, describing it first as a ‘bureaucratic shorthand’, and later saying, in January 2010, ‘We can’t use it anymore because it does not please people in Pakistan, for understandable reasons.’ Though the term was officially dropped, ‘bureaucratic shorthand’ continued to inform policy, and the approach of equivalence was not set aside. In December 2010, the Obama administration came out with its ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan annual review.’
The combination of the two countries in a ‘theatre of war’ approach might well be understandable from the point of view of military commanders. But it is difficult to see why it was embraced as a politico-diplomatic concept, not just by the US but by other Western countries and alliances, who also rushed to appoint their own ‘Af-Pak’ envoys. Two years later, it is still difficult to see what the concept has to offer apart from an increasing proclivity for Western troops to cross the border in violation of Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty. The initial crossings have been followed by unmanned drones, with each trespass followed by token apologies.
The ‘Af-Pak’ approach, however, does allow the US to narrow down its goals to immediate short-term aims: the downgrading of the al-Qaeda threat to the US and its allies, rather than the broader and more long-term aim of regional stability. Although the ‘region’ came up for mention in Hillary Clinton’s speech to the Asia Society, her elaboration of US policy left little doubt as to the narrowness of this vision. In its hurry to ‘transit’ out of Afghanistan, the US is looking for a ‘political settlement’ that will involve bringing some of the insurgent groups into the government, a step the US hopes will ensure that such groups will no longer pose a threat to the US. If there is any regional aspect here, it is to try and ensure that regional powers such as India do not become spoilers in any such settlement.
More of the same
The clubbing together of Afghanistan and Pakistan also has another attribute. It disguises the lack of coherence within the US administration towards Afghanistan – not only politically, but also within the State Department, the Defence Department and the CIA. Within Kabul these differences are clearly visible in the day-to-day operational arena. There is little unity of command or purpose in the US approach, and the US ambassador and the US commander based in Afghanistan have often had divergent approaches in policy. These differences were most sharply articulated during the tenure of General Stanley McChrystal, but have not disappeared since his abrupt departure in June 2010. The direct reporting by Kabul-based US officials to Washington has deprived the US of a focus of American authority in Kabul, and the office of the US special representative is based in Washington, not in either Islamabad or Kabul.
This allows various factions of power within Afghanistan to cultivate their own lines of communication directly with players in Washington. An individual who encapsulates the contradictions of US foreign policy is the brother of President Karzai – Ahmed Wali Karzai, known in US foreign-policy circles as AWK. Long rumoured to have links to the drug mafia – a link denied vehemently by the Afghan government and never substantiated by the US, despite regular reports in the US media – AWK is seen as a problem by the State Department, which wants to cut off links to him. The Defence Department, on the other hand, considers him someone they would rather have on their side than as an opponent, and continues to do business with him. The CIA likewise considers him an asset, and has, according to reports in the US media, kept him on their payrolls. The approach, a Western diplomat points out, is ‘not very different from the confused US approach towards Pakistan, its army and the ISI’. However, while such differences have a limited impact on Pakistan’s functioning and well-entrenched state apparatus, they have a disproportionate impact in Afghanistan, which is both weak and dependent.
Holbrooke himself was neither authorised nor senior enough to overcome these differences in US policy, being better suited to bullying leaders of desperate countries rather than trying to sway US politicos. It is unlikely that his successor will make much headway. Grossman’s last engagement with the Afghanistan-Pakistan region was during the 1970s and 1980s, in his first assignment, as a junior officer in Pakistan. Since then Grossman worked steadily, but not spectacularly, as an American diplomat. As assistant secretary of state for European affairs, from 1997 to 2000 he played a role in the US participation in NATO’s military campaign in Kosovo. He served two tenures in Turkey, the last as ambassador between 1994 and 1997, and held the position of undersecretary of state for political affairs from 2001 till he retired from service in 2005.
Holbrooke’s untimely death presented an opportunity to move beyond the narrow agenda defined by the ‘Af-Pak’ office within the State Department. However, the appointment of Grossman and Clinton’s Asia Society speech show that the narrow approach has been embraced with even greater fervour.
May 06, 2011
The Risks of Rising Anti-American Feelings in Kabul
Eurasianet/March 24, 2011
Anti-American sentiment is at record high levels in Afghanistan, a factor that promises to complicate what is already shaping up as a tricky transfer of security responsibilities from Western forces to indigenous military and law-enforcement entities.
Under the existing timeframe, the Afghan government will assume in 2014 primary responsibility for maintaining security in the country. The transfer of authority would involve the withdrawal of the bulk of US troops that are currently fighting to contain the Taliban insurgency. Growing Afghan displeasure with the US military presence means that many are eager for foreign troops to leave. “The people of Afghanistan no longer desire to see others defend their country for them,” Afghan President Hamid Karzai said March 22.
But the unpopularity of US forces could increase the difficulty of preparing Afghan forces to handle security operations after 2014. Foreign analysts widely agree that the Afghan Army and other government security structures are unprepared at this time to take the lead in battling Islamic insurgents. A major risk, given the current dynamic, is that anti-American sentiment can cloud the government’s judgment, leading to a transfer of authority in Kabul that ends up boosting the Taliban’s strategic position.
Karzai’s comments on the public’s perception of US troops came two days after Der Spiegel, a German magazine, published photos allegedly depicting American soldiers posing with the bloodied and naked corpse of an Afghan civilian, killed in what US authorities are investigating as a murder. Though the public’s response to the Der Spiegel photos has been relatively muted, observers fear the possible release of hundreds of other photos could spark a popular backlash.
Most Afghans mention civilian casualties as the major source of their disenchantment. A recent ABC/BBC poll released in December found that, among Afghans, strong support for the presence of US military forces had declined from 30 percent in 2006 to 16 percent in 2010; the number of those strongly opposed to their presence had almost tripled during the same period.
A story recounted by a government official is representative of the experiences of many Afghans, and helps illustrate a major cause of anti-Americanism. The official, in an interview with EurasiaNet.org, said he was traveling through northern Afghanistan with his son, visiting from Europe, who was filming the trip.
An American convoy stopped them. “They said, ‘Give us the f***ing camera. Who sent you?’” the official recalled, speaking on condition of anonymity. “They did not ask what we were doing there, but asked ‘who sent you,’ as if my son needed their permission to be in his own country.” The matter was resolved, but ended on another inappropriate note. “They gave us 500 afghanis [USD 9] as compensation. Were they buying the right to insult?”
Back in late 2001, when an American-led offensive drove the Taliban from power in Kabul, support for US troops among Afghans ran high. Many citizens saw the American presence as a welcome relief from Taliban oppression. They also entertained perhaps unrealistic hopes that American economic muscle would transform their war-ravaged country. The pool of goodwill that once existed, however, has been drained, according to Najib Manalai, a senior advisor in the Ministry of Finance.
“In 2001 and early 2002 there was quite a positive feeling toward Americans,” Manalai said. “But instead of winning hearts and minds, they [US forces] alienated the people through their indiscriminate punishment of the larger population … with blind bombing in certain areas and culturally inappropriate behavior of the ground forces when they came to meet people.”
Many Afghans felt deserted by Americans in the early 1990s, following the end of a decade-long Soviet occupation. Washington had waged what was in effect a proxy war against Moscow in Afghanistan from 1979-89, but as soon as Soviet troops departed the country, US officials lost interest with helping their Afghan allies stabilize the country. Eventually civil warfare erupted, paving the way for the Taliban conquest of much of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.
“The United States left Afghanistan alone after the Soviets. The subsequent problems were a result of the US intervention to bleed the Soviets. We had expected they would help rebuild the country, but we were left alone and factional fighting erupted,” said Akmal Dawi of the Afghan Rights Monitor, a human rights group.
Battlefield actions are not the sole source of Afghan resentment for foreign troops. The United States, prior to the arrival of US forces, was viewed by many, perhaps looking through an idealized prism, as a beacon of stability, justice and prosperity. The reality of the last 10 years has prompted some to grow embittered by what they see as American moral ambiguity. An Afghan working at an international organization, who asked to be called Mariam for fear of losing her job, summed up her feelings this way: “They came in 2001 promising to bring us democracy, and they will go out with negotiations with the Taliban, and after providing millions of dollars to the warlords. … If the Taliban or warlords cut off the ears of girls, they [the Americans] say, ‘it is not my business.’”
Other Afghans say Washington lacks willingness or the understanding to work effectively with Afghans. “They have the world’s biggest institutions for civil diplomacy, but they don’t use the human to human resources,” said Dawi. Contact for the most part “is only between Karzai and the White House or military to military.”
“The United States never tried to understand us,” added Manalai, the Finance Ministry official. “They have played the kind of politics which cannot work in Asia.”
Anti-American sentiment is at record high levels in Afghanistan, a factor that promises to complicate what is already shaping up as a tricky transfer of security responsibilities from Western forces to indigenous military and law-enforcement entities.
Under the existing timeframe, the Afghan government will assume in 2014 primary responsibility for maintaining security in the country. The transfer of authority would involve the withdrawal of the bulk of US troops that are currently fighting to contain the Taliban insurgency. Growing Afghan displeasure with the US military presence means that many are eager for foreign troops to leave. “The people of Afghanistan no longer desire to see others defend their country for them,” Afghan President Hamid Karzai said March 22.
But the unpopularity of US forces could increase the difficulty of preparing Afghan forces to handle security operations after 2014. Foreign analysts widely agree that the Afghan Army and other government security structures are unprepared at this time to take the lead in battling Islamic insurgents. A major risk, given the current dynamic, is that anti-American sentiment can cloud the government’s judgment, leading to a transfer of authority in Kabul that ends up boosting the Taliban’s strategic position.
Karzai’s comments on the public’s perception of US troops came two days after Der Spiegel, a German magazine, published photos allegedly depicting American soldiers posing with the bloodied and naked corpse of an Afghan civilian, killed in what US authorities are investigating as a murder. Though the public’s response to the Der Spiegel photos has been relatively muted, observers fear the possible release of hundreds of other photos could spark a popular backlash.
Most Afghans mention civilian casualties as the major source of their disenchantment. A recent ABC/BBC poll released in December found that, among Afghans, strong support for the presence of US military forces had declined from 30 percent in 2006 to 16 percent in 2010; the number of those strongly opposed to their presence had almost tripled during the same period.
A story recounted by a government official is representative of the experiences of many Afghans, and helps illustrate a major cause of anti-Americanism. The official, in an interview with EurasiaNet.org, said he was traveling through northern Afghanistan with his son, visiting from Europe, who was filming the trip.
An American convoy stopped them. “They said, ‘Give us the f***ing camera. Who sent you?’” the official recalled, speaking on condition of anonymity. “They did not ask what we were doing there, but asked ‘who sent you,’ as if my son needed their permission to be in his own country.” The matter was resolved, but ended on another inappropriate note. “They gave us 500 afghanis [USD 9] as compensation. Were they buying the right to insult?”
Back in late 2001, when an American-led offensive drove the Taliban from power in Kabul, support for US troops among Afghans ran high. Many citizens saw the American presence as a welcome relief from Taliban oppression. They also entertained perhaps unrealistic hopes that American economic muscle would transform their war-ravaged country. The pool of goodwill that once existed, however, has been drained, according to Najib Manalai, a senior advisor in the Ministry of Finance.
“In 2001 and early 2002 there was quite a positive feeling toward Americans,” Manalai said. “But instead of winning hearts and minds, they [US forces] alienated the people through their indiscriminate punishment of the larger population … with blind bombing in certain areas and culturally inappropriate behavior of the ground forces when they came to meet people.”
Many Afghans felt deserted by Americans in the early 1990s, following the end of a decade-long Soviet occupation. Washington had waged what was in effect a proxy war against Moscow in Afghanistan from 1979-89, but as soon as Soviet troops departed the country, US officials lost interest with helping their Afghan allies stabilize the country. Eventually civil warfare erupted, paving the way for the Taliban conquest of much of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.
“The United States left Afghanistan alone after the Soviets. The subsequent problems were a result of the US intervention to bleed the Soviets. We had expected they would help rebuild the country, but we were left alone and factional fighting erupted,” said Akmal Dawi of the Afghan Rights Monitor, a human rights group.
Battlefield actions are not the sole source of Afghan resentment for foreign troops. The United States, prior to the arrival of US forces, was viewed by many, perhaps looking through an idealized prism, as a beacon of stability, justice and prosperity. The reality of the last 10 years has prompted some to grow embittered by what they see as American moral ambiguity. An Afghan working at an international organization, who asked to be called Mariam for fear of losing her job, summed up her feelings this way: “They came in 2001 promising to bring us democracy, and they will go out with negotiations with the Taliban, and after providing millions of dollars to the warlords. … If the Taliban or warlords cut off the ears of girls, they [the Americans] say, ‘it is not my business.’”
Other Afghans say Washington lacks willingness or the understanding to work effectively with Afghans. “They have the world’s biggest institutions for civil diplomacy, but they don’t use the human to human resources,” said Dawi. Contact for the most part “is only between Karzai and the White House or military to military.”
“The United States never tried to understand us,” added Manalai, the Finance Ministry official. “They have played the kind of politics which cannot work in Asia.”
The hasty exit strategy
Himal/ February 2011
If only you could take the Afghans out of the equation, you might be able to rebuild their country’ – or at least so goes the black humour within a small section of the international community, the long-term residents who have watched with frustration as the country has moved from international-backed plan to plan, proffering new panaceas with seasonal regularity as the situation deteriorates. With each year deemed more critical than the last, the only underlying strand unifying these ‘solutions’ has been a singular absence of the Afghan citizen from the centrality of plans, projects and policies. Like collateral damage, the euphemism used to describe the death of civilians in military operations, Afghan citizens have been corollary to the rebuilding of their country. Unless their interests are allowed to take centre stage, no plan or policy is likely to make a substantive difference, even though other interest groups, including the donor countries or the powerful political elite of Afghanistan, might achieve their short-term or even long-term goals.
Although there is widespread agreement that Afghanistan is a complex country with complicated problems, solutions adopted have usually lacked the necessary sophistication, being reduced to one-dimensional aims. Despite its shortcomings, the 2001 Bonn process spelt out the components of a modern state, implementation of which could have done much to stabilise the country. However the timetable set for its completion was unrealistic, with emphasis on achieving the form rather than the substance of the agreement. While this allowed the international community to claim success in completing its blueprint by 2005, it left Afghans with a Constitution riddled with contradictions and a lack of clarity on the delegation of administrative and political authority, both of which have repeatedly come back to haunt the polity.
Since then, the situation has followed a downward spiral, with the international community adopting and discarding a succession of diagnoses and treatments, each centred on the one big idea that would provide the key. Corruption, President Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, Indo-Pakistani relations have, by turns, all figured as the bogey. Even democracy has begun to be seriously considered in this light – the ‘Afghanistan is not Switzerland’ theme. The accompanying solutions have, however, suffered from a remarkable lack of accountability to the Afghan citizen.
No accountability
The current buzzword is ‘Afghanisation’. This goal sounds both noble and progressive, constituting the handing over of control of decision-making to Afghans, thus strengthening their sovereign status. Yet, the institutions and processes put in place since 2001 have been contrary to the aims of establishing a responsive government and representative polity. Despite the obvious difficulties of creating a strong, centralised state in a country characterised by regional autonomy and the dysfunction of three decades of conflict, the most centralised form of government was chosen. Dominant interests of the Western coalition ensured that the Constitution, rather than reflecting the country’s decentralised polity and pluralistic social fabric, centralised all political and executive authority in the president. Having a one-man show made it easier for many of the donor countries to deal with Afghanistan, but it denied representative and participatory decision-making to Afghans.
While Afghanistan has been called an electoral democracy, political parties were banned from elections under an electoral law that prevents political consolidation through a complex system of multi-seat single-constituency voting (see Himal March 2010, ‘Tattered parachute’). Afghans therefore have neither the advantages of a strong authoritarian government nor the benefits of a political democracy.
Even the limited accountability to the people that might have been possible under this system has been further diluted by denying elected bodies a clear role and authority. The Parliament, the strongest of the country’s elected bodies, uses its leverage to play the spoiler, but is prevented from playing a more positive role in shaping governance in the partyless system. Provincial representatives, meanwhile, although also elected, have almost no role or power, with the provincial governments run by governors answerable only to the president. Even the governors themselves lack power, and moves at introducing effective sub-national governance have yielded little. District-level elections, mandated by the Constitution, have not been held.
While there is a strong body of opinion that feels a Westminster-style democracy might be more suited to Afghanistan, there is scope for much greater political and administrative accountability even within existing provisions. At a time when the armed opposition is being wooed to lay down arms and join the mainstream, it is imperative that ordinary Afghans are also provided the means to participate in governance if their loyalties to the pro-government forces are to be retained. Channels also have to be created to address citizens’ grievances, if they are not to be further alienated.
A critical aspect is the conflict of interest of the Afghan leadership. A significant section of influential Afghans benefit directly from the spoils of war, as the international community pays them for providing militias, land for military bases, goods and services for those bases, all at hugely inflated prices. Whatever the reasons for this, the operational practices of the international community have created a divide between the interests of the Afghan population and a significant section of its leaders, who stand to lose personally and monetarily if peace were to arrive.
Good to go
The disjunction between the concerns of Afghans and those of the Western compact was highlighted starkly in the December 2010 review of US strategy in Afghanistan. The review drew exceedingly positive conclusions of the US security strategy, claiming ‘notable operational gains’, ‘progress across all three assessed areas of al-Qa’ida, Pakistan and Afghanistan’ and ‘significant progress in disrupting and dismantling the Pakistan-based leadership and cadre of al-Qa’ida over the past year’. It also claimed that the security forces had ‘reduced overall Taliban influence and arrested the momentum they had achieved in recent years in key parts’ of Afghanistan. The glowing report card was presented even as civilian casualties increased sharply amidst a general rise in violence, increasing restrictions on the movement of the international community within Afghanistan and an increased threat level faced by the diplomatic community, even in relatively safe Kabul.
Photo credit: Marcin Bondarowicz
The contradictions between the US claims and ground realities are reconcilable, however, if one looks at the divergent goals between the US and the Afghan people. Speaking of the review, President Barrack Obama said, ‘From the start, I’ve been very clear about our core goal. It’s not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it’s not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.’
The Western coalition and the troop-contributing countries see themselves as answerable to their own populations – not to Afghans. As early as 2001, the US, reflecting ‘a desire by the American people to not seek only revenge, but to win a war against barbaric behaviour’, in the words of President George W Bush, prevented the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandated by the UN; and co-opted key militia commanders by equipping them in the pursuit of extremists turning a blind eye to their human-rights record and their terrorisation and brutality towards the local population. ISAF itself came under NATO command, later changed to US-led NATO command, and the cooption of militia leaders was carried on by several other Western countries with donor countries providing arms and money to specific commanders in the area, both in Kabul and, more specifically, in areas where their troops are based. By engaging with these commanders, they have also provided them with a degree of political legitimacy they might otherwise lack.
Receiving their wherewithal directly from the Western coalition, these militia commanders have remained unaccountable to the local population. They have also manipulated the considerable firepower of the Western military forces to target their political enemies and settle local rivalries, consolidating control in a situation of political flux. The international community did not deploy troops for the essential task of peacekeeping, and the strengthening of the Afghan army and police was neglected. All the while, the Afghan population was asked to support the Karzai government and its allies, and left at the mercy of insurgents, criminal networks and the drug mafia.
Civilian casualties caused by international forces and the response to them provide a clear example of the divergence of interests and the lack of accountability to the Afghan population. While the Afghan government has been paying solatia, or compensation, to civilians killed by the international forces, it lacks the authority to pursue action, either criminal or disciplinary, against the foreign military personnel. This task has been left to the discretion of the troop-contributing country. Instances of disciplinary action are rare and the civilian casualty figures acknowledged by the international forces remain consistently lower than those compiled by the UN. Most civilian casualties take place either due to lack of information or due diligence, but the numbers have almost certainly escalated because of the lack of punitive action.
Transition to what?
In seeking to hand over the responsibility of security to the Afghan security forces, the foremost concern of the Western coalition has been a timetable for pullout of troops to present to their own domestic public, rather than an appraisal based on the security for Afghans (see Himal December 2010, ‘Afghanistan: Too much, too little’). But how convinced is the Western coalition that Afghans are actually ready to begin the transition, now mandated to begin in early 2011?
In answer, panic followed the Karzai government’s decision to put a halt to the operations of private security companies in Afghanistan in October last year. The Western countries, most of whom use such companies, went into a frenzy, and private companies executing their projects said they would vote with their feet if the private security companies were shut down – a threat that most donor governments found both credible and justified. As recently as early January, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was asking President Karzai to increase the number of personnel in the private security companies. Yet the preparedness of the Afghan forces is nonetheless deemed sufficient to begin taking over the security of the country.
To ensure this ‘preparedness’ the international coalition has adopted two policies that are likely to further weaken the security apparatus of the Afghan state and endanger its citizens. The Afghan forces are now being built up at a rapid rate, with the emphasis on churning out numbers rather than ensuring quality of training and command structures. It is clear that an army and police force created in this manner will prove to be more of a threat than a panacea. In addition, since the numbers of personnel still remain below what is seen as required, the international forces are setting up community militias and arming communities. Needless, to say, these are two measures that have proven detrimental in Afghanistan, not just in the distant past but over the past three years, as communities fight each other and militias prey on the
general population.
Until the ‘security transition’ is recast as a transition from the goals of foreign troop-contributing countries to the concerns of the Afghan population, the rising tide of insecurity is unlikely to be reversed.
Donor-drive
The use of international aid to rebuild Afghanistan remains the most glaring example of a policy that is driven by the needs of donors rather than that of the Afghan population. An example of this is the underfunded ‘urgent humanitarian appeal’ launched by the UN for the past three years. Though the international community spends billions of dollars in Afghanistan each year, the humanitarian appeal identifying the most urgent requirements goes underfunded though it amounts to far less (USD 666 million in 2009, USD 775 million in 2010 and USD 678 million in 2011). This is because the bulk of aid continues to be spent bilaterally by donors following political and military objectives (see Himal August 2010, ‘Conferences, calendars and caveats’).
Major donors route their aid to the areas where their troops are based, and to sectors on which they would like to focus. Some, such as the US, make sure that a considerable portion of this money returns to American corporations. The commonly acknowledged rate of money returning back to the Western donor is between 40 and 50 percent. Beneficiary citizens ultimately receive a fraction of the original amount, with the rest going to overheads at each level of the sub-contracting process. The money leaks out in inflated salaries as well as inflated costs. The sub-contracting culture also means that the money reaches the final implementer very late, due to delays at each stage of the contracting process. Based on the donor’s annual budgetary cycle, the money is then required to be spent quickly, resulting in projects executed in a hurry, often shoddily.
Most donor countries have a system of accountability, but again, they answer to their own governments and elected representatives, not the Afghan beneficiaries. There are almost no mechanisms that allows the beneficiaries to have a say in aid projects, or how they are executed. The sight of private contractors executing projects while using hired guns to keep the ‘beneficiary population’ at bay is a common sight in Afghanistan. The system ensures that information about failed projects or misappropriation of money comes through only intermittently. Instances of companies being penalised because of complaints of beneficiaries, whether for badly constructed school buildings or inoperable water canal project are unheard of.
In fact, establishing accountability is not that hard, even within the existing remit. For example, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), an Afghan civil-society organisation, started a project in 2007 that empowers local communities to monitor projects being executed in their name with donor or government money. The community selects trustworthy members who are trained in the task of monitoring, to ensure there are no compromises in the quality of the projects. IWA also enabled the local monitor groups to go up the chain of contractors, to obtain information from the donor as necessary. The popularity of the process is evident from the growing demands on IWA to train communities throughout the country. Nevertheless, such initiatives are rare and receive inadequate support from the donors.
Peace before justice
The absence of the Afghan citizen is most starkly evident in the current mantra of ‘reconciliation’. As the Western coalition seeks to exit, it is compromising on the small political, civil, democratic and human-rights gains made by and for the Afghan population since 2001. While rhetorical homage is being paid to the Constitution and the so-called ‘red lines’ that will prevent compromise on the most fundamental of rights for the Afghan people, the actual rollback of these rights is taking place even now on the international community’s watch.
In 2005, for example, the international community, led by the UN, had extended robust support to a Transitional Justice Action Plan. It focused on prosecution for war crimes, reparation for losses, and acknowledgement of the suffering of victims as a means of reconciling citizens and bringing a sense of closure to the past. In 2007, the international community opposed the adoption of a law that sought to provide blanket amnesty to all participants in the conflict, pointing out that the law was against the principles of justice and human rights and violated international humanitarian principles. In 2010, however, with the focus shifting to reconciliation with the armed opposition, the concerns of citizens received short shrift. The amnesty law has indeed been adopted by Kabul, with scarcely a murmur from the international community. In fact, the UN itself has put peace before transitional justice, not only delinking peace and justice but also suggesting that the two were mutually exclusive in the current context.
Meanwhile, there is escalating violence against women, reversing the trend of the initial post-Taliban years. Opinion surveys show support for women’s work outside the home has dropped, as has support for women in Parliament. The parliamentary elections of 2010 – which dragged on messily for over four months - demonstrated the international community's changing posture. In the name of ‘Afghanisation’ of the electoral process, the international community decided to step back from its stated goal of strengthening the electoral institutions and processes. Though at the time Himal went to press a resolution under international pressure looked likely, it was not before the democratic process had been put through the wringer, setting a bad precedent for the future. To stem this deterioration, the international community needs to do more to support the efforts of Afghan civil-society organisations, which have been voicing demands for a spectrum of rights – rights that are being marginalised in the hasty exit strategy.
Rather than treating human rights and democracy as inconvenient principles that need to be shelved or circumvented in the short term, the international community needs to look at the country’s long-term stability by supporting policies that would reflect the country’s complex and pluralistic social and political fabric, and by strengthening democracy, rule of law, justice and an inclusive polity. By proffering ‘Afghanisation’ as the reason for not playing its part, the international community is being disingenuous. For better or worse, it is international aid money that is the current dominant determinant in Afghanistan. By picking and choosing individuals, institutions and forces it wants to fund, it is the international community that shapes the Afghanistan of today – and moulds the Afghanistan of tomorrow.
If only you could take the Afghans out of the equation, you might be able to rebuild their country’ – or at least so goes the black humour within a small section of the international community, the long-term residents who have watched with frustration as the country has moved from international-backed plan to plan, proffering new panaceas with seasonal regularity as the situation deteriorates. With each year deemed more critical than the last, the only underlying strand unifying these ‘solutions’ has been a singular absence of the Afghan citizen from the centrality of plans, projects and policies. Like collateral damage, the euphemism used to describe the death of civilians in military operations, Afghan citizens have been corollary to the rebuilding of their country. Unless their interests are allowed to take centre stage, no plan or policy is likely to make a substantive difference, even though other interest groups, including the donor countries or the powerful political elite of Afghanistan, might achieve their short-term or even long-term goals.
Although there is widespread agreement that Afghanistan is a complex country with complicated problems, solutions adopted have usually lacked the necessary sophistication, being reduced to one-dimensional aims. Despite its shortcomings, the 2001 Bonn process spelt out the components of a modern state, implementation of which could have done much to stabilise the country. However the timetable set for its completion was unrealistic, with emphasis on achieving the form rather than the substance of the agreement. While this allowed the international community to claim success in completing its blueprint by 2005, it left Afghans with a Constitution riddled with contradictions and a lack of clarity on the delegation of administrative and political authority, both of which have repeatedly come back to haunt the polity.
Since then, the situation has followed a downward spiral, with the international community adopting and discarding a succession of diagnoses and treatments, each centred on the one big idea that would provide the key. Corruption, President Hamid Karzai, Pakistan, Indo-Pakistani relations have, by turns, all figured as the bogey. Even democracy has begun to be seriously considered in this light – the ‘Afghanistan is not Switzerland’ theme. The accompanying solutions have, however, suffered from a remarkable lack of accountability to the Afghan citizen.
No accountability
The current buzzword is ‘Afghanisation’. This goal sounds both noble and progressive, constituting the handing over of control of decision-making to Afghans, thus strengthening their sovereign status. Yet, the institutions and processes put in place since 2001 have been contrary to the aims of establishing a responsive government and representative polity. Despite the obvious difficulties of creating a strong, centralised state in a country characterised by regional autonomy and the dysfunction of three decades of conflict, the most centralised form of government was chosen. Dominant interests of the Western coalition ensured that the Constitution, rather than reflecting the country’s decentralised polity and pluralistic social fabric, centralised all political and executive authority in the president. Having a one-man show made it easier for many of the donor countries to deal with Afghanistan, but it denied representative and participatory decision-making to Afghans.
While Afghanistan has been called an electoral democracy, political parties were banned from elections under an electoral law that prevents political consolidation through a complex system of multi-seat single-constituency voting (see Himal March 2010, ‘Tattered parachute’). Afghans therefore have neither the advantages of a strong authoritarian government nor the benefits of a political democracy.
Even the limited accountability to the people that might have been possible under this system has been further diluted by denying elected bodies a clear role and authority. The Parliament, the strongest of the country’s elected bodies, uses its leverage to play the spoiler, but is prevented from playing a more positive role in shaping governance in the partyless system. Provincial representatives, meanwhile, although also elected, have almost no role or power, with the provincial governments run by governors answerable only to the president. Even the governors themselves lack power, and moves at introducing effective sub-national governance have yielded little. District-level elections, mandated by the Constitution, have not been held.
While there is a strong body of opinion that feels a Westminster-style democracy might be more suited to Afghanistan, there is scope for much greater political and administrative accountability even within existing provisions. At a time when the armed opposition is being wooed to lay down arms and join the mainstream, it is imperative that ordinary Afghans are also provided the means to participate in governance if their loyalties to the pro-government forces are to be retained. Channels also have to be created to address citizens’ grievances, if they are not to be further alienated.
A critical aspect is the conflict of interest of the Afghan leadership. A significant section of influential Afghans benefit directly from the spoils of war, as the international community pays them for providing militias, land for military bases, goods and services for those bases, all at hugely inflated prices. Whatever the reasons for this, the operational practices of the international community have created a divide between the interests of the Afghan population and a significant section of its leaders, who stand to lose personally and monetarily if peace were to arrive.
Good to go
The disjunction between the concerns of Afghans and those of the Western compact was highlighted starkly in the December 2010 review of US strategy in Afghanistan. The review drew exceedingly positive conclusions of the US security strategy, claiming ‘notable operational gains’, ‘progress across all three assessed areas of al-Qa’ida, Pakistan and Afghanistan’ and ‘significant progress in disrupting and dismantling the Pakistan-based leadership and cadre of al-Qa’ida over the past year’. It also claimed that the security forces had ‘reduced overall Taliban influence and arrested the momentum they had achieved in recent years in key parts’ of Afghanistan. The glowing report card was presented even as civilian casualties increased sharply amidst a general rise in violence, increasing restrictions on the movement of the international community within Afghanistan and an increased threat level faced by the diplomatic community, even in relatively safe Kabul.
Photo credit: Marcin Bondarowicz
The contradictions between the US claims and ground realities are reconcilable, however, if one looks at the divergent goals between the US and the Afghan people. Speaking of the review, President Barrack Obama said, ‘From the start, I’ve been very clear about our core goal. It’s not to defeat every last threat to the security of Afghanistan, because, ultimately, it is Afghans who must secure their country. And it’s not nation-building, because it is Afghans who must build their nation. Rather, we are focused on disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.’
The Western coalition and the troop-contributing countries see themselves as answerable to their own populations – not to Afghans. As early as 2001, the US, reflecting ‘a desire by the American people to not seek only revenge, but to win a war against barbaric behaviour’, in the words of President George W Bush, prevented the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandated by the UN; and co-opted key militia commanders by equipping them in the pursuit of extremists turning a blind eye to their human-rights record and their terrorisation and brutality towards the local population. ISAF itself came under NATO command, later changed to US-led NATO command, and the cooption of militia leaders was carried on by several other Western countries with donor countries providing arms and money to specific commanders in the area, both in Kabul and, more specifically, in areas where their troops are based. By engaging with these commanders, they have also provided them with a degree of political legitimacy they might otherwise lack.
Receiving their wherewithal directly from the Western coalition, these militia commanders have remained unaccountable to the local population. They have also manipulated the considerable firepower of the Western military forces to target their political enemies and settle local rivalries, consolidating control in a situation of political flux. The international community did not deploy troops for the essential task of peacekeeping, and the strengthening of the Afghan army and police was neglected. All the while, the Afghan population was asked to support the Karzai government and its allies, and left at the mercy of insurgents, criminal networks and the drug mafia.
Civilian casualties caused by international forces and the response to them provide a clear example of the divergence of interests and the lack of accountability to the Afghan population. While the Afghan government has been paying solatia, or compensation, to civilians killed by the international forces, it lacks the authority to pursue action, either criminal or disciplinary, against the foreign military personnel. This task has been left to the discretion of the troop-contributing country. Instances of disciplinary action are rare and the civilian casualty figures acknowledged by the international forces remain consistently lower than those compiled by the UN. Most civilian casualties take place either due to lack of information or due diligence, but the numbers have almost certainly escalated because of the lack of punitive action.
Transition to what?
In seeking to hand over the responsibility of security to the Afghan security forces, the foremost concern of the Western coalition has been a timetable for pullout of troops to present to their own domestic public, rather than an appraisal based on the security for Afghans (see Himal December 2010, ‘Afghanistan: Too much, too little’). But how convinced is the Western coalition that Afghans are actually ready to begin the transition, now mandated to begin in early 2011?
In answer, panic followed the Karzai government’s decision to put a halt to the operations of private security companies in Afghanistan in October last year. The Western countries, most of whom use such companies, went into a frenzy, and private companies executing their projects said they would vote with their feet if the private security companies were shut down – a threat that most donor governments found both credible and justified. As recently as early January, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was asking President Karzai to increase the number of personnel in the private security companies. Yet the preparedness of the Afghan forces is nonetheless deemed sufficient to begin taking over the security of the country.
To ensure this ‘preparedness’ the international coalition has adopted two policies that are likely to further weaken the security apparatus of the Afghan state and endanger its citizens. The Afghan forces are now being built up at a rapid rate, with the emphasis on churning out numbers rather than ensuring quality of training and command structures. It is clear that an army and police force created in this manner will prove to be more of a threat than a panacea. In addition, since the numbers of personnel still remain below what is seen as required, the international forces are setting up community militias and arming communities. Needless, to say, these are two measures that have proven detrimental in Afghanistan, not just in the distant past but over the past three years, as communities fight each other and militias prey on the
general population.
Until the ‘security transition’ is recast as a transition from the goals of foreign troop-contributing countries to the concerns of the Afghan population, the rising tide of insecurity is unlikely to be reversed.
Donor-drive
The use of international aid to rebuild Afghanistan remains the most glaring example of a policy that is driven by the needs of donors rather than that of the Afghan population. An example of this is the underfunded ‘urgent humanitarian appeal’ launched by the UN for the past three years. Though the international community spends billions of dollars in Afghanistan each year, the humanitarian appeal identifying the most urgent requirements goes underfunded though it amounts to far less (USD 666 million in 2009, USD 775 million in 2010 and USD 678 million in 2011). This is because the bulk of aid continues to be spent bilaterally by donors following political and military objectives (see Himal August 2010, ‘Conferences, calendars and caveats’).
Major donors route their aid to the areas where their troops are based, and to sectors on which they would like to focus. Some, such as the US, make sure that a considerable portion of this money returns to American corporations. The commonly acknowledged rate of money returning back to the Western donor is between 40 and 50 percent. Beneficiary citizens ultimately receive a fraction of the original amount, with the rest going to overheads at each level of the sub-contracting process. The money leaks out in inflated salaries as well as inflated costs. The sub-contracting culture also means that the money reaches the final implementer very late, due to delays at each stage of the contracting process. Based on the donor’s annual budgetary cycle, the money is then required to be spent quickly, resulting in projects executed in a hurry, often shoddily.
Most donor countries have a system of accountability, but again, they answer to their own governments and elected representatives, not the Afghan beneficiaries. There are almost no mechanisms that allows the beneficiaries to have a say in aid projects, or how they are executed. The sight of private contractors executing projects while using hired guns to keep the ‘beneficiary population’ at bay is a common sight in Afghanistan. The system ensures that information about failed projects or misappropriation of money comes through only intermittently. Instances of companies being penalised because of complaints of beneficiaries, whether for badly constructed school buildings or inoperable water canal project are unheard of.
In fact, establishing accountability is not that hard, even within the existing remit. For example, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA), an Afghan civil-society organisation, started a project in 2007 that empowers local communities to monitor projects being executed in their name with donor or government money. The community selects trustworthy members who are trained in the task of monitoring, to ensure there are no compromises in the quality of the projects. IWA also enabled the local monitor groups to go up the chain of contractors, to obtain information from the donor as necessary. The popularity of the process is evident from the growing demands on IWA to train communities throughout the country. Nevertheless, such initiatives are rare and receive inadequate support from the donors.
Peace before justice
The absence of the Afghan citizen is most starkly evident in the current mantra of ‘reconciliation’. As the Western coalition seeks to exit, it is compromising on the small political, civil, democratic and human-rights gains made by and for the Afghan population since 2001. While rhetorical homage is being paid to the Constitution and the so-called ‘red lines’ that will prevent compromise on the most fundamental of rights for the Afghan people, the actual rollback of these rights is taking place even now on the international community’s watch.
In 2005, for example, the international community, led by the UN, had extended robust support to a Transitional Justice Action Plan. It focused on prosecution for war crimes, reparation for losses, and acknowledgement of the suffering of victims as a means of reconciling citizens and bringing a sense of closure to the past. In 2007, the international community opposed the adoption of a law that sought to provide blanket amnesty to all participants in the conflict, pointing out that the law was against the principles of justice and human rights and violated international humanitarian principles. In 2010, however, with the focus shifting to reconciliation with the armed opposition, the concerns of citizens received short shrift. The amnesty law has indeed been adopted by Kabul, with scarcely a murmur from the international community. In fact, the UN itself has put peace before transitional justice, not only delinking peace and justice but also suggesting that the two were mutually exclusive in the current context.
Meanwhile, there is escalating violence against women, reversing the trend of the initial post-Taliban years. Opinion surveys show support for women’s work outside the home has dropped, as has support for women in Parliament. The parliamentary elections of 2010 – which dragged on messily for over four months - demonstrated the international community's changing posture. In the name of ‘Afghanisation’ of the electoral process, the international community decided to step back from its stated goal of strengthening the electoral institutions and processes. Though at the time Himal went to press a resolution under international pressure looked likely, it was not before the democratic process had been put through the wringer, setting a bad precedent for the future. To stem this deterioration, the international community needs to do more to support the efforts of Afghan civil-society organisations, which have been voicing demands for a spectrum of rights – rights that are being marginalised in the hasty exit strategy.
Rather than treating human rights and democracy as inconvenient principles that need to be shelved or circumvented in the short term, the international community needs to look at the country’s long-term stability by supporting policies that would reflect the country’s complex and pluralistic social and political fabric, and by strengthening democracy, rule of law, justice and an inclusive polity. By proffering ‘Afghanisation’ as the reason for not playing its part, the international community is being disingenuous. For better or worse, it is international aid money that is the current dominant determinant in Afghanistan. By picking and choosing individuals, institutions and forces it wants to fund, it is the international community that shapes the Afghanistan of today – and moulds the Afghanistan of tomorrow.
Karzai visits Moscow as Russia eyes greater role in Afghanistan
Christian Science Monitor/January 21, 2011
President Hamid Karzai is in Moscow this week for the first bilateral summit between the two countries in two decades. The last Afghan president to visit Moscow on a state visit was Mohammad Najibullah, the final Soviet-backed president during whose term in office the Soviet Union withdrew forces.
The Soviet Union disintegrated soon after. Russia then kept a safe distance from involvement in the messy politics of Afghanistan, although it kept a watchful eye on the country.
Now, Russia is keen to play an increasingly larger role in the country and is gradually expanding the range and intensity of its engagement.
During Karzai's Moscow visit, Afghanistan and Russia are likely to sign agreements on political, social, economic, and defense cooperation initiatives, including the possible revival of some key infrastructure projects that had been implemented by the Soviet Union. Russia is keen not to only provide aid and training to Afghans, but to secure a piece of the aid pie for its businessmen in exchange for technical expertise.
Rehabilitation of the Salang tunnel, the main artery connecting northern Afghanistan to the south, for example, could be done with Russian expertise and international aid, say Russian officials.
Russia sees opportunity
Last year, the Russian government donated 20,000 AK-47 rifles to the Afghan government and trained some 250 Afghan police. This year it hopes to deepen its involvement and expand the number of military officers it trains in Moscow, says Andrey Avetisyan, the Russian ambassador to Afghanistan.
“The general situation during the past year has not developed in the way I could call safe and secure," he told the Monitor in an interview at the new Russian embassy in Kabul. "We now see constant fighting in the north, which worries us a lot because it is almost on our borders, [and] since our borders with the central Asian republics are absolutely open"
Two main threats emanating from Afghanistan are drugs and terrorism, and it's clear, he says, that they must be dealt at least at the Afghan border. "We are willing to support [Afghanistan] in any possible way, except direct military involvement in Afghanistan. No Russian soldier will ever be on Afghan soil."
Making the increased role of Russia possible
Russia has shed its concern about the presence of NATO and US troops in its backyard, and sees the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan as a top priority. It also now sees an opportunity to maximize its leverage with the US and NATO by using its influence on Central Asian countries.
Fahim Dashty, the editor of Kabul Weekly, points out that NATO itself changed its tune on a Russian role in Afghanistan because of its “need for a northern route into Afghanistan and the growing threat of the Taliban in the north.” The southern supply route of NATO that runs through Pakistan has been severely compromised by the growing number of attacks by insurgent and criminal groups. If NATO were to fail in Afghanistan, it would cost both Russia and NATO, he said.
“Military assistance from Russia will be welcome,” says Mr. Dashty, a former close associate of Ahmed Shah Masood, who led the armed resistance against the Soviet troops.
“The goals of the Russian Federation are quite different from that of the Soviet Union,” he says, although he was quick to reject the possibility of any Russian troops on Afghan soil.
A recent joint counternarcotics raid with Russian counternarcotics officials highlighted both the possibilities as well as limitation of a Russian role.
The raid last fall led to the recovery of a large quantity of heroin, but was criticized by President Karzai, who lashed out at Russian interference. Observers say Karzai was possibly preempting any political fallout.
However, senior government official and political analyst Najib Manalai says that while “there was a strong response from the government, there was no apparent reaction from the public. There have been many changes since the departure of the Russians. The emotional baggage of the past has been swept away by the misdeeds of the mujahideen.”
While Karzai’s anger was in keeping with his frequent outbursts against the international community, the subsequent conciliatory overtures were unusual.
Less than a week later, Karzai called Russian President Medvedev, and the two emphasized Russia’s role in Afghanistan including counternarcotics cooperation. As Western powers ready themselves for an exit, “the relationship with Russia is going to be key in the future,” says Candace Rondeaux of the International Crisis Group.
President Hamid Karzai is in Moscow this week for the first bilateral summit between the two countries in two decades. The last Afghan president to visit Moscow on a state visit was Mohammad Najibullah, the final Soviet-backed president during whose term in office the Soviet Union withdrew forces.
The Soviet Union disintegrated soon after. Russia then kept a safe distance from involvement in the messy politics of Afghanistan, although it kept a watchful eye on the country.
Now, Russia is keen to play an increasingly larger role in the country and is gradually expanding the range and intensity of its engagement.
During Karzai's Moscow visit, Afghanistan and Russia are likely to sign agreements on political, social, economic, and defense cooperation initiatives, including the possible revival of some key infrastructure projects that had been implemented by the Soviet Union. Russia is keen not to only provide aid and training to Afghans, but to secure a piece of the aid pie for its businessmen in exchange for technical expertise.
Rehabilitation of the Salang tunnel, the main artery connecting northern Afghanistan to the south, for example, could be done with Russian expertise and international aid, say Russian officials.
Russia sees opportunity
Last year, the Russian government donated 20,000 AK-47 rifles to the Afghan government and trained some 250 Afghan police. This year it hopes to deepen its involvement and expand the number of military officers it trains in Moscow, says Andrey Avetisyan, the Russian ambassador to Afghanistan.
“The general situation during the past year has not developed in the way I could call safe and secure," he told the Monitor in an interview at the new Russian embassy in Kabul. "We now see constant fighting in the north, which worries us a lot because it is almost on our borders, [and] since our borders with the central Asian republics are absolutely open"
Two main threats emanating from Afghanistan are drugs and terrorism, and it's clear, he says, that they must be dealt at least at the Afghan border. "We are willing to support [Afghanistan] in any possible way, except direct military involvement in Afghanistan. No Russian soldier will ever be on Afghan soil."
Making the increased role of Russia possible
Russia has shed its concern about the presence of NATO and US troops in its backyard, and sees the threat of terrorism from Afghanistan as a top priority. It also now sees an opportunity to maximize its leverage with the US and NATO by using its influence on Central Asian countries.
Fahim Dashty, the editor of Kabul Weekly, points out that NATO itself changed its tune on a Russian role in Afghanistan because of its “need for a northern route into Afghanistan and the growing threat of the Taliban in the north.” The southern supply route of NATO that runs through Pakistan has been severely compromised by the growing number of attacks by insurgent and criminal groups. If NATO were to fail in Afghanistan, it would cost both Russia and NATO, he said.
“Military assistance from Russia will be welcome,” says Mr. Dashty, a former close associate of Ahmed Shah Masood, who led the armed resistance against the Soviet troops.
“The goals of the Russian Federation are quite different from that of the Soviet Union,” he says, although he was quick to reject the possibility of any Russian troops on Afghan soil.
A recent joint counternarcotics raid with Russian counternarcotics officials highlighted both the possibilities as well as limitation of a Russian role.
The raid last fall led to the recovery of a large quantity of heroin, but was criticized by President Karzai, who lashed out at Russian interference. Observers say Karzai was possibly preempting any political fallout.
However, senior government official and political analyst Najib Manalai says that while “there was a strong response from the government, there was no apparent reaction from the public. There have been many changes since the departure of the Russians. The emotional baggage of the past has been swept away by the misdeeds of the mujahideen.”
While Karzai’s anger was in keeping with his frequent outbursts against the international community, the subsequent conciliatory overtures were unusual.
Less than a week later, Karzai called Russian President Medvedev, and the two emphasized Russia’s role in Afghanistan including counternarcotics cooperation. As Western powers ready themselves for an exit, “the relationship with Russia is going to be key in the future,” says Candace Rondeaux of the International Crisis Group.
Moscow Wants to Supply More Arms to Kabul -- Russian Envoy
Eurasianet/January 20, 2011
A EurasiaNet Q&A with Russian Ambassador Andrey Avetisyan
Afghan President Hamid Karzai is in Moscow for a two-day official visit that underscores the Kremlin’s growing political role in Afghanistan. The visit, which began January 20, also coincides with a deepening constitutional crisis inside Afghanistan, stemming from a dispute concerning the legitimacy of parliamentary elections [6] in 2010. While drugs [7] and terrorism top Russia’s agenda for Karzai’s visit, Russian Ambassador Andrey Avetisyan tells EurasiaNet.org in Kabul that Moscow would also like to benefit from a share in the defense pie as a commercial supplier.
EurasiaNet: Can you frame for us your concerns about the current situation in Afghanistan?
Avetisyan: We see constant fighting in the north, which worries us a lot. It is almost on our borders because you know we do not have proper borders with the Central Asian republics; they are absolutely open. Two main threats to Russia emanating from Afghanistan are drugs and terrorism. They must be dealt with here, or at least at the northern border of Afghanistan. So we try to encourage a regional approach to the Afghan issue including the Central Asian republics, which, like Russia, are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization [8].
The regional approach is something that is badly needed for the Afghan settlement. We know better than anybody how needed and how important peace in the region is, … but national reconciliation is the only way out of this. The international community’s role must be to support them [the Afghan parties to the conflict], not to find solutions for them, not to impose our visions of western democracy.
EurasiaNet: In what way are you prepared to support them?
Avetisyan: In any possible way, except through direct military involvement in Afghanistan. No Russian soldiers will ever [again] be on Afghan soil. Apart from that, everything is possible and we are doing many things already, for example, cooperating against drugs. There are plans for multilateral cooperation in this sphere.
EurasiaNet: Are you happy with the counter-narcotics policy being followed by the United States and NATO?
Avetisyan: With NATO and the United States we only have differences on eradication. … We are in favor of physical eradication like Afghan police do now. We are discussing the possibility of supplying the Afghan side with tractors and other means. We are absolutely not in favor of aerial spraying. We understand that this is a way of living for Afghan peasants. Even if we encourage and support eradication, we must substitute it with something.
We are absolutely certain that terrorism and drugs are inseparable. You fight drugs, you fight terrorism. You cannot fight terrorism without fighting drugs because that’s how they get their money.
EurasiaNet: Is the current military strategy employed by NATO and the Afghan government comprehensive enough?
Avetisyan: This war can’t be won. Everyone understands that now. I think the focus must be on training the Afghan national security forces -- serious training. It is not happening yet. Short-term training is not enough. To train a decent officer takes several years -- three, four or five years. Military academies must be set up here and military officers must be sent abroad for training. We have started with the police. We took 225 police officers to Russia [in 2010] in addition to running special courses for several hundred counter-narcotics police.
Apart from training, the strengthening of the national security forces includes ammunition, weapons, and all things necessary for an army to fight, so we support the approach of President Karzai when he asks allies to provide the army with real fighting capability. We recently supplied the Ministry of Interior with 20,000 AK-47 rifles. We are also discussing the possibility of providing the Afghan army and police with transport helicopters. If the Afghan army or police have other needs, we will consider it.
EurasiaNet: Are you also keen to sell your defense equipment to Afghanistan?
Avetisyan: Yes, of course we are, because we are a big producer, and at some point it will be on a commercial basis. In Lisbon [at a NATO meeting in November], there was an agreement with NATO to set up a trust fund to service and maintain Russian helicopters and to train technicians. We are in discussions on the purchase of Russian equipment [for the Afghan army] with members of the [NATO] coalition.
A EurasiaNet Q&A with Russian Ambassador Andrey Avetisyan
Afghan President Hamid Karzai is in Moscow for a two-day official visit that underscores the Kremlin’s growing political role in Afghanistan. The visit, which began January 20, also coincides with a deepening constitutional crisis inside Afghanistan, stemming from a dispute concerning the legitimacy of parliamentary elections [6] in 2010. While drugs [7] and terrorism top Russia’s agenda for Karzai’s visit, Russian Ambassador Andrey Avetisyan tells EurasiaNet.org in Kabul that Moscow would also like to benefit from a share in the defense pie as a commercial supplier.
EurasiaNet: Can you frame for us your concerns about the current situation in Afghanistan?
Avetisyan: We see constant fighting in the north, which worries us a lot. It is almost on our borders because you know we do not have proper borders with the Central Asian republics; they are absolutely open. Two main threats to Russia emanating from Afghanistan are drugs and terrorism. They must be dealt with here, or at least at the northern border of Afghanistan. So we try to encourage a regional approach to the Afghan issue including the Central Asian republics, which, like Russia, are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization [8].
The regional approach is something that is badly needed for the Afghan settlement. We know better than anybody how needed and how important peace in the region is, … but national reconciliation is the only way out of this. The international community’s role must be to support them [the Afghan parties to the conflict], not to find solutions for them, not to impose our visions of western democracy.
EurasiaNet: In what way are you prepared to support them?
Avetisyan: In any possible way, except through direct military involvement in Afghanistan. No Russian soldiers will ever [again] be on Afghan soil. Apart from that, everything is possible and we are doing many things already, for example, cooperating against drugs. There are plans for multilateral cooperation in this sphere.
EurasiaNet: Are you happy with the counter-narcotics policy being followed by the United States and NATO?
Avetisyan: With NATO and the United States we only have differences on eradication. … We are in favor of physical eradication like Afghan police do now. We are discussing the possibility of supplying the Afghan side with tractors and other means. We are absolutely not in favor of aerial spraying. We understand that this is a way of living for Afghan peasants. Even if we encourage and support eradication, we must substitute it with something.
We are absolutely certain that terrorism and drugs are inseparable. You fight drugs, you fight terrorism. You cannot fight terrorism without fighting drugs because that’s how they get their money.
EurasiaNet: Is the current military strategy employed by NATO and the Afghan government comprehensive enough?
Avetisyan: This war can’t be won. Everyone understands that now. I think the focus must be on training the Afghan national security forces -- serious training. It is not happening yet. Short-term training is not enough. To train a decent officer takes several years -- three, four or five years. Military academies must be set up here and military officers must be sent abroad for training. We have started with the police. We took 225 police officers to Russia [in 2010] in addition to running special courses for several hundred counter-narcotics police.
Apart from training, the strengthening of the national security forces includes ammunition, weapons, and all things necessary for an army to fight, so we support the approach of President Karzai when he asks allies to provide the army with real fighting capability. We recently supplied the Ministry of Interior with 20,000 AK-47 rifles. We are also discussing the possibility of providing the Afghan army and police with transport helicopters. If the Afghan army or police have other needs, we will consider it.
EurasiaNet: Are you also keen to sell your defense equipment to Afghanistan?
Avetisyan: Yes, of course we are, because we are a big producer, and at some point it will be on a commercial basis. In Lisbon [at a NATO meeting in November], there was an agreement with NATO to set up a trust fund to service and maintain Russian helicopters and to train technicians. We are in discussions on the purchase of Russian equipment [for the Afghan army] with members of the [NATO] coalition.
Donor Funding Missing Mark
Eurasianet/December 28, 2010
Aid workers in Afghanistan say the expanding scope of the Islamic radical insurgency is fueling a humanitarian crisis. Emergency aid agencies say they need several hundred million dollars to address the threat of widespread hunger. But foreign donors who have troops in Afghanistan are reluctant to admit the situation continues to deteriorate, aid workers complain, leaving the humanitarian needs consistently under-funded.
Half of Afghan children less than five years old are underweight and 16.7 percent face acute malnutrition, according to the United Nations' new Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan. Approximately 7.8 million of the country's 26 million -- or more than a quarter of the population -- will need food assistance in 2011.
After donors funded last year's annual appeal by only 66 percent, the UN has been more specific and restrained in its request, despite the increasing need. The appeal, launched on December 5, is for $678 million, nearly $100 million less than last year, even though it records Afghanistan's "dramatic increase in humanitarian need for its chronically vulnerable rural population."
"We have a more specific focus on life-saving activities that are critically important," David Del Conte, the Senior Field Coordinator for the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan, told EurasiaNet.org. "Afghanistan has gone through so much suffering. We are trying to ameliorate and prevent loss of life and loss of livelihood and meet the most basic needs."
By focusing on the purely humanitarian needs, the Consolidated Appeal hopes to foster a better response from donors. "This is a more effective marketing tool," said Resident Humanitarian Coordinator Robert Watkins, the UN's Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan.
The appeal is the largest worldwide. Yet, compared to the amount of development money poured into Afghanistan by donors annually, the humanitarian aid request "is peanuts," admitted Watkins.
While, in principle, humanitarian aid must be delivered in a neutral and impartial manner to anyone who needs it -- including combatants -- development aid in Afghanistan is largely tied to political and military objectives such as strengthening the Afghan government. Development aid is also delivered in large part by private commercial contractors or through the international military forces' provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Non-governmental organization (NGO) activists have long complained that humanitarian aid is being neglected because donors are unable to use it to score political points.
"The US government alone spends around $4.4 billion annually" on development, estimates a senior UN official. Donors are unwilling to provide consolidated figures but "the international community spends between $6-$8 billion annually" on development and security for development projects, said the official on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of criticizing the donors.
The lack of interest in funding humanitarian aid is also political, says Farhana Faruqi-Stocker, the managing director of Afghanaid, an NGO that works with rural communities. "It is difficult for donors who have spent billions in aid in Afghanistan to admit to their domestic public that the situation in Afghanistan is going from bad to worse, that the basic indicators of human security and well-being are getting worse in large parts of the country."
A recent paper by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit points out that while the 2008 Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) paid "considerable attention to the goal of poverty reduction," the topic had slipped off the agenda at donor conferences this year. "Reconciliation, reintegration and anti-corruption" measures took precedence. Development projects focusing on the economy emphasized job creation rather than poverty reduction, the AREU report notes.
The dire humanitarian predictions contradict donor and military claims that they are making the security, governance and development gains necessary to allow them to exit Afghanistan. The UN estimates that 177,169 people have been displaced due to conflict this year. 400,000 children are at risk of losing access to regular education. The food security situation is likely to worsen during the lean winter season, December to April, the Consolidated Appeal predicts, adding that the "number of people lacking the minimum daily kilocalorie intake has steadily increased since 2005."
The humanitarian and security situations are linked, a recent investigative report in Kabul's weekly Killid magazine illustrated. The unemployed appear to be joining the Taliban out of pure economic necessity. One youth who had joined the Taliban said, "I was fed up with being jobless. People despised me. I couldn't find any work so I had to pick up a weapon to fight the government. I had to join the Taliban as a last resort. Now that I have a weapon, I have both work and food."
In the "most likely scenario," the UN's appeal predicts "increased conflict leading to a deterioration of security, displacements and expansion of conflict to currently stable areas. That situation would hamper development progress and increase the demand for humanitarian interventions." The displaced will have less access to aid, moreover, as the increasing conflict makes it progressively more difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach affected areas.
Any residual hope for Afghanistan has faded into an emergency, it seems.
"Over the past three years we have seen an increase in violence and a number of natural disasters. Now the needs are growing ... compounding the impact of chronic needs and increasing the vulnerable population," said OCHA's Del Conte.
Aid workers in Afghanistan say the expanding scope of the Islamic radical insurgency is fueling a humanitarian crisis. Emergency aid agencies say they need several hundred million dollars to address the threat of widespread hunger. But foreign donors who have troops in Afghanistan are reluctant to admit the situation continues to deteriorate, aid workers complain, leaving the humanitarian needs consistently under-funded.
Half of Afghan children less than five years old are underweight and 16.7 percent face acute malnutrition, according to the United Nations' new Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan. Approximately 7.8 million of the country's 26 million -- or more than a quarter of the population -- will need food assistance in 2011.
After donors funded last year's annual appeal by only 66 percent, the UN has been more specific and restrained in its request, despite the increasing need. The appeal, launched on December 5, is for $678 million, nearly $100 million less than last year, even though it records Afghanistan's "dramatic increase in humanitarian need for its chronically vulnerable rural population."
"We have a more specific focus on life-saving activities that are critically important," David Del Conte, the Senior Field Coordinator for the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan, told EurasiaNet.org. "Afghanistan has gone through so much suffering. We are trying to ameliorate and prevent loss of life and loss of livelihood and meet the most basic needs."
By focusing on the purely humanitarian needs, the Consolidated Appeal hopes to foster a better response from donors. "This is a more effective marketing tool," said Resident Humanitarian Coordinator Robert Watkins, the UN's Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan.
The appeal is the largest worldwide. Yet, compared to the amount of development money poured into Afghanistan by donors annually, the humanitarian aid request "is peanuts," admitted Watkins.
While, in principle, humanitarian aid must be delivered in a neutral and impartial manner to anyone who needs it -- including combatants -- development aid in Afghanistan is largely tied to political and military objectives such as strengthening the Afghan government. Development aid is also delivered in large part by private commercial contractors or through the international military forces' provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Non-governmental organization (NGO) activists have long complained that humanitarian aid is being neglected because donors are unable to use it to score political points.
"The US government alone spends around $4.4 billion annually" on development, estimates a senior UN official. Donors are unwilling to provide consolidated figures but "the international community spends between $6-$8 billion annually" on development and security for development projects, said the official on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of criticizing the donors.
The lack of interest in funding humanitarian aid is also political, says Farhana Faruqi-Stocker, the managing director of Afghanaid, an NGO that works with rural communities. "It is difficult for donors who have spent billions in aid in Afghanistan to admit to their domestic public that the situation in Afghanistan is going from bad to worse, that the basic indicators of human security and well-being are getting worse in large parts of the country."
A recent paper by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit points out that while the 2008 Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) paid "considerable attention to the goal of poverty reduction," the topic had slipped off the agenda at donor conferences this year. "Reconciliation, reintegration and anti-corruption" measures took precedence. Development projects focusing on the economy emphasized job creation rather than poverty reduction, the AREU report notes.
The dire humanitarian predictions contradict donor and military claims that they are making the security, governance and development gains necessary to allow them to exit Afghanistan. The UN estimates that 177,169 people have been displaced due to conflict this year. 400,000 children are at risk of losing access to regular education. The food security situation is likely to worsen during the lean winter season, December to April, the Consolidated Appeal predicts, adding that the "number of people lacking the minimum daily kilocalorie intake has steadily increased since 2005."
The humanitarian and security situations are linked, a recent investigative report in Kabul's weekly Killid magazine illustrated. The unemployed appear to be joining the Taliban out of pure economic necessity. One youth who had joined the Taliban said, "I was fed up with being jobless. People despised me. I couldn't find any work so I had to pick up a weapon to fight the government. I had to join the Taliban as a last resort. Now that I have a weapon, I have both work and food."
In the "most likely scenario," the UN's appeal predicts "increased conflict leading to a deterioration of security, displacements and expansion of conflict to currently stable areas. That situation would hamper development progress and increase the demand for humanitarian interventions." The displaced will have less access to aid, moreover, as the increasing conflict makes it progressively more difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach affected areas.
Any residual hope for Afghanistan has faded into an emergency, it seems.
"Over the past three years we have seen an increase in violence and a number of natural disasters. Now the needs are growing ... compounding the impact of chronic needs and increasing the vulnerable population," said OCHA's Del Conte.
Mothers – the hidden addicts of Afghanistan
The Independent/December 12,2010
Mariana lies on her bed in the Sanga Amaj clinic in Kabul. She shares a small ward with 12 women enrolled in the clinic's 45-day residential drug rehabilitation programme. At 22, she is five months pregnant with her fourth child. Her one-year-old son lies in a separate room of the clinic. He is also addicted to opium.
Mariana is one of an estimated one million Afghan adults addicted to illegal drugs, according to the latest survey from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). At 8 per cent of the adult population, this is twice the global average. Mariana's opium dependence was not a result of recreational experimentation. She is one of the estimated thousands of Afghan women dependent on the outlawed and highly addictive painkiller because they cannot access medicines or medical help. In Mariana's case, it started four years ago after she gave birth. "During the birth of my first child I lost a lot of blood. There was no doctor. After that I had a lot of pain in my legs and my back, but we couldn't afford medicines," she says.
Opium paste, though banned, can be bought under the counter at small shops in most bazaars here and throughout Kabul. The opium latex is boiled and distilled into a thick sticky paste the consistency of putty and chewed like tobacco. "I started taking some opium paste with my tea," says Mariana. "Without the opium to dull my pain I could not clean, cook or look after my baby. Over the past year I have become deeply addicted and need to take the opium every day."
Afghanistan produces more than 90 per cent of the world's opium and heroin. About 123,000 hectares are given over to farming the poppies used to process the drugs, according to UNODC's 2010 survey. Years of efforts by the UN, the US and other nations to wean Afghan farmers off opium cultivation have failed. Output fell this year after the crops were hit by disease, but UNODC has warned output is likely to rise again.
Southern Afghanistan, the most volatile part of the country, accounts for 87 per cent of production. The bulk of this comes from Kandahar and Helmand provinces, where international military forces have been engaged in intense battles to oust the Taliban. "These regions are dominated by insurgency and organised crime networks," said the UNODC executive director, Yuri Fedotov.
Mariana explains that, unable to cope with the demands of three children, she began giving the opium to her youngest child to lull him to sleep. As a result, her baby son also became addicted and was enrolled in the programme. "There is traditional use of opium to calm children," says Gilberto Gerra, chief of the drug prevention and health branch of the UNODC. "It is difficult to distinguish between traditional use and addictive use. Many people are not aware of becoming addicted and they go from the grey area to the black area."
The latest statistics show a huge leap in the rate of addiction since the last survey in 2005. While opium use has increased by about 53 per cent, the proportion of heroin users has increased by 140 per cent due to the cheap availability of both drugs. UNODC says the true numbers of women addicts is likely to be much higher. Only 3 per cent of those interviewed for UNODC's survey were women.
"Cultural constraints also prevent access to women," says Sarah Waller, a drug demand reduction consultant with the UNODC. "Women tend to use drugs in their homes. They are an extremely hidden population."
Mariana is unusual in that her family allowed her to enrol in a residential clinic. "It is very difficult to convince families to let them complete the course," says Dr Latifa Hamidi, a co-ordinator at the Sanga Amaj clinic. The clinic does not advertise its location to ensure its security, and visits by outsiders such as journalists are carefully monitored.
While much investment has gone into trying to curb production, there has been less attention on the problem of addiction. "The treatment gap is enormous," Ms Waller says. There are only 40 treatment centres with a maximum capacity of 760 beds, though they can cater to 10,000 addicts, including through outpatient facilities as well as home-based care.
Robert Watkins, deputy special representative of the UN Secretary-General, points out that the causes of addiction require as much attention as treatment. "We also have to spend a lot of time looking at the root causes, and those are much more challenging and difficult to overcome, strongly rooted in poverty and the inability to access treatment not just for addiction but other ailments."
"Short-term funding for up to a year is not really a solution. Sustainable, longer-term funding solutions have to be sought," Ms Waller says. The risk of relapse is very high if patients go back to the same conditions which led to the drug addiction in the first place, points out Gilberto Gerra. Sustainable livelihoods need to complement drug reduction programmes.
Solutions in Afghanistan need to be tailor-made to the situation. They have to include not just medical treatment for physical addiction, but also for dealing with mental health issues of a population traumatised by a conflict that shows no sign of ending.
Mariana lies on her bed in the Sanga Amaj clinic in Kabul. She shares a small ward with 12 women enrolled in the clinic's 45-day residential drug rehabilitation programme. At 22, she is five months pregnant with her fourth child. Her one-year-old son lies in a separate room of the clinic. He is also addicted to opium.
Mariana is one of an estimated one million Afghan adults addicted to illegal drugs, according to the latest survey from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). At 8 per cent of the adult population, this is twice the global average. Mariana's opium dependence was not a result of recreational experimentation. She is one of the estimated thousands of Afghan women dependent on the outlawed and highly addictive painkiller because they cannot access medicines or medical help. In Mariana's case, it started four years ago after she gave birth. "During the birth of my first child I lost a lot of blood. There was no doctor. After that I had a lot of pain in my legs and my back, but we couldn't afford medicines," she says.
Opium paste, though banned, can be bought under the counter at small shops in most bazaars here and throughout Kabul. The opium latex is boiled and distilled into a thick sticky paste the consistency of putty and chewed like tobacco. "I started taking some opium paste with my tea," says Mariana. "Without the opium to dull my pain I could not clean, cook or look after my baby. Over the past year I have become deeply addicted and need to take the opium every day."
Afghanistan produces more than 90 per cent of the world's opium and heroin. About 123,000 hectares are given over to farming the poppies used to process the drugs, according to UNODC's 2010 survey. Years of efforts by the UN, the US and other nations to wean Afghan farmers off opium cultivation have failed. Output fell this year after the crops were hit by disease, but UNODC has warned output is likely to rise again.
Southern Afghanistan, the most volatile part of the country, accounts for 87 per cent of production. The bulk of this comes from Kandahar and Helmand provinces, where international military forces have been engaged in intense battles to oust the Taliban. "These regions are dominated by insurgency and organised crime networks," said the UNODC executive director, Yuri Fedotov.
Mariana explains that, unable to cope with the demands of three children, she began giving the opium to her youngest child to lull him to sleep. As a result, her baby son also became addicted and was enrolled in the programme. "There is traditional use of opium to calm children," says Gilberto Gerra, chief of the drug prevention and health branch of the UNODC. "It is difficult to distinguish between traditional use and addictive use. Many people are not aware of becoming addicted and they go from the grey area to the black area."
The latest statistics show a huge leap in the rate of addiction since the last survey in 2005. While opium use has increased by about 53 per cent, the proportion of heroin users has increased by 140 per cent due to the cheap availability of both drugs. UNODC says the true numbers of women addicts is likely to be much higher. Only 3 per cent of those interviewed for UNODC's survey were women.
"Cultural constraints also prevent access to women," says Sarah Waller, a drug demand reduction consultant with the UNODC. "Women tend to use drugs in their homes. They are an extremely hidden population."
Mariana is unusual in that her family allowed her to enrol in a residential clinic. "It is very difficult to convince families to let them complete the course," says Dr Latifa Hamidi, a co-ordinator at the Sanga Amaj clinic. The clinic does not advertise its location to ensure its security, and visits by outsiders such as journalists are carefully monitored.
While much investment has gone into trying to curb production, there has been less attention on the problem of addiction. "The treatment gap is enormous," Ms Waller says. There are only 40 treatment centres with a maximum capacity of 760 beds, though they can cater to 10,000 addicts, including through outpatient facilities as well as home-based care.
Robert Watkins, deputy special representative of the UN Secretary-General, points out that the causes of addiction require as much attention as treatment. "We also have to spend a lot of time looking at the root causes, and those are much more challenging and difficult to overcome, strongly rooted in poverty and the inability to access treatment not just for addiction but other ailments."
"Short-term funding for up to a year is not really a solution. Sustainable, longer-term funding solutions have to be sought," Ms Waller says. The risk of relapse is very high if patients go back to the same conditions which led to the drug addiction in the first place, points out Gilberto Gerra. Sustainable livelihoods need to complement drug reduction programmes.
Solutions in Afghanistan need to be tailor-made to the situation. They have to include not just medical treatment for physical addiction, but also for dealing with mental health issues of a population traumatised by a conflict that shows no sign of ending.
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