Justice fails Afghan women

Al Jazeera
By
Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul

Many female prisoners face rejection by their families after their release [File: EPA]
Afghanistan is building new jails for women. Though there are only 300 female prisoners now, that number is expected to grow.
While there are no signs of a crime wave, one of the reasons for the increase is an unlikely one.
Lacking in transitional houses for released prisoners, a suggested solution includes using jails as secure places where women can stay until they are reintegrated into society. By some strange logic, funding for building jails is much easier to come by. But again, half of the women in jail should not be there at all.
Imprisoned for what are loosely described as "moral crimes", these women would qualify as victims rather than criminals under any interpretation of international human rights laws, including those to which Afghanistan is a signatory.
A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on Afghanistan's female prisoners and their social reintegration drew attention to their dismal condition in a country where women face acute discrimination.
Not only are an estimated half victims themselves, but they are further victimised by the criminal justice process.
And on release from prison, they face victimisation for a third time. This can take the form of, at best, the family leaving the woman to fend for herself, and at worst, a so-called honour killing.Released in Kabul on Sunday, the UNODC report recommended laws changes, better facilities and improved legal aid to address some of the issues facing female prisoners. These suggestions were debated with representatives of the ministry of justice, the supreme court and other Afghan departments.
Forced marriagesThe UN women's fund (Unifem) found that 80 per cent of the violence perpetrated against women in Afghanistan originated in their homes.According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), 60 to 80 per cent of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, some of them involving girls as young as six years old.
Subjected to sexual and psychological abuse along with violence in their marital home, many girls run away. And when they come in contact with Afghanistan's criminal justice system, instead of receiving any protection, they are seen as offenders and convicted.
Opening a seminar organised jointly with the ministry of justice, Christina Orguz, UNODC country office representative, said that many people do not want to talk about the issue of female inmates.
Many are "in prison for things that would make them victims not perpetrators", she said.
Increased awarenessAnou Borrey, a gender and justice consultant with Unifem, said: "There is a need to increase the awareness of women about their rights so they don't end up in prison".
She said simple measures like registering marriages and the birth of a child could prevent adultery charges and stop child marriages.
"Currently the majority of the female prisoners are being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms" UN Office on Drugs and Crime"Currently the majority of the female prisoners are being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms," UNODC said.
The reason is the lack of a robust formal criminal justice system.
An estimated 80 per cent of all legal cases are dealt with by the traditional justice system, based on customary laws that vary from region to region and tribe to tribe.
Documentation of the customary laws by the International Legal Foundation showed that the laws are at their most discriminatory towards women.Not only are women penalised disproportionately for crimes, but they are punished on evidentiary standards that discriminate against them. Moreover, some of the customary laws also allow for them to be used as barter for settling other disputes, debts and feuds.
"In the restorative practice of the justice in Afghanistan, women who are regarded as the property of men, are often used as valuable commodities in the settlement of crimes and disputes" UNODC said.
"Rape may be treated as adultery and punished accordingly if a settlement cannot be reached between the two families concerned."
Unclear definitionEven Afghanistan's formal justice system does not clearly define rape as a separate crime, including it under the offence of "zina" or adultery, pederasty and violation of honour.
In practice, a woman often has to prove her lack of consent in a rape case in order to avoid being punished for it.
Although there is no distinct penalty for rape, there is a distinction - the so-called honour crimes. Those who commit them are exempt from the charge of murder, the conviction is discretionary and imprisonment is for a maximum of two years.
A 30-year-old woman serving a six year sentence in Pul-e-Charkhi jail became the victim of this clause of the law.
When her husband killed his neighbour during a dispute, he claimed he had been driven to murder by the man committing adultery with his "property". He received leniency from the court and his wife was jailed for committing adultery.
Mercenary reasonsSeveral women who were interviewed by UNODC were verbally divorced and had married again, but were later "reported" by their first husbands and jailed. In one case the woman had been in her second marriage for 10 years and had given birth to five children.
"Rape may be treated as adultery and punished accordingly if a settlement cannot be reached between the two families concerned" UN Office of Drugs and CrimeThe reason is not necessarily malignancy but often mercenary. If a man can prove his "property" has been seized by another, he can claim compensation using the threat of the criminal justice system.
But, as the UNODC report says, being in prison for moral crimes is only part of the problem.
Other women are dealt with outside the formal justice system, a threat that still awaits the prisoners when they step out of jail.
Shukria Noori, the national project co-ordinator for social reintegration of prisoners, says that women may be "threatened, violated and even killed".
Shelters for women do not have the capacity to absorb the large numbers of victims and are reluctant to accept inmates from prison, she said.
Borrey said there is a lack of support from the government, non-governmental organisations and the community to ensure that the women are reintegrated.Even if she does not become the victim of a so-called honour crime, a female prisoner's chance of survival after her release is very low.
Social moresIn a substantial number of cases, her family refuses to take her back. She has few marketable skills and Afghanistan's social mores make it extremely difficult for a single woman to survive on her own.
"A lot of women in prison are not criminals according to international standards" Dorothea Grieger, a criminal justice programme assistant with UNODC, said.
"But the underlying principles of minimum standard rules apply to them as well. Improvement should be used to help them to lead self-supporting lives after release."
This is something that UN bodies and women's organisations like Medica Mondiale are trying to address.
Legal aid as well as literacy, education and vocational training inside the prisons would empower the women prisoners with some marketable skills that could help them survive.
But most important of all perhaps is preparing them for release.
Mediation with the family, local elders or religious leaders enhances the chances of her acceptance. Sudden releases, like during Id al-Fitr, can actually harm the women more, leaving them on the streets.

No jirga like a peace jirga

Himal
Analysis
Kabul and Islamabad have taken an important step back from guiding the attempt at détente. Now it’s up to the myriad others to take the nascent peace process forward.
By : Aunohita Mojumdar
Now let’s get down to business: Pakistani jirga members arrive in Kabul, August 2007
In the feeding frenzy of deadline journalism, the first-ever Afghanistan-Pakistan ‘peace jirga’ quickly turned into a snack for the mass media. Insta-pundits and participants were asked to offer snap assessments of the four-day jamboree. Demanding instantaneous declarations on whether the jirga, held 9-12 August in Kabul, had been a failure or a success, media organisations sought to simplify the phenomenon, variously terming it a ‘tribal assembly’ or reducing it to the pronouncements by Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf. But the jirga itself was much more than that.
Though termed a jirga because it was modelled on the tribal assemblies of the past, the ‘peace jirga’, like the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002 and the Constitutional Loya Jirga of 2003, included not just tribal leaders, but also politicians, warlords and refugees recently returned to their homeland. The previous jirgas had seen the proactive, behind-the-scenes presence of the international community. During the peace jirga, however, there was a concerted effort to minimise international presence, and to emphasise the indigenous nature of the event. But the fact was that the idea of the peace jirga itself was first mooted in Washington, DC last year, following the separate meetings of presidents Musharraf and Karzai with George W Bush.
Backed by the US, and held at the initiative of the Kabul and Islamabad governments, the jirga departed from the traditional script by handing over some of the lead to non-government representatives. Parliamentarians, provincial-council members, tribal leaders, elders, civil-society activists as well as representatives of Islamabad and Kabul were brought together in the marathon four-day gathering. While a high degree of government involvement ensured that the jirga did not throw up completely unpleasant surprises, the format allowed the participants to debate issues without the pressures of government agendas, diplomatic niceties and the need to produce rhetorical results.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the meeting was that it was held at all, and allowed some 700 Afghans and Pakistanis to come together and openly exchange views. In the tense and fraught relationship between the two countries (and certainly between their capitals), such exchanges are exceptional. Of late, most of the traffic between the neighbours has been one way, with Afghans travelling to Pakistan – for refuge, for employment, for trade and even, Kabul would allege, for militant training. Here was a rare opportunity for opinion-makers from the two countries to discuss outstanding crossborder issues.
The intense involvement of Pakistan over the last two decades of Afghanistan’s conflict has resulted in a constant blame game. Though much of Islamabad’s involvement was fuelled by Western powers playing out the Cold War, Kabul would now like nothing more than to lay the blame for all conflict within its borders squarely on Pakistan. This would help to absolve the Afghan government of the pressure of admitting its failures regarding internal reconciliation and power sharing with disparate political groups. Islamabad, on the other hand, would like to point fingers at this very factor, insisting that the violence is bred wholly within the neighbour, and refusing to admit that the support and safe havens inside Pakistani territory energise the violence and complicate the politics of the insurgency, allowing for no easy solution.
Attempts over the last six years to produce some kind of détente have been largely confined to the two governments, and have yielded little – instead, exacerbating tensions as the political leadership engages in the ritual finger pointing. By now stepping away from full control of the attempted peace process, the two governments can be credited with at least the realisation that peace must include a people’s engagement, as well as the task of addressing the issues of dissatisfied communities.
And peopleThe August peace jirga took cognisance of this realisation, and its eventual recommendations addressed the shortcomings of both the Pakistani and Afghan governments. A joint declaration described “terrorism” as a “common threat”, and pledged that “the government and people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centres for terrorists in their respective countries.” This is an oft repeated sentiment, of course, but a crucial difference here was the reference to “people”. The sharing of the onus of responsibility with the citizenry was further spelled out in the recommendations of the subcommittees that were set up to look at various issues. These called for “utilising tribal influence and traditional means against terrorism”, and stated that “whoever gives sanctuary to a terrorist or otherwise supports him should be identified by the concerned tribe to the government authorities.”
The declaration and recommendations, if implemented with commitment, would indeed strengthen current attempts to rein in militant elements in the frontier. Islamabad and Kabul have varying and fluctuating degrees of control in these areas, and their best-intentioned plans for implementing order would make little headway without the support of the local inhabitants and the loose power structures of tribes and communities that form the de facto frontier government.
The downside of devolving the responsibility onto the ‘people’ is that it has the potential to divest the governments of responsibility. Two such ‘local peace agreements’ – in North Waziristan, and on a much smaller scale in Musa Qala District of Helmund in Afghanistan – have unravelled spectacularly, potentially leaving the areas even more unstable than before. The insecurity in North Waziristan has recently escalated to such an extent that there were few participants from the area at the peace jirga, an absence attributed to fears of retribution from those opposing the jirga, most notably the Taliban.
Participation, or lack thereof, was one of the main weaknesses of the jirga, and this eroded some of its achievements. Missing were not only some of the tribal and community leaders from the Pakistani border areas and senior members of Pakistan’s opposition parties, but also anti-government insurgents in Afghanistan. Since the participation of Afghan delegates in the jirga mandated adherence to the Constitution and laying-down of arms, it automatically precluded any representation from those groups engaged in armed struggle.
Despite the weaknesses in participation, the meet did underline the importance of engaging with these groups. The joint declaration resolved to constitute a jirgagai, or a smaller jirga of 25 representatives from each country, which would, among other things, work to expedite the ongoing process of dialogue for peace and reconciliation with the “opposition”. When asked to spell out exactly what ‘opposition’ meant in this case, the jirga functionaries were coy about the specifics, but admitted it included those not reconciled with the government.
Regardless, the fact that the issue of reconciliation and militant sanctuaries appeared in the joint declaration represents a step forward for both governments, taken at the behest of the civil society in each country. Afghan Urban Development Minister Yousaf Pashtun told this writer that the jirga represented the two countries coming to “a more realistic approach on the issue”. Likewise, Kabul’s top official on the jirga, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Farooq Wardak, said the big achievement was that the two countries had adopted a common stand on the issue of ‘terrorism’ – a unified approach rather than that of two parties.
Much of the success or failure of the jirga will, of course, depend on the subsequent steps taken. The jirgagai is supposed to meet at regular intervals to oversee the implementation of the summit’s decisions. The five new subcommittees also have an extensive list of their own recommendations, including: relaxing trade restrictions, expediting clearance of goods at border crossings, establishing relations between the universities of the two countries, deployment of Pakistani doctors in Afghanistan, technical training of Afghans, identifying special export zones in the border areas, exchange of parliamentary delegations, establishing a crossborder chamber of commerce, cultural and media exchanges, a joint committee to counter drug trafficking, and bilateral education and social-welfare projects in militancy-affected areas.
If even a portion of these initiatives is eventually implemented, the result would be a multilayered interaction between the people of both countries. This would herald a gradual deceleration of the extant mutual hostility. By operating a step away from the governments, the members of the jirga would face less of the jingoistic pressure under which politicians inevitably find themselves. Both their mandate and their achievements would be based on real progress on peace, rather than on the shrill hostility that politicians in power often utilise to secure popular appeal.
Only time will tell whether the jirga will actually prove to be a functional blueprint for use in other parts of Southasia, where people’s engagement could be tapped to reduce hostility and lay the groundwork for solving longstanding problems. Otherwise, the Afghanistan-Pakistan peace jirga of August 2007 will remain nothing more than a four-day wonder.

Reform of Afghan police force hindered

By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul

FT.com site

Published: Sep 03, 2007

Reform of the Afghan police system has been hindered by neglect by the international donor community, according to a Brussels-based think-tank, leaving the force corrupt, inefficient, and politicised.
In a report released Thursday, the International Crisis Group said that despite being paid less than the army, police were being used in anti-insurgency operations for which they are ill-trained and badly equipped. Last year (May 2006-2007), 406 police officers were killed compared with 170 soldiers, it said.
There have been some improvements in terms of equipment and buildings, the report said, but the "return on invested human and financial capital is modest ".
The ICG criticised the lead nation approach in which different donor countries were given responsibility for different security sectors - the US for the Afghan National Army and Germany (recently replaced by the EU Police Mission to Afghanistan) for the police. This, it said, resulted in the "absence of a comprehensive strategy " and a failure to grasp the "centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors ".
The Afghan National Army "received the lion's share of attention though a reformed police and judiciary would have had far more impact on the average citizen's life and perception of the government's legitimacy, "according to the report.
The outcome has been the emergence of a police force that citizens view "more as a source of fear than of security, " ICG said, noting that currently even the numbers of Afghanistan's police force on duty are not known.
The report documents a highly politicised appointments procedure with factional networks and those linked to the drugs world competing for posts, especially ones that oversee smuggling routes. ICG said the Karzai government lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and end political interference, merely shuffling police chiefs from one province to another in response to complaints.
Presidential spokesperson Humayun Hamidzada said: "I have not seen the report as yet, but in general I can say the president and the government are trying seriously to reform the police. The president yesterday called a meeting of police chiefs and spoke of the urgent need of building confidence and regaining the trust of the people. "
Dr Ali Wardak, a senior researcher with the Centre for Policy and Human Development, who has not seen the report either but has been working on the issue of rule of law, said: "One of the problems with the Afghan national police is that it does not operate as an integral part of the justice system and has little to do with prosecution. The judicial system should be one system in its entirety. "

Karzai blames west for poppy 'explosion'

By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul and Alex Barker and James Blitz,in London,

Financial TimesPublished: Aug 30, 2007

Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, yesterday launch-ed a powerful attack on the international community's failure to come up with a coherent counter-narcotics strategy for his country, blaming the west for Afghanistan's explosion in opium poppy cultivation.
In the aftermath of a United Nations report showing that opium production soared in Afghanistan by 34 per cent last year, Mr Karzai said there was insufficient co-operation among members of the international community in the fight against drug production in Afghanistan.
The president told journalists in Kabul that part ofthe problem facing Afghan-istan was that theinternational community had not respected the Kabulgovernment's proposals to reduce poppy production.
Mr Karzai did not explain which ideas were being over-ruled, but said: "Wherever the government is present, the drug fight is successful but where the government is overshadowed it is not successful."
Mr Karzai's comments were strongly rebutted by the UK government in London, which is leading the international fight against opium production in Afghanistan.
Britain has been under pressure on the issue because this week's report from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime showed that the biggest increase in opium production last year took place in Helmand province, where British troops are fighting the Taliban insurgency.
"The Afghan CounterNarcotics strategy is an Afghan-owned strategy and supported by the international community," a Foreign Office spokesman said last night.
"It has shown signs of progress in some provinces, and we are following the same approach in Helmand. The increase of cultivation in Helmand is a real concern but we are working very hard, side by side withthe Afghan authorities, to provide the security that will allow the counter-narcotics strategy to take hold."
British officials argue that there is no easy solution to Afghanistan's drugs problem.
"Bringing down drugs production [in Afghanistan] will take 10 to 15 years," one senior official said yesterday.
British officials say production has been soaring in Helmand because of rising insecurity and because the Taliban are taking a more active role in the trade.
British officials argue that production can only be brought down by a balanced strategy that improves incentives for farmers to switch crops, better governance and more targetederadication.
Nato has also adjusted its tactics to step up eradication in recognition of the links between the Taliban insurgency and the drugs trade. Nato will therefore provide greater support for Afghan law enforcement.
Senior US officials are keen to use aerial crop spraying as a means of tackling the soaring production rates in some of the country's provinces.
However, crop spraying has been strongly resisted by many European, Afghan and Nato officials who fear it will force farmers to shift their support away from the Afghan government and towards the Taliban insurgency.
Some western officials also believe the Afghans need to be more proactive themselves in the fight against the narcotics trade.
"We do need high-level arrests to begin to disrupt the big traffickers," said one official.
"We're slowly seeing some progress on this from the Afghans."

Afghanistan on course for record opium crop, says UN

By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Financial TimesPublished:
Aug 28, 2007
This year's opium harvest in Afghanistan is projected to reach record levels, up 34 per cent on 2006, with Helmand province "single-handedly" becoming the world's largest source of illicit drugs, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime said yesterday.
Better yields have combined with a 17 per cent increase in land under cultivation to undermine poppy- eradication efforts and produce a record harvest of 8,200 tonnes. Afghanistan accounted for 92 per cent of global production, with an area of opium cultivation larger than the combined coca cultivation area in Latin America, said UNODC.
Most of the increased production is concentrated in unstable southern provinces, which account for 80 per cent of cultivation. The largest rise has been in the volatile province of Helmand, where British troops are fighting insurgency.
The number of northern and central provinces free of opium doubled to 13. In Balkh, a northern province, opium cultivation has been cut to zero from 7,200 hectares last year.
Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC's executive director, said poverty could not be used as an excuse since the south had some of the country's most fertile land and provinces in the centre and north had half the per capita income of the south.
Poppy-growing was linked to insecurity and inversely related to the degree of government control. Mr Costa has called for higher rewards for non-opium farmers and warned that delay in disbursing assistance could lead to opium-free provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation. Calling for greater deterrents to planting poppies, he urged an end to practices enabling rich land-lords to evade eradication.
The total area under op-ium cultivation rose from 165,000 ha to 193,000 ha, with Helmand alone ac-counting for 102,770 ha, a rise of 48 per cent over last year.
Mr Costa called on Nato to extend active support to anti-narcotic operations. Nato forces have so far steered clear of dealing with the issue on the grounds that it is a task primarily for the police. He would take up the issue during the meeting of the Nato council in Brussels on September 5.
He also urged the Afghan government to submit the names of known traffickers to the UN Security Council for inclusion alongside al-Qaeda and Taliban members on a list of those barred from travelling, who have their assets seized and face extradition.

PROFILE The people’s king

The Hindu

AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Mohammed Zahir Shah presided over the last uninterrupted peace the country enjoyed.
Photo: AP An observer: Mohammed Zahir Shah at his KabuL office.
It is not often in history that an era can be defined by the lack of what didn’t exist, the absence of what didn’t occur. tO many in Afghanistan, the 40-year reign of Afghanistan’s last king is defined by exactly that — the ab sence of war and violence and major changes.
Mohammad Zahir Shah came to power when his father was assassinated in 1933. In 1973, he relinquished power to his cousin in a bloodless coup. That was the last peaceful transition that Afghanistan was to see and the last uninterrupted peace.Behind the thrnone
If the absence of violence characterised his reign, at least part of the reason was Shah’s personality. In the first 30 years of his 40-year reign, power was exercised from behind the throne. The 19-year-old boy steered by his uncles gave way to the middle-aged monarch who seemed content to allow his ambitious cousin Daud Khan to wield power as Prime Minister. In 1963, an order prohibiting members of the royal family from taking positions of power in government was promulgated. This move, popular with citizens, also helped remove his powerful and sometimes controversial Prime Minister Daud Khan.
For 10 years, Zahir Shah ruled alone. In 1964, a new constitution was adopted providing for a representative government through a bicameral parliament though the powers of the parliament were confined to the consultative process and not all members were elected. The royal family’s attitude towards women was liberal and Shah also tried to take this forward through education. Uneasy reforms
However, he lacked both the forceful personality and political savvy needed to survive in the changing social and political milieu of Afghanistan. The reforms sat uneasily on his shoulders. Easily persuaded that allowing political parties would weaken his position, he never signed the bill that would enable them to participate in parliamentary politics (a political position he shared with the current Afghan president Hamid Karzai). Liberal reforms proceeded fitfully.
Much of the development and the programmes remained confined to Kabul, as the king exercised varying degrees of control in outlying areas. For the royal family, it was a time of hunting parties and foreign visits.
A severe famine and lack of economic opportunities helped create the conditions for the removal of Shah by a determined Daud Khan, who seized power and declared Afghanistan a republic while the monarch was in Rome.
The coup supposedly took place while Shah was taking a mud bath, a story that has assumed mythic symbolism. For the next 34 years, Shah was to largely play the role of an observer, the first 29 years in Rome and the remaining in Afghanistan until his death last week.
Though he expressed disquiet with the events in his lost kingdom from time to time, his intervention never took a more forceful form and he never attempted to regain his place.
Perhaps the lack of a powerful personality was also the reason why there were attempts to reinstate him from time to time. His neutral personality was viewed as being largely acceptable to most ethnic and political groups. Comebacks
The first attempt was after the Soviet withdrawal, but failed because of the bitter opposition from conservative groups. The move saw a new lease of life in 2001, as the international community searched for a non-controversial figure following the ouster of the Taliban. Contemporary accounts of the proceedings suggest that Shah was ‘persuaded’ to drop out in favour of the US-backed Hamid Karzai. The 2004 Constitution anointed Zahir Shah the ‘father of the nation’, effectively stripping him of the last vestiges of monarchy.
Since 2002, when he returned to the country, Shah’s presence did create a political space that has now acquired a momentum. Shah was allowed to retain part of the royal palace as his personal quarters and his presence helped leverage the influence of the members of the royal family. New political front
Unsullied by the bloodletting of the last three decades, members of the royal family also command a respect denied to factional political leaders. This has emerged as an important political element in the current fractured polity of Afghanistan. The past six years has seen a concerted attempt to consolidate power in the hands of an executive style presidency, and the result has been a growing alienation and frustration of disparate political groups.
Three months ago, disparate groups, apparently sharing little in the way of a common platform other than a disenchantment with the sources of power, came together to form a new political front.
The members of the Afghanistan National Front, include the former president Burhanuddin Rabbani; the former warlord from the North Abdul Rashid Dostum; the Vice president Ahmad Zia Massoud; the former war lord from the West Ismail Khan, Younus Qanuni from the Northern Alliance and Mustafa Zahir the grandson of the former king, among others.
While their efficacy as a united front is yet to be tested, it is already clear that they wield considerable influence. Buttressed by this new political group, Northern Alliance’ Younus Qanooni has used his position as speaker of the lower house to maintain an adamant stance on parliament’s powers to dismiss ministers, the case in point being that of the Foreign Minister Dadfar Spanta.
In a nascent democracy with an ongoing demarcation of powers, the influence of the royal family will go some way in shaping the new political balance of power, the reshaping of a republic by an erstwhile monarchy.

Jirga aims for dialogue

Al Jazeera
By
Aunohita Mojumdar

Security around Kabul was tight ahead of the jirgaTribal elders from two of Pakistan's most troubled zones said they would not attend the event.
The Taliban dismissed the three-day gathering as a US-organised farce.
Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, excused himself from attending by citing "engagements in the capital" as the reason for a meeting to which he agreed nearly a year ago.
But despite the party poopers, Kabul has been spruced up to receive guests from neighbouring Pakistan for a headline meeting that was first announced in Washington in September last year following separate meetings of Musharraf and Hamid Karzai, his Afghan counterpart, with George Bush, the US president.
That over 300 delegates from across the border are in the city is in itself unusual, as Pakistanis rarely visit Afghanistan.
"Travel between the two countries has mainly been in one direction. Millions of Afghans have gone to Pakistan as refugees," says Amin Mudaqiq, the Kabul bureau chief of Radio Azadi.
Need for dialogue
Exchanges, especially post-9/11, have been largely between governments.
"When the governments have been in contact there have been slight misunderstandings" says Waheed Omar, deputy assistant of the jirga.
Haseeb Humayoon, an analyst with the Kabul-based Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, an independent research centre, is more blunt, saying bilateral government dialogue has sometimes widened the gap between the two countries.
Hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani delegateshave been attending the meeting [AFP] Featuring Pakistani and Afghan representatives, the three-day meeting is modelled on a tradition of calling jirgas - or tribal assemblies - in times of crisis.
And the rationale for a jirga that aims to take debate away from the strictures of formal government has never been more pressing.Both countries have seen the worst instability in territories that straddle the international border.
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have only limited control over these areas, where tribal elders hold particular influence and where the Taliban and al-Qaeda hold bases. If tribal elders, community leaders or residents who provide food and shelter to the insurgents in the border regions were to be convinced to turn against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the fighters would find it difficult to maintain their campaigns.
"If this jirga endorses punishment of the extremists, then the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have a legal [that is, acceptable to the tribal communities] basis for carrying out military operations in those areas," says Mudaqiq, adding that the political impact of any negative fallout from such operations would be much reduced.
Though the problem is too complex to be solved with one peace jirga, this week's council meeting could be a step towards reducing a long history of tension, he says.
Pessimistic view
Shinkai Karokhail, a member of the lower house of Afghanistan's parliament, endorses Mudaqiq's view. Emphasising that she cannot talk about what the result of the jirga may be, she says it is a good step in opening a dialogue.
The jirga will aim to foster mutualunderstanding on security issuesShe is hopeful there might be a change of attitude in Pakistan, since it has also felt the impact of terrorism in its own territory. She points out that Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, Pakistan's interior minister and that country's leader of the jirga, was himself the victim of an attack. Not everyone is quite so optimistic. Mustafa Kazemi, the spokesperson of the newly formed united front, which is now commonly viewed as Afghanistan’s first opposition, dismissed the jirga days before it began. Ramazan Bashar Dost, an outspoken Afghan MP, attacked the jirga on grounds that it was a futile exercise. Ahmed, a young Afghan, feels the real issue is one of ownership and power sharing. Calling Karzai's government US-dominated, he says: "Pashtuns will not come to Kabul while the Americans are here. In my village they came looking for me. I was not there but my cousin's son is now in Guantanamo and he has been there for the last six years. They have reduced the heroes of yesterday to terrorists."
Scope of meeting
The internal opposition to the government is something that the country has to deal with on its own and is not a bilateral issue, Omar says. The jirga will only examine the sanctuary and support provided to the insurgents in the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan's prime minister, said in his opening speech that global terrorism, Afghanistan's home-grown insurgency and the phenomenon of Talibanisation affecting Pakistan's own border areas were his country's main concerns.
However, Aziz also claimed that Afghanistan was not at peace with itself, adding that Kabul could not blame anyone else for this failure.
Some feel that the issues outlined by Aziz are already well known by the various parties concerned, but Omar says the jirga is an attempt to increase understanding.
The people of the affected areas, he says, "felt that they were ignored in addressing the problem they were most affected by. They felt the governments had taken the most superficial policy against terrorists and insurgents and that they were the ones who should have been asked. We feel this [jirga] is part of the democratic process."

Women’s view

FICTION
Women’s view
The Hindu
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR

A Thousand Splendid Suns documents, in vivid detail, the lives of Afghan women, in both the richness and the poverty of their lives.
Hosseini doesn’t make any overt political choices amongst the warring factions, but does portray the mujahideen years and that of the Taliban as the worst for women.

A second book is often an unfortunate addendum to a great first book, a limping shadow that disappoints, lurks and then disappears into obscurity, taking with it the author who is quickly transformed from the creator of a best seller to the writer wh o could not repeat his genius. Not so Khaled Hosseini’s A Thousand Splendid Suns.Splendid repeat
The Afghan-born author’s book has shot to the top of the bestsellers lists soon after its simultaneous release in several languages. Hosseini, it appears, can rest easy, at least with his publishers, having repeated the success that came to him with his debut novel The Kite Runner, which explored the story of friendship between two Afghan boys.
Comparisons between the two books are inevitable, more so because Hosseini’s new novel returns to some of the territory familiarised in the first book. Yet the stomping ground is quite different. The first person narrative is replaced by the slower cadence of lives observed. In A Thousand Splendid Suns the main characters are all women — four portraits spanning four generations and six different periods of conflict in Afghanistan. The monarchy, the new republic, the Sov iet incursion and its puppet government, the short-lived mujahideen government followed by the chaos of the mujahideen wars, the brutal order of the Taliban, followed by the American-led “bombing to liberation” and the current government.
Most of the story takes place in Kabul and in the Western city of Herat with a brief incursion into neighbouring Pakistan which has hosted million of Afghan refugees during the long years of conflict.
The core of the story revolves around two of the four women who are divided by almost a generation and by social segregation. The story of each woman is narrated in alternating chapters and the two halves slowly come together. The book documents their relationship or their many relationships with each other which they develop, discard and transcend until a climactic moment.Story worth telling
But the tale is more than a tale of two women. If The Kite Runner explored and brought alive some of the complexities of interrelationships in a ethnically diverse and unequal society shattered by war, A Thousand Splen did Suns documents, in vivid detail, the lives of many Afghan women, in both the richness and the poverty of their lives and that is a story worth telling and retelling.
Nearly six years after the so-called liberation of Afghanistan, Afghan women could well question whether this liberation was for just half of the country’s population. The denial of basic human rights to women, which demonised the Taliban and helped build the international support for the invasion, continues to be practised to varying degrees in Afghanistan. Though Afghan women now have equal rights on paper, strong and repressive social mores dictate otherwise. For the slightest degree of freedom to participate in public spaces and civil society, women are dependent on the goodwill of their families, husbands, in-laws, community, ethnic tribe and the generosity of the judiciary. Women, sometimes girls as young as seven, are still bartered to settle debts and seal bargains and the criminal system treats women running away from domestic abuse and sexual violence as perpetrators of a crime, and not as its victims, for having violated the family honour. Hosseini doesn’t make any overt political choices amongst the warring factions, but does portray the mujahideen years and that of the Taliban as the worst for women. The current situation is portrayed as a beneficial one for Afghanistan and for its women.Complex tapestry
Hosseini is a good storyteller and he weaves a tapestry in which politics, ethnicity and economics forms the backdrop, tinting it with the sounds, smells and colours of Afghanistan. Different lives and events are drawn together like strands of a warp and weft. He counts the victims, the dead and the maimed but also the survivors. One of the most powerful parts of the book is the documentation of the struggle to survive, to find enough food: the slow progress from wholesome meals to scratchy diets, the slow loss of weight, the malnourishment leading to quick aging, the creeping illnesses which mirror the political emaciation of Afghanistan.
The pace, the voice and the march of the book is distinct and different from The Kite Runner, lacking a certain urgent immediacy of the earlier book. It is at the end of the book, however, that the author of The Kite Runner shows up clearly: the build up, the climactic moment and the dissipation of tension into a neat and regular ending. The tidying up of loose ends, bringing order to the mess and mash and unfinished beginnings of real life, the trimming of a wild garden into a well- manicured lawn. It is also perhaps what makes A Thousand Splendid Suns a bestseller and a good book, and keeps it from becoming a great one.

The story behind the stories

Special Report
The story behind the stories
Newsline

Even post-Taliban, journalism in Afghanistan is not for the faint-hearted, says Aunohita Mojumdar, a reporter based in Kabul.


The Taliban may have retreated, taking with them the extreme controls on all forms of independent media in Afghanistan. However, even in present-day Afghanistan, being a journalist is not for the faint-hearted. With no tradition of independent journalism in the country, increasing insecurity, lack of information, absence of physical infrastructure and a deepening financial crisis, Afghanistan's media are in an unenviable spot.
Though the Taliban are generally blamed for the controls that virtually eliminated all but the state media, even prior to the emergence of the Taliban, media were not entirely independent. "We did not even understand the concept of an independent media," says an Afghan journalist candidly. "We did not have much exposure to the international media and thought that being aligned to one group or the other was quite normal." The result was that the media derived its strength, financial resources and protection from groups, communities or individuals it was aligned to, rather than from recognition of its independence.
While media organisations have attempted to chart an independent path in the last five years, the recognition of this is slow to come, especially in remote areas where the role of a journalist is scarcely understood. In many rural areas, even today, survival is a matter of negotiations; who you know and how you behave determine your chances of survival in areas where the state has either not reached or exercises scant control. Being a journalist, however, entails challenging the very sources of power which could provide protection. For most journalists in rural areas, survival depends on balancing out conflicting interests, deciding what issues to report on, who to report about and when to report it.
Those challenged by such reporting often resort to their own form of summary justice, which may involve seizure of materials, and going as far as threats, detentions, tortures and finally murders. While the overt violence grabs the headlines, what goes largely unreported is the daily self-censorship exercised by all Afghan journalists. Whether it is deciding how much of the content may be considered against the tradition of the country and lead to reprisals or deciding whether the source of power in a remote area is too powerful to be criticised, each media organisation draws its own limits.
Tolo TV, owned by an Australian Afghan family, for instance, has been pushing the boundaries of acceptable programming by using a large amount of foreign content and snappy, urban-oriented entertainment programmes. However, many in the Afghan media feel "the TV channel goes too far in the current context of Afghanistan," even while defending their own boundaries.
In the more remote rural areas, it may not even be the content that is offensive. There are instances where journalists asking routine questions have been detained by locals on suspicions of being spys on the assumption that that is the only reason why strangers would come asking questions.
Reporting on the battle against the Taliban is fraught with danger. It is difficult to get to the areas where there is often heavy bombardment and 'collateral damage.' The Taliban have also 'arrested' several journalists who had gone into the areas where they hold sway, the most recent example of detention being the case of the Afghan journalist Ajmal Naqshbandi, who was finally killed by the Taliban.
Naqshbandi's case starkly illustrates the double standards that exist for journalists in this country. Five-and-a half years after the liberation of their country, Afghan journalists still continue to be second-class citizens, inferior to their international, especially western colleagues. Whether it is sections of the international community or the Afghan government, international journalists find it much easier to access information and get interviews and appointments than their Afghan counterparts, especially those working for Afghan media organisations rather than international media outlets. Though this is partially fed by the language barrier (most Afghans do not speak English), there is sufficient anecdotal evidence suggesting that westerners and non-westerners usually receive different treatment. Fear of being completely blacklisted keeps Afghan journalists from lodging formal complaints, but not from sharing their grievances privately. Instances range from one in which an embassy kept Afghan reporters lined up in the sun for several hours while international journalists had lunch inside prior to a briefing, to requests for appointments being turned down without any substantive reasons.
Afghan journalists also work in conditions that are usually much more fraught with danger. Even while they run greater risks from societal displeasure, incurring the wrath of local commanders or criminals, they are usually poorly paid and unprotected in comparison to their Afghan counterparts.
Though the situation of Afghan journalists has improved over the last two years, even the occasional incident of discrimination is enough to reinforce the feeling of humiliation. However, international journalists also receive their share of humiliation, doled out regularly on grounds of security. Simple but routine examples are at the presidential palace where male journalists are lined up facing a wall, or when journalists outside the ISAF base have to stand, week after week, for usually an hour in the snow, rain or sun because five years have not been long enough for ISAF to build a tin roof that could shelter them.
While insecurity is a primary issue, it is not the only one. The lack of physical infrastructure makes operating a news agency a difficult task. Scarce power, especially in winter when power comes on for a few hours every few days, bad roads and insufficient technology plague news operations. An artificial economy sustained by the international community has made most buildings almost out of bounds for the ordinary Afghan with rents in thousands rather than hundreds of dollars.
Danish Karokhel, the director and editor-in-chief of Pajhwok Afghan News, worries about how to sustain his organisation. Pajhwok, like many other media organisations, was set up with a large influx of aid money. The funding has dropped sharply, and while Pajhwok currently raises 50% of its expenditure, it is not sure whether it can meet the shortfall when its funding is cut by another 50% from August 1. "A large number of journalists have become unemployed and have turned to other professions," says Karokhel. Several media organisations have also folded up. In a farewell editorial, the editor and founder of Kabul Weekly, Fahim Dashty, spoke passionately of his struggle to keep alive the weekly before deciding he could not sustain it any longer. Unspoken among journalists is the threat that organisations unwilling to fold may start taking money from different and dubious sources. With the power of the media slowly unfolding, control of news organisations is to be coveted by those wielding power.
In fact, it is the success and reach of the independent media that has perhaps led to increasing calls for its control. In the struggle over territory and power, all sides expect the media to join the battle on their side. The government itself has resorted to a number of measures to control information. The last three years have seen increasing restraints on government servants, including doctors, policemen and teachers, who are asked to obtain clearance prior to any interaction with the press. In the absence of any databases, information-gathering depends, of course, on the willingness of people to speak to the press. More specifically, access to information can also be used to reward those who provide favourable coverage.
More direct attempts to intervene in press coverage include a mysterious memo that emanated from the president's office before being disowned, which spelt out specific parameters for reportage. More recently, there have been attempts to impose restraints on the media through a media bill currently being debated in parliament.
Adding to the problems faced by the journalists is the difficulty of uniting different groups. While media organisations have been able to establish independence in reporting, it has been more difficult for journalists to unite on issues threatening media freedom. Years of ethnic, community and political divides still cast their shadows, as do gender stereotypes.
As managing editor of Pajhwok, Afghanistan's single largest independent news agency, Farida Nekzad manages far more than news. Dealing with threats to her correspondents in the provinces and urging on her reporters in an environment where there are increasing controls on information, is no mean task. On a daily basis Nekzad has to counter conservative attitudes from society, which challenge her role as a newswoman. In an environment where women are expected to largely efface themselves or fulfill roles within their home environments, there is little space or respect for those like her. However, against all odds, Nekzad and a number of gutsy young women have come forward to take on the most challenging roles. As managers, newscasters, reporters and even photographers, they work shoulder to shoulder with men, demanding respect and stretching boundaries. They give hope that the Afghan media will find within itself the strength to counter the challenges of what promises to be a critical year.
(The author is a Kabul-based Indian journalist).

The Deviant Diplomat

Little India

A diplomatic posting in Afghanistan is not everyone's cup of tea. Sandeep Kumar has made it his pot.
By:
Aunohita Mojumdar
It was the mid 1980s when the trend of abandoning small towns for the big bad world of city lights hadn't quite caught fire. Certainly the offspring of affluent business families in his town rarely left the roost. But even then Sandeep Kumar's feet were itching.
"It's always been this love of traveling, languages, interacting with new cultures, meeting people." So after a very English upbringing at the prestigious Doon School, Kumar left his town of Najibabad in Western Uttar Pradesh to join the Indian Foreign Service and see the world. 22 years later Kumar is still stepping out of the box. A diplomatic posting in Afghanistan is not everyone's cup of tea. The country has rudimentary services; cities, villages and families have been destroyed by 30 years of war. There are pitched battles for territorial control in South Afghanistan and elsewhere, including the capital city of Kabul, where bombs, suicide and rocket attacks are commonplace. In this city most foreigners live almost an embattled existence. Behind tall walls and barbed wire, they travel from one "secure location" to another. Surrounded by a large security apparatus that prevents them from taking public transport, walking, shopping and eating in local restaurants, most complete their postings in Afghanistan with limited contact with Afghans and Afghanistan. Life is lived in an artificial expat bubble that separates foreigners from Afghans, with the real and normal life experienced during frequent rest and recuperation breaks outside the country. In this peculiar milieu, Kumar stands out by his ability to lead a normal life.A walk around his flat is a tell tale giveaway of his wide ranging interests. The walls are covered by his oil paintings, the difference in colors and styles hreflecting the progression of his travels, from the rich reds and yellows of Cape Town to the muted blues and browns of Afghanistan's landscape. Musical instruments are strewn around. In a corner is his gym equipment, the essential tools of a junkie, a man who by his own confession, is addicted to the gym. He is working on a book, Musings from Afghanistan, in which he jots down his impressions of Afghanistan, the dust, the smells and tastes of the country, the human interactions, the concerns about the rebuilding of the nation.Before Cape he was in Hong Kong, Paris, Cambridge and Vietnam. In each place Kumar managed to claim a little bit of the country through his eclectic interests. In Vietnam he joined the Vietnamese symphony orchestra, singing Vietnamese songs, traveling and giving performances. "When we returned home there would be flowers at our doorsteps from appreciative listeners." In Afghanistan Kumar misses his Sitar, something he had to leave behind because of the difficulties of transporting it. When he arrived here Kumar was fearful of missing out on his gym regimen as well. But he soon found his niche. Not in the "international only" gyms frequented by the denizens of UN and other international organizations, but in an Afghan-only gym.He writes in his diary:"Hundred metres from my place: mostly young guys in trendy tracksuits, no women. I am the only foreigner, but I am not complaining as I get right of first use on the machines (traditional Afghan hospitality). However I have to constantly watch out for the bulky weights, some of which are beautifully carved out of old vehicle tyres, steel cans and discarded weapons that get swung around wildly in all directions... At times there is no electricity/fuel, in the generator, all movements are conducted in gaslight and although it is admittedly rather risky, I prefer to attribute romantic overtones to the situation: where else in the world does one get to gym by candlelight?"
Now Kumar's relationship with the gym regulars is one of friends. "They call up saying we want to come and cook pizza at your place." The crowning glory was the Mr Afghanistan body building competition last year when Kumar cast aside the usual diplomatic reticence to take part, preparing for a month on a strict diet. Finally, in the competition solely attended by Afghans, Kumar took his place in the spotlight to preen and flex his muscles cheered on by a wildly enthusiastic crowd.At the Indian embassy in Afghanistan, Kumar is a minister, the senior most diplomat after the ambassador. He administers India's large aid program to Afghanistan, a complex and politically sensitive task, meeting with ministers, officials and visiting around the country. But Kumar makes sure he makes time for painting. In Cape Town he picked up his brush after a gap of 10 year inspired by the amazing landscape. In Afghanistan the inspiration is Afghan women. Canvas after canvas is filled with paintings of women in blue burkhas. For Kumar the most amazing thing about the women is their strength. His favorite painting based on a picture that of a woman in a burkha her hand outstretched holding a gun, a policewoman from Kandahar practicing her shooting skills, a woman he was to meet later on.He muses in his diary: "There are five paintings, hreflecting the situation of women at a cross roads of life, against stark backdrops... I can feel their collective piercing gaze slicing through me.. the muse yields, the hear quivers, the sparks solder. The painter becomes the painting."Along with other Afghan men he has learnt to look out for the telltale signs under the burkha, the paint on the toe nails, the footwear that reveals more about the personality of the wearer. "I try to get my stare to ducs on the feet of the lady in blue to see what color toe nails she apprents to her torso, but am disappointed by her all-black non-revealing footwear...."Kumar's desire to partake of Afghan life fully takes him to Afghan homes, streets, places in the city normally avoided by expats and even Afghan orphanages. A friend Hameed is an Afghan government interpreter who gave up his own academic ambitions to put his brother through college and support his family. Hameed is thrilled when Kumar decided to perform namaz. Wahid has a medical degree, but cannot practice medicine, because of the inadequate salaries of doctor in Afghanistan. Kumar becomes involved in negotiations for Wahid's marriage, even as he decries Wahid's double standards towards women in his diary. "In his own way he has been illegally 'dating' several young girls as well, but wouldn't marry them. 'If a girl can date another man before marriage, then she is not wife material' he says simply. 'And what about the man who leads them on?' I am unable to ward off the aggression and sarcasm that has crept into my voice. But he just passes that off with a disarming shrug."Kumar learns that the relatively poorer border province of Paktika apparently has the highest bride price, ranging from $10-12,000. Why he wonders later, are women not treated better if they are so expensive?Kumar's book reveals a great deal about him. Written with a painful honesty, the book records every thought, his emotions, struggles, joys and lows with an almost embarrassing frankness. He struggles with his own frustrations when the problems of living in Kabul and the country get too much for him. In doing so, it also provides a glimpse of Afghanistan. Not the Afghanistan of academic tomes and sensational stories, but the ordinariness of living life in an extraordinary land.

Afghan king presided over lengthy golden age

Afghan king presided over lengthy golden age
By Aunohita Mojumdar

Financial Times

Published: July 24 2007 03:00 Last updated: July 24 2007 03:00
Zahir Shah, the former monarch who has died in Kabul at the age of 92, watched his country descend into a period of extraordinary tumult. His peaceful, un-interrupted reign of 40 years was followed by an exile of nearly three decades after he was deposed in a bloodless coup by his cousin.
In exile, he saw his country passing from his cousin's hands into those of a communist regime supported by the Soviet Union. For a while, Afghanistan was a cold-war battleground, but when Soviet troops eventually left after being defeated by Mujahideen fighters there followed a period of bloody, internecine conflict.
The Taliban movement of fundamentalist Islamists took over, until they were ousted following 9/11, and many Afghans clamoured for Zahir Shah to return. He did so in 2002, but not as king - merely with the title of Father of the Nation.
Born in 1914, he was educated in Kabul and Montpellier in southern France. Returning to Afghanistan, he was trained as an army officer and became a government minister. His reign began bloodily. In 1933, the 19-year-old Zahir Shah was thrust abruptly into the role of king when his father Nadir Shah was murdered in front of him.
Though nominally the monarch, power was exercised largely by his uncles, and it was only in the 1950s that Zahir Shah assumed full control. Although never a dynamic ruler, his neutral foreign policy and limited liberalisation fostered a lengthy period of peace - sometimes seen today as a golden age. His reign, one of the longest in Afghanistan's history, saw the founding of democratic institutions, including parliament, elections and a new constitution.
He was married in 1931 to Lady Homira. The couple had two daughters and five sons. The royal family org-anised hunting trips and lavish parties, and espoused liberal values. Women enjoyed considerable freedom to participate in public life.
But economic development remained largely confined to Kabul. This led to discontent and paved the way for a coup in 1973 by Zahir's cousin and former prime minister Mohammad Daud Khan.
Zahir Shah, who was deposed during a trip to Italy, remained there in exile until 2002. Following the fall of the Taliban regime, many thought that Zahir Shah, a Persian-speaking Pashtun, would be a unifying factor as king, who would be acceptable to the country's disparate ethnic groups. Instead, he stepped aside and became a revered but largely ineffectual and ailing figure. His family, however, retain an influential position in Afghan politics - notably through his grandson, the outspoken Mustafa Zahir.
For Afghanistan, the death of Zahir Shah brings formal closure to an era of dynastic rule. Yet the democratic reforms and institutions he introduced during his 40- year reign are those Afghanistan is trying to implement once again - an enduring tribute to his legacy.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

A Make-up Mission

A Make-up Mission

Book Review

Aunohita M0jumdar

"She must be married. She does her eyebrows," said my Afghan friend Safia. Despite having grown up in the US, Safia is aware of the entire regimen of codes that govern the social behavior of Afghan women. For example, eyebrows indicate the marital status. Plucked eyebrows indicate marriage. If, by chance, an unmarried woman has plucked eyebrows, it is a suggestion that either she or her family is not very strict about 'morality'.So, when Deborah Rodriguez stepped into this intricate world governed by thousands of minutiae, it was a little like a bull in a China shop. Loud, brazen and colorful, Rodriguez (Debbie, to everyone in Kabul), a hairdresser from Michigan, USA, came to post-Taliban Afghanistan as part of a group offering humanitarian aid to the war-torn nation. Running away from a bad marriage, she was looking for something more fulfilling to do in life.
In her recent book, 'Kabul Beauty School ', Debbie documents how she arrived in Afghanistan to work with an aid group - mostly comprising doctors, nurses and therapists - but soon realized that she was of little help to them.However, she found her calling in a most unique service. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the international community is not quite wearing jackboots and camouflage fatigues. Most are well-paid internationals, desperate for some beauty care. Debbie immediately saw potential in that.One to mix around easily with locals as well, Debbie discovered that until the Taliban came to power, Afghan women used to run their own beauty salons. An idea dawned on her. She realized that upgrading the skills of Afghan beauticians, forced underground during the Taliban ban on beauty salons, would be a way of contributing and helping destitute women. As she began collecting money and supplies for the school, she says, she realized another group of women had the same idea at the same time and she decided to join them. Thus was born the Kabul Beauty School.But, this is where Debbie's account begins to deviate from what other women involved in Kabul 's first beauty school have to say. Most have expressed their displeasure at Debbie not giving them their due. But Debbie and her co-author, Kristin Ohlson, deny that she has taken sole credit for the idea and the work.However, in the book, apart from acknowledging the contribution of Mary Meakin - who has stayed and worked in Afghanistan for over 50 years - Debbie chooses to blank out all others. No one else seems to exist in this story of courage, struggle and hope - except for Debbie and the women she is helping.Most reviewers, when they have not been gasping in awe at her work in Afghanistan, have chosen to document the claims and counter-claims of the contending sides. Certainly, the importance of factual narrative in an autobiography is essential. However, the book would have been equally fascinating as a work of fiction.While Debbie's flamboyant personality and marriage to a former commander (who worked for northern Afghan warlord Rasheed Dostum), make the book an easy-sell on talk shows, its appeal actually lies completely outside the how-I-married-an-Afghan-'mujahid'-and-saved-Afghan-women routine.What is fascinating about the book is the wealth of detail, the colors, patterns, dialogues and gestures that document Debbie's odyssey through Kabul. Though tomes have been written analyzing post-conflict Afghanistan, Debbie's narrative brings alive the tapestry of lives, especially of women in post-conflict Kabul, almost without a self-awareness of the documentation.Through the almost surreally-dizzy world of beauty salons, we see lives unfolding. Whether it is the problem of running hair dryers without electricity or the description of markets lined with butcher's stalls with headless carcasses or the harassment of women on the street, Debbie brings to life the sights and smells of the city.Similar is the way her layers of documentation reveal the lives of ordinary women in Kabul: beauticians desperate to join the beauty school and earn a living; or the girl at the salon who tries to get her co-wife to push her husband to divorce so she can be free of an oppressive marriage; or the young girl who has to prove she is a virgin on the night of her marriage even though she is not.At another level, Debbie provides a parallel to the lives of her girls at the beauty parlor. Trapped in an abusive marriage, Debbie tried to cope by "getting religion". Yet, she found little comfort in her spiritual leaders, who could not support her decision for divorce (as her husband had not committed adultery). Not too different from Afghan women, who are told to maintain their marriage despite all odds.Once in Afghanistan, Debbie's friends decided that she needed 'a husband', discussing a prospective partnership as if "offering me another egg roll". Despite her initial surprise, she did accept the egg roll, a mere 20 days after meeting with Samer Mohammed Abdul Khan or Sher, a henchman of Dostum. Debbie speaks frankly of language difficulties and cultural barriers. Her husband has another wife and seven daughters in Saudi Arabia and even though she was angry and unhappy when she found out, she accepted them.Despite this apparent frankness, it is clear from the book that Debbie has revealed as much as she has hidden, turning up only a small sliver of her life for inspection. How does she deal with marriage to a man she had known for less than a month and who speaks scant English? Why did she sideline all her co- workers at the salon in the book? What about her problems with the Ministry of Women's Affairs, which virtually shut down her salon/beauty school on the grounds that she was running a for-profit business? (Debbie herself acknowledges settling a tax demand through a large pay-off.)Unfortunately, these questions must wait: Debbie, a frequent fixture at the Kabul Coffee House, which she owns, has left the country. It is said she may not return and that the book may have forced her to leave the country, of which she wrote in the closing sentences of her book: "As soon as I set my foot on this soil, I knew I'd somehow managed to come home."('Kabul Beauty School: An American Woman Goes Behind the Veil' by Deborah Rodriguez, co-written with Kristin Ohlson. Published by Random House. Price Rs.700/US $17.5)
June 17, 2007
By arrangement with WFS B

Tussle at the top

The Afghan Parliament, dominated by minority interests, initiates a series of bills, not all of them intended to benefit the people it represents. AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR

June 17, 2007

IN October 2005, the international community was in a celebratory mood. Elections to Afghanistan’s first fully representational parliament had been completed. Sceptics and critics were silenced as doubters and cynics. Yet, since then, this opti mism has dribbled out. Violence has reached proportions higher than at anytime since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 and there are serious issues regarding the non-delivery of development. However, while these problems are visible, less evident but more serious are the systemic flaws that are revealing themselves in the institutions of State. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in the Parliament itself.Hurried reforms
In 2005 the international community pushed through its agenda of Parliamentary elections in the face of concerned and informed criticism on the grounds that a less than perfect election was better than no election since it was time to empower the representatives of the people. In its eagerness to meet its own deadline, it accepted many compromises. It agreed to President Karzai’s desire to ban political parties from contesting (in any other country this would have been likened to autocratic governance), it agreed to a multi-seat constituency contest while marrying it to the single non-transferable vote system — a hybrid system that beggared belief. Elections also took place before a country-wide census (anyone claiming to be a voter could get a voter identity card), before the disarmament of the legal and illegal armed groups and before any efforts to rein in the more powerful war lords. The result has been a Parliament that is dominated by a minority of interests. In the absence of political parties, issued based politics and ideologies, the most powerful groups emerging from Parliament are those coming together to preserve the status quo, whether it is their own power or a conservative dogma.
Adding to the confusion is a lack of clarity about the procedures of Parliament, or even the demarcation of authority between the three pillars of State. In fact each contested decision is now becoming the battleground for this separation of powers, with the jury out on who will emerge the strongest.
The first visibly disturbing law to be passed was the “amnesty law”. The bill, piloted by former warlords, called for immunity from prosecution for all jihadis, regardless of their actions, on the grounds that they shoul d be honoured. It also called for reconciliation with currently warring groups.
What of the MPs? The Chairman of the Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission, Haji Mohammed Mohaqiq, a former commander, told this reporter that the international community should not interfere with the right of the Parliament to make laws. “There is a contradiction in the action of the international community. First they spent $360 million to organise elections and now they are criticising democracy. We have the right to make laws. Anyone criticizing us is violating our sovereignty and interfering in our internal affairs. The Parliament is the highest law making body.”
Woman MP Shukriya Barakzai challenged this right stating, “in which country does a criminal become his own judge? These people are just using their chairs to protect themselves.”Missing the wood
Eventually protests from the international community led President Karzai to include a clause that would allow individuals to pursue prosecution for individual crimes notwithstanding the reconciliation with currently warring groups. This was, at best, a dubious protection of the interests of the thousands of victims. However, rather than pursuing this flagrant breach of the human rights of victims of war crimes, the international community decided to accept each clause at its face value on a stand-alone basis, rather than examine the contradictions of the law in its totality.
The debate however opened up interesting questions about the authority of the parliament. While internationals suggested that war crimes could not fall within the ambit of amnesty, parliamentarians cited the process of reconciliation in South Africa to defend their right. So did the members have the right, however morally reprehensible their decision might have been?
This week threw up yet another conundrum. The fieriest parliamentarian in Afghanistan, the young woman MP Malalai Joya was suspended for insulting the house. In her comparison of Parliament with an animal barn, animals had come off better. Human Rights Watch rushed to her defence arguing “the article banning criticism of parliament is an unreasonable rule that violates the principle of free speech enshrined in international law and valued around the world.” While the extent of the punishment, suspension for the remainder of her entire term was indeed extreme, there are provisions for punitive action for breach of privilege in every parliament and HRW may have jumped the gun.
In recent weeks, the Parliament has also attempted to dismiss two ministers of the Hamid Karzai on ground of non performance. While Karzai accepted the removal of one minister, he has challenged the decision on the second on the grounds that the process was flawed. The international community came up with an entirely different stance saying that the right of parliament to dismiss ministers was not spelt out explicitly. While the Supreme Court will be the deciding authority the issue does highlight the differing interpretations or rules.
A similar confusion exists over a “bill” passed by the Parliament’s upper house calling for an end to military operations by international forces and talks with the Taliban. No one is quite clear whether the upper house has the authority to initiate a bill.Controversial moves
Other contentious moves have included attempts to pass through a media bill restricting many rights (the bill has now been moderated after an intense campaign by journalists and is under consideration) and several moves which have received far less publicity since they relate to women’s rights, a low priority for parliament, the international community and the Afghan government. They include attempts to lower the age of majority of girls to 13 years, make it mandatory for women MPs and officials to have a mehram or male escort from the family for visits outside the country and an attempt to abolish the Ministry of Women’s Affairs altogether.
The series of conflicts leads to an interesting conundrum. How do you strengthen a democratic institution, the Parliament, while at the same time tempering its democratic authority in the interests of upholding larger democratic values?

Afghan media pin hopes on new law

By Aunohita Mojumdar Kabul

June 5, 2007

The media in Afghanistan works under lots of restrictions

In her newsroom in Afghanistan's only independent news agency, Pajhwok, Farida Nekzad sits worrying about information-gathering.
Greater curbs from government and greater threats to her reporters have made her task more difficult.
Last month she compered a function on world press freedom day when Ajmal Naqshbandi's father limped onto the stage on crutches to receive an honour on behalf of his journalist son who was killed by the Taleban.
The same function saw the mother of another journalist, Tawab Niazi, accept an honour on behalf of her son, who is in jail for talking to the Taleban.
We have some concerns, though there are some good things in the new bill
Aqa Hussain Sancharaki,Afghan National Journalists' Union
"The death of Ajmal Naqshbandi and the media law have brought Afghan journalists together," says Aqa Hussain Sancharaki, a journalist who earlier held the post of deputy minister of information.
He now heads the Afghan National Journalists' Union.
Mr Sancharaki is taking a breather from campaigning for press freedom after the lower house of parliament passed the hotly debated media bill last week.
The bill will now go to the upper house of parliament and subsequently for presidential assent before it becomes law.
In its initial form the bill caused a great deal of concern since it brought the state-owned Radio Television Afghanistan under greater government control and opened private media content to more intense scrutiny and government control.
It also listed a number of broad-ranging restrictions on media content that could be widely interpreted or open to misuse.

Intense lobbying of MPs by journalists, open debates and seminars, an informed critique of the provisions of the draft law, an awareness campaign and some political manoeuvring have helped remove some of the more restrictive clauses from the draft law.
Journalists are, however, cautious about celebrating, aware that the bill might still undergo many mutations and that several of the current provisions are still less than desirable.

Journalists have been targeted and killed in Afghanistan
"We have some concerns, though there are some good things in the new bill," says Mr Sancharaki.
His opinion is also shared by the president of the Association of Independent Afghan Journalists, Rahimullah Samander.
Mr Samander states their concerns bluntly when he says that journalists were worried that the warlords who were amongst the more conservative members would push through a law that would impact negatively on the media.
His fears were not unfounded.
The Religious and Cultural Affairs Commission, headed by former commander Haji Mohammed Mohaqeq, had argued along with the government that an unfettered media would run amok, discrediting individuals without any checks or balances.
Information and Culture Minister Abdul Karim Khurram argued that the country could not afford to have a state broadcaster that was not under government control in a situation of war.
In its current form the media bill has freed the state broadcaster Radio Television Afghanistan from under the control of the Ministry of Information and Culture.
Instead, the broadcaster has been brought under an independent commission which comprises professionals and civil society representatives, including journalists.
The move has been welcomed by journalists, but they are still unsure about the extent of control the government will exert.
A council for formulating media policy now has representation from journalists, although it is still heavily weighed in favour of the government, and the commission for monitoring private media is now made up of professionals.
There are, however, no clear provisions for resolving disputes or the extent of powers of each of the commissions.
The new draft bill also retains some of the wide-ranging content restriction clauses.
The list of prohibitions includes:
content that goes against the principles of Islam
materials humiliating and offensive to real or legal entities
materials inconsistent with Afghanistan's constitution
anything that is considered a crime by the penal code
publicising and promotion of religions other than Islam
broadcasting pictures of victims of violence and rape in a way to cause damage to their social dignity
topics that harm the physical, spiritual and moral well-being of people, especially children and adolescents.
Some of these prohibitions remain open to wide interpretation.
Also worrying is the stipulation that makes it mandatory for the mass media to include programmes on health, the environment, and education, as well as on the dangers of cultivating, producing and consuming illegal drugs.

Ms Ayubi says the new revised bill is better than the previous one
While public education is indeed a necessary component of media, the law does not stipulate a limit on the amount or nature of mandatory material, again leaving this open to interpretation and possible misuse.
The manager of Radio Killid, Najiba Ayubi, is cautious.
"It is not a complete or perfect law, but I can say it is better than before."
Ms Ayubi has been involved with the debate and campaign for a better law during which journalists also brought in Article 19 to explain some of the issues to parliamentarians.
This achievement of Afghan journalists has come at a crucial time.
One of the most successful stories of post-conflict reconstruction, Afghanistan's media are now facing one of their most challenging periods.
Increasing curbs on information have been accompanied by greater violence and increasing intolerance from all sides, even as a sharp cut in donor funding has forced many media organisations to close down, downsize or worry about their survival.
Afghan journalists hope that the new media law, once passed, will give them more rights, rather than making their jobs more difficult.

Afghanistan anodyne

Review June 2007
By : Aunohita Mojumdar

No Space for Further Burials by Feryal Ali GauharWomen Unlimited, 2007

Feryal Ali Gauhar’s new novel is an unmitigated tale of horror – bestial fact stacked upon bestial fact, evoking revulsion and nausea. The book’s jacket claims that the work powerfully reveals the tragedy of Afghanistan, the terrible madness of war. But No Space for Further Burials never reaches that broader bank, staying caught instead in the narrow sewer it describes.
Although the book’s publisher gives only sketchy details about the author, Gauhar is well-known enough in her multiple roles as a UN goodwill ambassador, a TV actress, and as the author of the 2002 The Scent of Wet Earth in August, which explored Tibbi Galli (Lahore’s red-light area) and the abuse of women. In No Space for Further Burials, she moves away from both Pakistan and gender issues, instead basing her novel in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Gauhar’s central figure is a US Army soldier who, having strayed from his base, is captured, and suddenly finds himself shoved into in a mental asylum along with mentally deranged, physically crippled and diseased inmates. Inside the walls of the asylum he is known as ‘Firangi’. The asylum, once funded by the government and serviced by foreign doctors, has now been abandoned to itself, with only the inmates/captives remaining behind, kept forcibly by the asylum’s caretaker and his wife. There are several mysteries here: why the caretaker continues to hold these people here; why he and his wife do not turn the inmates free, and escape themselves; where the group’s food comes from, and why they choose to slowly starve rather than leave the asylum’s horrific confines. Perhaps Gauhar feels no need to explain these issues, preferring instead to allow them to build into her endless vortex of sordidness.
In the midst of all this, there are some references to the outside world. Soldiers, who are interchangeable with looters and rebels (the distinction is not explained at any length), come regularly to plunder the asylum for whatever it might yield. There are some brief snapshots of Firangi’s earlier life in his military base, as well as occasional references to the possible futility of the American military attempt to bring democracy and liberation to a country such as Afghanistan. Gauhar tries to weave in bits of Afghan history, as well as that of the Great Depression of 1930s America. Where the book fails is in linking these issues together; in broadening the peephole show to take in the larger world; in balancing the horror with the human element that would let the reader relate to the characters or their squalid situation.
No single character in this asylum is afflicted by just one ailment. Instead, each has a string of horrors plaguing him or her. Even the one friend that Firangi makes in the asylum, Bulbul, ends up making lewd gestures at him before stealing his clothes. All the while, Firangi’s homophobic fear of contact with Bulbul hangs over the relationship like a pallid, overcast sky. At other times, limbs are broken and deformed, flesh is torn, and family tortures family; pus, mucus and blood are liberally smeared over this tale. All forms of madness also make appearances here – rape, injury, the killing of families, and people driven insane by the terrible things that have happened to them.
AnaesthetisedSitting in Afghanistan reading this book, this reviewer notices interest in Afghanistan flagging in the international media. Only the big, sexy stories continue to capture interest: the drug wars, the Taliban and the deaths. There is the fear that reporting on Afghanistan will go the way of Iraq, reduced to stories of the dead and not the living. The incessant roll call of death in Iraq has blunted media viewers the world round – immunised us from feeling anything but the mildest shock. Death tolls of more than a hundred are relegated to sidebars in newspapers, taken off the headlines after cursory mentions in brief bulletins.
The unmitigated reporting of horror functions as an anodyne. The lack of shock evoked by the coverage of Iraq is skewed; not because no one cares about the living, but rather due to the fact that the media does not talk of them. When understanding of a country is reduced to its death count, there is no human face to the tragedy there, and it slowly ceases to matter. Similarly, the sheer horrors in Feryal Ali Gauhar’s book also act as an anodyne, to anaesthetise any sensation.
There is an element of Mantoesque madness recreated in No Space for Further Burials: the blurring of lines between the sane and the insane, between memories and reality, between dreams and facts; the loss of concepts of time and space; the nowhere land of Toba Tek Singh, from where Firangi will not be rescued. At best, however, this remains a mere attempt. The attempt to make everything absolutely horrifying, surpassed by even more unimaginable horrors that lie in wait, destroys what the book sets out to do. No Space for Further Burials may bring up plenty of bile, but it does little to stir real emotions.

Muted voices

Hindu, May 27, 2007

An independent and vocal media is one of the rare success stories of Afghanistan. A new bill and dwindling sponsorship, however, threaten its functioning and survival.

AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR

IN a post-conflict situation where reconstruction has been riddled with shortcomings, frustrations and bad policies, Afghanistan’s media is one of the rare success stories. Emerging as a vibrant independent voice, it has brought under scrutiny the performance of the government and the international community and is questioning entrenched interests. In the absence of a consolidated opposition (political parties were banned from the electoral contest during the parliamentary elections), the media often plays the role of a democratic opposition with some success.
However, the very strength of the media now seems to be the cause of its undoing, its critical voice discomfiting those in power. Whether it is the government which fears losing its credibility, the former warlords who would prefer no examination about the sources of their power or past deeds, the Taliban who hold sway in some districts of Southern Afghanistan or the international forces, none is very eager to be scrutinised. The result is increasing threats to the independence of the media at the very moment that they are consolidating the gains of the past five years.
Ominous signs
Ajmal Naqshbandi met a brutal end at the hands of the Taliban who have also arrested several groups of journalists simply for the crime of having “entered their territory” without permission. On the other hand are journalists jailed regularly by the government or media, organisations raided as the country’s largest TV channel Tolo was, recently, for a report which “could be seen as ill-intentioned” and “can lead to various interpretations and cause unnecessary public anguish”. The international security forces strictly control access to information and have, on occasion, detained journalists or seized their materials. Now the country’s parliament is in the midst of debating a law that may further erode the rights of the Afghan media.
Specific clauses in the bill which have caused consternation amongst Afghan journalists include provisions to bring media content directly under the scrutiny of a council appointed and staffed by government officials and bringing all complaints against the media before the courts, the latter a conservative bastion in Afghanistan. There are other clauses restricting content on grounds of culture, tradition and religious sensitivities and the catch-all provision of national interest. While seemingly non-objectionable, these clauses are so wide-ranging that they are open to misuse by those wishing to censor media content for any reason.
In a situation of conflict, facts, for example, are always contentious and the media currently balances the contending versions of the truth. However, if the definition of facts is to be determined by the government, it would result in censorship of all news contrary to government claims whether it emanated from human rights groups, civil society or the Taliban.
Another setback
The new law may also reverse attempts to make the State broadcaster, Radio Television Afghanistan(RTA) into a public service broadcaster. Though taken outside the purview of the Ministry of Information, RTA will be under the control of the government, through a structure that is yet to be determined. The Minister of Information and Culture, Abdul Karim Khurram, says the government cannot afford not to control the RTA in a country at war.
In the absence of a viable opposition, the media has battled alone but vociferously to temper some of the provisions of the new law, with some success. Media conferences and articles and rigorous lobbying by Afghan journalists has alerted parliamentarians to the dangers of a government controlled media and widened the debate.
Unfortunately, the domination of the media by the West or countries from the North in general exacerbates the threat to the media. Within Afghanistan, those wishing to curb media freedoms, whether in the name of social order, national unity, security or traditional and religious values, project media independence as a “Western” or alien value, feeding on the anti-foreigner (read anti-Westerner) hostility endemic to Afghanistan. The lack of engagement of South Asia in this debate has not helped.
Financial support
South Asian media organisations could also help financially by using content generated by Afghan media. This would help substantially in supporting media independence, especially at a time when rapid withdrawal of donor funding has left many news organisations teetering on the edge of survival.
While donors rushed in with funding to set up private independent media in 2003 and 2004, seeing it as an essential component of rebuilding democracy, the financial support is drying up. Donors argue that it is time for market forces to determine the survival of media even though it is clear that the non-existent market in Afghanistan can scarcely support multiple media organisations. Those who are surviving on the market are doing so with an overwhelming portion of entertainment content, usually culled from India and elsewhere. This too may be jeopardised. The Information Minister is keen to slap a ceiling on the use of foreign content in Afghan media even though indigenous production of media content is at an early stage.
The greater threat
The financial crunch has resulted in some media outlets closing down while others are downsizing. An even greater threat lies in the fact that yet others may turn to dubious sources of funding to survive. In a conflict situation where differing sides are carrying out propaganda wars, any vulnerability in the media is likely to be seized upon.
Unlike other countries where a robust tradition of independent media helps the media to tide over difficult periods, Afghanistan’s new media may lack the resilience to survive these times. Once the media loses its independence, it may be very difficult to regain it.

Afghanistan: Trouble on the farm

Asia Times

By Aunohita Mojumdar KABUL -
Former Afghan warlords and commanders are becoming increasingly adept at fighting their battles in Parliament, with the latest example of their muscle-flexing coming on Monday when firebrand female parliamentarian Malalai Joya was suspended from the Lower House. Joya had compared her fellow, overwhelmingly male, colleagues to farmyard animals. The incident underlines a growing conflict of interests among Parliament, the government and the international community. The contradiction first came to light during the infamous "amnesty
vote" in February when members tried to give themselves immunity from prosecution for any crimes committed during the past 25 years of war. Former communists, mujahideen and Taliban united on this issue. The international community expressed concern over this apparent subversion of the process of transitional justice, resulting in a fierce war of words. The standoff was resolved after President Hamid Karzai signed off on a law that seemed to include a clause to satisfy every need. One clause, Article 3, grants immunity from prosecution, while another clause gives individuals the right to pursue justice over individual crimes. At best the law can be termed ambiguous, a factor that is likely to favor the status quo rather than any pursuit of prosecution of war crimes. However, the United Nations' top representative in the country, Tom Koenigs, claims the law has strengthened the rights of the individual, adding that he has been assured by Karzai that the law does not preempt the state's right to prosecute. Since then, the issue of the extent of Parliament's power and its possible misuse has only grown more acute. Having installed a Parliament in a tearing hurry in 2005, both the government and the international community are now faced with considerable challenges as Parliament comes up with laws and decisions that would be considered incongruous in a liberal democratic framework. Both the US-backed government in Kabul and the international community pushed for the formation of Parliament in 2005 even though few of the conditions that had led to the postponement of elections in 2004 had changed. Elections took place in an environment vitiated by the failure of the disarmament process. The multi-seat single non-transferable vote system used in the elections beggared belief, as did the ban on political parties from contesting in the elections. The situation was compounded by an evidently faulty vetting process. The composition of Parliament therefore falls short of what its backers would have liked. The House of Representatives (Wolesi Jirga - Lower House) is dominated by a minority comprising former commanders and warlords and those who have other sources of wealth and power. This group is taking advantage to push its agenda, helped by a power vacuum in the country created by Karzai's lack of writ beyond the capital, the absence of political parties, and the lack of established parliamentary procedures. This month, the Meshrano Jirga, or Upper House, passed a bill calling for talks with indigenous Taliban, a cessation of operations by international troops, a date for their withdrawal, and the request that these troops operate only when necessary and with the approval of the government. But whether the Upper House can initiate a bill is still to be clarified. If it can, it could render anti-insurgency operations untenable, requiring a complete rewiring of the military strategy of the foreign forces as well as the chain of command. The international community, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the US-led coalition forces, are counting on Karzai to bail them out. The president's assent is required on all laws passed by Parliament, though his power of veto is limited. If Parliament disagrees with him, it can overrule the president with a two-thirds majority, something that obviously tempers the president's willingness or ability to counter some of the illiberal moves. There was considerable international dismay this month over the "dismissal" of two ministers - the minister of refugees and the minister of foreign affairs, apparently on the grounds of their failure to deal with the problem of returnees and refugees being pushed out by Iran and Pakistan. While Karzai challenged the procedure of a no-confidence vote against Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, (while accepting the no-confidence move against Minister of Refugees Mohammed Akbar), the UN questioned Parliament's authority to dismiss the ministers altogether. It said the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's view "is that the constitution provides for votes of censure of confidence in ministers, but does not expressly give Parliament the right to dismiss ministers". A senior parliamentary official, however, reacted to this statement with anger, saying such observations on the part of the UN amounted to "interference in the country's internal affairs". The official cited Article 92 of the constitution, which allows a vote of no confidence to be passed against any minister by a simple majority of the House. "No confidence means removal of the minister," he insisted. In this case the UN did attempt to interpret the constitution, despite saying that this was the prerogative of the Supreme Court, to which Karzai has referred the issue. A number of countries take particular interest in Afghanistan because they are helping pay for its reconstruction, whether it is physical infrastructure or the institutions of state, such as law and justice and their delivery mechanisms. There is, though, a fine line between aid and interference. Countries are also selective about when they pitch in. They are assertive on issues relating to the rule of law and almost the sole decision-makers in terms of military operations. However, they are quite happy to pipe down on issues relating to gender on the grounds that they do not want to interfere with the cultural traditions of the country. Long before the amnesty bill, parliamentarians attempted to pass laws that would lower the age of consent of girls to 13 years and make it mandatory for all female parliamentarians to be "escorted" by mehrams (male family members) while traveling both within and outside Afghanistan. There was also a concerted bid to abolish the Ministry of Women's Affairs, on the grounds that it had not achieved anything concrete, notwithstanding that it had been deliberately kept weak by making it a policymaking body without any implementing powers. No one is convinced that these moves have seen their last. Harsh words Malalai Joya, 29, who is from Farah province, angered her colleagues when she spoke in a television interview of the "farmyard" nature of Parliament. She added that at least cows were useful as they provided milk. Joya has been a consistent critic of warlords and those accused of war crimes being allowed in Parliament. In 2004, when she challenged their presence in the council established to write a constitution, she received death threats - she now has around-the-clock security. Her outspoken speeches have made her a target for verbal abuse, even while her courage and work for the destitute and women in general have made her extremely popular in her own constituency. She was returned to Parliament with one of the highest numbers of votes, competing against men on her own right rather than entering Parliament as a beneficiary of the reserved seats for women. Joya's outspokenness brought her into Parliament, the same trait that now seems to have had her removed from the House. In the broader picture, if Parliament continues to assert its supremacy at the behest of the "warlord clique", the country could face a political "insurgency" to go with the military one led by the Taliban.

Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively. (Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)