Christian Science Monitor/June 2008
Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened for the first time Sunday to send troops into Pakistan to fight militants, raising Afghanistan's longtime criticism of its neighbor for not stopping cross-border attacks to a new level.
President Karzai's statement came as NATO and Afghan forces continued hunting for 870 prisoners – including some 400 Taliban militants – who escaped Friday after a spectacular assault on a high-security prison in Kandahar Province in southern Afghanistan.
The prison break did not negate overall advances in security but could hurt public confidence, NATO spokesperson Mark Laity told the Monitor.
The incident did prompt the strongest rhetoric yet from Karzai, who like many Afghan officials has long blamed Pakistan for the insurgency in their country, claiming that Pakistan helps insurgents by providing them a haven if not actively supporting them.
Because militants come from Pakistan "to come and kill Afghan and kill coalition troops, it exactly gives us the right to do the same," Karzai said at a press conference Sunday.
The president singled out Taliban leaders Mullah Omar and Baitullah Mehsud, saying, "We will complete the journey, and we will get them and we will defeat them. We will avenge all that they have done to Afghanistan for the past so many years," Karzai said.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said in response that his country wants good relations with its neighbors, but that the Afghan-Pakistan border is too long to prevent people from crossing, "even if Pakistan puts its entire Army along the border."
In the hunt for escaped prisoners, meanwhile, coalition forces claimed to have killed 15 insurgents during the manhunt and arrested five people. It was not clear whether those killed or captured were involved with the prison break or had been prisoners themselves.
Friday's prison attack sent a ripple of shock felt all the way to the capital city of Kabul, raising further questions about the security preparedness of the Afghan state and the international troops supporting it.
Details of the assault in Kandahar, where the president's brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, heads the provincial council, reveal that it was well coordinated and well planned. According to the Taliban, they loaded explosives into a truck that they then rammed into the prison's front gate. As the gate fell, armed Taliban moved in, shooting prison guards who had survived.
While agreeing that security had been poor, Sayed Sami Sadat, deputy director of strategic communications in the Ministry of Interior, said there was no information to indicate whether there had been any inside help. The command-and-control structure of the prison had been destroyed in the attack, he said, and it would take time to piece the details together.
The Kandahar prison is administered by the Ministry of Justice and manned largely by guards from that ministry, as well as policemen from the Ministry of Interior. The prison guards have been trained by Canadian forces. They lead Kandahar's provincial reconstruction team and have reportedly spent $1.5 million on the training and the jail facility.
Afghanistan's prisons have a poor record of external and internal security as well as frequent reports of human rights abuses. The Kandahar prison itself saw a week-long hunger strike by prisoners that ended when a parliamentary delegation promised to look into allegations of severe abuse and torture.
Mr. Laity, the NATO spokesperson, played down the attack's significance. "Obviously it is a very serious breach of security in a carefully planned attack, and the outcome is very dismaying," he said, but added that this year has seen "significant successes putting the Taliban on the back foot operationally in many areas, and this does not set all that aside.
Militants have struck at several high-security, high-visibility targets this year, giving the impression that their operational capability has risen. This January Taliban fighters attacked the well-secured luxury Serena Hotel in Kabul. In April, militants disrupted a parade attended by several national and international dignitaries including Karzai, whom they tried to assassinate. The prison break is expected to strengthen the Taliban's morale.
June 16, 2008
NGOs call for improved Afghan aid
Al Jazeera/June 2008
As the Afghan government and the international donor community meet in Paris on June 12 to decide the future nature of assistance to the war-ravaged nation, NGOs and rights groups are urging that the needs of ordinary citizens come first.
Some $15 billion has been spent on reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan since the US-led coalition deposed the Taliban and set up a democratic-influenced government in 2000.
But international aid groups believe donor priorities continue to overlook the needs of the people.
Oxfam, the international development agency which has maintained a long-term commitment and experience in Afghanistan, is critical of both the quantity and quality of aid that has been disbursed in the country.
"So far international aid to Afghanistan has not gone far enough to alleviate the poverty and suffering of the Afghan people," Matt Waldman, Afghanistan policy advisor for Oxfam International, said in a statement provided to Al Jazeera.
"The amount of international aid has been wholly insufficient given the huge job of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of the aid that has been given too much has been driven by the priorities of the international community and its security concerns rather [than] meeting the needs of the people and building a more effective state," he added.
Limited success
Though donor countries cite the return of six million children to school and the expansion of medical services and construction of roads as major achievements, there are limitations to the "success story".
The percentage of the population living below the minimum dietary level has increased from 30 to 35 per cent in the past year, increasing the need for food aid.
According to the National Human Development Report of 2007, literacy levels have fallen from 28.7 per cent in 2003 to 23.5 per cent in 2007.
Life expectancy figures have also fallen from 44.5 years in 2003 to 43.1 years in 2007.
Chrissie Hirst, the Chief of Policy and Advocacy in DACAAR, a development NG, says that while donors are willing to spend some amount on food aid, "they are not prepared to fund long-term intervention to provide for long-term food security".
Though 70-80 per cent of the country is dependant on agriculture, the total investment in this sector since 2001 has been only $400-$500 million.
"The agriculture sector is seriously underfunded," Hirst told Al Jazeera.
Drastic change needed
Some 35 per cent of the population are at risk
of malnutrition, agencies say [GETTY]
The Paris conference will be the venue for new benchmarks to be set as the final Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the roadmap for the next five years, is rolled out and fresh donor commitments are made. The follow-up to the London Compact of 2006 is expected to further cement the partnership between the Afghan government and international donors.
Participants are also expected to use slogans like 'Afghan first' and 'Afghan ownership' to reflect their commitment to Afghanistan. However, not everyone is convinced that Paris will result in the much-needed tectonic shift needed to bring about an alignment between donor and Afghan priorities.
Lorenzo Delesgues, the director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan NGO that is committed to "increase transparency, integrity and accountability in Afghanistan's reconstruction process," says the status quo hinders the country's development.
"More of the same is not an option," he said.
Though foreign aid accounts for 90 per cent of all public expenditure in Afghanistan, Delesgues says "it remains highly unpredictable and too much aid is channelled outside of the government's priorities and of the core government budget".
USAID, the American aid agency, accounted last year for 40 per cent of the aid to Afghanistan. However 90 per cent of USAID spending remains outside the government budget, something that Delesgues says, must change.
"It is very important for them to increase aid but also their accountability to the government by channeling aid through the Afghan government," he said.
Government supervision required?
According to a recent report by Acbar, the coordinating agency for NGOs working in Afghanistan, 70 per cent of the aid coming in is spent outside the government budget and an estimated 40 per cent of the aid returns to the donor countries in the form of contracts awarded to implementing agencies and high salaries of expatriate experts.
According to Acbar, a foreign consultant can cost between $250,000 and $500,000 per year.
At approximately $60 per month, an Afghan civil servant with a family of four (Afghan families are usually larger) is just above the acceptable poverty level of $14 per capita per month
Reports in recent weeks indicated that the escalating price of wheat was putting the cost of food well beyond the salaries of even government employees.
"Despite high level of aid pledged, aid remains highly unpredictable and too much aid is channeled outside of the government's priorities and the government budget," Delesgues told Al Jazeera.
He believes that the lack of consultation with the local populace has meant that the Afghan population has "not yet become an actor of aid but is a subject of aid".
This is an issue that the Afghan government has said is an impediment to development.
Funding government aid
The Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB), a joint body set up to coordinate between the international donors and the Afghan government and reporting directly to the Afghan president, noted that "a significant portion of external resources provided to Afghanistan are still routed directly to projects by donors rather than to the government's budget".
The JCMB said lack of government supervision undermines the ability and flexibility of the Afghan government to commit funds to development priorities and to increase the funding of provincial based programs.
Action Aid, a development NGO has also called on the donor community to "pledge huge aid to be expensed by the Afghans themselves according to their needs and not as donors wish".
The NGO called on the international donor community to establish mechanisms at all levels, villages, districts, where people and their elected representatives are able to monitor and evaluate development work and aid distribution in their areas.
Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, Policy Research and Advocacy coordinator for Action Aid Afghanistan told Al Jazeera: "Donors need to keep the needs and requirements of Afghans in mind rather than their own geopolitical and security considerations."
As the Afghan government and the international donor community meet in Paris on June 12 to decide the future nature of assistance to the war-ravaged nation, NGOs and rights groups are urging that the needs of ordinary citizens come first.
Some $15 billion has been spent on reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan since the US-led coalition deposed the Taliban and set up a democratic-influenced government in 2000.
But international aid groups believe donor priorities continue to overlook the needs of the people.
Oxfam, the international development agency which has maintained a long-term commitment and experience in Afghanistan, is critical of both the quantity and quality of aid that has been disbursed in the country.
"So far international aid to Afghanistan has not gone far enough to alleviate the poverty and suffering of the Afghan people," Matt Waldman, Afghanistan policy advisor for Oxfam International, said in a statement provided to Al Jazeera.
"The amount of international aid has been wholly insufficient given the huge job of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Of the aid that has been given too much has been driven by the priorities of the international community and its security concerns rather [than] meeting the needs of the people and building a more effective state," he added.
Limited success
Though donor countries cite the return of six million children to school and the expansion of medical services and construction of roads as major achievements, there are limitations to the "success story".
The percentage of the population living below the minimum dietary level has increased from 30 to 35 per cent in the past year, increasing the need for food aid.
According to the National Human Development Report of 2007, literacy levels have fallen from 28.7 per cent in 2003 to 23.5 per cent in 2007.
Life expectancy figures have also fallen from 44.5 years in 2003 to 43.1 years in 2007.
Chrissie Hirst, the Chief of Policy and Advocacy in DACAAR, a development NG, says that while donors are willing to spend some amount on food aid, "they are not prepared to fund long-term intervention to provide for long-term food security".
Though 70-80 per cent of the country is dependant on agriculture, the total investment in this sector since 2001 has been only $400-$500 million.
"The agriculture sector is seriously underfunded," Hirst told Al Jazeera.
Drastic change needed
Some 35 per cent of the population are at risk
of malnutrition, agencies say [GETTY]
The Paris conference will be the venue for new benchmarks to be set as the final Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the roadmap for the next five years, is rolled out and fresh donor commitments are made. The follow-up to the London Compact of 2006 is expected to further cement the partnership between the Afghan government and international donors.
Participants are also expected to use slogans like 'Afghan first' and 'Afghan ownership' to reflect their commitment to Afghanistan. However, not everyone is convinced that Paris will result in the much-needed tectonic shift needed to bring about an alignment between donor and Afghan priorities.
Lorenzo Delesgues, the director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an Afghan NGO that is committed to "increase transparency, integrity and accountability in Afghanistan's reconstruction process," says the status quo hinders the country's development.
"More of the same is not an option," he said.
Though foreign aid accounts for 90 per cent of all public expenditure in Afghanistan, Delesgues says "it remains highly unpredictable and too much aid is channelled outside of the government's priorities and of the core government budget".
USAID, the American aid agency, accounted last year for 40 per cent of the aid to Afghanistan. However 90 per cent of USAID spending remains outside the government budget, something that Delesgues says, must change.
"It is very important for them to increase aid but also their accountability to the government by channeling aid through the Afghan government," he said.
Government supervision required?
According to a recent report by Acbar, the coordinating agency for NGOs working in Afghanistan, 70 per cent of the aid coming in is spent outside the government budget and an estimated 40 per cent of the aid returns to the donor countries in the form of contracts awarded to implementing agencies and high salaries of expatriate experts.
According to Acbar, a foreign consultant can cost between $250,000 and $500,000 per year.
At approximately $60 per month, an Afghan civil servant with a family of four (Afghan families are usually larger) is just above the acceptable poverty level of $14 per capita per month
Reports in recent weeks indicated that the escalating price of wheat was putting the cost of food well beyond the salaries of even government employees.
"Despite high level of aid pledged, aid remains highly unpredictable and too much aid is channeled outside of the government's priorities and the government budget," Delesgues told Al Jazeera.
He believes that the lack of consultation with the local populace has meant that the Afghan population has "not yet become an actor of aid but is a subject of aid".
This is an issue that the Afghan government has said is an impediment to development.
Funding government aid
The Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB), a joint body set up to coordinate between the international donors and the Afghan government and reporting directly to the Afghan president, noted that "a significant portion of external resources provided to Afghanistan are still routed directly to projects by donors rather than to the government's budget".
The JCMB said lack of government supervision undermines the ability and flexibility of the Afghan government to commit funds to development priorities and to increase the funding of provincial based programs.
Action Aid, a development NGO has also called on the donor community to "pledge huge aid to be expensed by the Afghans themselves according to their needs and not as donors wish".
The NGO called on the international donor community to establish mechanisms at all levels, villages, districts, where people and their elected representatives are able to monitor and evaluate development work and aid distribution in their areas.
Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, Policy Research and Advocacy coordinator for Action Aid Afghanistan told Al Jazeera: "Donors need to keep the needs and requirements of Afghans in mind rather than their own geopolitical and security considerations."
So Many Miles To Go
Times of India/ June 2008
KABUL: A new blueprint for the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan is expected to be finalised at the international conference in Paris today, a meeting between the inter-national donor community and the Afghan government.
The Afghan government will unveil its Afghanistan National Developments Strategy (ANDS), the equivalent of a five-year plan, and seek to raise $50 billion in donor commitment, more than three times the amount that has been disbursed by donors in Afghanistan since 2001.
Paris will certainly raise more money. However, will it answer critical questions on aid delivery and effectiveness?
Nearly seven years into the reconstruction of the country and $15 billion later, there is increasing criticism of the approach of the international community over the priorities of the aid regime. Though donor aid is inevitably tied to the interests of donor nations, it must also reflect the priorities of the recipient country. In Afghanistan, however, the pursuance of donor politics has often come at the cost of the welfare of Afghan citizens, something that long-term aid workers and organisations are increasingly articulating.
Consider the facts. While the enrolment in schools (six million children), increase of medical services, return of refugees and rebuilding of roads have been put forward as major achievements, the quality of life for the majority of Afghans has not improved to an extent commensurate with hopes, promises and expenditure.
The most recent National Human Development Report showed that literacy (23.5 per cent) and life expectancy (43.1 years) of Afghans were lower than what had been estimated at the time that the reconstruction was begun.
The country's current ranking in the Human Development Index remains one of the lowest anywhere in the world with an estimated ranking of 174, only above four other African nations.
The Human Poverty Index places it lowest while the Gender Development Index places it only above Niger. Estimates show that the amount of money spent in Afghanistan per capita has been a fraction of what was spent in rebuilding Kosovo and Timor, as the international community tried to do Afghanistan on the cheap even though the decimation of human and physical infrastructure here was much more devastating.
However, the 'cut-price' reconstruction has not been just about money. International efforts have been found lacking in terms of time and attention.
With an eye on taxpayers back home, donors have tended to focus on short-term projects with quick delivery and visible impact.
At best these projects are economically unsustainable while at worst the quick execution is often shoddy, lasting only long enough to give project implementers and donors their mandatory photo-op.
A critical example is the agriculture sector. In the past six and a half years, the sector has received only an estimated $400-500 million in donor funding.
This, despite the fact that an estimated 70 per cent of the country's population is dependant on agriculture for a livelihood and that development of ‘alternative livelihoods' has been identified as a key to weaning the country's farmers off poppy cultivation.
KABUL: A new blueprint for the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan is expected to be finalised at the international conference in Paris today, a meeting between the inter-national donor community and the Afghan government.
The Afghan government will unveil its Afghanistan National Developments Strategy (ANDS), the equivalent of a five-year plan, and seek to raise $50 billion in donor commitment, more than three times the amount that has been disbursed by donors in Afghanistan since 2001.
Paris will certainly raise more money. However, will it answer critical questions on aid delivery and effectiveness?
Nearly seven years into the reconstruction of the country and $15 billion later, there is increasing criticism of the approach of the international community over the priorities of the aid regime. Though donor aid is inevitably tied to the interests of donor nations, it must also reflect the priorities of the recipient country. In Afghanistan, however, the pursuance of donor politics has often come at the cost of the welfare of Afghan citizens, something that long-term aid workers and organisations are increasingly articulating.
Consider the facts. While the enrolment in schools (six million children), increase of medical services, return of refugees and rebuilding of roads have been put forward as major achievements, the quality of life for the majority of Afghans has not improved to an extent commensurate with hopes, promises and expenditure.
The most recent National Human Development Report showed that literacy (23.5 per cent) and life expectancy (43.1 years) of Afghans were lower than what had been estimated at the time that the reconstruction was begun.
The country's current ranking in the Human Development Index remains one of the lowest anywhere in the world with an estimated ranking of 174, only above four other African nations.
The Human Poverty Index places it lowest while the Gender Development Index places it only above Niger. Estimates show that the amount of money spent in Afghanistan per capita has been a fraction of what was spent in rebuilding Kosovo and Timor, as the international community tried to do Afghanistan on the cheap even though the decimation of human and physical infrastructure here was much more devastating.
However, the 'cut-price' reconstruction has not been just about money. International efforts have been found lacking in terms of time and attention.
With an eye on taxpayers back home, donors have tended to focus on short-term projects with quick delivery and visible impact.
At best these projects are economically unsustainable while at worst the quick execution is often shoddy, lasting only long enough to give project implementers and donors their mandatory photo-op.
A critical example is the agriculture sector. In the past six and a half years, the sector has received only an estimated $400-500 million in donor funding.
This, despite the fact that an estimated 70 per cent of the country's population is dependant on agriculture for a livelihood and that development of ‘alternative livelihoods' has been identified as a key to weaning the country's farmers off poppy cultivation.
Laura Bush urges donors to stand by Afghanistan
Christian Science Monitor/June 2008
US first lady Laura Bush made a quick trip to Afghanistan, emphasizing the need for continued attention to the country ahead of an international donors' conference in Paris on June 12.
The Mrs. Bush met with President Hamid Karzai in Kabul Sunday after flying to Bamiyan in central Afghanistan.
Bamiyan, famed for its colossal Buddha statues that were blown up by the Taliban in March 2001, is also the only province in the country headed by a woman governor, Habiba Sarobi. But the province is also emblematic of problems in the aid delivery systems that have come under increasing criticism from aid workers and analysts. The province, one of the most peaceful areas in the country, suffers from economic neglect exacerbated by a difficult mountainous topography.
"Donors need to keep the needs and requirements of Afghans in mind rather than their own geopolitical and security considerations," says Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, policy research and advocacy coordinator for Action Aid Afghanistan. Referring to the skewed distribution of aid that benefits provinces with conflict and penalizes the peaceful areas, Mr. Siddiqui referred to Bamiyan as an example.
Siddiqui emphasized that more money needed to be spent in Afghanistan and to be tied to the new Afghanistan National Development Strategy that is expected to be unveiled in Paris this week.
Host country France is hoping to raise $12 billion to $15 billion to help Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts. Approximately $15 billion has already been disbursed by the international community in Afghanistan.
Bush told reporters traveling with her Sunday: "We don't need to be intimidated by them. The international community can't drop Afghanistan now at this very crucial time."
It was important Afghans understood "the rest of the world is with you and that we're not going to leave you right now when the Taliban and Al Qaeda is trying to intimidate you," she said.
Bush visited a police academy in Bamiyan and spoke to around a dozen women police recruits. She later inaugurated a US-funded road-building project and was serenaded by schoolgirls from poor backgrounds.
While the Taliban banned girls from school, the United Nations says there are now more girls in education than there were boys being taught under the ousted Islamist government. "Of course we want more [girls] in school, and I think this is the key to success in Afghanistan," said Bush, a former schoolteacher. Despite progress, still only 35 percent of those in education are girls. "We want that to be 50-50," she said.
Analysts in Afghanistan, however, blame the US, the largest donor, for some of the major problems in aid delivery.
Lorenzo Delesgues, director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, says that "it is very important for [the US] to increase aid but also its accountability to the government by channeling its aid through the Afghan government."
Mr. Delesgues says that currently 90 percent of the American aid was routed outside the Afghan government budget. Currently, approximately 70 percent of all international aid to Afghanistan is outside the government budget; a factor the Afghan government says has led to waste and erosion of authority, and hampers long- term planning.
Chrissie Hirst, the chief of policy and advocacy in DACAAR, a Danish development nongovernmental organization, says that the Paris donors' conference should focus on sustainable aid. While food aid is forthcoming, she points out donors are less willing to invest in long-term projects that will ensure food security.
• Information from Reuters was used in this report.
US first lady Laura Bush made a quick trip to Afghanistan, emphasizing the need for continued attention to the country ahead of an international donors' conference in Paris on June 12.
The Mrs. Bush met with President Hamid Karzai in Kabul Sunday after flying to Bamiyan in central Afghanistan.
Bamiyan, famed for its colossal Buddha statues that were blown up by the Taliban in March 2001, is also the only province in the country headed by a woman governor, Habiba Sarobi. But the province is also emblematic of problems in the aid delivery systems that have come under increasing criticism from aid workers and analysts. The province, one of the most peaceful areas in the country, suffers from economic neglect exacerbated by a difficult mountainous topography.
"Donors need to keep the needs and requirements of Afghans in mind rather than their own geopolitical and security considerations," says Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, policy research and advocacy coordinator for Action Aid Afghanistan. Referring to the skewed distribution of aid that benefits provinces with conflict and penalizes the peaceful areas, Mr. Siddiqui referred to Bamiyan as an example.
Siddiqui emphasized that more money needed to be spent in Afghanistan and to be tied to the new Afghanistan National Development Strategy that is expected to be unveiled in Paris this week.
Host country France is hoping to raise $12 billion to $15 billion to help Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts. Approximately $15 billion has already been disbursed by the international community in Afghanistan.
Bush told reporters traveling with her Sunday: "We don't need to be intimidated by them. The international community can't drop Afghanistan now at this very crucial time."
It was important Afghans understood "the rest of the world is with you and that we're not going to leave you right now when the Taliban and Al Qaeda is trying to intimidate you," she said.
Bush visited a police academy in Bamiyan and spoke to around a dozen women police recruits. She later inaugurated a US-funded road-building project and was serenaded by schoolgirls from poor backgrounds.
While the Taliban banned girls from school, the United Nations says there are now more girls in education than there were boys being taught under the ousted Islamist government. "Of course we want more [girls] in school, and I think this is the key to success in Afghanistan," said Bush, a former schoolteacher. Despite progress, still only 35 percent of those in education are girls. "We want that to be 50-50," she said.
Analysts in Afghanistan, however, blame the US, the largest donor, for some of the major problems in aid delivery.
Lorenzo Delesgues, director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, says that "it is very important for [the US] to increase aid but also its accountability to the government by channeling its aid through the Afghan government."
Mr. Delesgues says that currently 90 percent of the American aid was routed outside the Afghan government budget. Currently, approximately 70 percent of all international aid to Afghanistan is outside the government budget; a factor the Afghan government says has led to waste and erosion of authority, and hampers long- term planning.
Chrissie Hirst, the chief of policy and advocacy in DACAAR, a Danish development nongovernmental organization, says that the Paris donors' conference should focus on sustainable aid. While food aid is forthcoming, she points out donors are less willing to invest in long-term projects that will ensure food security.
• Information from Reuters was used in this report.
A media soap opera in Kabul
Asia Times/ April 2008
KABUL - A fresh deadline seeking compliance with a ban on the five Indian TV serials being broadcast by private Afghan TV channels was due to end on Tuesday. The ban, ordered by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, has caused public controversy and a strident clash between conservatives and liberals. The truth is more multi-layered: not all those who oppose the serials are doing so out of conservative values, nor are the reasons for their defense uniformly liberal.
The serials are considered by critics to have content considered "too modern" for Afghan audiences. Meanwhile, the so-called values the shows portray are viewed as regressive, even backward, in India. By positing this case as a simple test of media freedom, there is a danger of losing sight of the
complexities that need to be addressed to strengthen the independence of the Afghan media.
The debate over the ban has been described in private national media and the international press as "the latest battle of the long-simmering war between cultural conservatives and liberals", as one reputed newspaper called it. The reality is somewhat more complex. While conservatives, including some of the religious ulema, have been consistently pressuring the government and TV channels to curtail any content that goes beyond their interpretation of Afghanistan's conservative social mores, in this instance the demand for curtailing the soap operas has more widespread support. The reasons for this are two-fold.
The story lines of some of the serials go beyond traditional family scenarios to include complex relationships that are anathema to Afghan families. Children born out of wedlock and extramarital relationships are just two salient examples. The second reason for the criticism is that the serials have allegedly become addictive to viewers, especially young children.
"My daughter is worshipping her dolls, setting then out in a row as she sees people worshipping in the serials," a liberal female member of parliament (MP)told a diplomat when asked for her views. A senior political figure - who has little sympathy for conservatives - said his children were emulating scenes from the popular Indian soap opera Tulsi. Meanwhile, a senior government official said social customs viewed in the serials were being emulated in middle-class Afghani homes.
Liberal MP Shukriya Barakzai told Asia Times Online that while she did not support the ban - which she said appeared to be a result of political machinations - she felt there needed to be more indigenous content on Afghan TV.
"Afghans have a rich history and culture," she said. "The Ministry of Information should make a strategy so that we have our own serials or other programs. Otherwise, if you ban Indian serials, some other serials, maybe from Iran and not in keeping with our culture, will take their place."
In India, soap operas face strong competition from other forms of programming as well as social and cultural activities. But, in Afghanistan - especially its urban areas - such alternatives are unavailable. In fact, there is a disproportionate emphasis on TV viewing; Afghan social customs place low priority on family activities in public spaces, leaving television as one of the foremost "family" events.
Lack of indigenous programming has also meant an over-reliance on foreign content. Bollywood's serials, slickly produced with engaging plots, have been gross earners for the channels which broadcast them. The lack of a strong and varied programming base has meant that an unprecedented number of viewers watch serials such as Tulsi, the most-watched of the five Bollywood soaps that face a ban. The serials also inhabit terrain that is culturally more familiar to the Afghan viewer. Dubbing them in Dari, the local language, has provided an additional comfort factor which has resulted in an undue influence on viewers.
It may be that the familiarity of the customs, culture and values presented in the shows is what's causing consternation. Because the content comes from a similar culture, it has greater impact and influence than content that is completely alien, for example Hollywood products. As such, the Indian soaps are understandably influencing behavior patterns among Afghan viewers.
A senior official of the Ministry of Information and Culture (MIC) said he had nothing against the Indian serials, but commented that TV channels were showing them "too much". He told Asia Times Online, "By going too far some of the media organizations are closing even the existing space for media freedom. If the conservatives strike back forcefully even the existing freedoms may be lost."
Information Minister Abdul Karim Khurram, who is seen as a conservative, has argued that it is not he, but a joint meeting of the Media Commission, MPs, the ulema and media houses that made the decision to ban the soaps. According to Khurram, the decision constitutes a legal order because the Media Commission was involved in the meeting. Khurram also said the MIC would like new legislation to regulate and limit the proportion of foreign content in local media. The minister declined to discuss what steps would be taken should the MIC ban be flouted.
The saas-bahu or "mother-in-law and daughter-in-law" serials as they are called in India, are watched by mostly conservative, urban middle-class families. Most feminists and liberals view the soap operas with distaste because they allegedly stereotype male and female family roles and present everyday life through the lens of so-called "family values".
At best, the saas-bahu soaps are viewed as "traditional", and at worst anti-feminist and regressive. The marketing of family values is another reason why the serials appeal widely in Afghanistan; their heavy focus on the family being something to which many Afghans can relate.
Women outside the family structure have no place in Afghan society. This is the main reason why there has been little progress in the area of gender rights, specifically in the provision of protection mechanisms for female victims of violence.
The most popular Afghan TV channel, Tolo TV, has so far defied the ban on Indian serials. Its owners have argued that they were only following public demand. A journalists' union has called for a meeting with President Hamid Karzai, Khurram, directors of Afghan television and representatives of the Council of Religious Scholars to "find a moderate solution for the problem".
While pushing for greater leeway over the right to broadcast these five Indian serials, journalists need to be careful about who they invite to the table. A media commission, charged with arbitrating on media content, already exists, but needs to be strengthened through wider civil society and media representation. To invite others, including the president, the minister of information and the ulema to decide the fate of the serials would set a precedent that would make them legitimate stakeholders in any decision-making on media content in the future.
At a time when the media law is on hold, and there is continuous pressure from religious leaders, the government and the Taliban, the media need to emphasize the importance of the rule of law rather than arbitrary decisions in regard to televised content. The debate over these five serials also loses sight of the complexities of media content and survival, issues that need to be addressed to strengthen an independent media as well as larger progressive rights.
Debate over democratic, political and human rights - including women's rights - is being increasingly dismissed as "Western" or alien. An editorial published in the government-owned newspaper Kabul Times provided an apparent justification for domestic violence against women, arguing that nagging women provoked their husbands and other male family members to "beat them black and blue". The editorial passed without any remark from any member of the government.
Today there is greater intolerance in Afghanistan. Specifically in the expression of progressive social, cultural and political mores and also for democratization. The international community, fearful of losing its leverage, has tiptoed around these issues, taking refuge in the all-encompassing pretext of "cultural propriety".
The current debate over the Indian soaps needs to take into account the complexities of the issue. It must differentiate between conservative opposition, parental concern and the government's use of this issue as a tool to gain greater control over the media and to tame private media by hitting them in the pocket.
Any discussion should consider the need for more varied programming, indigenous content and financial viability. By lumping all opposition to the Indian family dramas into one basket and losing sight of the complexities, those espousing more progressive values could walk right into a trap that would help affirm larger space for cultural intolerance.
KABUL - A fresh deadline seeking compliance with a ban on the five Indian TV serials being broadcast by private Afghan TV channels was due to end on Tuesday. The ban, ordered by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, has caused public controversy and a strident clash between conservatives and liberals. The truth is more multi-layered: not all those who oppose the serials are doing so out of conservative values, nor are the reasons for their defense uniformly liberal.
The serials are considered by critics to have content considered "too modern" for Afghan audiences. Meanwhile, the so-called values the shows portray are viewed as regressive, even backward, in India. By positing this case as a simple test of media freedom, there is a danger of losing sight of the
complexities that need to be addressed to strengthen the independence of the Afghan media.
The debate over the ban has been described in private national media and the international press as "the latest battle of the long-simmering war between cultural conservatives and liberals", as one reputed newspaper called it. The reality is somewhat more complex. While conservatives, including some of the religious ulema, have been consistently pressuring the government and TV channels to curtail any content that goes beyond their interpretation of Afghanistan's conservative social mores, in this instance the demand for curtailing the soap operas has more widespread support. The reasons for this are two-fold.
The story lines of some of the serials go beyond traditional family scenarios to include complex relationships that are anathema to Afghan families. Children born out of wedlock and extramarital relationships are just two salient examples. The second reason for the criticism is that the serials have allegedly become addictive to viewers, especially young children.
"My daughter is worshipping her dolls, setting then out in a row as she sees people worshipping in the serials," a liberal female member of parliament (MP)told a diplomat when asked for her views. A senior political figure - who has little sympathy for conservatives - said his children were emulating scenes from the popular Indian soap opera Tulsi. Meanwhile, a senior government official said social customs viewed in the serials were being emulated in middle-class Afghani homes.
Liberal MP Shukriya Barakzai told Asia Times Online that while she did not support the ban - which she said appeared to be a result of political machinations - she felt there needed to be more indigenous content on Afghan TV.
"Afghans have a rich history and culture," she said. "The Ministry of Information should make a strategy so that we have our own serials or other programs. Otherwise, if you ban Indian serials, some other serials, maybe from Iran and not in keeping with our culture, will take their place."
In India, soap operas face strong competition from other forms of programming as well as social and cultural activities. But, in Afghanistan - especially its urban areas - such alternatives are unavailable. In fact, there is a disproportionate emphasis on TV viewing; Afghan social customs place low priority on family activities in public spaces, leaving television as one of the foremost "family" events.
Lack of indigenous programming has also meant an over-reliance on foreign content. Bollywood's serials, slickly produced with engaging plots, have been gross earners for the channels which broadcast them. The lack of a strong and varied programming base has meant that an unprecedented number of viewers watch serials such as Tulsi, the most-watched of the five Bollywood soaps that face a ban. The serials also inhabit terrain that is culturally more familiar to the Afghan viewer. Dubbing them in Dari, the local language, has provided an additional comfort factor which has resulted in an undue influence on viewers.
It may be that the familiarity of the customs, culture and values presented in the shows is what's causing consternation. Because the content comes from a similar culture, it has greater impact and influence than content that is completely alien, for example Hollywood products. As such, the Indian soaps are understandably influencing behavior patterns among Afghan viewers.
A senior official of the Ministry of Information and Culture (MIC) said he had nothing against the Indian serials, but commented that TV channels were showing them "too much". He told Asia Times Online, "By going too far some of the media organizations are closing even the existing space for media freedom. If the conservatives strike back forcefully even the existing freedoms may be lost."
Information Minister Abdul Karim Khurram, who is seen as a conservative, has argued that it is not he, but a joint meeting of the Media Commission, MPs, the ulema and media houses that made the decision to ban the soaps. According to Khurram, the decision constitutes a legal order because the Media Commission was involved in the meeting. Khurram also said the MIC would like new legislation to regulate and limit the proportion of foreign content in local media. The minister declined to discuss what steps would be taken should the MIC ban be flouted.
The saas-bahu or "mother-in-law and daughter-in-law" serials as they are called in India, are watched by mostly conservative, urban middle-class families. Most feminists and liberals view the soap operas with distaste because they allegedly stereotype male and female family roles and present everyday life through the lens of so-called "family values".
At best, the saas-bahu soaps are viewed as "traditional", and at worst anti-feminist and regressive. The marketing of family values is another reason why the serials appeal widely in Afghanistan; their heavy focus on the family being something to which many Afghans can relate.
Women outside the family structure have no place in Afghan society. This is the main reason why there has been little progress in the area of gender rights, specifically in the provision of protection mechanisms for female victims of violence.
The most popular Afghan TV channel, Tolo TV, has so far defied the ban on Indian serials. Its owners have argued that they were only following public demand. A journalists' union has called for a meeting with President Hamid Karzai, Khurram, directors of Afghan television and representatives of the Council of Religious Scholars to "find a moderate solution for the problem".
While pushing for greater leeway over the right to broadcast these five Indian serials, journalists need to be careful about who they invite to the table. A media commission, charged with arbitrating on media content, already exists, but needs to be strengthened through wider civil society and media representation. To invite others, including the president, the minister of information and the ulema to decide the fate of the serials would set a precedent that would make them legitimate stakeholders in any decision-making on media content in the future.
At a time when the media law is on hold, and there is continuous pressure from religious leaders, the government and the Taliban, the media need to emphasize the importance of the rule of law rather than arbitrary decisions in regard to televised content. The debate over these five serials also loses sight of the complexities of media content and survival, issues that need to be addressed to strengthen an independent media as well as larger progressive rights.
Debate over democratic, political and human rights - including women's rights - is being increasingly dismissed as "Western" or alien. An editorial published in the government-owned newspaper Kabul Times provided an apparent justification for domestic violence against women, arguing that nagging women provoked their husbands and other male family members to "beat them black and blue". The editorial passed without any remark from any member of the government.
Today there is greater intolerance in Afghanistan. Specifically in the expression of progressive social, cultural and political mores and also for democratization. The international community, fearful of losing its leverage, has tiptoed around these issues, taking refuge in the all-encompassing pretext of "cultural propriety".
The current debate over the Indian soaps needs to take into account the complexities of the issue. It must differentiate between conservative opposition, parental concern and the government's use of this issue as a tool to gain greater control over the media and to tame private media by hitting them in the pocket.
Any discussion should consider the need for more varied programming, indigenous content and financial viability. By lumping all opposition to the Indian family dramas into one basket and losing sight of the complexities, those espousing more progressive values could walk right into a trap that would help affirm larger space for cultural intolerance.
Afghan women turn to art
Al Jazeera/June 2008
On a dusty road in a middle class neighbourhood in west Kabul, an unassuming house looks almost as nondescript as any other except for the simple board declaring it is the Centre for Contemporary Arts in Afghanistan.
It is here that a quiet revolution is taking place. For the first time in the country's recent history, a group of young women are learning to express their experiences, sorrows and joys growing up in war-ravaged Afghanistan through art
And they are producing remarkably sophisticated and eloquent work.
The originality of their imagination is even more extraordinary in the context of Afghanistan's tragic history of conflict and the violence which continues to be visited upon women living in this country.
The Introvert
Yalda Noori, a student at the Centre, stands
next to her painting 'Life Passages'
Sheenkai Alam, a 19-year-old Afghan school girl is displaying 'Introvert', a painting which combines an array of colours in geometric shapes; circles, bars, and blocks fragment the colours. In the midst sits the figure of a man holding his head in his hands.
"He is the Afghan trying to find himself, the colours represent the mirror of history," Alam told Al Jazeera.
Eschewing a formulaic approach for herself, she says: "What method of work I use does not matter much to me. What matters is what I have to say and how I can respond to my inner needs."
"Some think that to paint they should possess innate skills, but I believe they should possess good knowledge, open vision and awareness which is of no less value than innate talent and skills," she added.
Alam has tasked herself with expressing the state of the Afghan people following war, bloodshed and strife. She believes that Afghans are a peoples who have been robbed of their identity because of years of displacement, a plight she herself experienced as a refugee.
Her family only returned from life as refugees in the Pakistani border town of Peshawar five years ago.
Survival art
For the tens of thousands of refugees who tried to survive in makeshift camps dotting the Afghan-Pakistan border in the 1990s, there was little scope for creativity or learning traditional arts and crafts skills.
Art was an early victim of the violence and policies of successive governments in Afghanistan; if the Soviets stifled independent creativity, the mujahideen did not like the arts and the Taliban systematically destroyed what was left of it.
But now, despite continued violence in parts of Afghanistan, a small market for art has emerged, largely patronised by the Afghan elite and the expatriate community.
Most of what is available however reverts back to the traditional classical and representational art styles that existed before the 1979 Soviet invasion.
A lot of it caters to the stereotypes of Afghanistan - woman in blue burkhas, the Bactrian camel, the destroyed monuments.
They are symbolic of the repetitive picture post card clichés and the ubiquitous paintings of the famous Steve Mc Curry photograph of the green-eyed Afghan girl.
Artistic spirit
Rahraw Omarzad, himself a painter, runs the
Centre for Contemporary Arts in Afghanistan
Rahraw Omarzad, a former refugee and teacher at the Fine Arts Faculty in Kabul University, and his wife have been struggling to keep the Centre for Contemporary Art alive in hopes of galvanising a resurgent art community in Kabul.
"In this Centre I did not want [the students] to adopt one 'ism' over another. I did not want them to copy what they saw. So I have not taught them either technique or theory of modern art. They have created everything out of their own imagination and we discussed each painting on its merit," he told Al Jazeera.
Expressing an independent sense of imagination is crucial for Omarzad who encourages his students to think beyond and away from the teacher and focus on self-expression as the guiding principle.
When one of Omarzad's students created a 'dance of colours' she was unaware that she had stumbled upon a technique tried by world renown artists.
"I showed her Jackson Pollock's work after she did her painting. She was amazed."
Women expressing themselves
Unlike some Afghan youth whose families were able to go to the West, most of the women at the centre were refugees in neighbouring countries and lacked the benefits of a more sophisticated exposure to arts and culture.
Though Ommolbanin Shamsia, a 20-year old accounting student, has been painting since she was four years old, it is only at the centre that she first received formal art instruction.
She says there was little opportunity to learn art while living as a refugee in Iran. Her art work, like Alam's is widely varied in subject and technique.
In one painting, one sees only the hemline of a woman's dress and her feet at the edge of a pool of water. Reflected up from the water, however, is a young green tree.
"The woman is the regeneration of life; she represents rebirth, the beginning of life," Shamsia says.
Despite some advances, such as increased visibility in schools and the workforce, the role of women in public spaces is very limited. Even Kabul, the Afghan capital, has no women shopkeepers and many women are only allowed out of their homes for the duration of their work - whether it is to their workplace or to school.
Afghanistan's prisons hold women who are in jail for having left their homes without male permission or supervision since under the country's customary laws women are part of the household possessions.
As a result, many budding female artists resort to painting in the privacy of their homes unlike other forms of art which may need public space.
But Omarzad believes that with such enterprises as the art centre, women may are beginning to find means to express themselves.
"Now that they have held their first exhibition and seen the response of the people they have confidence in their own creativity they and can learn about the history and techniques without becoming intimidated," he said.
Excited about his students and their work, Omarzad says he is aware the Centre could face difficult times in near future.
"Until now no one knew about [the Centre]. I am sure when we are better known there will be some opposition from the conservative people who are against art and the participation of women."
On a dusty road in a middle class neighbourhood in west Kabul, an unassuming house looks almost as nondescript as any other except for the simple board declaring it is the Centre for Contemporary Arts in Afghanistan.
It is here that a quiet revolution is taking place. For the first time in the country's recent history, a group of young women are learning to express their experiences, sorrows and joys growing up in war-ravaged Afghanistan through art
And they are producing remarkably sophisticated and eloquent work.
The originality of their imagination is even more extraordinary in the context of Afghanistan's tragic history of conflict and the violence which continues to be visited upon women living in this country.
The Introvert
Yalda Noori, a student at the Centre, stands
next to her painting 'Life Passages'
Sheenkai Alam, a 19-year-old Afghan school girl is displaying 'Introvert', a painting which combines an array of colours in geometric shapes; circles, bars, and blocks fragment the colours. In the midst sits the figure of a man holding his head in his hands.
"He is the Afghan trying to find himself, the colours represent the mirror of history," Alam told Al Jazeera.
Eschewing a formulaic approach for herself, she says: "What method of work I use does not matter much to me. What matters is what I have to say and how I can respond to my inner needs."
"Some think that to paint they should possess innate skills, but I believe they should possess good knowledge, open vision and awareness which is of no less value than innate talent and skills," she added.
Alam has tasked herself with expressing the state of the Afghan people following war, bloodshed and strife. She believes that Afghans are a peoples who have been robbed of their identity because of years of displacement, a plight she herself experienced as a refugee.
Her family only returned from life as refugees in the Pakistani border town of Peshawar five years ago.
Survival art
For the tens of thousands of refugees who tried to survive in makeshift camps dotting the Afghan-Pakistan border in the 1990s, there was little scope for creativity or learning traditional arts and crafts skills.
Art was an early victim of the violence and policies of successive governments in Afghanistan; if the Soviets stifled independent creativity, the mujahideen did not like the arts and the Taliban systematically destroyed what was left of it.
But now, despite continued violence in parts of Afghanistan, a small market for art has emerged, largely patronised by the Afghan elite and the expatriate community.
Most of what is available however reverts back to the traditional classical and representational art styles that existed before the 1979 Soviet invasion.
A lot of it caters to the stereotypes of Afghanistan - woman in blue burkhas, the Bactrian camel, the destroyed monuments.
They are symbolic of the repetitive picture post card clichés and the ubiquitous paintings of the famous Steve Mc Curry photograph of the green-eyed Afghan girl.
Artistic spirit
Rahraw Omarzad, himself a painter, runs the
Centre for Contemporary Arts in Afghanistan
Rahraw Omarzad, a former refugee and teacher at the Fine Arts Faculty in Kabul University, and his wife have been struggling to keep the Centre for Contemporary Art alive in hopes of galvanising a resurgent art community in Kabul.
"In this Centre I did not want [the students] to adopt one 'ism' over another. I did not want them to copy what they saw. So I have not taught them either technique or theory of modern art. They have created everything out of their own imagination and we discussed each painting on its merit," he told Al Jazeera.
Expressing an independent sense of imagination is crucial for Omarzad who encourages his students to think beyond and away from the teacher and focus on self-expression as the guiding principle.
When one of Omarzad's students created a 'dance of colours' she was unaware that she had stumbled upon a technique tried by world renown artists.
"I showed her Jackson Pollock's work after she did her painting. She was amazed."
Women expressing themselves
Unlike some Afghan youth whose families were able to go to the West, most of the women at the centre were refugees in neighbouring countries and lacked the benefits of a more sophisticated exposure to arts and culture.
Though Ommolbanin Shamsia, a 20-year old accounting student, has been painting since she was four years old, it is only at the centre that she first received formal art instruction.
She says there was little opportunity to learn art while living as a refugee in Iran. Her art work, like Alam's is widely varied in subject and technique.
In one painting, one sees only the hemline of a woman's dress and her feet at the edge of a pool of water. Reflected up from the water, however, is a young green tree.
"The woman is the regeneration of life; she represents rebirth, the beginning of life," Shamsia says.
Despite some advances, such as increased visibility in schools and the workforce, the role of women in public spaces is very limited. Even Kabul, the Afghan capital, has no women shopkeepers and many women are only allowed out of their homes for the duration of their work - whether it is to their workplace or to school.
Afghanistan's prisons hold women who are in jail for having left their homes without male permission or supervision since under the country's customary laws women are part of the household possessions.
As a result, many budding female artists resort to painting in the privacy of their homes unlike other forms of art which may need public space.
But Omarzad believes that with such enterprises as the art centre, women may are beginning to find means to express themselves.
"Now that they have held their first exhibition and seen the response of the people they have confidence in their own creativity they and can learn about the history and techniques without becoming intimidated," he said.
Excited about his students and their work, Omarzad says he is aware the Centre could face difficult times in near future.
"Until now no one knew about [the Centre]. I am sure when we are better known there will be some opposition from the conservative people who are against art and the participation of women."
Wakhan wanderer
Himal Southasia/May 2008
text By : Aunohita Mojumdar
Photographs by : anne feenstra
Even in Afghanistan – residence of which often carries a level of fascination for those outside – going to the Wakhan corridor is considered considerably exotic. This small strip of land, making its wayward way eastward, appears distinctly disjointed from the rest of the Afghan landmass. A relief map reveals the continuities of contour, a swathe of brown that begins in the central part of Afghanistan narrowing towards the east, before then broadening out again, layered with that distinctive white colour that mapmakers use to indicate high altitude. Indeed, by the beginning of the corridor, the map is almost completely white, with the Pamir, Hindukush and Karakoram forming one of the most formidable of mountain stretches.
On a political map, however, the area forms a perfect barrier: a sliver of territory that once separated Tsarist Russia from Britain’s Indian empire. But Wakhan’s politically expedient location also comes at a cost. Though its position made it a natural route for traders travelling on Bactrian camels, yaks, donkeys and horses, modern motorised transport could not make use of this rugged route. As such, the region became progressively isolated in modern times.
Writing in the 1970s, the intrepid chronicler of Afghanistan’s heritage, Nancy Dupree, had much advice for those setting out for Badakshan, the province where Wakhan is located. “This is an exciting trip through some of Afghanistan’s most thrilling scenery,” she noted, “enjoyable only, however, if you have a strong car, spare parts, sleeping bags and an extra cache of food and petrol.” These words ring true even today. Also to be heeded is Dupree’s subsequent recommendations on securing a special permit to enter the Wakhan Corridor.
The current dispenser of permits is Commander Waheed, who fought in the force of the legendary Northern Alliance guerrilla fighter Ahmad Shah Masood. For Masood’s forces, the area, impregnable to the Taliban due to its difficult geography, was one of the few safe havens left when the Taliban took over. This was, perhaps, the sole reason that the locals were saved from the horrific ravages visited on the country’s other minority sects, such as the Shia of Hazarajat, in central Afghanistan.
To reach Wakhan today, one first has to drive or fly to Faizabad, the provincial capital. From there it takes another two days on the road, when the weather allows passage. As during Dupree’s time, the road here remains little more than a mud-and-stone track, necessitating a sturdy four-wheel-drive vehicle that can also ford the numerous streams, many without bridges. Add to this the inaccessibility of petrol and spare parts, and you have several good reasons why Wakhan remains off the map for most people.
Largely untouched
In earlier times, this area attracted empire-builders and adventurers. Chronicles of the former (those available in the Subcontinent are mainly British) are dotted with tales of low intrigue in the high mountain passes, as the armies and proxies of tsars and governor-generals fought each other. For explorers, there was a different kind of intrigue: the fascination of the unknown, such as the legendary Oxus River, the source of which had yet to be identified by the Western world. This mighty waterway, which winds its way more than 2400 km northwards before meeting the Aral Sea, is locally known as the Amu Darya, the ‘mother river’. Indeed, an ancient heritage can today be found in the many petroglyphs, thought to have been created eons ago, on boulders along the sparkling blue-grey waters of the Kokcha River en route to Wakhan.
The remoteness of Wakhan has meant that the distinct culture and language of the peoples of this area has remained essentially intact, largely untouched by the influences and cultures of the lower mainland. In the lower altitudes are the Wakhis, a community that relies on subsistence agriculture, growing mainly potatoes and wheat. They speak the Wakhi language, derived from several Iranian languages, and are Ismaili Shia, followers of the Aga Khan. In the higher altitudes are the pastoral Kyrghyz, who are generally Sunni and who speak Kyrghyz, of Turkic origin. Their large, well-fed herds of cattle are a draw for traders who arrive on Russian Kamaz trucks, exchanging cheap goods – synthetic clothes, furniture, plasticware and ugly, machine-made carpets. The traders also bring opium, which locals use as a painkiller in the absence of pharmaceutical drugs. Once addicted, the locals sell off much of their cattle to feed their habit. In turn, this forces them to breed more and more cattle, which conservationists worry could result in land degradation in the not-so-long term – an interesting study on how human addiction can affect ecology.
Whether due to or despite this isolation, the people of the Wakhan corridor are much more open to the outsider than are their counterparts in the mainland. In many other parts of Afghanistan, there tends to be significant suspicion of outsiders; the women are also cloistered, shying away from strangers even when working in the fields. In Wakhan, however, full families will turn curious, friendly gazes towards the visitor, with women in the larger villages even coming forward to talk.
Difficult development
In the middle of the village of Qala-e-Panja, roughly midway through the Wakhan, is the old hunting lodge of Zahir Shah, the last monarch of Afghanistan. Directly opposite this is the new visitor’s centre for the Pamir National Park. Today, on top of the centre’s roof, stands master mason Afiyat Khan. He lost his father at a young age, and later joined the mujahideen. Now, he makes a living constructing buildings. But Afiyat says that this one is different. The new visitor’s centre, he hopes, marks the advent of more visitors to the area, something that would enable him to live by his real passion: mountain climbing. Afiyat has already attended training courses under the Italian mountaineer Carlo Alberto Pinelli, a pioneer in what can be called ‘post-conflict mountaineering’ in Afghanistan. In 2007, Pinelli released a book in the hopes of exciting mountaineers to the possibilities of Wakhan’s peaks, which have not been climbed in three decades.
For the less adventurous, a drive through Wakhan is just as memorable. Long, sandy stretches give way to rock faces, which give way to boulder-strewn lunar landscapes, to the greens of spring and the bright colours of autumn – all of which is pleasantly interrupted by the clear, sparkling waters of the tumbling joi, as the mountain streams are called. Surrounding each vivid palette are the mountains, each distinct in colour, texture and shape. There is a feeling of security here in Wakhan, which allows for a sense of freedom unusual in the rest of Afghanistan.
Potatoes cooked in oil are the staple diet in these parts, accompanied by thick, dry flatbread – very different from the naan of the Subcontinent, though it still goes by this name. The locals have proved remarkably resistant to moving beyond this subsistence diet. Efforts by the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) to introduce vegetables and fruits in the area have been slow to catch on. At one point in our visit, we benefited from a chance encounter with an AKDN team by receiving, as a gift, an unbelievably large cabbage. Despite its eye-popping size, however, most of the villagers had no idea that the vegetable had been grown on an experimental farm in their very own village.
Amongst other things, the AKDN has been focusing on the local ecotourism potential. The training of guesthouse owners and guides has now brought about a number of guesthouses in the area, strewn along the road up to the last motorable point. In Qala-e-Panja, it is the Shah himself who owns the only guesthouse. Unfortunately, this writer discovered the requisite toilet only at the end of the trip (it turned out to be one of the carefully locked rooms), after having spent a week squatting in the outfield in the back. These new guesthouses have become focal points for curious villagers. During our visit, we met two young girls, Barfaq and the stunningly beautiful Daulatmand. Perhaps 15 years old, Daulatmand already has a young child, but nonetheless continues to go to school every day. For some reason, this writer was drawn to her, and the bond appeared to be mutual – a small space reaching out across the divides of culture, religion and language, with a few words and many smiles.
Daulatmand reflects the positive trend of a large number of school-goers, children who come stumbling down from the mountainside villages twice a day, sunburnt and rosy-cheeked, to attend class. Hopefully, some of these children will be able to reach high school, and further on to college in Kabul and elsewhere. Wakhan badly needs its skilled workers, teachers and doctors included. The high altitude, coupled with scarce medical facilities, meagre utilities, low nutrition and lack of awareness, contributes to a sparse health network. This inevitably takes a heavy toll, especially on maternal health.
There is always a fear about whether one would be able to see someone like Daulatmand again. If she has a second child soon, will she survive the odds stacked against young mothers in the wilderness of Wakhan?
text By : Aunohita Mojumdar
Photographs by : anne feenstra
Even in Afghanistan – residence of which often carries a level of fascination for those outside – going to the Wakhan corridor is considered considerably exotic. This small strip of land, making its wayward way eastward, appears distinctly disjointed from the rest of the Afghan landmass. A relief map reveals the continuities of contour, a swathe of brown that begins in the central part of Afghanistan narrowing towards the east, before then broadening out again, layered with that distinctive white colour that mapmakers use to indicate high altitude. Indeed, by the beginning of the corridor, the map is almost completely white, with the Pamir, Hindukush and Karakoram forming one of the most formidable of mountain stretches.
On a political map, however, the area forms a perfect barrier: a sliver of territory that once separated Tsarist Russia from Britain’s Indian empire. But Wakhan’s politically expedient location also comes at a cost. Though its position made it a natural route for traders travelling on Bactrian camels, yaks, donkeys and horses, modern motorised transport could not make use of this rugged route. As such, the region became progressively isolated in modern times.
Writing in the 1970s, the intrepid chronicler of Afghanistan’s heritage, Nancy Dupree, had much advice for those setting out for Badakshan, the province where Wakhan is located. “This is an exciting trip through some of Afghanistan’s most thrilling scenery,” she noted, “enjoyable only, however, if you have a strong car, spare parts, sleeping bags and an extra cache of food and petrol.” These words ring true even today. Also to be heeded is Dupree’s subsequent recommendations on securing a special permit to enter the Wakhan Corridor.
The current dispenser of permits is Commander Waheed, who fought in the force of the legendary Northern Alliance guerrilla fighter Ahmad Shah Masood. For Masood’s forces, the area, impregnable to the Taliban due to its difficult geography, was one of the few safe havens left when the Taliban took over. This was, perhaps, the sole reason that the locals were saved from the horrific ravages visited on the country’s other minority sects, such as the Shia of Hazarajat, in central Afghanistan.
To reach Wakhan today, one first has to drive or fly to Faizabad, the provincial capital. From there it takes another two days on the road, when the weather allows passage. As during Dupree’s time, the road here remains little more than a mud-and-stone track, necessitating a sturdy four-wheel-drive vehicle that can also ford the numerous streams, many without bridges. Add to this the inaccessibility of petrol and spare parts, and you have several good reasons why Wakhan remains off the map for most people.
Largely untouched
In earlier times, this area attracted empire-builders and adventurers. Chronicles of the former (those available in the Subcontinent are mainly British) are dotted with tales of low intrigue in the high mountain passes, as the armies and proxies of tsars and governor-generals fought each other. For explorers, there was a different kind of intrigue: the fascination of the unknown, such as the legendary Oxus River, the source of which had yet to be identified by the Western world. This mighty waterway, which winds its way more than 2400 km northwards before meeting the Aral Sea, is locally known as the Amu Darya, the ‘mother river’. Indeed, an ancient heritage can today be found in the many petroglyphs, thought to have been created eons ago, on boulders along the sparkling blue-grey waters of the Kokcha River en route to Wakhan.
The remoteness of Wakhan has meant that the distinct culture and language of the peoples of this area has remained essentially intact, largely untouched by the influences and cultures of the lower mainland. In the lower altitudes are the Wakhis, a community that relies on subsistence agriculture, growing mainly potatoes and wheat. They speak the Wakhi language, derived from several Iranian languages, and are Ismaili Shia, followers of the Aga Khan. In the higher altitudes are the pastoral Kyrghyz, who are generally Sunni and who speak Kyrghyz, of Turkic origin. Their large, well-fed herds of cattle are a draw for traders who arrive on Russian Kamaz trucks, exchanging cheap goods – synthetic clothes, furniture, plasticware and ugly, machine-made carpets. The traders also bring opium, which locals use as a painkiller in the absence of pharmaceutical drugs. Once addicted, the locals sell off much of their cattle to feed their habit. In turn, this forces them to breed more and more cattle, which conservationists worry could result in land degradation in the not-so-long term – an interesting study on how human addiction can affect ecology.
Whether due to or despite this isolation, the people of the Wakhan corridor are much more open to the outsider than are their counterparts in the mainland. In many other parts of Afghanistan, there tends to be significant suspicion of outsiders; the women are also cloistered, shying away from strangers even when working in the fields. In Wakhan, however, full families will turn curious, friendly gazes towards the visitor, with women in the larger villages even coming forward to talk.
Difficult development
In the middle of the village of Qala-e-Panja, roughly midway through the Wakhan, is the old hunting lodge of Zahir Shah, the last monarch of Afghanistan. Directly opposite this is the new visitor’s centre for the Pamir National Park. Today, on top of the centre’s roof, stands master mason Afiyat Khan. He lost his father at a young age, and later joined the mujahideen. Now, he makes a living constructing buildings. But Afiyat says that this one is different. The new visitor’s centre, he hopes, marks the advent of more visitors to the area, something that would enable him to live by his real passion: mountain climbing. Afiyat has already attended training courses under the Italian mountaineer Carlo Alberto Pinelli, a pioneer in what can be called ‘post-conflict mountaineering’ in Afghanistan. In 2007, Pinelli released a book in the hopes of exciting mountaineers to the possibilities of Wakhan’s peaks, which have not been climbed in three decades.
For the less adventurous, a drive through Wakhan is just as memorable. Long, sandy stretches give way to rock faces, which give way to boulder-strewn lunar landscapes, to the greens of spring and the bright colours of autumn – all of which is pleasantly interrupted by the clear, sparkling waters of the tumbling joi, as the mountain streams are called. Surrounding each vivid palette are the mountains, each distinct in colour, texture and shape. There is a feeling of security here in Wakhan, which allows for a sense of freedom unusual in the rest of Afghanistan.
Potatoes cooked in oil are the staple diet in these parts, accompanied by thick, dry flatbread – very different from the naan of the Subcontinent, though it still goes by this name. The locals have proved remarkably resistant to moving beyond this subsistence diet. Efforts by the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) to introduce vegetables and fruits in the area have been slow to catch on. At one point in our visit, we benefited from a chance encounter with an AKDN team by receiving, as a gift, an unbelievably large cabbage. Despite its eye-popping size, however, most of the villagers had no idea that the vegetable had been grown on an experimental farm in their very own village.
Amongst other things, the AKDN has been focusing on the local ecotourism potential. The training of guesthouse owners and guides has now brought about a number of guesthouses in the area, strewn along the road up to the last motorable point. In Qala-e-Panja, it is the Shah himself who owns the only guesthouse. Unfortunately, this writer discovered the requisite toilet only at the end of the trip (it turned out to be one of the carefully locked rooms), after having spent a week squatting in the outfield in the back. These new guesthouses have become focal points for curious villagers. During our visit, we met two young girls, Barfaq and the stunningly beautiful Daulatmand. Perhaps 15 years old, Daulatmand already has a young child, but nonetheless continues to go to school every day. For some reason, this writer was drawn to her, and the bond appeared to be mutual – a small space reaching out across the divides of culture, religion and language, with a few words and many smiles.
Daulatmand reflects the positive trend of a large number of school-goers, children who come stumbling down from the mountainside villages twice a day, sunburnt and rosy-cheeked, to attend class. Hopefully, some of these children will be able to reach high school, and further on to college in Kabul and elsewhere. Wakhan badly needs its skilled workers, teachers and doctors included. The high altitude, coupled with scarce medical facilities, meagre utilities, low nutrition and lack of awareness, contributes to a sparse health network. This inevitably takes a heavy toll, especially on maternal health.
There is always a fear about whether one would be able to see someone like Daulatmand again. If she has a second child soon, will she survive the odds stacked against young mothers in the wilderness of Wakhan?
April 06, 2008
Afghanistan adrift in misplaced aid
Afghanistan adrift in misplaced aid
Asia Times/March 29,2008
KABUL - A map of Afghanistan dotted with colorful pins adorned the wall in the office of the aid agency official. Looking with relish at the embellished map, the official stuck in a handful more, noting with a sigh of satisfaction the increase in the number of "projects completed".
For several years, reconstruction in Afghanistan has been a "drawing board and drawing pin" approach, with aid delivery overwhelmingly focused on numbers, quick delivery, high visibility, meeting benchmarks, a production line approach to the rebuilding of a nation.
However, the short-term, low-cost approach of the donor community is coming under increasing criticism from development
experts, reputed international non-governmental organization (NGOs) and civil society.
In a report released this week by ACBAR, (an umbrella organization for NGOs working in Afghanistan), Oxfam, a member of ACBAR, called for a change of approach saying "too much of aid has been prescriptive and driven by donor priorities - rather than responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences".
While Afghanistan has received nearly US$15 billion in the period from 2002-2008, Oxfam points out that in the first two years after the ouster of the Taliban the per capita expenditure on rebuilding the shattered country was $57 per capita compared to $679 per capita in Bosnia. Even this money does not come without strings attached. Half of it is "tied aid" which refers to the aid that has to be spent in the purchase of goods and services from the donor country.
"Preferenced aid" delineates the select areas - both in terms of sector and geography that the donor selects. An estimated 40% has returned to the donor country in the form of corporate profits and consultant salaries.
A Corpwatch report in 2006 stated "many development experts find the process by which aid contracts and loans are awarded to be counterproductive. International and national aid agencies - including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and USAID - that distribute aid money to developing countries have, in effect, designed a system that is efficient in funneling money back to the wealthy donor countries, without providing sustainable development in poor states." Oxfam states that vast sums of the aid money are lost in corporate profits of contractors and sub-contractors, which can be as high as 50% on a single contract.
Only approximately 25-30% of all aid coming into the country is routed through the government, eroding its legitimacy, planning capacity and authority. Donor funding is also usually premised on an annual cycle making it impossible for the government and the NGOs to undertake multi-year planning, a necessary concomitant for sustainable development.
"The nature of our funding in Afghanistan is such that we survive on a cycle of a few months. Once the funding comes in, it takes time for the project to be started up and then it's time to do the donor reporting and raise money for the next year," said the head of an established NGO in Afghanistan.
Criticism of donors has seen a shift in recent months. Whereas most of the earlier censure was limited to scrutiny of the efficiency of donor organizations, recent criticism has questioned the underpinnings of the aid paradigm. Noting the links between development and security Oxfam notes "thus far aid has been insufficient and in many cases wasteful or ineffective" pointing out that "most Afghans still endure conditions of hardship and millions live in extreme poverty".
The perception of the sporadic and patchy nature of economic development is also captured in a 2007 public opinion survey conducted by the Asia Foundation. While 49% of people thought they were more prosperous than under the Taliban, the number was down from the 54% who thought so in 2006. Those who thought they were less prosperous had increased by 2%. According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population was below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption.
The Oxfam report points out that despite an overwhelming dependence of the country's population on agriculture (70% directly or indirectly), the sector has received only $400-500 million since 2001. International spending in Afghanistan is focussed overwhelmingly on military operations. The US military alone spends nearly $100 million a day on Afghanistan while the combined donor funding on aid is only $7 million of which a bulk goes to those provinces and areas where donors have their troops.
Disbursement is often very slow, making the projects ineffective. A study of the National Solidarity Program by ELBAG (an Action Aid initiative in evolving accountability through civil society participation in budgetary analysis) found that the program, considered one of the most effective aid delivery projects in Afghanistan was facing not just a shortfall of funds but also huge delays in disbursement, leading to problems in implementation.
The ELBAG report called for "greater emphasis in looking at Afghan priorities rather than donor priorities" and "reducing the amount of preferenced aid, reducing the gap between donor commitment and disbursement and routing more of the external budget trough the Afghan government".
It is not just the delivery mechanisms of aid that are faulty. Coordination among donors is almost non-existent leading to overlapping projects and waste. "Donors are failing to coordinate between themselves and with the government," Oxfam states. A recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group stated "disunity in Afghanistan is about not just structural issues or coordination but also priorities and preferences, goals, means and increasingly endgames, exit strategies and perhaps more importantly the reasons for being in the country".
Donors and donor countries have so far avoided any scrutiny of their effectiveness and aid delivery strategies. Oxfam points out that while there are 77 indicators for the government's performance in the London Compact, a joint Afghan international partnership, there are no benchmarks for the international community. "A national independent commission for aid effectiveness should be established to monitor aid practices, identify deficiencies and make recommendations."
While aid has made a significant difference to Afghan lives, Oxfam believes "major weaknesses have severely constrained its capacity to reduce poverty". Donors, the NGO argues, must take urgent steps to increase and improve their assistance to Afghanistan.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.)
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)
Asia Times/March 29,2008
KABUL - A map of Afghanistan dotted with colorful pins adorned the wall in the office of the aid agency official. Looking with relish at the embellished map, the official stuck in a handful more, noting with a sigh of satisfaction the increase in the number of "projects completed".
For several years, reconstruction in Afghanistan has been a "drawing board and drawing pin" approach, with aid delivery overwhelmingly focused on numbers, quick delivery, high visibility, meeting benchmarks, a production line approach to the rebuilding of a nation.
However, the short-term, low-cost approach of the donor community is coming under increasing criticism from development
experts, reputed international non-governmental organization (NGOs) and civil society.
In a report released this week by ACBAR, (an umbrella organization for NGOs working in Afghanistan), Oxfam, a member of ACBAR, called for a change of approach saying "too much of aid has been prescriptive and driven by donor priorities - rather than responsive to evident Afghan needs and preferences".
While Afghanistan has received nearly US$15 billion in the period from 2002-2008, Oxfam points out that in the first two years after the ouster of the Taliban the per capita expenditure on rebuilding the shattered country was $57 per capita compared to $679 per capita in Bosnia. Even this money does not come without strings attached. Half of it is "tied aid" which refers to the aid that has to be spent in the purchase of goods and services from the donor country.
"Preferenced aid" delineates the select areas - both in terms of sector and geography that the donor selects. An estimated 40% has returned to the donor country in the form of corporate profits and consultant salaries.
A Corpwatch report in 2006 stated "many development experts find the process by which aid contracts and loans are awarded to be counterproductive. International and national aid agencies - including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and USAID - that distribute aid money to developing countries have, in effect, designed a system that is efficient in funneling money back to the wealthy donor countries, without providing sustainable development in poor states." Oxfam states that vast sums of the aid money are lost in corporate profits of contractors and sub-contractors, which can be as high as 50% on a single contract.
Only approximately 25-30% of all aid coming into the country is routed through the government, eroding its legitimacy, planning capacity and authority. Donor funding is also usually premised on an annual cycle making it impossible for the government and the NGOs to undertake multi-year planning, a necessary concomitant for sustainable development.
"The nature of our funding in Afghanistan is such that we survive on a cycle of a few months. Once the funding comes in, it takes time for the project to be started up and then it's time to do the donor reporting and raise money for the next year," said the head of an established NGO in Afghanistan.
Criticism of donors has seen a shift in recent months. Whereas most of the earlier censure was limited to scrutiny of the efficiency of donor organizations, recent criticism has questioned the underpinnings of the aid paradigm. Noting the links between development and security Oxfam notes "thus far aid has been insufficient and in many cases wasteful or ineffective" pointing out that "most Afghans still endure conditions of hardship and millions live in extreme poverty".
The perception of the sporadic and patchy nature of economic development is also captured in a 2007 public opinion survey conducted by the Asia Foundation. While 49% of people thought they were more prosperous than under the Taliban, the number was down from the 54% who thought so in 2006. Those who thought they were less prosperous had increased by 2%. According to the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population was below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption.
The Oxfam report points out that despite an overwhelming dependence of the country's population on agriculture (70% directly or indirectly), the sector has received only $400-500 million since 2001. International spending in Afghanistan is focussed overwhelmingly on military operations. The US military alone spends nearly $100 million a day on Afghanistan while the combined donor funding on aid is only $7 million of which a bulk goes to those provinces and areas where donors have their troops.
Disbursement is often very slow, making the projects ineffective. A study of the National Solidarity Program by ELBAG (an Action Aid initiative in evolving accountability through civil society participation in budgetary analysis) found that the program, considered one of the most effective aid delivery projects in Afghanistan was facing not just a shortfall of funds but also huge delays in disbursement, leading to problems in implementation.
The ELBAG report called for "greater emphasis in looking at Afghan priorities rather than donor priorities" and "reducing the amount of preferenced aid, reducing the gap between donor commitment and disbursement and routing more of the external budget trough the Afghan government".
It is not just the delivery mechanisms of aid that are faulty. Coordination among donors is almost non-existent leading to overlapping projects and waste. "Donors are failing to coordinate between themselves and with the government," Oxfam states. A recent report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group stated "disunity in Afghanistan is about not just structural issues or coordination but also priorities and preferences, goals, means and increasingly endgames, exit strategies and perhaps more importantly the reasons for being in the country".
Donors and donor countries have so far avoided any scrutiny of their effectiveness and aid delivery strategies. Oxfam points out that while there are 77 indicators for the government's performance in the London Compact, a joint Afghan international partnership, there are no benchmarks for the international community. "A national independent commission for aid effectiveness should be established to monitor aid practices, identify deficiencies and make recommendations."
While aid has made a significant difference to Afghan lives, Oxfam believes "major weaknesses have severely constrained its capacity to reduce poverty". Donors, the NGO argues, must take urgent steps to increase and improve their assistance to Afghanistan.
(Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.)
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)
April 05, 2008
Sulabh in Kabul
Sulabh in Kabul
Civil Society/April 2008
Mohammad Younus sells cigarettes from a tray one of the busiest roads of Kabul city in the Deh Afghanan area. With a big market and many government offices, it is a good place to do business and Younus who came from Kandahar to Kabul three years ago to earn a living manages to make ends meet.
But Younus is a street salesman and does not have access to toilets in offices, shops or hotels. For the past few months he has been regularly using the new Sulabh toilet, one among five constructed by Sulabh International in the capital city with Rs 3 crore in aid from the Indian government.
Located in five of the most congested areas of the city, the Sulabh toilets are an important contribution to the reconstruction of sanitation facilities in this city. As the capital, Kabul became a much sought after prize – facing daily bombardments and attacks which reduced the city’s infrastructure to rubble during the successive waves of war.
Houses were destroyed or damaged, pipes broken and water sources contaminated. Yet the population pressure on the city has grown throughout this time. Internally displaced people migrated to Kabul in search of livelihoods during the years of conflict and the departure of the Taliban has meant the return of millions of refugees to Afghanistan.
A city with a population of under half a million before the war has had to absorb more than 4-5 million people even though its service delivery system was completely shattered.
While most cities in the developing world have areas with open sewers, in Kabul, the sewage flows down the street even in middle class and upper class neighbourhoods. Combined with the lack of paving and streets which are little more than potholed mud tracks, the mess of sewage and mud can turn entire roads into dank contaminated cesspools.
Laying sewer lines is a major challenge. Not only is it economically expensive, but a city wide sewerage system would require an overview that can determine land usage, something that needs delicate planning and enormous time.
In the International Year of Sanitation, the technology used by Sulabh seems especially relevant to rebuilding sanitation and restoring hygienic living conditions in Afghanistan. Dr Bindeshwar Pathak, Founder of the Sulabh Sanitation and Social Reform Movement, who was in Kabul last year for the inauguration of the completed project, says the technology is extremely well suited to Afghanistan. While the pit toilet for individual households is extremely cheap to build ($10-$500) and its contents can be turned into bio fertiliser, explains Dr Pathak, the biogas digester for use in public spaces has an added value in Afghanistan. With scant sources of electricity, even Kabul city remains bereft of power for large stretches of time. The biogas produced in Sulabh’s public toilets in Kabul helps power the lamps and heat water.
The hot water and lighting as well as the cooking fuel provided by the biogas plant in the Deh Afghanan toilet are a mater of pride for municipality employee Zainullah, the caretaker of the complex. “In winter we had about 700-800 men using the toilets and in summer this number was around 1200” he says. Sima Gul who is in the area for shopping uses the toilet to freshen up and relax for a few minutes; something that Afghanistan’s social customs do not allow women to do in public spaces. Fewer women have been using the toilet because of the conservative social customs and this toilet gets about 25 women a day.
“We would like to have more such facilities in Kabul, says Engineer Muzafar Pamir, the head of Policy and coordination in the Kabul Municipality. The generation of bio gas, the lack of requirement of sewage pipes and sewage treatment plants make it an ideal solution for an overburdened city where Pamir and his colleagues struggle to restore basic services.
Kabul is not the only city impressed by the program. Senior Indian diplomat Sandeep Kumar, who as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Kabul is in charge of administering India’s aid program here, says the embassy has been inundated with similar requests. “Given the success of this project many of the municipalities have asked that this be replicated in other provinces” he says, adding that the matter is under consideration. Kumar says the project has been unique in several ways. “Firstly it is a breakthrough in eco-friendly sanitation technology both in terms of its contribution to the revival of the crippled sanitation sector as well as adapting efficiently to the harsh climatic conditions in Kabul.” Kumar also points out that it is one of the few projects that has become self sustaining generating revenues of up to 10,000 Afghani daily for the Kabul municipality which helps in the sustainable operations and maintenance of the project.
The technology has been an eye opened not just for the residents of Kabul but even for Sulabh International itself. The toilets survive one of Kabul’s harshest winters when temperatures plummeted below – 25 degrees. “We had experience of just up to 2-3 degrees (cold) and not that of -20 to -30” notes Dr Pathak with some satisfaction. For the plants in Kabul extra precautions were taken to insulate the plants from the outside temperature using thermocol and glass wool.
A few minor problems were reported by users. Bio gas generation was not sufficient in winter (users are also fewer then) to heat the water, leading to the closure of the bathing space. The balance between insulation of the toilet from the cold weather and sufficient ventilation to ensure it is odour free is also yet to be established and some of the water pipes were damaged by the extremities of climate. However that the toilet was able to stay open and function through severe winter is itself a major advance.
“The lesson that we have learnt is that these biogas digesters can work very well even in harsh winter conditions like in Kabul Afghanistan” says Dr Pathak adding “henceforth if we get an opportunity, we can put up biogas digesters in cold climates in India and other parts of the world.”
Civil Society/April 2008
Mohammad Younus sells cigarettes from a tray one of the busiest roads of Kabul city in the Deh Afghanan area. With a big market and many government offices, it is a good place to do business and Younus who came from Kandahar to Kabul three years ago to earn a living manages to make ends meet.
But Younus is a street salesman and does not have access to toilets in offices, shops or hotels. For the past few months he has been regularly using the new Sulabh toilet, one among five constructed by Sulabh International in the capital city with Rs 3 crore in aid from the Indian government.
Located in five of the most congested areas of the city, the Sulabh toilets are an important contribution to the reconstruction of sanitation facilities in this city. As the capital, Kabul became a much sought after prize – facing daily bombardments and attacks which reduced the city’s infrastructure to rubble during the successive waves of war.
Houses were destroyed or damaged, pipes broken and water sources contaminated. Yet the population pressure on the city has grown throughout this time. Internally displaced people migrated to Kabul in search of livelihoods during the years of conflict and the departure of the Taliban has meant the return of millions of refugees to Afghanistan.
A city with a population of under half a million before the war has had to absorb more than 4-5 million people even though its service delivery system was completely shattered.
While most cities in the developing world have areas with open sewers, in Kabul, the sewage flows down the street even in middle class and upper class neighbourhoods. Combined with the lack of paving and streets which are little more than potholed mud tracks, the mess of sewage and mud can turn entire roads into dank contaminated cesspools.
Laying sewer lines is a major challenge. Not only is it economically expensive, but a city wide sewerage system would require an overview that can determine land usage, something that needs delicate planning and enormous time.
In the International Year of Sanitation, the technology used by Sulabh seems especially relevant to rebuilding sanitation and restoring hygienic living conditions in Afghanistan. Dr Bindeshwar Pathak, Founder of the Sulabh Sanitation and Social Reform Movement, who was in Kabul last year for the inauguration of the completed project, says the technology is extremely well suited to Afghanistan. While the pit toilet for individual households is extremely cheap to build ($10-$500) and its contents can be turned into bio fertiliser, explains Dr Pathak, the biogas digester for use in public spaces has an added value in Afghanistan. With scant sources of electricity, even Kabul city remains bereft of power for large stretches of time. The biogas produced in Sulabh’s public toilets in Kabul helps power the lamps and heat water.
The hot water and lighting as well as the cooking fuel provided by the biogas plant in the Deh Afghanan toilet are a mater of pride for municipality employee Zainullah, the caretaker of the complex. “In winter we had about 700-800 men using the toilets and in summer this number was around 1200” he says. Sima Gul who is in the area for shopping uses the toilet to freshen up and relax for a few minutes; something that Afghanistan’s social customs do not allow women to do in public spaces. Fewer women have been using the toilet because of the conservative social customs and this toilet gets about 25 women a day.
“We would like to have more such facilities in Kabul, says Engineer Muzafar Pamir, the head of Policy and coordination in the Kabul Municipality. The generation of bio gas, the lack of requirement of sewage pipes and sewage treatment plants make it an ideal solution for an overburdened city where Pamir and his colleagues struggle to restore basic services.
Kabul is not the only city impressed by the program. Senior Indian diplomat Sandeep Kumar, who as Minister in the Indian Embassy in Kabul is in charge of administering India’s aid program here, says the embassy has been inundated with similar requests. “Given the success of this project many of the municipalities have asked that this be replicated in other provinces” he says, adding that the matter is under consideration. Kumar says the project has been unique in several ways. “Firstly it is a breakthrough in eco-friendly sanitation technology both in terms of its contribution to the revival of the crippled sanitation sector as well as adapting efficiently to the harsh climatic conditions in Kabul.” Kumar also points out that it is one of the few projects that has become self sustaining generating revenues of up to 10,000 Afghani daily for the Kabul municipality which helps in the sustainable operations and maintenance of the project.
The technology has been an eye opened not just for the residents of Kabul but even for Sulabh International itself. The toilets survive one of Kabul’s harshest winters when temperatures plummeted below – 25 degrees. “We had experience of just up to 2-3 degrees (cold) and not that of -20 to -30” notes Dr Pathak with some satisfaction. For the plants in Kabul extra precautions were taken to insulate the plants from the outside temperature using thermocol and glass wool.
A few minor problems were reported by users. Bio gas generation was not sufficient in winter (users are also fewer then) to heat the water, leading to the closure of the bathing space. The balance between insulation of the toilet from the cold weather and sufficient ventilation to ensure it is odour free is also yet to be established and some of the water pipes were damaged by the extremities of climate. However that the toilet was able to stay open and function through severe winter is itself a major advance.
“The lesson that we have learnt is that these biogas digesters can work very well even in harsh winter conditions like in Kabul Afghanistan” says Dr Pathak adding “henceforth if we get an opportunity, we can put up biogas digesters in cold climates in India and other parts of the world.”
De dood versalaan in Kipkoet
De dood versalaan in Kipkoet
Trouw
Wakhan - Het is prachtig in die vergeten uithoek van Afghanistan, maar ook berekoud en onherbergzaam. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris wil geen arts zich hier vestigen”, zegt de verantwoordelijk ambtenaar. Maar Christel Bosman kwam wel.
Als arts behandelt Christel Bosman zwangere vrouwen en baby’s. In haar vrije tijd koopt ze boeken en muziek via internet, bekijkt ze de laatste mode bij Wehkamp en luistert naar Marco Borsato, Daniel Bedingfield, gospel en klassieke muziek. Niks bijzonders, behalve dat ze dit alles doet in een van de meest afgelegen uithoeken van Afghanistan.
Al anderhalf jaar is ze dokter in een dorp op de bergrug Wakhan, een Afghaanse landtong, die zich tussen Pakistan en Tadjikistan uitstrekt naar China. Het adembenemende landschap met zijn diepe valleien en de grote diversiteit aan planten en dieren is nog niet ontdekt door het toerisme en de handel. Maar deze ongerepte schoonheid heeft een prijs. Er is stromend water noch elektriciteit en er zijn slechts enkele verharde wegen. Op deze hoogte met zijn grote temperatuurverschillen en de schrale wind over het Pamir-gebergte is bijna niets te verbouwen.
Behalve Christel en de Britse arts Alex Duncan en zijn gezin – die de medische post hebben opgezet – is er in dit gebied geen vreemdeling te bekennen. Waarom zou een jonge Amsterdamse ervoor kiezen om haar flonkerende stad te verwisselen voor een arm Afghaans dorp?
Vanwege haar sociale betrokkenheid. Die was al tijdens Bosmans studie medicijnen een grote drijfveer. „Ik wilde hoe dan ook de wereld in”, zegt ze. „Ik studeerde drie jaar tropische geneeskunde en wilde zo ver mogelijk weg. In 1998 werkte ik in een asielzoekerscentrum bij Deventer. Daar kwamen Afghanen met wie ik zo goed kon opschieten dat ik in dat land aan de slag wilde.”
De medische post van Kipkoet werd vier jaar geleden opgericht door Ora International, dat zichzelf omschrijft als ’een niet-confessionele christelijke hulp- en ontwikkelingsorganisatie ten dienste van mensen in nood in de hele wereld’. De dokters hebben het geloof als inspiratiebron, maar zeggen niet uit te zijn op de bekering van de bevolking. Hun doel is medische zorg geven in dit ontoegankelijke gebied.
Dokter Abdul Momin Jalaly, verantwoordelijk voor de publieke gezondheidszorg in de provincie, vertelt hoe moeilijk het is om hier aan artsen te komen. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris is niemand bereid zich hier te vestigen, omdat het zo afgelegen is.”
Aanvankelijk was de medische post bedoeld voor de aanpak van het grote aantal opiumverslavingen. Opium is overal te krijgen, maar er was geen enkele medische hulp. Ook nu nog zijn de artsen de enigen in de wijde omtrek en hun agenda is overbelast. „Hier dokter zijn, betekent dat je nooit kunt stoppen met werken”, zegt Bosman. De post is dan ook altijd open . „Wat moet je anders zeggen tegen een patiënt die een dag heeft gelopen om hier te komen. Kom maar terug als we open zijn?”
Een grote bron van zorg is de hoge sterfte onder zuigelingen en moeders. De sterfte onder kleine kinderen is wel gedaald van een geschatte 40 procent in 2002 tot 21 procent in 2006, alleen vanwege een aantal simpele maatregelen. Zo worden kinderen onder de vijf jaar geregeld gewogen om hun ontwikkeling te volgen. Wat ook helpt, is het bestrijden van hardnekkige mythes die moeders ervan weerhouden om borstvoeding te geven. De dokters adviseren de vrouwen bovendien hoe ze hun kindje extra kunnen voeden, als er risico bestaat op ondervoeding.
Moedersterfte is een nog groter probleem. Met de sterfte van 6500 van de 100.000 moeders heeft de provincie Badakshan verreweg de hoogste moedersterfte ter wereld. De oorzaak zijn vaak ’simpele’ complicaties. „Meestal is het de combinatie van hoge bloeddruk en complicaties bij de geboorte die uitmondt in zwaar bloedverlies”, vertelt Bosman. „In Nederland doe je dan een bloedtransfusie. Maar waar haal ik hier bloed vandaan?” De dichtstbijzijnde bloedbank is in de provinciehoofdstad Faizabad, op twee dagen rijden.
Bosman vertelt het geëmotioneerd; onlangs verloor ze om deze reden Sahib Daulat. Na de geboorte van haar kindje bleef de nageboorte van de placenta uit. De familie wachtte vier dagen voordat ze Bosman inschakelde. Toen was het bloedverlies al zo groot dat de vrouw twee dagen later overleed.
Een modern ziekenhuis of een bloedbank zullen voor dit dorp waarschijnlijk nooit dichtbij zijn. Maar er zijn wel maatregelen te nemen die kunnen helpen. Zo traint het team 45 vrouwen in de behandeling van veelvoorkomende aandoeningen en in het doen van hygiënische bevallingen. Er is een vaccinatiecampagne begonnen voor kleine kinderen en jonge vrouwen. Wat ook helpt tegen het hoge sterftecijfer, zijn vroege opsporing van ziektebeelden, gynaecologisch advies en informatie over een gezonder eetpatroon.
„We hebben goede hoop dat het sterftecijfer in de komende jaren verder daalt”, zegt Bosman. Ze wil graag nog drie tot vier jaar in het gebied blijven, ondanks het vertrek van haar Britse collega over een jaar. „Ik ben hier omdat ik christen ben. God riep me om hier te zijn. Wil ik getrouwd zijn, kinderen krijgen, een gezin stichten? Natuurlijk wil ik dat en de kans dat ik hier een leuke levenspartner vind, is nihil. Maar het is belangrijker om hier te zijn dan om voor een gemakkelijker leven te kiezen. Het verschil dat we hier maken, schenkt me grote voldoening.”
Bosman heeft haar hoop gevestigd op een Amerikaanse verpleegkundige die onlangs interesse toonde om te komen helpen. Een ambulance die ook als mobiele kliniek kan dienen, is een droom waarvoor voorlopig nog geen geld zal zijn.
Het leven in Kipkoet is spartaans. „Het is zwaar”, zegt Bosman. „Alleen als het niet te droog is en niet vriest, kan ik in de buurt aan water komen.” De temperatuur kan in de winter dalen tot 25 graden onder nul, waarbij de gevoelstemperatuur in de wind nog tien graden lager ligt. In de winter krijgt het dorp drie tot vier uur zon en stoken de mensen dieselkachels. Bosman heeft internet, de enige elektriciteit komt van zonnepanelen en windmolens. Er groeien slechts enkele groentes. De dokters vullen hun menu aan met voorverpakt, houdbaar voedsel. Eens per jaar slaan ze een voorraad in.
„Wat ik vooral mis, is informatie en dynamiek”, zegt Bosman, zittend in haar kleine kamer, tussen haar boeken en dvd’s, op een klein bankstel. Afgelopen januari ging ze weer even naar Nederland. Hete douches en goed eten spelen dan een hoofdrol, maar ook hier laat ze haar werk niet los. Ze geeft presentaties om fondsen te werven en haalt geld binnen door lokale Afghaanse producten aan de man te brengen.
„Het leven in Kipkoet gaat zo traag. Als ik uitga, wil ik graag kleuren zien, mensen ontmoeten en lekker veel eten. Laatst heb ik vijf dagen in het winkelcentrum van Dubai rondgelopen. Niet om te kopen, maar alleen om te kijken. In Nederland hield ik niet zo van winkelen, maar hier voel ik het gemis.”
Trouw
Wakhan - Het is prachtig in die vergeten uithoek van Afghanistan, maar ook berekoud en onherbergzaam. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris wil geen arts zich hier vestigen”, zegt de verantwoordelijk ambtenaar. Maar Christel Bosman kwam wel.
Als arts behandelt Christel Bosman zwangere vrouwen en baby’s. In haar vrije tijd koopt ze boeken en muziek via internet, bekijkt ze de laatste mode bij Wehkamp en luistert naar Marco Borsato, Daniel Bedingfield, gospel en klassieke muziek. Niks bijzonders, behalve dat ze dit alles doet in een van de meest afgelegen uithoeken van Afghanistan.
Al anderhalf jaar is ze dokter in een dorp op de bergrug Wakhan, een Afghaanse landtong, die zich tussen Pakistan en Tadjikistan uitstrekt naar China. Het adembenemende landschap met zijn diepe valleien en de grote diversiteit aan planten en dieren is nog niet ontdekt door het toerisme en de handel. Maar deze ongerepte schoonheid heeft een prijs. Er is stromend water noch elektriciteit en er zijn slechts enkele verharde wegen. Op deze hoogte met zijn grote temperatuurverschillen en de schrale wind over het Pamir-gebergte is bijna niets te verbouwen.
Behalve Christel en de Britse arts Alex Duncan en zijn gezin – die de medische post hebben opgezet – is er in dit gebied geen vreemdeling te bekennen. Waarom zou een jonge Amsterdamse ervoor kiezen om haar flonkerende stad te verwisselen voor een arm Afghaans dorp?
Vanwege haar sociale betrokkenheid. Die was al tijdens Bosmans studie medicijnen een grote drijfveer. „Ik wilde hoe dan ook de wereld in”, zegt ze. „Ik studeerde drie jaar tropische geneeskunde en wilde zo ver mogelijk weg. In 1998 werkte ik in een asielzoekerscentrum bij Deventer. Daar kwamen Afghanen met wie ik zo goed kon opschieten dat ik in dat land aan de slag wilde.”
De medische post van Kipkoet werd vier jaar geleden opgericht door Ora International, dat zichzelf omschrijft als ’een niet-confessionele christelijke hulp- en ontwikkelingsorganisatie ten dienste van mensen in nood in de hele wereld’. De dokters hebben het geloof als inspiratiebron, maar zeggen niet uit te zijn op de bekering van de bevolking. Hun doel is medische zorg geven in dit ontoegankelijke gebied.
Dokter Abdul Momin Jalaly, verantwoordelijk voor de publieke gezondheidszorg in de provincie, vertelt hoe moeilijk het is om hier aan artsen te komen. „Zelfs voor een hoger salaris is niemand bereid zich hier te vestigen, omdat het zo afgelegen is.”
Aanvankelijk was de medische post bedoeld voor de aanpak van het grote aantal opiumverslavingen. Opium is overal te krijgen, maar er was geen enkele medische hulp. Ook nu nog zijn de artsen de enigen in de wijde omtrek en hun agenda is overbelast. „Hier dokter zijn, betekent dat je nooit kunt stoppen met werken”, zegt Bosman. De post is dan ook altijd open . „Wat moet je anders zeggen tegen een patiënt die een dag heeft gelopen om hier te komen. Kom maar terug als we open zijn?”
Een grote bron van zorg is de hoge sterfte onder zuigelingen en moeders. De sterfte onder kleine kinderen is wel gedaald van een geschatte 40 procent in 2002 tot 21 procent in 2006, alleen vanwege een aantal simpele maatregelen. Zo worden kinderen onder de vijf jaar geregeld gewogen om hun ontwikkeling te volgen. Wat ook helpt, is het bestrijden van hardnekkige mythes die moeders ervan weerhouden om borstvoeding te geven. De dokters adviseren de vrouwen bovendien hoe ze hun kindje extra kunnen voeden, als er risico bestaat op ondervoeding.
Moedersterfte is een nog groter probleem. Met de sterfte van 6500 van de 100.000 moeders heeft de provincie Badakshan verreweg de hoogste moedersterfte ter wereld. De oorzaak zijn vaak ’simpele’ complicaties. „Meestal is het de combinatie van hoge bloeddruk en complicaties bij de geboorte die uitmondt in zwaar bloedverlies”, vertelt Bosman. „In Nederland doe je dan een bloedtransfusie. Maar waar haal ik hier bloed vandaan?” De dichtstbijzijnde bloedbank is in de provinciehoofdstad Faizabad, op twee dagen rijden.
Bosman vertelt het geëmotioneerd; onlangs verloor ze om deze reden Sahib Daulat. Na de geboorte van haar kindje bleef de nageboorte van de placenta uit. De familie wachtte vier dagen voordat ze Bosman inschakelde. Toen was het bloedverlies al zo groot dat de vrouw twee dagen later overleed.
Een modern ziekenhuis of een bloedbank zullen voor dit dorp waarschijnlijk nooit dichtbij zijn. Maar er zijn wel maatregelen te nemen die kunnen helpen. Zo traint het team 45 vrouwen in de behandeling van veelvoorkomende aandoeningen en in het doen van hygiënische bevallingen. Er is een vaccinatiecampagne begonnen voor kleine kinderen en jonge vrouwen. Wat ook helpt tegen het hoge sterftecijfer, zijn vroege opsporing van ziektebeelden, gynaecologisch advies en informatie over een gezonder eetpatroon.
„We hebben goede hoop dat het sterftecijfer in de komende jaren verder daalt”, zegt Bosman. Ze wil graag nog drie tot vier jaar in het gebied blijven, ondanks het vertrek van haar Britse collega over een jaar. „Ik ben hier omdat ik christen ben. God riep me om hier te zijn. Wil ik getrouwd zijn, kinderen krijgen, een gezin stichten? Natuurlijk wil ik dat en de kans dat ik hier een leuke levenspartner vind, is nihil. Maar het is belangrijker om hier te zijn dan om voor een gemakkelijker leven te kiezen. Het verschil dat we hier maken, schenkt me grote voldoening.”
Bosman heeft haar hoop gevestigd op een Amerikaanse verpleegkundige die onlangs interesse toonde om te komen helpen. Een ambulance die ook als mobiele kliniek kan dienen, is een droom waarvoor voorlopig nog geen geld zal zijn.
Het leven in Kipkoet is spartaans. „Het is zwaar”, zegt Bosman. „Alleen als het niet te droog is en niet vriest, kan ik in de buurt aan water komen.” De temperatuur kan in de winter dalen tot 25 graden onder nul, waarbij de gevoelstemperatuur in de wind nog tien graden lager ligt. In de winter krijgt het dorp drie tot vier uur zon en stoken de mensen dieselkachels. Bosman heeft internet, de enige elektriciteit komt van zonnepanelen en windmolens. Er groeien slechts enkele groentes. De dokters vullen hun menu aan met voorverpakt, houdbaar voedsel. Eens per jaar slaan ze een voorraad in.
„Wat ik vooral mis, is informatie en dynamiek”, zegt Bosman, zittend in haar kleine kamer, tussen haar boeken en dvd’s, op een klein bankstel. Afgelopen januari ging ze weer even naar Nederland. Hete douches en goed eten spelen dan een hoofdrol, maar ook hier laat ze haar werk niet los. Ze geeft presentaties om fondsen te werven en haalt geld binnen door lokale Afghaanse producten aan de man te brengen.
„Het leven in Kipkoet gaat zo traag. Als ik uitga, wil ik graag kleuren zien, mensen ontmoeten en lekker veel eten. Laatst heb ik vijf dagen in het winkelcentrum van Dubai rondgelopen. Niet om te kopen, maar alleen om te kijken. In Nederland hield ik niet zo van winkelen, maar hier voel ik het gemis.”
UN: End abuse of Afghan women
UN: End abuse of Afghan women
Al Jazeera/march 21, 2008
Violence against women in Afghanistan has reached "endemic" proportions,
says one UN official [AP]
Jamila was married off when she was seven years old. Subjected to brutal beatings for nine years by her husband, she approached her father-in-law for help. For this "shame," a family member shot her in the leg.
During a rare visit to her parental home, she sought a divorce. A jirga, or assembly of local elders who act as informal dispute-resolution mechanisms in the absence of a formal justice system in many parts of Afghanistan, rejected her plea and sent her back to her marital home.
Jamila, whose real name and location cannot be revealed for her own safety, was punished once again, this time by her father-in-law, who beat her, cut off one nostril, shaved her head and tied her with a rope before throwing her outside the house.
Andre Huber, the director of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in Afghanistan, says mistreatment and abuse of women persists because cases such as Jamila's are rarely reported.
"Violence against women exists in every continent, every country and every culture, and Afghanistan makes no exception, but the problem here in Afghanistan is that most of the cases remain unreported due to the severe restrictions women face in seeking justice," he told Al Jazeera.
"Female victims are often denied equal access to justice because traditionally they rarely register cases themselves."
'Endemic' violence
Even when women do manage to report the violence, the act of reporting may itself increase the abuse against them, either from family members, as in the case of Jamila, or from officials of the criminal justice system.
The UN says more Afghan girls are returning
to school, but violence persists [AP]
A United Nations Development Fund for Women (Unifem) report cites documented cases of women who were killed after returning home.
"The initial violence is compounded by further violations of the victim as she approaches or comes into contact with different institutions of the State of community," the report stated.
"When the women or girls seek recourse from the government, they are further molested by the government representatives" and "most of the time women who report incidents of violence to the police end up in prison themselves".
However, Jamila's case is different in that she actually divorced her husband, who is now serving a three-year jail sentence. Documentation of the violence against her, as well as a follow-up by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, made this possible.
Social, religious norms
An earlier report by the UN's Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also found that the majority of women prisoners in Afghanistan were being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms.
Christina Orguz, UNODC's country director, said that most of the "criminals" would have been considered and treated as victims elsewhere.
Najia Zewari, a senior national program officer at Unifem in Afghanistan, said there is a social intolerance towards women who do not belong to a family unit.
"Women are more vulnerable if they are not attached to a group, family or tribe," she said.
She added that any intervention on the issue of violence against women needs to be sustainable.
"We cannot create another monster by taking people out of the family."
Few options
The lack of representation of women in decision-making positions (only one cabinet minister is a woman and there are no vocal women in leadership positions), reinforces stereotypes that limit a woman's role to the household.
Women's rights advocates say this also engenders hostility to women who participate in civil society and public life.
Afghanistan has one of the world's highest
maternal mortality rates [GALLO/GETTY]
Suzana Paklar, the head of Medica Mondiale, an NGO that provides support to women in war and crises zones, told Al Jazeera: "There is systematic oppression of women based on the deep-rooted belief that women have a lesser value."
A woman is perceived as an 'it' rather than a 'she,' Paklar said, adding that the problem in addressing the issue of violence against women in Afghanistan is that "we don't have real options to offer women".
"There is nothing really functional as protection," she said.
The strong shame associated with a woman leaving her home, even if as a victim of abuse, makes reintegrating into society and family nearly impossible.
If she returns home, the victim may be killed. If she does not return home, it is likely she will face more violence as a result of being an 'unattached woman'.
Currently, Afghanistan has only short-stay provisions for emergency cases, most of which do not allow women to keep their children.
Matrix of repression
A recent editorial in the government-owned Kabul Times offered a stark reminder of the widespread acceptance of violence against women in Afghanistan. The editorial, which ran four days after International Women's Day on March 8, was titled "A few reasons for violence against women."
"We always condemn men who beat their wives or sisters … but overlook what some women do to invoke men's ire. To begin with, there are numerous obstinate, groggy, nagging, quarrelsome, stingy and arguing women in this country who disturb the peace in their families. When they get charged they go on and on till they provoke their husbands to beat them black and blue."
The apparent justification of violence against women was written by Abdul Haq, the English-language newspaper's editor-in-chief. The acting editor, S. Ghiassi, told Al Jazeera that Haq could not comment on the issue because he was ill and hospitalised.
Root causes
A Unifem study, based on a primary database of violence covering 21 districts over a year-and-a-half during which 1,011 cases were registered, found that most of the cases of violence were a result of forced marriages.
Afghan women celebrate International
Women's Day [AP]
The report also stated that the incidence of forced marriages is as high as 70 to 80 per cent, while 57 per cent of marriages are estimated to be before the legal age of 16.
The widespread prevalence of child marriage compelled Hamid Karzai, the nation's president, to publicly address this issue on International Women's Day, calling on religious elders to end this practice and the social custom of giving away girls as a means of settling disputes and debts.
Afghanistan also suffers one of the world's highest maternal mortality rates - one woman dies every 29 minutes during child birth – and a female literacy rate that stands at 15.8 per cent, nearly half that of men.
Campaign for change
Several groups, including the SDC, the governments of Norway and Italy, and the UN are fighting violence against women by setting up a trust fund for projects that raise legal aid awareness, provide psychosocial aid and build safe houses and shelters.
As part of the initiative, Unifem and Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs opened its second referral centre in the northern Parwan province last week. The referral centre will ensure that women seeking help from authorities are not automatically arrested pending investigation.
Reports from the first referral centre indicate that the initiative has made some gains.
"Not one of the women who went there ended up in custody," Zaweri said. The next step, Unifem and its partners said, will be the introduction of specific legislation for the elimination of violence against women.
A draft of the proposed law has been sent to the Ministry of Justice for review.
Al Jazeera/march 21, 2008
Violence against women in Afghanistan has reached "endemic" proportions,
says one UN official [AP]
Jamila was married off when she was seven years old. Subjected to brutal beatings for nine years by her husband, she approached her father-in-law for help. For this "shame," a family member shot her in the leg.
During a rare visit to her parental home, she sought a divorce. A jirga, or assembly of local elders who act as informal dispute-resolution mechanisms in the absence of a formal justice system in many parts of Afghanistan, rejected her plea and sent her back to her marital home.
Jamila, whose real name and location cannot be revealed for her own safety, was punished once again, this time by her father-in-law, who beat her, cut off one nostril, shaved her head and tied her with a rope before throwing her outside the house.
Andre Huber, the director of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) in Afghanistan, says mistreatment and abuse of women persists because cases such as Jamila's are rarely reported.
"Violence against women exists in every continent, every country and every culture, and Afghanistan makes no exception, but the problem here in Afghanistan is that most of the cases remain unreported due to the severe restrictions women face in seeking justice," he told Al Jazeera.
"Female victims are often denied equal access to justice because traditionally they rarely register cases themselves."
'Endemic' violence
Even when women do manage to report the violence, the act of reporting may itself increase the abuse against them, either from family members, as in the case of Jamila, or from officials of the criminal justice system.
The UN says more Afghan girls are returning
to school, but violence persists [AP]
A United Nations Development Fund for Women (Unifem) report cites documented cases of women who were killed after returning home.
"The initial violence is compounded by further violations of the victim as she approaches or comes into contact with different institutions of the State of community," the report stated.
"When the women or girls seek recourse from the government, they are further molested by the government representatives" and "most of the time women who report incidents of violence to the police end up in prison themselves".
However, Jamila's case is different in that she actually divorced her husband, who is now serving a three-year jail sentence. Documentation of the violence against her, as well as a follow-up by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, made this possible.
Social, religious norms
An earlier report by the UN's Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also found that the majority of women prisoners in Afghanistan were being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms.
Christina Orguz, UNODC's country director, said that most of the "criminals" would have been considered and treated as victims elsewhere.
Najia Zewari, a senior national program officer at Unifem in Afghanistan, said there is a social intolerance towards women who do not belong to a family unit.
"Women are more vulnerable if they are not attached to a group, family or tribe," she said.
She added that any intervention on the issue of violence against women needs to be sustainable.
"We cannot create another monster by taking people out of the family."
Few options
The lack of representation of women in decision-making positions (only one cabinet minister is a woman and there are no vocal women in leadership positions), reinforces stereotypes that limit a woman's role to the household.
Women's rights advocates say this also engenders hostility to women who participate in civil society and public life.
Afghanistan has one of the world's highest
maternal mortality rates [GALLO/GETTY]
Suzana Paklar, the head of Medica Mondiale, an NGO that provides support to women in war and crises zones, told Al Jazeera: "There is systematic oppression of women based on the deep-rooted belief that women have a lesser value."
A woman is perceived as an 'it' rather than a 'she,' Paklar said, adding that the problem in addressing the issue of violence against women in Afghanistan is that "we don't have real options to offer women".
"There is nothing really functional as protection," she said.
The strong shame associated with a woman leaving her home, even if as a victim of abuse, makes reintegrating into society and family nearly impossible.
If she returns home, the victim may be killed. If she does not return home, it is likely she will face more violence as a result of being an 'unattached woman'.
Currently, Afghanistan has only short-stay provisions for emergency cases, most of which do not allow women to keep their children.
Matrix of repression
A recent editorial in the government-owned Kabul Times offered a stark reminder of the widespread acceptance of violence against women in Afghanistan. The editorial, which ran four days after International Women's Day on March 8, was titled "A few reasons for violence against women."
"We always condemn men who beat their wives or sisters … but overlook what some women do to invoke men's ire. To begin with, there are numerous obstinate, groggy, nagging, quarrelsome, stingy and arguing women in this country who disturb the peace in their families. When they get charged they go on and on till they provoke their husbands to beat them black and blue."
The apparent justification of violence against women was written by Abdul Haq, the English-language newspaper's editor-in-chief. The acting editor, S. Ghiassi, told Al Jazeera that Haq could not comment on the issue because he was ill and hospitalised.
Root causes
A Unifem study, based on a primary database of violence covering 21 districts over a year-and-a-half during which 1,011 cases were registered, found that most of the cases of violence were a result of forced marriages.
Afghan women celebrate International
Women's Day [AP]
The report also stated that the incidence of forced marriages is as high as 70 to 80 per cent, while 57 per cent of marriages are estimated to be before the legal age of 16.
The widespread prevalence of child marriage compelled Hamid Karzai, the nation's president, to publicly address this issue on International Women's Day, calling on religious elders to end this practice and the social custom of giving away girls as a means of settling disputes and debts.
Afghanistan also suffers one of the world's highest maternal mortality rates - one woman dies every 29 minutes during child birth – and a female literacy rate that stands at 15.8 per cent, nearly half that of men.
Campaign for change
Several groups, including the SDC, the governments of Norway and Italy, and the UN are fighting violence against women by setting up a trust fund for projects that raise legal aid awareness, provide psychosocial aid and build safe houses and shelters.
As part of the initiative, Unifem and Afghanistan's Ministry of Women's Affairs opened its second referral centre in the northern Parwan province last week. The referral centre will ensure that women seeking help from authorities are not automatically arrested pending investigation.
Reports from the first referral centre indicate that the initiative has made some gains.
"Not one of the women who went there ended up in custody," Zaweri said. The next step, Unifem and its partners said, will be the introduction of specific legislation for the elimination of violence against women.
A draft of the proposed law has been sent to the Ministry of Justice for review.
Living in Kabul
Living in Kabul
Civil Society/March 2008
“Is it safe to go to Kabul?” friends and acquaintances and would-be visitors often ask? The question though natural, often strikes me as odd. How does one answer it as a denizen of the city of a war-torn country? My usual response is to say its safe unless one is unlucky to be in the wrong place at the wrong time- the same response I would give while reporting on Kashmir in earlier years.
Alternatively I remark that I am usually more scared of the men than the bombs. Facetious though the remark may sound, there is certainly a core of truth in it. On a daily basis, nothing impacts on me more than the identity of being a woman.
Being a journalist in Afghanistan today is an enormous privilege. Seeing a country being built brick by brick both literally and figuratively is a unique journalistic experience- as one sees the emergence of new trends, cultures, economic development, institutions being built or not being built as the case may be.
Living in Kabul is not quite as easy. Electric supply can be as intermittent as two hours every fourth day in freezing winter, a time when heating, hot water and even light are the most essential in temperatures that vary between minus 15 to minus 25 degrees. Of course many parts of India also lack this basic necessity. But try running an entire capital city, and one which is attempting to rebuild a country on sporadic bursts of power? Try imagining- not the occasional power cuts at home, which we all face, but going to an office with no electricity? How do you charge laptops, cell phones, work in the evening? Most people who can afford it, and this includes almost all expatriates, rely on heavy generator sets to provide them electricity. This of course comes at a price: fumes, noise and frequent breakdowns unless you can afford the high costs of high maintenance.
In winter our rooms are warmed with wood stoves and it is only after four and a half years that I can claim to have somewhat mastered the art of lighting a successful wood fire- previous winters having been spent intermittently opening windows to air the room of smoke and closing them again to try and keep out the cold!
Though living conditions may resemble the poorer quarters or third world countries, costs of living are higher than most of the first world, because goods and services are still at a premium.
Six years into the rebuilding of Afghanistan, especially its urban centres still reply completely on imported goods including even milk and butter and fruit. Even though there is an abundance of all three in the country, the difficulties of processing and packaging and distribution as well as the complete absence of an industrial base make difficult to access locally produced goods.
So why stay on in this difficult country. Most foreigners asked this question are stumped for a rationale answer, mentioning only the intensity of the country. The ‘intensity’, difficult to explain to someone who hasn’t experienced it, is something that draws you in like an inexplicable attraction- an atmosphere where everything is experienced at a heightened level of experience. The light, the colours, the warmth and cold and most of all the emotions. Initial days there left me feeling like my life, my little personal world with its small joys, travails and sorrows was very trivial. That feeling has given way now to a more measured emption- but still one that accentuates every emotion, every detail, perhaps because of the absence of normality or what we call normality.
The normal is the unusual here and it is those expatriates who do ‘normal’ things who are seen as extraordinary. An Indian diplomat, Sandeep Kumar, stands out because he frequents the Afghan gyms, paints and travels in taxis. Deborah Rodriguez, an American became a bestselling author with her account of how she set up a beauty parlour, married an Afghan and coped with life here. Saska and Gay le Clerc are woman restaurateurs. The task is not easy. Saska and Le Clerc have to import a lot of their basic food.
Imported goods are sold at very high prices to the expatriate community and the Afghan elite while the poorer citizens get pushed to the margins. Take for example the price of housing. The scarcity of good housing- substantive number of houses were completely or partially destroyed in years of bombing, mortar shelling and gunfire and the advent of a cash rich expatriate community has resulted in enormously high rents that are unaffordable for most Afghans who get pushed to more remote areas of the city and ‘kuccha houses’ without any plumbing.
It is not just the economy of Afghanistan that is the tale of two cities. Expatriate seem to live in a bubble of their own partially by choice and partially by circumstance. Most internationals working for international organisations are bound by a clutch of security regulations. Houses with barbed wire and bomb shelters and high walls. Guards at the door, sandbags outside. Travel in armoured cars or atleast large SUVs – often with armed guards. Expatriates are also prohibited from walking in the street, going to areas or locations that are not ‘cleared’ by their security apparatus in advance and usually also prohibited from consorting with Afghans who are not ‘cleared’. Afghans are usually treated as suspect unless proven otherwise under this security regimen under which private security companies also seal off roads and access to ‘ordinary’ locals, prevent local taxies from many routes and cordon off half the road in front of the houses and offices of the more rich and powerful.
The divide is further accentuated in the social sphere. Most restaurants are either predominantly frequented by either Afghans or expats and few see the presence of both purely because ‘expat’ restaurants are way too expensive(a simple sandwhich in a simple café costs usually $7 to $10). Even where they are affordable, many restaurants hang signs outside saying ‘no locals’, ‘no Afghans’ or ‘foreign passports only’. The rationale is that they are forbidden from serving liquor to Afghans under the country’s laws and get raided by the police if locals are found outside. Whatever the reason, the result is an apartheid that appears to have become accepted.
It would be wrong to blame just the expatriate community for this separation however. Afghan society does not lend itself easily to a great deal of tolerance in socialising, especially where the presence of women is concerned.
Though the Taliban alone are usually equated with denial of rights to women, the truth is that they were only the most extreme manifestation of existing customs. In most parts of the country women still need permission to leave the house(the degree of strictness of course varies with geography, ethnicity and individual family values).
Women are largely seen as possessions and women’s role outside the family home is ill-understood. The fact that more than 50% of the women in Afghanistan’s largest jail are there for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for having run away from home, illustrates best the opinion of those in authority towards women stepping outside the family structure. Though a small number of women are joining the workforce(especially in urban centres), they are often subject to harassment.
While this view of women is not limited to Afghanistan, the polarisation of views seems far more acute here. War, displacement, extreme conservatism overlaid with exposure to TV’s pop culture and its display of women combined with a move towards more progressive liberal values has created a confused value system that has a strong streak of hostility towards women in public spaces. Where the creed of treating women as property comes face to face with the commodification of women, the result is a debate that centres around the apparent contradiction of a women in burkha or a bikini. Subsumed in this superficial dispute are the real rights of women to participate in public space- both as participants and decision makers.
The hostility that this confrontation creates also it difficult even for women expatriates to function with comfort, even though they enjoy layers of safety and insulation denied to their Afghan counterparts.
As an Indian woman I usually straddle a schizophrenic identity. Indians are the most loved nationality in Afghanistan, being seen rightly or wrongly as selfless friends with no agenda. Being a woman counters most of that advantage.
To summarise life in Kabul: as a journalist it is fascinating, living is difficult and being a woman can be depressing.
Civil Society/March 2008
“Is it safe to go to Kabul?” friends and acquaintances and would-be visitors often ask? The question though natural, often strikes me as odd. How does one answer it as a denizen of the city of a war-torn country? My usual response is to say its safe unless one is unlucky to be in the wrong place at the wrong time- the same response I would give while reporting on Kashmir in earlier years.
Alternatively I remark that I am usually more scared of the men than the bombs. Facetious though the remark may sound, there is certainly a core of truth in it. On a daily basis, nothing impacts on me more than the identity of being a woman.
Being a journalist in Afghanistan today is an enormous privilege. Seeing a country being built brick by brick both literally and figuratively is a unique journalistic experience- as one sees the emergence of new trends, cultures, economic development, institutions being built or not being built as the case may be.
Living in Kabul is not quite as easy. Electric supply can be as intermittent as two hours every fourth day in freezing winter, a time when heating, hot water and even light are the most essential in temperatures that vary between minus 15 to minus 25 degrees. Of course many parts of India also lack this basic necessity. But try running an entire capital city, and one which is attempting to rebuild a country on sporadic bursts of power? Try imagining- not the occasional power cuts at home, which we all face, but going to an office with no electricity? How do you charge laptops, cell phones, work in the evening? Most people who can afford it, and this includes almost all expatriates, rely on heavy generator sets to provide them electricity. This of course comes at a price: fumes, noise and frequent breakdowns unless you can afford the high costs of high maintenance.
In winter our rooms are warmed with wood stoves and it is only after four and a half years that I can claim to have somewhat mastered the art of lighting a successful wood fire- previous winters having been spent intermittently opening windows to air the room of smoke and closing them again to try and keep out the cold!
Though living conditions may resemble the poorer quarters or third world countries, costs of living are higher than most of the first world, because goods and services are still at a premium.
Six years into the rebuilding of Afghanistan, especially its urban centres still reply completely on imported goods including even milk and butter and fruit. Even though there is an abundance of all three in the country, the difficulties of processing and packaging and distribution as well as the complete absence of an industrial base make difficult to access locally produced goods.
So why stay on in this difficult country. Most foreigners asked this question are stumped for a rationale answer, mentioning only the intensity of the country. The ‘intensity’, difficult to explain to someone who hasn’t experienced it, is something that draws you in like an inexplicable attraction- an atmosphere where everything is experienced at a heightened level of experience. The light, the colours, the warmth and cold and most of all the emotions. Initial days there left me feeling like my life, my little personal world with its small joys, travails and sorrows was very trivial. That feeling has given way now to a more measured emption- but still one that accentuates every emotion, every detail, perhaps because of the absence of normality or what we call normality.
The normal is the unusual here and it is those expatriates who do ‘normal’ things who are seen as extraordinary. An Indian diplomat, Sandeep Kumar, stands out because he frequents the Afghan gyms, paints and travels in taxis. Deborah Rodriguez, an American became a bestselling author with her account of how she set up a beauty parlour, married an Afghan and coped with life here. Saska and Gay le Clerc are woman restaurateurs. The task is not easy. Saska and Le Clerc have to import a lot of their basic food.
Imported goods are sold at very high prices to the expatriate community and the Afghan elite while the poorer citizens get pushed to the margins. Take for example the price of housing. The scarcity of good housing- substantive number of houses were completely or partially destroyed in years of bombing, mortar shelling and gunfire and the advent of a cash rich expatriate community has resulted in enormously high rents that are unaffordable for most Afghans who get pushed to more remote areas of the city and ‘kuccha houses’ without any plumbing.
It is not just the economy of Afghanistan that is the tale of two cities. Expatriate seem to live in a bubble of their own partially by choice and partially by circumstance. Most internationals working for international organisations are bound by a clutch of security regulations. Houses with barbed wire and bomb shelters and high walls. Guards at the door, sandbags outside. Travel in armoured cars or atleast large SUVs – often with armed guards. Expatriates are also prohibited from walking in the street, going to areas or locations that are not ‘cleared’ by their security apparatus in advance and usually also prohibited from consorting with Afghans who are not ‘cleared’. Afghans are usually treated as suspect unless proven otherwise under this security regimen under which private security companies also seal off roads and access to ‘ordinary’ locals, prevent local taxies from many routes and cordon off half the road in front of the houses and offices of the more rich and powerful.
The divide is further accentuated in the social sphere. Most restaurants are either predominantly frequented by either Afghans or expats and few see the presence of both purely because ‘expat’ restaurants are way too expensive(a simple sandwhich in a simple café costs usually $7 to $10). Even where they are affordable, many restaurants hang signs outside saying ‘no locals’, ‘no Afghans’ or ‘foreign passports only’. The rationale is that they are forbidden from serving liquor to Afghans under the country’s laws and get raided by the police if locals are found outside. Whatever the reason, the result is an apartheid that appears to have become accepted.
It would be wrong to blame just the expatriate community for this separation however. Afghan society does not lend itself easily to a great deal of tolerance in socialising, especially where the presence of women is concerned.
Though the Taliban alone are usually equated with denial of rights to women, the truth is that they were only the most extreme manifestation of existing customs. In most parts of the country women still need permission to leave the house(the degree of strictness of course varies with geography, ethnicity and individual family values).
Women are largely seen as possessions and women’s role outside the family home is ill-understood. The fact that more than 50% of the women in Afghanistan’s largest jail are there for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for having run away from home, illustrates best the opinion of those in authority towards women stepping outside the family structure. Though a small number of women are joining the workforce(especially in urban centres), they are often subject to harassment.
While this view of women is not limited to Afghanistan, the polarisation of views seems far more acute here. War, displacement, extreme conservatism overlaid with exposure to TV’s pop culture and its display of women combined with a move towards more progressive liberal values has created a confused value system that has a strong streak of hostility towards women in public spaces. Where the creed of treating women as property comes face to face with the commodification of women, the result is a debate that centres around the apparent contradiction of a women in burkha or a bikini. Subsumed in this superficial dispute are the real rights of women to participate in public space- both as participants and decision makers.
The hostility that this confrontation creates also it difficult even for women expatriates to function with comfort, even though they enjoy layers of safety and insulation denied to their Afghan counterparts.
As an Indian woman I usually straddle a schizophrenic identity. Indians are the most loved nationality in Afghanistan, being seen rightly or wrongly as selfless friends with no agenda. Being a woman counters most of that advantage.
To summarise life in Kabul: as a journalist it is fascinating, living is difficult and being a woman can be depressing.
Between the verses
Between the verses
In the rush to ‘define’, have we forgotten Southasia’s long history of blurring the boundaries of love, of the distinction between the platonic and the sexual?
Himal/March 2008
jessica schnabel
Young men wander hand in hand, giggle together, sit on each other’s laps. At weddings and parties they dance together sensuously, usually without any woman around. In many places, such overt displays of physical bonding between the same sex would be immediately slotted as homosexual. Whether viewed with liberal acceptance or castigated with opprobrium, it would first be categorised. Yet in the scene sketched here, most of the young men are intensely interested in girls, not boys.
In today’s Kabul, whether due to the unforgiving taboos on overt displays of heterosexual behaviour, or having grown up under the Taliban regime, which managed to make women disappear from sight, intense displays of physical affection between men are the norm, even more so than in other Southasian cities and towns. Despite the extreme sexual repression that continues to exist in Afghanistan, this ‘permission’ to exhibit physical tenderness towards the same sex simultaneously challenges the stereotypes of homosexual, heterosexual and even bisexual identities, which often form the core of gender politics elsewhere.
Though there has been considerable documentation of the denial of women’s rights in Afghanistan, as well as some cursory examination into issues of gay identities, the behavioural norm that blurs the distinction between sexual and platonic relationships remains almost completely unexplored. This continues in spite of the fact that there is a long history of such relationships in official records and cultural traditions of the region. Take, for example, two widely known works of literature, the Baburnama (Book of Babur) and the works of the 13th-centruy poet Rumi. The former was written by an emperor who came from Uzbekistan to make Hindustan his home, but all his life longed for Kabul, for its resemblance to his childhood home. The latter, though born in Balkh in northern Afghanistan, ultimately left the region for Turkey.
Zahiruddin Muhammed Babur, who lived between 1483 and 1530, was the founder of the Mughal dynasty in the Subcontinent. In his astonishingly frank autobiography, the Baburnama, he provides an extensive record his longing for a young boy. Unfortunately, this infatuation also coincided with his marriage. Though wed at the age of 17, to one Ayisheh Sultan Begum, he soon loses both his interest in and fondness for his wife. “Once every month or forty days,” the emperor recalls, “my mother, the khanim, drove me to her [Ayisheh] with all the severity of a quartermaster.” Readers are never told exactly what the results were of these disciplinarian efforts. And, of course, as is the norm with the history of kings, we know even less of Ayisheh’s feelings. What we do know, however, is of Babur’s real interest. “During this time there was a boy from the camp market named Baburi,” he writes.
Even his name was amazingly appropriate. I developed a strange inclination for him – rather I made myself miserable over him.
Before this experience I had never felt a desire for anyone, nor did I listen to talk of love and affection or speak of such things. At that time I used to compose single lines and couplets in Persian. I composed the following lines there:
‘May no one be so distraught and devastated by love as I;
May no beloved be so pitiless and careless as you.’
Occasionally Baburi came to me, but I was so bashful that I could not look him in the face, much less converse with him. In my excitement and agitation I could not thank him for coming, much less complain of his leaving. Who could bear to demand the ceremonies of fealty?
Another time, coming suddenly across the subject of his affections, Babur recalls being so embarrassed that he nearly went to pieces.
In the throes of love, in the foment of youth and madness, I wandered bareheaded and barefoot around the lanes and streets and through gardens and orchard, paying no attention to acquaintances and strangers, oblivious to self and others.
When I fell in love I became mad and crazed. I knew not this to be part of loving beauties.
Sometimes I went out alone like a madman to the hills and wilderness, sometimes I roamed through the orchards and lanes of town, neither walking nor sitting within my own volition, restless in going and staying.
I have no strength to go, no power to stay. You have snared us in this state, my heart.
What appears to have been a passing infatuation ends here, however, and little more is heard of Babur’s love and longing. Much of the rest of the Baburnama is instead devoted to more ‘manly’ pursuits, particularly Babur’s extensive military expeditions.
Inside the unsayable
Preceding Babur by three centuries was Jelaluddin Balkhi, commonly known as Rumi, the mystic Sufi poet. Unlike Babur, love was not a passing infatuation for Rumi, but rather formed a core of both his life and work. Born in 1207, Rumi married young and had a family. But it was not until 1244 that he came across what was to be his strongest and most abiding relationship – with the wandering dervish, Shams of Tabrizi.
Writing of this friendship, the translator and Rumi scholar Coleman Barks says: “We cannot say much about love at first sight. It happens and we live in the wake of a new life. Dante and Beatrice. Rumi and Shams. Part of the love mystery explored in Rumi’s poetry is how presences flow together, evolve, and create in tandem.” Describing his own intense relationship with Rumi’s poems, Barks writes: “I loved the unpredictable spontaneity, the push-pull of great tenderness and great loneliness, of living beyond psychology, of drifting at ease inside the unsayable.”
Much is now made of Rumi’s role in bridging cultures. As a Sufi poet whose verse transcended the narrow boundaries of not just one religion but also the more narrow interpretation of man’s relationship with god, Rumi is now held up as an example of the religious tolerance that existed.
His poetry is often quoted and used to buttress the more liberal interpretations of religion and tolerance, especially since he came from a region that has recently seen a great deal of intolerance.
But even today, little is said of Rumi’s role in blurring the boundaries of love. Soon after they met, Shams and Rumi became inseparable. “Their friendship is one of the mysteries,” Barks writes. “They spent months together without any human needs, transported into a region of pure conversation. This ecstatic connection caused difficulties in the religious community.” As a teacher of religion, after all, Rumi would have been expected to be beyond ‘worldly’ longings, while his students are also said to have felt neglected by this obsession with Shams. Shams eventually disappeared, only to be brought back at Rumi’s urging. “Shams stayed in Rumi’s home and was married to a young girl who had been brought up in the family. Again the long mystical conversation (sohbet) began and again the jealousies grew.” Shams disappeared again, this time probably murdered by Rumi’s own family.
In despair Rumi travelled to Damascus, realising only then: “Why should I seek? I am the same as he. His essence speaks through me. I have been looking for myself.” Yet even so, Rumi needed his muse. Barks states, somewhat obliquely, “After Shams’ death and Rumi’s emotional ‘merging’ with him another companion was found. Saladin Zarkub.” And, after Zarkub, there was another, Husam Chelebi – all of them male. It was to Shams, however, that Rumi addressed his most intense poems, included in a masterwork collectively referred to as “The Shams”. “There’s no more wine; my bowl is broken,” Rumi laments, “I am terribly sick, and only Shams can cure me.
Do you know Shams, the prince of seeing,
who lifts the utterly drowned up out of the ocean
and revives them, so that the shore looks like
multiple marriages are going on at once,
easy laughing here, a formal toast,
a procession without music.
Shams is a trumpet note of light
that starts the atoms spinning,
a wind that comes at dawn
tasting of bread and salt.
Contemporary history does not say whether the love of Rumi for Shams, or of Babur for Baburi, ever had a physical element. If this were so, these couples would perhaps be called homosexual. But what if it were not so? In the narrow categorisations of homosexual, heterosexual and bisexual, where would these friendships fit in – traversing the space between sexual and platonic, between friendship and love? Babur and Shams may well have also been homosexual. Or, like the boys of Kabul today, it might be just that they were uninhibited and intensely attached to others of the same sex.
What enables young men in Afghanistan today to hold swinging hands as they walk together is a lack of awareness that such behaviour is nowadays stereotyped as ‘gay’. Caught in something of a time warp, isolated by three decades’ of fighting, Afghanistan, in a paradoxical way, provides some spaces and freedoms that are a direct result of its years of social seclusion. Now on the path of assimilation into the ‘global community’, perhaps it will not be long before Afghan youth, like others in the region, become aware of ‘modern’ behavioural codes, and the displays of physical affection that are now the norm will quickly be labelled as ‘deviant’.
In the rush to ‘define’, have we forgotten Southasia’s long history of blurring the boundaries of love, of the distinction between the platonic and the sexual?
Himal/March 2008
jessica schnabel
Young men wander hand in hand, giggle together, sit on each other’s laps. At weddings and parties they dance together sensuously, usually without any woman around. In many places, such overt displays of physical bonding between the same sex would be immediately slotted as homosexual. Whether viewed with liberal acceptance or castigated with opprobrium, it would first be categorised. Yet in the scene sketched here, most of the young men are intensely interested in girls, not boys.
In today’s Kabul, whether due to the unforgiving taboos on overt displays of heterosexual behaviour, or having grown up under the Taliban regime, which managed to make women disappear from sight, intense displays of physical affection between men are the norm, even more so than in other Southasian cities and towns. Despite the extreme sexual repression that continues to exist in Afghanistan, this ‘permission’ to exhibit physical tenderness towards the same sex simultaneously challenges the stereotypes of homosexual, heterosexual and even bisexual identities, which often form the core of gender politics elsewhere.
Though there has been considerable documentation of the denial of women’s rights in Afghanistan, as well as some cursory examination into issues of gay identities, the behavioural norm that blurs the distinction between sexual and platonic relationships remains almost completely unexplored. This continues in spite of the fact that there is a long history of such relationships in official records and cultural traditions of the region. Take, for example, two widely known works of literature, the Baburnama (Book of Babur) and the works of the 13th-centruy poet Rumi. The former was written by an emperor who came from Uzbekistan to make Hindustan his home, but all his life longed for Kabul, for its resemblance to his childhood home. The latter, though born in Balkh in northern Afghanistan, ultimately left the region for Turkey.
Zahiruddin Muhammed Babur, who lived between 1483 and 1530, was the founder of the Mughal dynasty in the Subcontinent. In his astonishingly frank autobiography, the Baburnama, he provides an extensive record his longing for a young boy. Unfortunately, this infatuation also coincided with his marriage. Though wed at the age of 17, to one Ayisheh Sultan Begum, he soon loses both his interest in and fondness for his wife. “Once every month or forty days,” the emperor recalls, “my mother, the khanim, drove me to her [Ayisheh] with all the severity of a quartermaster.” Readers are never told exactly what the results were of these disciplinarian efforts. And, of course, as is the norm with the history of kings, we know even less of Ayisheh’s feelings. What we do know, however, is of Babur’s real interest. “During this time there was a boy from the camp market named Baburi,” he writes.
Even his name was amazingly appropriate. I developed a strange inclination for him – rather I made myself miserable over him.
Before this experience I had never felt a desire for anyone, nor did I listen to talk of love and affection or speak of such things. At that time I used to compose single lines and couplets in Persian. I composed the following lines there:
‘May no one be so distraught and devastated by love as I;
May no beloved be so pitiless and careless as you.’
Occasionally Baburi came to me, but I was so bashful that I could not look him in the face, much less converse with him. In my excitement and agitation I could not thank him for coming, much less complain of his leaving. Who could bear to demand the ceremonies of fealty?
Another time, coming suddenly across the subject of his affections, Babur recalls being so embarrassed that he nearly went to pieces.
In the throes of love, in the foment of youth and madness, I wandered bareheaded and barefoot around the lanes and streets and through gardens and orchard, paying no attention to acquaintances and strangers, oblivious to self and others.
When I fell in love I became mad and crazed. I knew not this to be part of loving beauties.
Sometimes I went out alone like a madman to the hills and wilderness, sometimes I roamed through the orchards and lanes of town, neither walking nor sitting within my own volition, restless in going and staying.
I have no strength to go, no power to stay. You have snared us in this state, my heart.
What appears to have been a passing infatuation ends here, however, and little more is heard of Babur’s love and longing. Much of the rest of the Baburnama is instead devoted to more ‘manly’ pursuits, particularly Babur’s extensive military expeditions.
Inside the unsayable
Preceding Babur by three centuries was Jelaluddin Balkhi, commonly known as Rumi, the mystic Sufi poet. Unlike Babur, love was not a passing infatuation for Rumi, but rather formed a core of both his life and work. Born in 1207, Rumi married young and had a family. But it was not until 1244 that he came across what was to be his strongest and most abiding relationship – with the wandering dervish, Shams of Tabrizi.
Writing of this friendship, the translator and Rumi scholar Coleman Barks says: “We cannot say much about love at first sight. It happens and we live in the wake of a new life. Dante and Beatrice. Rumi and Shams. Part of the love mystery explored in Rumi’s poetry is how presences flow together, evolve, and create in tandem.” Describing his own intense relationship with Rumi’s poems, Barks writes: “I loved the unpredictable spontaneity, the push-pull of great tenderness and great loneliness, of living beyond psychology, of drifting at ease inside the unsayable.”
Much is now made of Rumi’s role in bridging cultures. As a Sufi poet whose verse transcended the narrow boundaries of not just one religion but also the more narrow interpretation of man’s relationship with god, Rumi is now held up as an example of the religious tolerance that existed.
His poetry is often quoted and used to buttress the more liberal interpretations of religion and tolerance, especially since he came from a region that has recently seen a great deal of intolerance.
But even today, little is said of Rumi’s role in blurring the boundaries of love. Soon after they met, Shams and Rumi became inseparable. “Their friendship is one of the mysteries,” Barks writes. “They spent months together without any human needs, transported into a region of pure conversation. This ecstatic connection caused difficulties in the religious community.” As a teacher of religion, after all, Rumi would have been expected to be beyond ‘worldly’ longings, while his students are also said to have felt neglected by this obsession with Shams. Shams eventually disappeared, only to be brought back at Rumi’s urging. “Shams stayed in Rumi’s home and was married to a young girl who had been brought up in the family. Again the long mystical conversation (sohbet) began and again the jealousies grew.” Shams disappeared again, this time probably murdered by Rumi’s own family.
In despair Rumi travelled to Damascus, realising only then: “Why should I seek? I am the same as he. His essence speaks through me. I have been looking for myself.” Yet even so, Rumi needed his muse. Barks states, somewhat obliquely, “After Shams’ death and Rumi’s emotional ‘merging’ with him another companion was found. Saladin Zarkub.” And, after Zarkub, there was another, Husam Chelebi – all of them male. It was to Shams, however, that Rumi addressed his most intense poems, included in a masterwork collectively referred to as “The Shams”. “There’s no more wine; my bowl is broken,” Rumi laments, “I am terribly sick, and only Shams can cure me.
Do you know Shams, the prince of seeing,
who lifts the utterly drowned up out of the ocean
and revives them, so that the shore looks like
multiple marriages are going on at once,
easy laughing here, a formal toast,
a procession without music.
Shams is a trumpet note of light
that starts the atoms spinning,
a wind that comes at dawn
tasting of bread and salt.
Contemporary history does not say whether the love of Rumi for Shams, or of Babur for Baburi, ever had a physical element. If this were so, these couples would perhaps be called homosexual. But what if it were not so? In the narrow categorisations of homosexual, heterosexual and bisexual, where would these friendships fit in – traversing the space between sexual and platonic, between friendship and love? Babur and Shams may well have also been homosexual. Or, like the boys of Kabul today, it might be just that they were uninhibited and intensely attached to others of the same sex.
What enables young men in Afghanistan today to hold swinging hands as they walk together is a lack of awareness that such behaviour is nowadays stereotyped as ‘gay’. Caught in something of a time warp, isolated by three decades’ of fighting, Afghanistan, in a paradoxical way, provides some spaces and freedoms that are a direct result of its years of social seclusion. Now on the path of assimilation into the ‘global community’, perhaps it will not be long before Afghan youth, like others in the region, become aware of ‘modern’ behavioural codes, and the displays of physical affection that are now the norm will quickly be labelled as ‘deviant’.
Afghanistan 2007
Afghanistan 2007
South Asia Journal
Afghanistan completed its sixth year since the removal of the Taliban with an erratic record of post conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Though designated as a ‘post-conflict’ country since November 2001, the country continued to see pitched battles with Taliban in large parts of Southern Afghanistan as well as intermittent incidents of violence in others parts of the country. The capital Kabul saw explosions, suicide bombings and rocket attacks and Taliban activities crept closer to the capital. The province of Ghazni was used as a base by the Taliban for their kidnapping of the Korean hostages, an event which also allowed the Taliban to openly hold a press conference, the first since 2001.
In several parts of the South, the Taliban were able to hold districts for varying lengths of time until the government and international forces were able to take control again. There were repeated calls for more troops contribution from the NATO countries, but numbers continued to fall short of what was required given the magnitude of problem. The resource constraint as well as operational methods used by some of the countries also led to heavy reliance on air power and concurrently high rates of civilian casualties. While no exact numbers were made public, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour expressed concern over the civilian casualties during her visit to Afghanistan, terming it “alarming.”
The year also saw a change in the command and control structure of NATO-led ISAF. The rotational system of command where a single NATO member country assumed command was replaced and the ISAF troops will henceforth be commanded an American general in perpetuity.
Other developments on the security front saw the Afghan National Army grow at a slow incremental rate and this year saw greater emphasis on the need for building up the Afghan National Police. Alarmingly, the call for rearming village communities as a means of meeting the shortfall of regular forces, both international and national, continued to gain ground. The first step saw the deployment of the auxiliary police, drawn from the local community and under the command of local commanders. The auxiliary police were deployed with less training than the regular forces.
While government and international forces claimed that they had turned the corner and forced the Taliban to adopt desperate strategies like suicide bombings there appeared to be no let up in the violence. A major suicide bombing in the relatively peaceful province of Baghlan towards the end of the year shocked the country claiming the lives of several parliamentarians visiting the province, including the spokesman of the United National Front and former Minister of Commerce, Syed Mustafa Kazemi.
The United National Front emerged as the political opposition to the government this year, bringing together members of the Northern Alliance, as well as powerful former commanders and members of the royal family who had not played an overt political part in recent years. The year also saw the death of the last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who had returned to the country as the ‘father of the nation’.
The country’s parliament, dominated by members of the United National Front also continued to function as an opposition, coming into regular confrontation with the government. The most visible conflict arose after the parliament dismissed two ministers for non performance. While President Hamid Karzai accepted one dismissal he challenged the other seeking and obtaining a Supreme Court decision against it. However Parliament refused to accept it, claiming that the government was trying to subvert parliamentary prerogative, and the country saw the bizarre spectacle of a foreign minister who dealt with foreign countries and the international community while parliament refused to accept his authority.
The parliament also succeeded in passing a resolution seeking to grant amnesty to all those who had participated in the ‘jehad’ of the last few decades, immunizing warlords and their followers from any prosecution for war crimes or criminal acts. The amnesty, though criticised by the international community, was made into legislation with presidential assent with minor changes. Despite having accepted the plan for transitional justice, the government dragged its feet on implementing any part of it.
President Karzai’s apparent ‘weakness’ was the subject of some criticism from some of the international partners who also drew attention to the inefficiency and corruption in governance. The Afghan government on its part continued seeking greater ownership over the aid being routed into this country. With an estimated 75% of the aid flowing into the ‘external’ budget(i.e. not through the government), the government argued that it can neither build capacity nor assert its authority without control over resources. The international aid community however argued that lack of capacity and endemic corruption in the government prevents it from routing its resources through the government. A significant portion of the aid through the external budget however flows out of the country leading to resentment in the local population. An assessment of the $1.36 billion spent in the Afghan year1384 revealed that the local impact was 31.2%.
Whatever the arguments, the limited efficacy of the aid delivered to Afghanistan so far is clearly visible on the ground. The conflict with the Taliban and the violence occupy the major portion of attention on Afghanistan and the more insidious violence gets much less notice. Though larger numbers of children enrolled in schools and health services improved in some parts of the country, the 2007 National Human Development Report revealed that human development indicators were lower than what was estimated at the time the reconstruction began.
Afghanistan’s HDI ranking was 174, only above the three lowest countries of Niger, Sierra Leone and Mali. The NHDR for 2007, the second since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, reveals a literacy rate of 23.5%, down from the 2004 assessment which put it at 28.7%. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared to 44.5 in the past. International aid still fell woefully short of requirements, while government revenues remained at a dismal 7% of the GDP. Disbursement of aid over 2002-2005 was $83 per capita, even though the Afghan government estimated at a minimum of $168 per capita was needed for minimal stablisation.
According to the latest National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population remains below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption and only 31% has access to safe drinking water. The rate of infant mortality has dropped from 165 per 1000 to 135 per 1000, but the maternal mortality ratio has remained unchanged at 1600 per 100,000 live births, one of the highest in the world.
The situation of women in Afghanistan remains one of the most dismal and the country has a Gender Development Index which ranks it alongside Niger. Despite the removal of the Taliban who were seen as one of the most important reasons for oppression of women, the situation of women has improved only tangentially. Though the country has one of the highest number of women parliamentarians thanks to reservation of seats in the first parliamentary elections, the women parliamentarians are severely disempowered to exercise their roles. There are few women in public service and even fewer in high office. Women’s rights has remained more a token declaration with token representation in the form of one woman cabinet minister and one woman governor.
Violence against women continued in many horrific forms, most patently in the domestic sphere with considerable evidence of forced marriages including child marriages and domestic violence. The practice of suicides and self immolations by women desperate to escape their marriage received some public attention but apart from sporadic and isolated efforts there was little to signal the engagement of either the international community or the Afghan government on this issue. Those working in the area of gender rights continued their effort to reverse or mitigate the worst impacts of customary law and practice which treat women as property. The conflation of several trends – the customary practices, war, the displacement of populations, the return of refugees, the advent of the consumer culture and its commodification of women and the attempts to introduce a more liberal approach – sees an increasingly confrontational approach on the issue of women’s role, rights and participation in the public space.
The country recorded a high growth rate but the economic progress has been patchy and uneven, its inequality hidden behind a façade of glitzy malls in capital cities, new shops and businesses, palatial houses and plenty of hot money that prop up an artificial economy.
Much of the ostentatious wealth was attributed to the narco-economy. The year saw a record opium cultivation. With this Afghanistan, already the world’s single largest supplier of opium, also surpassed any other country in history to have produced opium on such a large scale. An increased acreage of 17% combined with good weather conditions forecasts an increase in opium production by 34%. There were continuing differences of opinion within the international community on the best counter narcotics strategy. At the level of implementation, actions continued to be carried out in selective areas to crackdown on opium farmers with very little enforcement on interdiction, or high value targets like drug traffickers.
Attention continued to be drawn to the linkages between criminals, drug traffickers, terrorists and anti-government elements but yielded little results with security operations continuing in a fractured manner- the US Coalition forces responsible for the war against terror, the NATO-led ISAF responsible for counter insurgency and the police entrusted to deal with counter narcotics. One southern district of Helmund alone accounting for an increase of 48% in opium cultivation.
Helmund proved to be a critical location in more ways than one. The Musa Qala district shot into the limelight following an ‘agreement’ for a ceasefire. The deal, ostensibly between the government authorities and the local tribal elders, resulted in NATO withdrawing its forces from the area in exchange for a guarantee of peace and no Taliban activities in a demarcated area. The agreement, sold as a new way of engaging the tribal community fell through soon however with the area becoming a safe haven for the Taliban. It was only pitched battles at the end of the year that resulted in the government forces supported by NATO’s British troops taking back control.
The need for engaging communities however was given some precedence this year in different forms. A peace jirga between tribal elders from the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan along with government officials and parliamentarians resulted in the first Pak-Afghan peace jirga taking discussions on violence and peace beyond the government to government talks. There were other attempts to engage the communities at the local and provincial level by international organisations as well as NGOs.
The concept of bringing the moderate Taliban back into the fold also gained momentum with renewed calls for holding negotiations. While no details of specific talks were made public, there was continuing anecdotal evidence of overtures between parts of the Taliban and anti government leaderships and the authorities at various levels.
Negotiations with the Taliban led to successful outcomes on atleast two occasions The ICRC mediated between the Taliban and Korean authorities for the release of the Korean hostages and the UN agencies successfully negotiated days of tranquillity that allowed them to carry out much needed vaccinations campaigns in difficult areas of the South after the Taliban assured them of safe passage.
While events on the ground did not provide a cheerful outlook in 2007, one of the most significant shifts was in the overall perception, especially of the international community, that efforts for aid, development and reconstruction needed to be oriented much more towards the Afghan community.
2008 will tell whether this realisation actually results in concrete results and greater cohesiveness of effort that will bring about substantial changes in the lives of Afghans. ‘Afghanisation’ of the process of helping Afghans in the seventh year of rebuilding their country will be a remarkable step forward.
South Asia Journal
Afghanistan completed its sixth year since the removal of the Taliban with an erratic record of post conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Though designated as a ‘post-conflict’ country since November 2001, the country continued to see pitched battles with Taliban in large parts of Southern Afghanistan as well as intermittent incidents of violence in others parts of the country. The capital Kabul saw explosions, suicide bombings and rocket attacks and Taliban activities crept closer to the capital. The province of Ghazni was used as a base by the Taliban for their kidnapping of the Korean hostages, an event which also allowed the Taliban to openly hold a press conference, the first since 2001.
In several parts of the South, the Taliban were able to hold districts for varying lengths of time until the government and international forces were able to take control again. There were repeated calls for more troops contribution from the NATO countries, but numbers continued to fall short of what was required given the magnitude of problem. The resource constraint as well as operational methods used by some of the countries also led to heavy reliance on air power and concurrently high rates of civilian casualties. While no exact numbers were made public, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour expressed concern over the civilian casualties during her visit to Afghanistan, terming it “alarming.”
The year also saw a change in the command and control structure of NATO-led ISAF. The rotational system of command where a single NATO member country assumed command was replaced and the ISAF troops will henceforth be commanded an American general in perpetuity.
Other developments on the security front saw the Afghan National Army grow at a slow incremental rate and this year saw greater emphasis on the need for building up the Afghan National Police. Alarmingly, the call for rearming village communities as a means of meeting the shortfall of regular forces, both international and national, continued to gain ground. The first step saw the deployment of the auxiliary police, drawn from the local community and under the command of local commanders. The auxiliary police were deployed with less training than the regular forces.
While government and international forces claimed that they had turned the corner and forced the Taliban to adopt desperate strategies like suicide bombings there appeared to be no let up in the violence. A major suicide bombing in the relatively peaceful province of Baghlan towards the end of the year shocked the country claiming the lives of several parliamentarians visiting the province, including the spokesman of the United National Front and former Minister of Commerce, Syed Mustafa Kazemi.
The United National Front emerged as the political opposition to the government this year, bringing together members of the Northern Alliance, as well as powerful former commanders and members of the royal family who had not played an overt political part in recent years. The year also saw the death of the last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who had returned to the country as the ‘father of the nation’.
The country’s parliament, dominated by members of the United National Front also continued to function as an opposition, coming into regular confrontation with the government. The most visible conflict arose after the parliament dismissed two ministers for non performance. While President Hamid Karzai accepted one dismissal he challenged the other seeking and obtaining a Supreme Court decision against it. However Parliament refused to accept it, claiming that the government was trying to subvert parliamentary prerogative, and the country saw the bizarre spectacle of a foreign minister who dealt with foreign countries and the international community while parliament refused to accept his authority.
The parliament also succeeded in passing a resolution seeking to grant amnesty to all those who had participated in the ‘jehad’ of the last few decades, immunizing warlords and their followers from any prosecution for war crimes or criminal acts. The amnesty, though criticised by the international community, was made into legislation with presidential assent with minor changes. Despite having accepted the plan for transitional justice, the government dragged its feet on implementing any part of it.
President Karzai’s apparent ‘weakness’ was the subject of some criticism from some of the international partners who also drew attention to the inefficiency and corruption in governance. The Afghan government on its part continued seeking greater ownership over the aid being routed into this country. With an estimated 75% of the aid flowing into the ‘external’ budget(i.e. not through the government), the government argued that it can neither build capacity nor assert its authority without control over resources. The international aid community however argued that lack of capacity and endemic corruption in the government prevents it from routing its resources through the government. A significant portion of the aid through the external budget however flows out of the country leading to resentment in the local population. An assessment of the $1.36 billion spent in the Afghan year1384 revealed that the local impact was 31.2%.
Whatever the arguments, the limited efficacy of the aid delivered to Afghanistan so far is clearly visible on the ground. The conflict with the Taliban and the violence occupy the major portion of attention on Afghanistan and the more insidious violence gets much less notice. Though larger numbers of children enrolled in schools and health services improved in some parts of the country, the 2007 National Human Development Report revealed that human development indicators were lower than what was estimated at the time the reconstruction began.
Afghanistan’s HDI ranking was 174, only above the three lowest countries of Niger, Sierra Leone and Mali. The NHDR for 2007, the second since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, reveals a literacy rate of 23.5%, down from the 2004 assessment which put it at 28.7%. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared to 44.5 in the past. International aid still fell woefully short of requirements, while government revenues remained at a dismal 7% of the GDP. Disbursement of aid over 2002-2005 was $83 per capita, even though the Afghan government estimated at a minimum of $168 per capita was needed for minimal stablisation.
According to the latest National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population remains below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption and only 31% has access to safe drinking water. The rate of infant mortality has dropped from 165 per 1000 to 135 per 1000, but the maternal mortality ratio has remained unchanged at 1600 per 100,000 live births, one of the highest in the world.
The situation of women in Afghanistan remains one of the most dismal and the country has a Gender Development Index which ranks it alongside Niger. Despite the removal of the Taliban who were seen as one of the most important reasons for oppression of women, the situation of women has improved only tangentially. Though the country has one of the highest number of women parliamentarians thanks to reservation of seats in the first parliamentary elections, the women parliamentarians are severely disempowered to exercise their roles. There are few women in public service and even fewer in high office. Women’s rights has remained more a token declaration with token representation in the form of one woman cabinet minister and one woman governor.
Violence against women continued in many horrific forms, most patently in the domestic sphere with considerable evidence of forced marriages including child marriages and domestic violence. The practice of suicides and self immolations by women desperate to escape their marriage received some public attention but apart from sporadic and isolated efforts there was little to signal the engagement of either the international community or the Afghan government on this issue. Those working in the area of gender rights continued their effort to reverse or mitigate the worst impacts of customary law and practice which treat women as property. The conflation of several trends – the customary practices, war, the displacement of populations, the return of refugees, the advent of the consumer culture and its commodification of women and the attempts to introduce a more liberal approach – sees an increasingly confrontational approach on the issue of women’s role, rights and participation in the public space.
The country recorded a high growth rate but the economic progress has been patchy and uneven, its inequality hidden behind a façade of glitzy malls in capital cities, new shops and businesses, palatial houses and plenty of hot money that prop up an artificial economy.
Much of the ostentatious wealth was attributed to the narco-economy. The year saw a record opium cultivation. With this Afghanistan, already the world’s single largest supplier of opium, also surpassed any other country in history to have produced opium on such a large scale. An increased acreage of 17% combined with good weather conditions forecasts an increase in opium production by 34%. There were continuing differences of opinion within the international community on the best counter narcotics strategy. At the level of implementation, actions continued to be carried out in selective areas to crackdown on opium farmers with very little enforcement on interdiction, or high value targets like drug traffickers.
Attention continued to be drawn to the linkages between criminals, drug traffickers, terrorists and anti-government elements but yielded little results with security operations continuing in a fractured manner- the US Coalition forces responsible for the war against terror, the NATO-led ISAF responsible for counter insurgency and the police entrusted to deal with counter narcotics. One southern district of Helmund alone accounting for an increase of 48% in opium cultivation.
Helmund proved to be a critical location in more ways than one. The Musa Qala district shot into the limelight following an ‘agreement’ for a ceasefire. The deal, ostensibly between the government authorities and the local tribal elders, resulted in NATO withdrawing its forces from the area in exchange for a guarantee of peace and no Taliban activities in a demarcated area. The agreement, sold as a new way of engaging the tribal community fell through soon however with the area becoming a safe haven for the Taliban. It was only pitched battles at the end of the year that resulted in the government forces supported by NATO’s British troops taking back control.
The need for engaging communities however was given some precedence this year in different forms. A peace jirga between tribal elders from the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan along with government officials and parliamentarians resulted in the first Pak-Afghan peace jirga taking discussions on violence and peace beyond the government to government talks. There were other attempts to engage the communities at the local and provincial level by international organisations as well as NGOs.
The concept of bringing the moderate Taliban back into the fold also gained momentum with renewed calls for holding negotiations. While no details of specific talks were made public, there was continuing anecdotal evidence of overtures between parts of the Taliban and anti government leaderships and the authorities at various levels.
Negotiations with the Taliban led to successful outcomes on atleast two occasions The ICRC mediated between the Taliban and Korean authorities for the release of the Korean hostages and the UN agencies successfully negotiated days of tranquillity that allowed them to carry out much needed vaccinations campaigns in difficult areas of the South after the Taliban assured them of safe passage.
While events on the ground did not provide a cheerful outlook in 2007, one of the most significant shifts was in the overall perception, especially of the international community, that efforts for aid, development and reconstruction needed to be oriented much more towards the Afghan community.
2008 will tell whether this realisation actually results in concrete results and greater cohesiveness of effort that will bring about substantial changes in the lives of Afghans. ‘Afghanisation’ of the process of helping Afghans in the seventh year of rebuilding their country will be a remarkable step forward.
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