A narrow vision returns meagre gains

India appears to have become hostage to its own rhetoric on Afghanistan

Times of India, April 17, 2010




Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Washington visit is being viewed as a having yielded some gains for Indian foreign policy, having secured an apparent endorsement of the Indian role in Afghanistan. The implication, both overt and covert, has been that India scored a win over Pakistan given the latter’s attempts to curtail India’s presence in the country. The perspective is not new. The success and failure of the Indian role and presence in Afghanistan since 2001 has been largely interpreted through the Indian ability to influence the international community on Pakistan. Bringing pressure on elements within Pakistan and the Pakistani establishment, which are supportive of insurgents with a totalitarian worldview is certainly a valid concern and gains have been made in this area.
However, by restricting its role and influence to this narrow interest, Indian foreign policy is losing sight of the bigger picture. The wider strategic interests of the international community that includes Western countries as well as regional players have been ignored as have crucial decisions impacting on the stability of Afghanistan. By focusing mainly on Pakistan, the Indian government scores brownie points domestically, but ignores the long-term interests of the region and India in particular.
Though differences between the US and India on Afghanistan is now acknowledged, a realisation of these differences remains limited to the difference of perception on how to deal with Pakistan. South Block has repeatedly stressed that India and the US share the same goal in Afghanistan, i.e. stability of the country. While it is difficult to fault such admirable ambitions, a more mature foreign policy position would require looking at the details of the ‘stability’ that has remained elusive in Afghanistan after nine years of a US-dominated policy. There is universal acknowledgement now that security in the country is at its worst since 2001 even as the Western countries are moving towards a disengagement of troops. Beyond a general commitment against terrorism, the US notion of ‘stability’ may look very different from that envisaged by India.
Unfortunately for India and the region, Indian policy in Afghanistan continues to be stuck in the past, relying on bilateralism, the historicity of Indo-Afghan friendship and the ‘feel good’ factor, rather than recognising new realities. Though there is plenty of goodwill for India, which is seen, rightly or wrongly, as a disinterested benefactor with no axe to grind, the Indian government appears to be either unwilling or unable to leverage this in the pursuit of larger strategic interests of both India and the region, ceding policy-making on stabilisation entirely to the western countries engaged in Afghanistan, particularly the US. The costs of this myopia are now becoming visible.
The Western troop surge and the accompanying civilian surge is directed towards an exit strategy — now being euphemistically termed the ‘transition’ strategy. This end goal is not without a cost, given the impatience to exit. In the pursuit of its core interests — which have been publicly and clearly defined as degradation of the capabilities of the al Qaeda and the supportive Taliban in order to prevent them from attacking the US, the Obama administration is supporting several steps in the area of security and stability that have
long-term implications for the region.
Since building Afghan national forces is painstaking and time-consuming, British and American forces are rearming tribal and community militias despite clear concerns that such a step, without clear and accountable chains of command and control will rebound with a vengeance. They are encouraging the rapid build-up of the Afghan army and police, a move that is also viewed by some experts as a dangerous acceleration that would erode institutional stability of the armed forces. The recent emphasis on reconciliation with the insurgent groups also has its genesis in the need to bring the ongoing conflict to a manageable level that would allow the Western troops to exit gracefully. Almost all the steps are designed for shortterm stability and may, in all likelihood, lead to long-term instability in Afghanistan and region.
So why are South Block’s astute mandarins and the political leadership in India still viewing their role in Afghanistan through rose-tinted glasses? Not only has India not engaged in decision making on these issues, it is completely absent from policy making on a spectrum of issues in Afghanistan. It directs its efforts in Afghanistan bilaterally on the grounds that it does not have a political agenda in Afghanistan, as if India’s neglect of multilateral strategising would make these multifarious interests disappear. Whilst projecting itself as a key regional player, India has also neglected its relationship with key players Russia and Iran who are crucial to Afghanistan’s and the region’s stability.
It is no wonder then that when decisions are taken by the Afghan government and the international community — on Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan or on making compromises with the Taliban — India finds itself out of the loop, unable to exercise its clout, its muscles having rusted from disuse.
Astute international diplomats are aware that little more is required to please the Indian establishment than the occasional rant against Pakistan, enough to keep the Indian government happy. Shrewd Afghan politicians are aware that rhetoric on the mutual goodwill and stroking the Indian establishment’s ego goes a long way, while real decisions are taken in consonance with the Afghan government’s Western allies.
Signs of the Indian establishment’s inability to comprehend Afghanistan’s enormous strategic interest are evident. Despite the presence of five consulates, the Indian embassy in Kabul has less than a handful of staff who can engage at the diplomatic level on the multilateral arena that is Afghanistan, falling far short of requirements in this complex and fast-changing environment. It is true that India will not be able to shape or influence all strategic decisions in Afghanistan given other overweening interests. The pity is that it is not even trying