Afghanistan: No solution in sight

Times of India, July 10

The arrival of General David Petraeus in Kabul and the commotion of General Stanley Mc-Chrystal losing his job caused quite a clatter internationally with speculation on whether the new General, who was actually the old General - both in seniority and in terms of the genesis of the COIN and 'surge' strategies - would retain the same policy. Chastened by his predecessor's fate, General Petraeus is going slow on exhibiting his individuality.

What attracted less attention, except from the most assiduous of Afghanistan watchers were the swift changes executed by President Hamid Karzai in the security sector, through a series of appointments that consolidate his hold in key positions. They include the shifting of the powerful General Bismillah Khan to the Ministry of Interior, a new deputy minister in the Ministry of Defence, a new chief of staff of the army, and a new head of the National Security Directorate, the country's intelligence agency.

The local media interpreted them as signs of a greater role for Pashtuns in the security apparatus as well as paving the way for reconciliation with insurgent groups including the Taliban and the Haqqani faction. However the appointments also reflect something wider - a shift in the centre of gravity over the past few months, away from the international compact on rebuilding of the Afghan state and government towards more localised interests , both within Afghanistan and the region.

While the US still dominates in Afghanistan with the sheer size of the military and economic resources that it brings, its leverage has become more fragmented with no clarity of direction. Over the past year US engagement in Afghanistan has been fraught with tensions, as much between Karzai and the Obama administrations as within the Obama administration itself, most clearly visible here in Kabul in the wide divergence between the top military and civilian representatives in Kabul - General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. The reason perhaps, is not, as is often suggested, that Obama can't get it right, but just that his administration's attention is engaged elsewhere.

If Iraq was the distraction during the Bush era, it is domestic issues that absorb a great deal of the new president's energy and focus. In so far as Afghanistan factors into this, it is largely through a preoccupation with how quickly and how neatly the US will be able to exit Afghanistan.

While differences in the American agenda display themselves as dissonances in policy, the Afghan establishment is also working at multiple levels, but in an effort to position itself for multiple realities. These include keeping a working relationship with the international community to maintain a stream of economic and military support, overtures to the Taliban, enhanced political engagement with Pakistan, pacification of India, Iran and the Russia and most important of all, a way of consolidating its own hold on power. How the insurgency grows in the future, how much leverage Pakistan can assert and how quickly the international community wants to exit will be amongst the main factors determining which of these overtures by the Karzai government strengthens or weakens in the future.

The recent peace jirga is an illustrative example of how a single event can work at various levels. On the one hand it fed into the international community's concerns of increasing chaos by projecting reconciliation as a magic panacea, a way out of the morass; to those of the insurgents willing to bite, it held out the prospect of joining the establishment; those fearful of the return of the Taliban were assured by the various and ambiguous caveats limiting insurgent participation that are open to widely varied interpretation. The jirga assured Pakistan of its significance in an eventual political solution and reassured India that a government led by Karzai would not go too far. In concrete terms it also provided the initiation of a 'project' that could attract more donor funding - a new cash cow just when the international community was beginning to ask questions about other sectors it has been funding.

The forthcoming Kabul Conference promises to be yet another such beast. The Afghan government's priorities, which were set in 2006, refined in 2008 and reviewed in London in 2010, are now expected to be reworked in July 2010. Like the proverbial elephant in a room full of blind men, the conference may well end with each taking from it a suitable conclusion. In fact, in the current international mindset which equates a 'full calendar of events' with actual progress, not much needs to happen anyway, apart from the mere holding of the conference.

The acute concentration of attention on new, bright and shining events belies what lies beneath its shadows: increasing despair, impoverishment and estrangement of ordinary Afghans from the process of governance. The poorest segment - one third of all Afghans - do not meet their dietary requirements are getting squeezed further , being forced to sell income-generating assets as the humanitarian crisis deepens. Significant numbers of those entrusted with leadership in the task of rebuilding the Afghan state are those who have private economic interests that benefit directly from continuation of the conflict.

The growth of intolerant ideologies is pushing women back into their homes, obstructing their movement and encouraging violence against them through impunity. Ethnic minorities have started expressing their concerns about marginalisation. Political movements and the process of democratisation are being deliberately weakened. Rule of law and justice are being seen as an expendable luxury in the quest for 'stability'. Meanwhile the support for the Taliban continues to grow, albeit less rapidly than the Taliban itself.

The Taliban now operate in all 34 provinces and have shadow governments in 33 provinces of Afghanistan. Their growing capabilities and the increasing violence in Afghanistan are well-documented. Until now an overwhelming majority of the Afghan people continue to put their faith in the government and the institutions of state. But this trend is changing. People are increasingly turning away to non-state actors in search for help. Less noticeable than the shift of gravity within the political class, the centre of gravity within the Afghan population is also moving.