Women Cook Up Restaurants in Shaky Kabul
Run Date: 12/18/07
The capital of Afghanistan is a tough place to start and run a restaurant but a handful of foreign women are doing just that. For one, Kabul is the latest in a series of post-conflict cities where she has catered to the nomadic "U.N. crowd."
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--For restaurateurs, the unnerving routine of rocket attacks and suicide bombings in Afghanistan's capital city means that business often depends on that week's security advisory.
Saska Galic, for instance, has just thrown out all the duck in her freezer. The customers just didn't show.
But the 51-year-old Croatian shrugs it off, saying she isn't looking to make an enormous profit. "I just like to make people happy."
Kabul is relatively stable compared to other parts of Afghanistan, boasting amenities such as health care, education, transportation, entertainment and even the semblance of a functioning government.
A hungry crowd of ex-pats meanwhile has fueled an explosion of restaurants serving cuisines from all over the world: Italian, Lebanese, Chinese, Indian, French, Mexican, German, Filipino, Korean, Azerbaijani, even Tex-Mex. Now about several dozen restaurants are serving meals and each month sees the opening of yet another.
But it's not an easy place to run a restaurant.
Hamid Karzai's government struggles with a variety of factions displaced by the power restructuring six years ago, from a resurgent Taliban to resurgent warlords. And the city still has plenty of war scars. Streets are potholed. Electricity often dips to two hours every fourth day, disrupting refrigeration. Most food is imported.
To attract foreigners, entrepreneurs must meet United Nations security specifications that turn a business into a small fortress, with armed guards at the doors and coils of barbed wire in the yards.
Add the counter-cultural aspect of women in authority in Afghanistan and foreign women owning and running restaurants seems like a recipe for disaster.
But in a sector dominated by men Galic and a handful of others are nonetheless participating in the small boom that is one of the few signs of private enterprise daring the city's business and political risks.
Following the Chaos
For Lalitha Thongngamkam, Kabul's chaos is a prerequisite.
Thongngamkam, a Thai in her 50s, has followed the "U.N. crowd" from one war-torn country to the next, exploiting a frontier niche. Before Kabul there was Kosovo. Before that Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda and East Timor.
In each place she operated a restaurant for as long as the aid workers lasted. When the political situation settles down the competition picks up, the international community moves on and she follows suit.
In 2003 when she set up her restaurant, Lai Thai, it was the only high-security restaurant catering to Kabul's foreign influx. Soaked in the fragrance of lemon grass and coconut milk, it was an ideal oasis, a perfect sliver of all that the city was not. Tables had to be reserved.
Business is slower now. But she hopes a place she just opened this week inside the NATO military headquarters and another opened inside a second NATO compound in May 2005 will make up for it.
Galic's restaurant, Zadar, is named after her hometown. Behind high walls and armed guards, outdoor tables sprawl over a lawn and tables covered in white linen and Croatian dishware sit inside. Along with food she doles out equal portions of advice about what to eat and what not to order because it isn't of the best quality that day.
Cooking on Her Own
Galic, who came to Kabul four years ago for a better paying job in telecommunications so her daughter could enroll in the Royal College of Music in London, opened the restaurant in 2004 and built it up entirely on her own. She still works at the telecom company in the morning, then heads to the restaurant from four to midnight to serve her evening customers.
She says her restaurant draws a loyal base of customers, but she is just managing to survive and is not in it for the money.
"I have always cooked as a wife and mother and I like to cook," says the mother of two grown children. "I like to make people happy."
Last year Gay Le Clerc helped open the Kabul Coffee House, a colorful, cozy place open from morning into late evening that seats about 40 and combines a breakfast menu with Mexican fast food.
Le Clerc and her Afghan husband had run a cafe in Reno, Nev., but when they moved to Kabul in 2002, another wasn't on the agenda. Hoping to rebuild the country, they worked on projects ranging from helping women develop businesses to restoring local government.
But when Le Clerc's friend Deborah Rodriguez, author of "Kabul Beauty School," suggested they open a coffee house together, she felt it was a good idea that could provide two things missing in the city: good coffee and a comfortable place for women to be.
Published this year, Rodriguez's bestselling book stirred controversy. She was accused of making money off the girls who worked in her hair salon and endangering their lives. Her new wealth also posed a threat to her, and she left the country soon after returning from a book promotion tour in the United States. Since then Le Clerc has been sole owner of the coffee house.
Focal Point for Internationals
Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, a development consultant, calls it her regular hangout. "They have Internet and great coffee and nobody bothers you . . . It's kind of a focal point for the aid community and you can chill out alone but also run into people you need to meet."
Le Clerc, in her mid-50s, imports all her coffee from Dubai, where she makes frequent stocking-up visits. "I can't get a good supply of fresh milk here so I am forced to concede and use packaged milk with the coffee," she says.
On a brighter note, she says the business is not as heavily taxed or regulated as in the United States. But there are gunmen; former groups of militia yet to be disarmed who occasionally shake owners down. "Businesses can experience unregulated tax-collection efforts," she says.
Sometimes the unwanted visits are from officials.
Alcohol is banned by the Afghan constitution but restaurants can apply for a license to serve it to foreigners. The legal gray area can cause police officials to raid restaurants on the pretext that Afghans are being served.
Britta Petersen is the German co-owner of Sufi, which serves traditional Afghan fare of kebabs, rice pilaf, tender lamb, steamed dumplings and lentils.
She recounts how a local commander strolled in every other night to eat with his guards, expecting a free meal on the grounds that he was a local commander.
Instead of confronting him she says her Afghan staff handled it in a traditional way. They invited him for a meal and established a relationship. After that, the commander came less frequently and was less demanding when he did.
To start the restaurant in 2004 Petersen, who is 41, and her business partner, Sultan Karimi, an Afghan German, scoured the markets of Kabul for traditional woodwork and textiles.
They say it was difficult finding Afghan cooks after decades of war and displacement. People had moved around, recipes were lost and ingredients disappeared from the market. But they did manage to find an older cook who knew the secrets.
Petersen, who is also a media consultant, moved to Delhi last year but comes back every few months to check on things.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 17 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
April 05, 2008
Killing fields of Wakhan
Killing fields of Wakhan
The Hindu/December 2, 2007
Because of the inhospitable terrain, the people of Wakhan, Afghanistan, lack access to medical care. So, while poppy cultivation is on the decline, addiction is on the rise.
Amidst growing concern over the record levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, the province of Badakshan provided some good news this year. Contrary to the general trend, the province was one of those showing a drastic decline — 72 per cent in one year. And up in the remote mountainous region of the province, however, Mubarak Kadam spent the festival of Id in an opium de-addiction clinic in Khandud village in the province’s Wakhan corridor.
Kadam is 49 years old but looks more like 60. A teacher at the local high school where he has been employed for 12 years, Kadam is now trying to cure an opium habit of 20 years. Until his family forced him into the clinic, he spent 100 Afghani everyday on teryak, as opium is called here, selling his sheep and wheat to feed the habit.
Kadam still has his job to return to. Mohammad Zayar is not so lucky. The 50-year-old farmer lost all his land to his habit, forcing his sons to go out to work as cattle traders. The close family unit which lived together off the land fell apart. Zayar realised he was losing his family and entered the de-addiction programme.
Root cause
Opium grown in Badakshan and elsewhere in Afghanistan feeds heroin addiction on the streets of London and NewYork, where youngsters fuel their desire for excitement with heroin and cocaine. Here in remote Badakshan, neither Zayar nor Kadam were using opium for recreational purposes. The single biggest reason for opium addiction in the isolated area of the Wakhan is the lack of access to medical care.
Located in the eastern region of the country, Badakshan’s rugged terrain and inhospitable geography ensured that it was the only province where the Taliban could not enter. It is also the reason for its isolation and economic deprivation.
On the province’s eastern extremity is the Wakhan, a slender corridor of Afghan land separating Tajikistan from Pakistan, and the source of the mighty Amu Darya, or Oxus as it was named by the Bactrians. The Karakoram, Pamir and Hindukush ranges come together here.
Astoundingly beautiful, the Wakhan, all of which is above 2,500 metres altitude with valleys of 3,500 metres and bordered by mountains 7,000 metres high on the South, is even more inaccessible and economically deprived. A flourishing trade corridor on the silk route in earlier times, the area is today isolated and marginalised. International borders have been sealed off due to the war, cutting off access to the closest points of goods and services.
Not a viable crop
One of the reasons for the decrease in poppy cultivation in the province this year was the drastic decline in poppy prices, says the Counter Narcotics chief of Badakshan, Abdul Jamel Hadafmand. Poppy cultivation in Badakshan was simply not competitive, says Hadafmand, compared to other areas with better connections. Strict policing on the borders also led to the drop in poppy growth. Tajikistan for example, has such strict enforcement that it does not allow even medicines through some of the border crossings, a cost that is paid by the people of Wakhan. The farm gate price of dry opium in Badakshan and two adjoining provinces was the lowest in Afghanistan this year, having fallen by 31 per cent in one year.
In the lower Wakhan, inhabited by the Wakhi people, the economy is agro-pastoral. But crop yields are low and few vegetables grow in the stony, arid terrain, forcing the province to import most of its basic goods and vegetables. In the higher regions, inhabited by the Kyrghyz community, the economy is completely dependant on livestock which graze on the high altitude pastures of the Pamirs.
The nearest petrol station in the Wakhan is at the mouth of the Wakhan in Ishqasim. Summer is a short few months between June and September and the severe cold and heavy snow makes most of the Wakhan inaccessible during the long winter. There are few motorable roads and most areas are accessed on foot or using donkeys, mules, camels and yaks.
Medical services have been scarce in this inhospitable terrain. Doctors from the plains are reluctant to be posted to this isolated area, even at higher salaries. Medicines have to be brought via the provincial capital of Faizabad, a two-day drive away and villagers may have to travel hours, if not days, on foot to receive medical attention.
“Providing healthcare is not just a small job for the health provider if the support of other sectors is not there” says Dr. Abdul Momin Jalaly, the Director of Health Services in Badakshan. It has to be an integrated effort here, Jalaly says, pointing out that even to reach the services roads are needed while implementation needs initiatives to reduce poverty and malnutrition.
In this situation opium works as an easily available analgesic, as it did for Kadam and Zayar, both of whom started the habit to relieve themselves of pain. The acceptability of the practice also widened its use, and locals would take it not just for extreme pain but to counter the stress of the daily struggle.
In the de-addiction centre in Khandud, Nigar, a 35-year-old woman, says she has been taking opium for 25 years. “I do very hard work,” she says when asked how she started her habit. Nigar was sent there by her husband, who got himself cured at the clinic.
The livestock that Kadam and Zayar lost to the habit is not unusual. The plentiful livestock are an attraction for traders from the lower regions who travel to the area bringing basic goods. Opium is carried from the lower poppy producing regions into the mountainous regions where it can be exchanged for a large number of cattle once a farmer is addicted. Local addiction also helps smugglers seeking to use the route to take out the opium into Tajikistan and Pakistan.
Habib Jalali, the manager of the Aga Khan de-addiction clinic in Khandud which is named “Omid” (Hope), says they work with local shouras to try and stop traders from selling opium. Initially located in the Futur village, the clinic treated 500 addicts before moving further up the Wakhan to target another stretch of population. With one doctor and three nurses, the clinic relies on medicine, social counselling, community pressure and religious leadership to try and curb the habit. Addicts typically spend 12-15 days at the clinic where they are provided tranquilisers and analgesics, good food and take part in group activities including music and sports.
The provincial public health Director Abdul Momin Jalaly mentions unemployment as a major reason for the addiction. Agricultural land is scarce and other employment opportunities almost non existent. Poppy cultivation has decreased but addiction may be increasing, he warns.
In Kabul there are other fears. The UNODC has emphasised that it is especially important to achieve zero opium cultivation in the provinces of Nangarhar and Badakshan (both in eastern Afghanistan) in order to confine the opium problem totally to the southern insurgency infested areas. The UNODC’s chief warned earlier of the risk of some provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation. In Badakshan the lack of alternative livelihoods is a very real danger for the backsliding. It is also a very real danger for increase in addiction.
The Hindu/December 2, 2007
Because of the inhospitable terrain, the people of Wakhan, Afghanistan, lack access to medical care. So, while poppy cultivation is on the decline, addiction is on the rise.
Amidst growing concern over the record levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, the province of Badakshan provided some good news this year. Contrary to the general trend, the province was one of those showing a drastic decline — 72 per cent in one year. And up in the remote mountainous region of the province, however, Mubarak Kadam spent the festival of Id in an opium de-addiction clinic in Khandud village in the province’s Wakhan corridor.
Kadam is 49 years old but looks more like 60. A teacher at the local high school where he has been employed for 12 years, Kadam is now trying to cure an opium habit of 20 years. Until his family forced him into the clinic, he spent 100 Afghani everyday on teryak, as opium is called here, selling his sheep and wheat to feed the habit.
Kadam still has his job to return to. Mohammad Zayar is not so lucky. The 50-year-old farmer lost all his land to his habit, forcing his sons to go out to work as cattle traders. The close family unit which lived together off the land fell apart. Zayar realised he was losing his family and entered the de-addiction programme.
Root cause
Opium grown in Badakshan and elsewhere in Afghanistan feeds heroin addiction on the streets of London and NewYork, where youngsters fuel their desire for excitement with heroin and cocaine. Here in remote Badakshan, neither Zayar nor Kadam were using opium for recreational purposes. The single biggest reason for opium addiction in the isolated area of the Wakhan is the lack of access to medical care.
Located in the eastern region of the country, Badakshan’s rugged terrain and inhospitable geography ensured that it was the only province where the Taliban could not enter. It is also the reason for its isolation and economic deprivation.
On the province’s eastern extremity is the Wakhan, a slender corridor of Afghan land separating Tajikistan from Pakistan, and the source of the mighty Amu Darya, or Oxus as it was named by the Bactrians. The Karakoram, Pamir and Hindukush ranges come together here.
Astoundingly beautiful, the Wakhan, all of which is above 2,500 metres altitude with valleys of 3,500 metres and bordered by mountains 7,000 metres high on the South, is even more inaccessible and economically deprived. A flourishing trade corridor on the silk route in earlier times, the area is today isolated and marginalised. International borders have been sealed off due to the war, cutting off access to the closest points of goods and services.
Not a viable crop
One of the reasons for the decrease in poppy cultivation in the province this year was the drastic decline in poppy prices, says the Counter Narcotics chief of Badakshan, Abdul Jamel Hadafmand. Poppy cultivation in Badakshan was simply not competitive, says Hadafmand, compared to other areas with better connections. Strict policing on the borders also led to the drop in poppy growth. Tajikistan for example, has such strict enforcement that it does not allow even medicines through some of the border crossings, a cost that is paid by the people of Wakhan. The farm gate price of dry opium in Badakshan and two adjoining provinces was the lowest in Afghanistan this year, having fallen by 31 per cent in one year.
In the lower Wakhan, inhabited by the Wakhi people, the economy is agro-pastoral. But crop yields are low and few vegetables grow in the stony, arid terrain, forcing the province to import most of its basic goods and vegetables. In the higher regions, inhabited by the Kyrghyz community, the economy is completely dependant on livestock which graze on the high altitude pastures of the Pamirs.
The nearest petrol station in the Wakhan is at the mouth of the Wakhan in Ishqasim. Summer is a short few months between June and September and the severe cold and heavy snow makes most of the Wakhan inaccessible during the long winter. There are few motorable roads and most areas are accessed on foot or using donkeys, mules, camels and yaks.
Medical services have been scarce in this inhospitable terrain. Doctors from the plains are reluctant to be posted to this isolated area, even at higher salaries. Medicines have to be brought via the provincial capital of Faizabad, a two-day drive away and villagers may have to travel hours, if not days, on foot to receive medical attention.
“Providing healthcare is not just a small job for the health provider if the support of other sectors is not there” says Dr. Abdul Momin Jalaly, the Director of Health Services in Badakshan. It has to be an integrated effort here, Jalaly says, pointing out that even to reach the services roads are needed while implementation needs initiatives to reduce poverty and malnutrition.
In this situation opium works as an easily available analgesic, as it did for Kadam and Zayar, both of whom started the habit to relieve themselves of pain. The acceptability of the practice also widened its use, and locals would take it not just for extreme pain but to counter the stress of the daily struggle.
In the de-addiction centre in Khandud, Nigar, a 35-year-old woman, says she has been taking opium for 25 years. “I do very hard work,” she says when asked how she started her habit. Nigar was sent there by her husband, who got himself cured at the clinic.
The livestock that Kadam and Zayar lost to the habit is not unusual. The plentiful livestock are an attraction for traders from the lower regions who travel to the area bringing basic goods. Opium is carried from the lower poppy producing regions into the mountainous regions where it can be exchanged for a large number of cattle once a farmer is addicted. Local addiction also helps smugglers seeking to use the route to take out the opium into Tajikistan and Pakistan.
Habib Jalali, the manager of the Aga Khan de-addiction clinic in Khandud which is named “Omid” (Hope), says they work with local shouras to try and stop traders from selling opium. Initially located in the Futur village, the clinic treated 500 addicts before moving further up the Wakhan to target another stretch of population. With one doctor and three nurses, the clinic relies on medicine, social counselling, community pressure and religious leadership to try and curb the habit. Addicts typically spend 12-15 days at the clinic where they are provided tranquilisers and analgesics, good food and take part in group activities including music and sports.
The provincial public health Director Abdul Momin Jalaly mentions unemployment as a major reason for the addiction. Agricultural land is scarce and other employment opportunities almost non existent. Poppy cultivation has decreased but addiction may be increasing, he warns.
In Kabul there are other fears. The UNODC has emphasised that it is especially important to achieve zero opium cultivation in the provinces of Nangarhar and Badakshan (both in eastern Afghanistan) in order to confine the opium problem totally to the southern insurgency infested areas. The UNODC’s chief warned earlier of the risk of some provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation. In Badakshan the lack of alternative livelihoods is a very real danger for the backsliding. It is also a very real danger for increase in addiction.
Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN
Himal December 2007
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN
The long shadow
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN
The long shadow
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.
Nobody guarding Afghanistan's guards
Nobody guarding Afghanistan's guards
Nov 21, 2007 Asia Times
KABUL - The Afghan government and its international partners are struggling to bolster the country's security forces, fighting the twin problems of boosting the numbers of the national army and trying to disband illegal armed groups.
Yet, an unmonitored, unregulated and unauthorized force is on the streets, not just under the noses of authorities but also hired and legitimized by those working on building the security sector.
As many as 28,000 armed personnel are hired by private security
companies (PSCs), which have been operating as a lucrative business in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion to oust the Taliban in 2001, providing protection to foreigners and elite Afghans, guarding institutions, homes and individuals.
The number of armed contractors is more than half the Afghan National Army, which is estimated at between 35,000 to 50,000, and could be larger if the numbers of "irregular" forces are added to the ranks of legal contractors.
As a report on private security companies released recently by Swiss Peace points out, part of the problem of estimating the numbers of armed personnel of the PSCs is that in the absence of regulations there is little to distinguish between a professional firm that is in the business of providing security from a ragtag bunch of former militiamen who should have been demobilized but who have merely turned into hired guns.
Though at least eight PSCs have been closed down in the past few weeks, and the government is currently finalizing a regulatory framework for PSCs, six years of unfettered freedom to do as they please may make it difficult to bring the PSCs under control, and to implement the regulatory framework, especially one as complex as the one being drafted.
As he travels to work every day, Ahmed sees dozens of armed men. They hurry him on as he passes high walls of reinforced cement bags, stop him for questioning and block his entry not just into offices and houses but also roads where they have set up barricades - usually with a mixture of arrogance and rude behavior.
Ahmed's fault is that he is an ordinary Afghan, without arms, money or a large motorcar, (usually a sports utility vehicle), the three ingredients that constitute the password separating those who are protected from those who constitute the "threat".
Six years into nation-building, Afghans are very much second-class citizens in their own capital city, considered a potential threat unless proven otherwise, as the international community keeps its safe distance from the citizens of the country it is rebuilding. This makes the PSCs indispensable and has in part been responsible for the fact that despite considerable money and expense poured into the justice sector, they fall into the blind spot, neither disarmed as illegal armed groups, nor recognized as a licensed business bound by strict guidelines on the hiring of personnel, use of arms and a code of conduct.
Naeem, a resident of Kabul who works with an international non-governmental agency, sees little difference between the armed personnel of security companies he encounters every day and the fighters of earlier years. "They are the people who fought for money earlier," he said. "Now with their guns they enrolled in private companies to make money. They still think they rule. They cannot show their power towards foreigners so they show it towards Afghans. Their attitude is: if you are an Afghan we decide for you."
Brashness and an aggressive policing style apart, the lack of regulation presents a very real danger, and "contributes to a blurring among international PSCs and international military actors; international PSC staff and the international civilian community; local PSCs and illegal armed groups," said the Swiss Peace report.
The report, the first of its kind, which looks at both Angola and Afghanistan, argues that the lack of a regulatory framework creates distrust due to a lack of transparency, a sense of insecurity due to a perceived heavily armed presence of PSCs, distrust due to "bad" or criminal behavior and human-rights abuses by PSC staff, loss of trust in the state and its monopoly of the use of force.
On the positive side, its notes that the groups provide employment opportunities, especially for former militia fighters and demobilized soldiers.
Susanne Schmeidl, who co-authored the report, said there is no known account of the PSCs being used for active combat duties in Afghanistan. However, she pointed out that they are used for providing security to military compounds which may involve them in combat duties. Unauthorized though they are, they are also used extensively for training the army and police, poppy eradication and interrogation.
Schmeidl said that during her research she found a lot of "pushing of responsibility". She feels the international community has a responsibility since it is trying to build a legal state. "On the one hand you are trying to build a strong legal state and then you refuse to comply when the state tries to exert its power. On the one hand you are building it and on the other hand you are undermining it," she said describing the situation as "problematic".
Khaled, who works with a private business which doesn't use security firms, feels the larger than life presence of the private security companies means "the government's power is shown as being weak, making the ambit of the government's security forces smaller". Though he sees the private companies as a necessity, he feels they should be brought under government control. "Afghanistan is full of guns," he said, "and to do business you need guns too."
Zabi, his colleague, feels the companies provide employment for some but said there is anecdotal evidence of their criminality.
Schmeidl said some of the behavior of the use of private security resembles that of the mafia. Locals she interviewed complained that some contractors would go into an area, find the bad man or the strongman and pay him. Humayun, a student of Kabul University, feels they the PSCs should be regulated, registered and with an accounted numbers of arms and weapons, unlike now when "they are doing whatever they want".
A big question that remains is who will bell the cat. Current draft legislation suggests for example that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) would have to certify the clean criminal records of PSC Afghan staff. In the absence of criminal records in the country and the lack of capacity of the AIHRC that will prove impossible. Introducing legislation that cannot be implemented, as in Angola, the report points out, would defeat its purpose.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Nov 21, 2007 Asia Times
KABUL - The Afghan government and its international partners are struggling to bolster the country's security forces, fighting the twin problems of boosting the numbers of the national army and trying to disband illegal armed groups.
Yet, an unmonitored, unregulated and unauthorized force is on the streets, not just under the noses of authorities but also hired and legitimized by those working on building the security sector.
As many as 28,000 armed personnel are hired by private security
companies (PSCs), which have been operating as a lucrative business in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion to oust the Taliban in 2001, providing protection to foreigners and elite Afghans, guarding institutions, homes and individuals.
The number of armed contractors is more than half the Afghan National Army, which is estimated at between 35,000 to 50,000, and could be larger if the numbers of "irregular" forces are added to the ranks of legal contractors.
As a report on private security companies released recently by Swiss Peace points out, part of the problem of estimating the numbers of armed personnel of the PSCs is that in the absence of regulations there is little to distinguish between a professional firm that is in the business of providing security from a ragtag bunch of former militiamen who should have been demobilized but who have merely turned into hired guns.
Though at least eight PSCs have been closed down in the past few weeks, and the government is currently finalizing a regulatory framework for PSCs, six years of unfettered freedom to do as they please may make it difficult to bring the PSCs under control, and to implement the regulatory framework, especially one as complex as the one being drafted.
As he travels to work every day, Ahmed sees dozens of armed men. They hurry him on as he passes high walls of reinforced cement bags, stop him for questioning and block his entry not just into offices and houses but also roads where they have set up barricades - usually with a mixture of arrogance and rude behavior.
Ahmed's fault is that he is an ordinary Afghan, without arms, money or a large motorcar, (usually a sports utility vehicle), the three ingredients that constitute the password separating those who are protected from those who constitute the "threat".
Six years into nation-building, Afghans are very much second-class citizens in their own capital city, considered a potential threat unless proven otherwise, as the international community keeps its safe distance from the citizens of the country it is rebuilding. This makes the PSCs indispensable and has in part been responsible for the fact that despite considerable money and expense poured into the justice sector, they fall into the blind spot, neither disarmed as illegal armed groups, nor recognized as a licensed business bound by strict guidelines on the hiring of personnel, use of arms and a code of conduct.
Naeem, a resident of Kabul who works with an international non-governmental agency, sees little difference between the armed personnel of security companies he encounters every day and the fighters of earlier years. "They are the people who fought for money earlier," he said. "Now with their guns they enrolled in private companies to make money. They still think they rule. They cannot show their power towards foreigners so they show it towards Afghans. Their attitude is: if you are an Afghan we decide for you."
Brashness and an aggressive policing style apart, the lack of regulation presents a very real danger, and "contributes to a blurring among international PSCs and international military actors; international PSC staff and the international civilian community; local PSCs and illegal armed groups," said the Swiss Peace report.
The report, the first of its kind, which looks at both Angola and Afghanistan, argues that the lack of a regulatory framework creates distrust due to a lack of transparency, a sense of insecurity due to a perceived heavily armed presence of PSCs, distrust due to "bad" or criminal behavior and human-rights abuses by PSC staff, loss of trust in the state and its monopoly of the use of force.
On the positive side, its notes that the groups provide employment opportunities, especially for former militia fighters and demobilized soldiers.
Susanne Schmeidl, who co-authored the report, said there is no known account of the PSCs being used for active combat duties in Afghanistan. However, she pointed out that they are used for providing security to military compounds which may involve them in combat duties. Unauthorized though they are, they are also used extensively for training the army and police, poppy eradication and interrogation.
Schmeidl said that during her research she found a lot of "pushing of responsibility". She feels the international community has a responsibility since it is trying to build a legal state. "On the one hand you are trying to build a strong legal state and then you refuse to comply when the state tries to exert its power. On the one hand you are building it and on the other hand you are undermining it," she said describing the situation as "problematic".
Khaled, who works with a private business which doesn't use security firms, feels the larger than life presence of the private security companies means "the government's power is shown as being weak, making the ambit of the government's security forces smaller". Though he sees the private companies as a necessity, he feels they should be brought under government control. "Afghanistan is full of guns," he said, "and to do business you need guns too."
Zabi, his colleague, feels the companies provide employment for some but said there is anecdotal evidence of their criminality.
Schmeidl said some of the behavior of the use of private security resembles that of the mafia. Locals she interviewed complained that some contractors would go into an area, find the bad man or the strongman and pay him. Humayun, a student of Kabul University, feels they the PSCs should be regulated, registered and with an accounted numbers of arms and weapons, unlike now when "they are doing whatever they want".
A big question that remains is who will bell the cat. Current draft legislation suggests for example that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) would have to certify the clean criminal records of PSC Afghan staff. In the absence of criminal records in the country and the lack of capacity of the AIHRC that will prove impossible. Introducing legislation that cannot be implemented, as in Angola, the report points out, would defeat its purpose.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
‘Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
‘Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
NRC Handelsblad/29 November 2007
Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
Het kabinet moest lang nadenken over verlenging van de militaire missie in Uruzgan. In Afghanistan zelf zijn de Nederlanders glashelder: de troepen moeten blijven.
Door Aunohita Mojumdar
Kabul, 29 nov. Voor Anja de Beer is het geen punt van discussie. De Nederlandse militairen moeten in Afghanistan blijven, vindt de directeur van Acbar in Kabul, coördinator van niet-gouvernementele hulp aan het land. „Als ze vertrekken, stort alles waarschijnlijk in.”
De Beer werkt nu zevenenhalf jaar in het land en constateert bitter weinig vooruitgang. De militaire activiteiten doorkruisen die van de hulpverleners soms. Dat de NAVO elke Afghaan eerder als potentiële vijand ziet dan als potentiële vriend, heeft de hulpverleners volgens De Beer krediet gekost, evenals het grote aantal burgerslachtoffers door militaire operaties. Maar de hulpgemeenschap zou nog minder hebben bereikt, denkt ze, zonder NAVO-troepen.
Nederland heeft ervoor gekozen troepen naar Uruzgan te sturen, stelt de Acbar-directeur vast, en „nu moeten ze volhouden.” Terugtrekking is volgens haar contraproductief. Militairen uit een ander NAVO-land doorgronden de omstandigheden niet zo goed als de Nederlanders, vindt ze. Het vertrek van de Nederlanders zou bovendien betekenen dat er minder geld voor hulp beschikbaar komt.
Ontwikkelingsconsultant Mary Munnik deelt die mening. Ze noemt zichzelf pacifist, maar acht de troepen hard nodig om de veiligheid in Afghanistan te garanderen. Tegelijk stelt ze vast dat de Nederlandse regering „de missie heeft onderschat”. Daardoor is er niets gebeurd op het gebied van ontwikkeling en is de veiligheid evenmin verbeterd. Op het platteland wacht de bevolking wanhopig op bescherming, zegt ze.
Munnik en De Beer verwoorden de opvattingen van de Nederlandse gemeenschap in Kabul. Nederland moet zijn troepen ook na augustus 2008 in Afghanistan houden, luidt het eensgezind. Wel verschillen de meningen over de prestaties van de Nederlandse missie, de noodzaak van een andere strategie en de aard van de verlenging.
Nesar Popal deelt de zorg over de continuïteit, die geschaad zou worden door wijziging van het militaire commando. Deze Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, werkzaam in het kantoor van de tweede vicepresident van Afghanistan, merkt op dat nieuwe troepen de ervaring met de lokale omstandigheden missen die de Nederlanders zich nu hebben verworven.
Ambassadeur Daan Everts, de speciale vertegenwoordiger van de secretaris-generaal van de NAVO in Afghanistan, is ook tegen een plotselinge aftocht van de Nederlandse troepen. Dat zou een „vernietigend psychologisch effect” hebben. Hoewel de Nederlanders wellicht „onevenredig zwaar” worden belast, vindt Everts dat Afghanistan „niet kan worden gestraft voor ruzies binnen het bondgenootschap.” Andere troepen kunnen naar Uruzgan komen, maar „de Nederlanders moeten de hoofdmacht blijven leveren.”
Everts noemt de situatie in Uruzgan ernstiger dan verwacht, maar dat kon volgens hem niet worden voorzien. Uruzgan was betrekkelijk rustig toen het besluit viel er troepen heen te sturen. Door uitbreiding van de militaire activiteiten naar het zuiden en zwaardere druk op aangrenzende provincies werden de Talibaan geprovoceerd, legt hij uit, „zodat ze actiever en zichtbaarder zijn geworden. Ze gingen Uruzgan als een van de veiligere gebieden beschouwen, waar ze zich konden schuilhouden en van waaruit ze konden opereren.”
Militair was het noodzakelijk in Uruzgan op te treden, vindt Everts. „We moeten daar zijn. Het is onderdeel van onze belofte Afghanistan weer op eigen benen te leren staan.” En die belofte was nodig omdat „dit terrorisme een bron van oneindige moeilijkheden is. Dit zijn regressieve, duistere krachten, die geen recht hebben op een veilige thuishaven.”
Een VN-functionaris die anoniem wil blijven, onderstreept dat de Nederlandse missie in Uruzgan vooral voor wederopbouw was bedoeld. Slechts elf bataljons (330 van de 1.600 militairen) bestaan uit gevechtstroepen, de rest is ondersteunend personeel. De Nederlanders werden volgens hem verrast door de wederopstanding van de Talibaan. Niettemin, zegt hij, is overdracht van het militaire commando ongewenst. Dit zou betekenen dat alles weer van het begin af aan moet worden opgebouwd, met alle problemen vandien.
Inzet van extra eenheden van het nationale leger is een van de beloften die de Afghaanse regering aan Nederland heeft gedaan om verlenging van de troepeninzet te vergemakkelijken. Nesar Popal gaat ervan uit Afghanistan 30.000 militairen extra naar de vier zuidelijke provincies stuurt, waaronder Uruzgan. Analisten hebben overigens twijfel aan hun inzetbaarheid. Desertie in onveilige situaties kwam in het verleden vaak voor.
Uruzgan is met afstand de armste van de instabiele zuidelijke provincies. De kindersterfte is er hoog, er gaan weinig kinderen naar school en maar heel weinig meisjes en vrouwen kunnen lezen en schrijven. De extreme armoede valt eerder te wijten aan aan decennia van verwaarlozing dan aan het beleid in de post-Talibaan-jaren. De Nederlandse troepen wilden er snel een aantal ontwikkelingsprojecten realiseren, maar dat lukte nauwelijks door de grote onveiligheid.
Kailash Muttreja, een Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, is een van de weinige ondernemers die een kantoor hebben geopend in Tarin Kowt, de hoofdstad van Uruzgan. Hij leidt Afghan Solar, een bedrijf dat het gebruik van alternatieve energiebronnen ontwikkelt in het energiearme Afghanistan. Hij had gezien welk goed werk de Nederlanders hadden verricht in de provincie Baghlan. Omdat ze ook naar Uruzgan kwamen, opende hij er een kantoor. Vandaag de dag is hij een teleurgesteld man. „Mijn kantoor krijgt opdrachten, maar niet van de Nederlanders. Hun bijdrage is nul komma nul.”
Muttreja voelde zich gemotiveerd om activiteiten in Uruzgan te ontplooien, toen de Nederlanders daarheen kwamen. Nu verwijt hij hun een gebrek aan visie. Wat hem betreft blijven ze alleen, „als ze ook echt iets gaan doen.”
NRC Handelsblad/29 November 2007
Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
Het kabinet moest lang nadenken over verlenging van de militaire missie in Uruzgan. In Afghanistan zelf zijn de Nederlanders glashelder: de troepen moeten blijven.
Door Aunohita Mojumdar
Kabul, 29 nov. Voor Anja de Beer is het geen punt van discussie. De Nederlandse militairen moeten in Afghanistan blijven, vindt de directeur van Acbar in Kabul, coördinator van niet-gouvernementele hulp aan het land. „Als ze vertrekken, stort alles waarschijnlijk in.”
De Beer werkt nu zevenenhalf jaar in het land en constateert bitter weinig vooruitgang. De militaire activiteiten doorkruisen die van de hulpverleners soms. Dat de NAVO elke Afghaan eerder als potentiële vijand ziet dan als potentiële vriend, heeft de hulpverleners volgens De Beer krediet gekost, evenals het grote aantal burgerslachtoffers door militaire operaties. Maar de hulpgemeenschap zou nog minder hebben bereikt, denkt ze, zonder NAVO-troepen.
Nederland heeft ervoor gekozen troepen naar Uruzgan te sturen, stelt de Acbar-directeur vast, en „nu moeten ze volhouden.” Terugtrekking is volgens haar contraproductief. Militairen uit een ander NAVO-land doorgronden de omstandigheden niet zo goed als de Nederlanders, vindt ze. Het vertrek van de Nederlanders zou bovendien betekenen dat er minder geld voor hulp beschikbaar komt.
Ontwikkelingsconsultant Mary Munnik deelt die mening. Ze noemt zichzelf pacifist, maar acht de troepen hard nodig om de veiligheid in Afghanistan te garanderen. Tegelijk stelt ze vast dat de Nederlandse regering „de missie heeft onderschat”. Daardoor is er niets gebeurd op het gebied van ontwikkeling en is de veiligheid evenmin verbeterd. Op het platteland wacht de bevolking wanhopig op bescherming, zegt ze.
Munnik en De Beer verwoorden de opvattingen van de Nederlandse gemeenschap in Kabul. Nederland moet zijn troepen ook na augustus 2008 in Afghanistan houden, luidt het eensgezind. Wel verschillen de meningen over de prestaties van de Nederlandse missie, de noodzaak van een andere strategie en de aard van de verlenging.
Nesar Popal deelt de zorg over de continuïteit, die geschaad zou worden door wijziging van het militaire commando. Deze Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, werkzaam in het kantoor van de tweede vicepresident van Afghanistan, merkt op dat nieuwe troepen de ervaring met de lokale omstandigheden missen die de Nederlanders zich nu hebben verworven.
Ambassadeur Daan Everts, de speciale vertegenwoordiger van de secretaris-generaal van de NAVO in Afghanistan, is ook tegen een plotselinge aftocht van de Nederlandse troepen. Dat zou een „vernietigend psychologisch effect” hebben. Hoewel de Nederlanders wellicht „onevenredig zwaar” worden belast, vindt Everts dat Afghanistan „niet kan worden gestraft voor ruzies binnen het bondgenootschap.” Andere troepen kunnen naar Uruzgan komen, maar „de Nederlanders moeten de hoofdmacht blijven leveren.”
Everts noemt de situatie in Uruzgan ernstiger dan verwacht, maar dat kon volgens hem niet worden voorzien. Uruzgan was betrekkelijk rustig toen het besluit viel er troepen heen te sturen. Door uitbreiding van de militaire activiteiten naar het zuiden en zwaardere druk op aangrenzende provincies werden de Talibaan geprovoceerd, legt hij uit, „zodat ze actiever en zichtbaarder zijn geworden. Ze gingen Uruzgan als een van de veiligere gebieden beschouwen, waar ze zich konden schuilhouden en van waaruit ze konden opereren.”
Militair was het noodzakelijk in Uruzgan op te treden, vindt Everts. „We moeten daar zijn. Het is onderdeel van onze belofte Afghanistan weer op eigen benen te leren staan.” En die belofte was nodig omdat „dit terrorisme een bron van oneindige moeilijkheden is. Dit zijn regressieve, duistere krachten, die geen recht hebben op een veilige thuishaven.”
Een VN-functionaris die anoniem wil blijven, onderstreept dat de Nederlandse missie in Uruzgan vooral voor wederopbouw was bedoeld. Slechts elf bataljons (330 van de 1.600 militairen) bestaan uit gevechtstroepen, de rest is ondersteunend personeel. De Nederlanders werden volgens hem verrast door de wederopstanding van de Talibaan. Niettemin, zegt hij, is overdracht van het militaire commando ongewenst. Dit zou betekenen dat alles weer van het begin af aan moet worden opgebouwd, met alle problemen vandien.
Inzet van extra eenheden van het nationale leger is een van de beloften die de Afghaanse regering aan Nederland heeft gedaan om verlenging van de troepeninzet te vergemakkelijken. Nesar Popal gaat ervan uit Afghanistan 30.000 militairen extra naar de vier zuidelijke provincies stuurt, waaronder Uruzgan. Analisten hebben overigens twijfel aan hun inzetbaarheid. Desertie in onveilige situaties kwam in het verleden vaak voor.
Uruzgan is met afstand de armste van de instabiele zuidelijke provincies. De kindersterfte is er hoog, er gaan weinig kinderen naar school en maar heel weinig meisjes en vrouwen kunnen lezen en schrijven. De extreme armoede valt eerder te wijten aan aan decennia van verwaarlozing dan aan het beleid in de post-Talibaan-jaren. De Nederlandse troepen wilden er snel een aantal ontwikkelingsprojecten realiseren, maar dat lukte nauwelijks door de grote onveiligheid.
Kailash Muttreja, een Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, is een van de weinige ondernemers die een kantoor hebben geopend in Tarin Kowt, de hoofdstad van Uruzgan. Hij leidt Afghan Solar, een bedrijf dat het gebruik van alternatieve energiebronnen ontwikkelt in het energiearme Afghanistan. Hij had gezien welk goed werk de Nederlanders hadden verricht in de provincie Baghlan. Omdat ze ook naar Uruzgan kwamen, opende hij er een kantoor. Vandaag de dag is hij een teleurgesteld man. „Mijn kantoor krijgt opdrachten, maar niet van de Nederlanders. Hun bijdrage is nul komma nul.”
Muttreja voelde zich gemotiveerd om activiteiten in Uruzgan te ontplooien, toen de Nederlanders daarheen kwamen. Nu verwijt hij hun een gebrek aan visie. Wat hem betreft blijven ze alleen, „als ze ook echt iets gaan doen.”
October 22, 2007
Afghanistan's Favored People
Aunohita Mojumdar
Little India
It was an interest in elephants that led Shanthini Dawson to Afghanistan, a country of high mountains and rugged terrain where most people don't know what an elephant looks like. But for Dawson, the trajectory was quite logical. Working on elephant ranges, which were expected to be "people-free," led to an awareness about the exclusionary aspects of environmental policy, which broadened into an interest in social development.
Vrinda Dar in Badakshan ProvinceThe rest was a natural progression. Even for Afghanistan, which attracts unusual people, Dawson stands apart. She applied for her job in Afghanistan because of her growing interest in Islamic populations sparked by her work amongst the Rohingas of the Rakhine state of Thailand (bordering the Chittagong area of India). Initially Dawson was to come to Afghanistan while the Taliban was still in power. 9/11 changed all that and Shanthini finally arrived in 2002. Unwilling to join the "UN circus" as she calls it, she opted to work in the field with Christian Aid in its community based programs before joining the Government of Afghanistan. Currently she works as an adviser to the Minister of Education, playing a critical role in shaping and implementing the national education strategy that has brought 5 million children into schools, one of the few major achievements of post Taliban reconstruction, an endeavor otherwise riddled with loopholes, missed opportunities, weak policy and poor implementation.
Even for Afghanistan which attracts unusual people, Shanthini dawson stands apartWhile Dawson is an international development specialist, her Indian identity underpins much of her work in Afghanistan. Though Western countries dominate the post conflict development paradigm in Afghanistan, both in the areas of policy and finances, Indian expertise is increasingly being valued. Because of the cultural similarity, shared history and economic milieu, regional experience enjoys a premium. Dawson brings the regional expertise "subconsciously" into her work, which has also taken her on frequent trips to India for tie ups with Indian institutions. "When technical assistance is from the region, people are able to accept it better," she says, touching on one of the most sensitive aspects of nation building in Afghanistan, the prickly hostility of Afghans to occupation and patronizing. Even amongst the regional countries, Indians are perhaps the most favored community. Afghans look upon India as a friend without ulterior motives, something they treasure as many of them feel that most of the international community has played a self-serving role in Afghanistan. This friendship is undoubtedly clinched by a hostility towards Pakistan, who Afghans blame for much of the recent violence in their country. Coupled with a craze for films and soap operas emanating from Bollywood, the love affair is passionate, even if it quite one-sided. For Indians residing in Afghanistan this warmth is palpable and makes for easy access to all corridors, from those of power to ordinary homes.
Pushpa Pathak with her Kabul Municipality colleaguesThe word "hind" opens doors, says Vrinda Dar, a community development specialist based in Kabul. Dar had a more than unusual reason for taking up a job in Afghanistan. She wanted to "settle down." An unsettling country to most, a job with a reputed international NGO seemed steady to Dar after a period of itinerant wanderings as a freelancer. That and the irresistible lure of a challenge of a lifetime. In Afghanistan, Dar works in community development projects, often traveling to rural areas, a space she finds more real and accepting than urban Kabul. Initially people are skeptical, but they warm up soon, Dar says. Married to an Italian, she experienced an outsider bias in small town Italy until people got to know her better and elected her to the community council.In Kabul her life is constrained by a plethora of restrictions that limit her movements and interactions so strictly that even her organization cannot be named. Expatriates working for international organizations are barred from walking on the streets, must undertake door to door travel under armed escort, are subject to night curfews and prohibited from using of public transport; many areas are simply out of bounds. Every fresh incident of violence brings further clampdowns. Dar's organization also bars visits to the homes of Afghans. The restrictions are even greater for women. If Indians are favored, women, in general, are not. War, displacement, extreme conservatism, overlaid with exposure to TV's pop culture of commodification of women and a liberalism movement has created a confused value system that has a strong streak of hostility toward women in public spaces. Whether it is women going to work, walking outside their homes or participating in public life, a visible minority is openly hostile, and most expat women live with some sense of discomfort if they venture out of protected spaces. Dar finds this accentuated in cities like Kabul, because "people here do not get to talk to you," unlike more intense community based interactions in rural areas. "I feel like I am in a cage" says Dar, adding that the need for male protection as soon as a woman steps out of the home or office makes her feel handicapped.For Pushpa Pathak, one of the one of the few women to brave the male dominated corridors of Kabul Municipality as a senior adviser, her Indian experience was invaluable in dealing with the gender discrimination. Pathak who grew up in a conservative family in Ballia, in Western Uttar Pradesh, initially had a hard time convincing her family when she decided to come to Afghanistan. The challenge of working in Afghanistan appealed to her as it is "the biggest development challenge in the least developed countries," even more so in the post conflict countries.Her Indianness worked in two ways to break barriers. The initial difficulty in communicating with colleagues who had never encountered a woman in a working environment was overcome as her Indian identity helped open doors. Professionally, her Indian experience also bears great resemblance to Afghanistan. An example is the planning and municipal laws, the principle of customary ownership, and cost recovery strategies for municipal services, which mirror Indian practices. The significant difference perhaps is that the regional expertise helps in dealing with these challenges better than western solutions. Pathak feels it is important to not come with preconceptions or models, but to instead develop them indigenously. She says she is now so well assimilated that her colleagues no longer remember she is a woman. She says she was able to overcome "a rough beginning," because the resistance to a woman in a senior position is something she had to overcome in India as well, especially in the early stages of her career. Small town India, Pathak says, has the same attitude and she remembers many a round table meetings where she would be bypassed completely as people assumed she was either present in a secretarial capacity or would have nothing worthwhile to say. It was by doggedly maintaining her space and her professional attitude that Pathak was able to make inroads in India, something she also adopted here to survive. Of her colleagues in Kabul she say : "Perhaps some of them had never talked to a woman outside their family and there was resistance in listening to a woman. I continued and did not get disturbed," building relationships with patience over endless cups of green tea, Afghanistan's favored way of engaging whether it is between friends, or business partners, deal makers, politicians or even sizing up an adversary.Adaptation is perhaps the most important feature of surviving in Afghanistan at both the professional and personal level. For Indian women, the experience is intensified. As Indian and women, they get to straddle the contradictory and peculiar space of love and hate that makes their experience distinctive - sometimes bizarre but always unique.
Little India
It was an interest in elephants that led Shanthini Dawson to Afghanistan, a country of high mountains and rugged terrain where most people don't know what an elephant looks like. But for Dawson, the trajectory was quite logical. Working on elephant ranges, which were expected to be "people-free," led to an awareness about the exclusionary aspects of environmental policy, which broadened into an interest in social development.
Vrinda Dar in Badakshan ProvinceThe rest was a natural progression. Even for Afghanistan, which attracts unusual people, Dawson stands apart. She applied for her job in Afghanistan because of her growing interest in Islamic populations sparked by her work amongst the Rohingas of the Rakhine state of Thailand (bordering the Chittagong area of India). Initially Dawson was to come to Afghanistan while the Taliban was still in power. 9/11 changed all that and Shanthini finally arrived in 2002. Unwilling to join the "UN circus" as she calls it, she opted to work in the field with Christian Aid in its community based programs before joining the Government of Afghanistan. Currently she works as an adviser to the Minister of Education, playing a critical role in shaping and implementing the national education strategy that has brought 5 million children into schools, one of the few major achievements of post Taliban reconstruction, an endeavor otherwise riddled with loopholes, missed opportunities, weak policy and poor implementation.
Even for Afghanistan which attracts unusual people, Shanthini dawson stands apartWhile Dawson is an international development specialist, her Indian identity underpins much of her work in Afghanistan. Though Western countries dominate the post conflict development paradigm in Afghanistan, both in the areas of policy and finances, Indian expertise is increasingly being valued. Because of the cultural similarity, shared history and economic milieu, regional experience enjoys a premium. Dawson brings the regional expertise "subconsciously" into her work, which has also taken her on frequent trips to India for tie ups with Indian institutions. "When technical assistance is from the region, people are able to accept it better," she says, touching on one of the most sensitive aspects of nation building in Afghanistan, the prickly hostility of Afghans to occupation and patronizing. Even amongst the regional countries, Indians are perhaps the most favored community. Afghans look upon India as a friend without ulterior motives, something they treasure as many of them feel that most of the international community has played a self-serving role in Afghanistan. This friendship is undoubtedly clinched by a hostility towards Pakistan, who Afghans blame for much of the recent violence in their country. Coupled with a craze for films and soap operas emanating from Bollywood, the love affair is passionate, even if it quite one-sided. For Indians residing in Afghanistan this warmth is palpable and makes for easy access to all corridors, from those of power to ordinary homes.
Pushpa Pathak with her Kabul Municipality colleaguesThe word "hind" opens doors, says Vrinda Dar, a community development specialist based in Kabul. Dar had a more than unusual reason for taking up a job in Afghanistan. She wanted to "settle down." An unsettling country to most, a job with a reputed international NGO seemed steady to Dar after a period of itinerant wanderings as a freelancer. That and the irresistible lure of a challenge of a lifetime. In Afghanistan, Dar works in community development projects, often traveling to rural areas, a space she finds more real and accepting than urban Kabul. Initially people are skeptical, but they warm up soon, Dar says. Married to an Italian, she experienced an outsider bias in small town Italy until people got to know her better and elected her to the community council.In Kabul her life is constrained by a plethora of restrictions that limit her movements and interactions so strictly that even her organization cannot be named. Expatriates working for international organizations are barred from walking on the streets, must undertake door to door travel under armed escort, are subject to night curfews and prohibited from using of public transport; many areas are simply out of bounds. Every fresh incident of violence brings further clampdowns. Dar's organization also bars visits to the homes of Afghans. The restrictions are even greater for women. If Indians are favored, women, in general, are not. War, displacement, extreme conservatism, overlaid with exposure to TV's pop culture of commodification of women and a liberalism movement has created a confused value system that has a strong streak of hostility toward women in public spaces. Whether it is women going to work, walking outside their homes or participating in public life, a visible minority is openly hostile, and most expat women live with some sense of discomfort if they venture out of protected spaces. Dar finds this accentuated in cities like Kabul, because "people here do not get to talk to you," unlike more intense community based interactions in rural areas. "I feel like I am in a cage" says Dar, adding that the need for male protection as soon as a woman steps out of the home or office makes her feel handicapped.For Pushpa Pathak, one of the one of the few women to brave the male dominated corridors of Kabul Municipality as a senior adviser, her Indian experience was invaluable in dealing with the gender discrimination. Pathak who grew up in a conservative family in Ballia, in Western Uttar Pradesh, initially had a hard time convincing her family when she decided to come to Afghanistan. The challenge of working in Afghanistan appealed to her as it is "the biggest development challenge in the least developed countries," even more so in the post conflict countries.Her Indianness worked in two ways to break barriers. The initial difficulty in communicating with colleagues who had never encountered a woman in a working environment was overcome as her Indian identity helped open doors. Professionally, her Indian experience also bears great resemblance to Afghanistan. An example is the planning and municipal laws, the principle of customary ownership, and cost recovery strategies for municipal services, which mirror Indian practices. The significant difference perhaps is that the regional expertise helps in dealing with these challenges better than western solutions. Pathak feels it is important to not come with preconceptions or models, but to instead develop them indigenously. She says she is now so well assimilated that her colleagues no longer remember she is a woman. She says she was able to overcome "a rough beginning," because the resistance to a woman in a senior position is something she had to overcome in India as well, especially in the early stages of her career. Small town India, Pathak says, has the same attitude and she remembers many a round table meetings where she would be bypassed completely as people assumed she was either present in a secretarial capacity or would have nothing worthwhile to say. It was by doggedly maintaining her space and her professional attitude that Pathak was able to make inroads in India, something she also adopted here to survive. Of her colleagues in Kabul she say : "Perhaps some of them had never talked to a woman outside their family and there was resistance in listening to a woman. I continued and did not get disturbed," building relationships with patience over endless cups of green tea, Afghanistan's favored way of engaging whether it is between friends, or business partners, deal makers, politicians or even sizing up an adversary.Adaptation is perhaps the most important feature of surviving in Afghanistan at both the professional and personal level. For Indian women, the experience is intensified. As Indian and women, they get to straddle the contradictory and peculiar space of love and hate that makes their experience distinctive - sometimes bizarre but always unique.
Freedom Called Lethal Risk for Jailed Afghan Women
By Aunohita Mojumdar
WeNews correspondent
Women are jailed in Afghanistan for "crimes" that would make them victims of domestic abuse elsewhere. As the annual festival of Eid brings the prospect of presidential pardons, advocates warn that many women are safer inside prison.
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Each year the festival of Eid that ends the month-long Ramadan holiday season is commemorated in Afghanistan with presidential pardons for prisoners.
It's a show of cultural benevolence since Ramadan is traditionally celebrated with families coming together.
But as Eid approaches on Oct. 13, women's groups and international organizations are warning that many women, if released, will become homeless, ostracized and vulnerable to sexual exploitation. Others may wind up back in custody for being "unaccompanied" women.
Some may become victims to relatives who carry out punishments as severe as execution.
"Women die after leaving prison," said Dr. Anou Borrey, a gender justice consultant for the United Nations Development Fund for Women in Afghanistan.
"Afghan women in jail are lucky, at least they are alive," said Carla Ciavarella, the justice program coordinator of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan, who has worked with Afghanistan's penitentiary system for four years. "We do not know how many women are killed or abused at home every day."
The warnings follow an early September report by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime that found at least half the women in Afghanistan's largest jail are there for so-called moral crimes such as adultery, "running away," being in the company of a man who is not a relative or even giving shelter to a runaway woman.
The agency's Afghanistan representative, Christina Orguz, said many of the women would be considered victims, not perpetrators, in most other countries.
Findings Echoed
The findings echo a January 2007 assessment of the status of women in Afghanistan by Medica Mondiale, an advocacy group for traumatized women and girls in war and crisis zones that has worked extensively with female prisoners in Afghanistan.
"The judiciary overwhelmingly tends to hold women responsible for crimes even when they themselves are the victims and cases are judged employing tribal laws of traditions instead of codified law," the Cologne, Germany-based group found. "In particular accusations of 'zina,' or sexual intercourse outside of marriage--irrespective of the truth--are often prosecuted and the woman sentenced to prison even when she was the victim of rape."
For the U.N. report, investigators interviewed 56 of the 69 women imprisoned in Pul-e-Charkhi, the country's largest prison located on the outskirts of Kabul.
One of the female prisoners at Pul-e-Charkhi told interviewers that her husband killed a man in a land dispute and later claimed it was her adultery that led to the killing. Since she had no witnesses to prove she had not committed adultery she was imprisoned. The woman, who is illiterate and poor, is serving a six-year sentence along with her child. Her initial sentence of one year was increased she says, after her request for a divorce, a plea she feels may have prejudiced the judge against her.
Among the 11,200 people imprisoned in Afghanistan there are 300 women, a number that has roughly doubled from 2004 to 2006.
Some of the women's "crimes" are not listed in Afghanistan's formal modern criminal code, which is based on Sharia, or Islamic religious law.
Women as Property
The formal justice system based on Sharia as well as the traditional or customary councils of elders--which are often harsher--view women as the property of their husbands' extended family, a view that warps the interpretation of the criminal code.
As property, for instance, women do not have the right to run away because they do not have the right to leave the house without permission of a husband or male relative, a custom that prevents depriving men of their possessions.
Women are also the bearers of family honor and any perceived erosion of that honor can be considered dangerous and punishable by families.
A UNIFEM study from May 2006 estimates that 82 percent of the violence against women in Afghanistan is committed by family members.
Domestic violence is more common in forced marriages, including those involving brides younger than 16. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission's last assessment estimated that the majority of marriages in Afghanistan--between 60 percent and 80 percent--are forced and many include a child of either sex.
Afghanistan's laws allow a girl to be married at the age of 15 with paternal consent, but in practice many fathers are considered entitled to grant consent to children of any age.
Marriages and divorces are often not documented in Afghanistan. This means a woman who marries after a divorce risks being accused of adultery if her former husband claims he never divorced her. Social customs and tradition here make it much more difficult for a woman to initiate divorce proceedings and the lack of formal documentation of births, marriages and divorces makes it difficult to provide proof. In a dispute where it is a man's word against a woman's, the man is usually believed. Some ex-husbands exploit the lack of proof of divorces to gain monetary compensation from a second husband for taking his "property."
Women are given away in exchange for debts, to settle scores, to redress complaints.
Forced to Marry 9-Year-Old Boy
Amina, who like many other Afghan women uses only her first name, is a member of the local women's peace council in Ghazni, a city located in southern Afghanistan. In a meeting in Kabul with her local female parliamentarian she angrily recounted the story of a 46-year-old widow she knows who was forced to marry her 9-year-old brother-in-law because custom demands widows marry into her husband's family.
Zahira Mawlai, the parliamentarian, pointed out that under Islam a woman's consent is mandatory for any marriage and any use of force is considered a sin. But in practice, she said, Afghan women often lack such decision-making power. A first step to ending forced and under-age marriages, she said, is to add the practices to the country's penal code as criminal offenses.
U.N. representatives and women's groups such as Medica Mondiale are working to equip female prisoners with skills that will help them survive and to establish conditions for their safe release.
These include literacy vocational training for employment and legal awareness classes. Advocates are also working to establish short- and long-term guidelines with the Afghanistan Ministry of Justice for the treatment and rehabilitation of female prisoners.
Transitional houses are yet to be established, but have been recommended by the United Nations and other groups.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 17 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
For more information:
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,"Female Prisoners and Their Social Reintegration"[Adobe PDF format]:http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Afghan_women_prison_web.pdf
Medica Mondiale:http://www.medicamondiale.org/_en/
Note: Women's eNews is not responsible for the content of external Internet sites and the contents of Web pages we link to may change without notice.
WeNews correspondent
Women are jailed in Afghanistan for "crimes" that would make them victims of domestic abuse elsewhere. As the annual festival of Eid brings the prospect of presidential pardons, advocates warn that many women are safer inside prison.
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Each year the festival of Eid that ends the month-long Ramadan holiday season is commemorated in Afghanistan with presidential pardons for prisoners.
It's a show of cultural benevolence since Ramadan is traditionally celebrated with families coming together.
But as Eid approaches on Oct. 13, women's groups and international organizations are warning that many women, if released, will become homeless, ostracized and vulnerable to sexual exploitation. Others may wind up back in custody for being "unaccompanied" women.
Some may become victims to relatives who carry out punishments as severe as execution.
"Women die after leaving prison," said Dr. Anou Borrey, a gender justice consultant for the United Nations Development Fund for Women in Afghanistan.
"Afghan women in jail are lucky, at least they are alive," said Carla Ciavarella, the justice program coordinator of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan, who has worked with Afghanistan's penitentiary system for four years. "We do not know how many women are killed or abused at home every day."
The warnings follow an early September report by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime that found at least half the women in Afghanistan's largest jail are there for so-called moral crimes such as adultery, "running away," being in the company of a man who is not a relative or even giving shelter to a runaway woman.
The agency's Afghanistan representative, Christina Orguz, said many of the women would be considered victims, not perpetrators, in most other countries.
Findings Echoed
The findings echo a January 2007 assessment of the status of women in Afghanistan by Medica Mondiale, an advocacy group for traumatized women and girls in war and crisis zones that has worked extensively with female prisoners in Afghanistan.
"The judiciary overwhelmingly tends to hold women responsible for crimes even when they themselves are the victims and cases are judged employing tribal laws of traditions instead of codified law," the Cologne, Germany-based group found. "In particular accusations of 'zina,' or sexual intercourse outside of marriage--irrespective of the truth--are often prosecuted and the woman sentenced to prison even when she was the victim of rape."
For the U.N. report, investigators interviewed 56 of the 69 women imprisoned in Pul-e-Charkhi, the country's largest prison located on the outskirts of Kabul.
One of the female prisoners at Pul-e-Charkhi told interviewers that her husband killed a man in a land dispute and later claimed it was her adultery that led to the killing. Since she had no witnesses to prove she had not committed adultery she was imprisoned. The woman, who is illiterate and poor, is serving a six-year sentence along with her child. Her initial sentence of one year was increased she says, after her request for a divorce, a plea she feels may have prejudiced the judge against her.
Among the 11,200 people imprisoned in Afghanistan there are 300 women, a number that has roughly doubled from 2004 to 2006.
Some of the women's "crimes" are not listed in Afghanistan's formal modern criminal code, which is based on Sharia, or Islamic religious law.
Women as Property
The formal justice system based on Sharia as well as the traditional or customary councils of elders--which are often harsher--view women as the property of their husbands' extended family, a view that warps the interpretation of the criminal code.
As property, for instance, women do not have the right to run away because they do not have the right to leave the house without permission of a husband or male relative, a custom that prevents depriving men of their possessions.
Women are also the bearers of family honor and any perceived erosion of that honor can be considered dangerous and punishable by families.
A UNIFEM study from May 2006 estimates that 82 percent of the violence against women in Afghanistan is committed by family members.
Domestic violence is more common in forced marriages, including those involving brides younger than 16. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission's last assessment estimated that the majority of marriages in Afghanistan--between 60 percent and 80 percent--are forced and many include a child of either sex.
Afghanistan's laws allow a girl to be married at the age of 15 with paternal consent, but in practice many fathers are considered entitled to grant consent to children of any age.
Marriages and divorces are often not documented in Afghanistan. This means a woman who marries after a divorce risks being accused of adultery if her former husband claims he never divorced her. Social customs and tradition here make it much more difficult for a woman to initiate divorce proceedings and the lack of formal documentation of births, marriages and divorces makes it difficult to provide proof. In a dispute where it is a man's word against a woman's, the man is usually believed. Some ex-husbands exploit the lack of proof of divorces to gain monetary compensation from a second husband for taking his "property."
Women are given away in exchange for debts, to settle scores, to redress complaints.
Forced to Marry 9-Year-Old Boy
Amina, who like many other Afghan women uses only her first name, is a member of the local women's peace council in Ghazni, a city located in southern Afghanistan. In a meeting in Kabul with her local female parliamentarian she angrily recounted the story of a 46-year-old widow she knows who was forced to marry her 9-year-old brother-in-law because custom demands widows marry into her husband's family.
Zahira Mawlai, the parliamentarian, pointed out that under Islam a woman's consent is mandatory for any marriage and any use of force is considered a sin. But in practice, she said, Afghan women often lack such decision-making power. A first step to ending forced and under-age marriages, she said, is to add the practices to the country's penal code as criminal offenses.
U.N. representatives and women's groups such as Medica Mondiale are working to equip female prisoners with skills that will help them survive and to establish conditions for their safe release.
These include literacy vocational training for employment and legal awareness classes. Advocates are also working to establish short- and long-term guidelines with the Afghanistan Ministry of Justice for the treatment and rehabilitation of female prisoners.
Transitional houses are yet to be established, but have been recommended by the United Nations and other groups.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 17 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
Women's eNews welcomes your comments. E-mail us at editors@womensenews.org.
For more information:
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,"Female Prisoners and Their Social Reintegration"[Adobe PDF format]:http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Afghan_women_prison_web.pdf
Medica Mondiale:http://www.medicamondiale.org/_en/
Note: Women's eNews is not responsible for the content of external Internet sites and the contents of Web pages we link to may change without notice.
An elusive quest for justice in Afghanistan
Aunohita Mojumdar KABUL
Asia Times
Afghanistan's latest National Human Development Report has called for a new and hybrid justice system that will bring together modern formal justice systems and the local traditional shuras and jirgas that have functioned as dispute-resolution mechanisms. The proposal for a collaborative model is a radical departure from the current efforts to expand the reach of the modern formal justice system, an effort that has met with limited success so far. The differences in the two justice systems, both in law and in principle, are also likely to stir up some controversy, especially among purists. Proposing the launch of a pilot project of the hybrid model in five provinces by mid-2008, the report, released on Wednesday, argues that the current formal justice system does not reach the majority of Afghans, with more than 80% of the cases throughout Afghanistan settled through traditional decision-making assemblies. By acting in isolation, state and non-state institutions of justice are missing an opportunity to improve the delivery of justice significantly, the report states. The justice sector is an area that is commonly accepted to have lagged far behind others in the efforts at reconstruction of the country. Despite sporadic efforts at reform, the changes have not been far-reaching. Severe constraints in capacity, including basic training and education of judicial staff, have severely hampered uniform delivery of justice through the formal court systems, and public perception of corruption of the courts is also high. The report notes this, saying the judiciary suffers from severe deficiencies: "Most judges cannot access legal textbooks, procedures and practices." Only a little more than half of the judges (in a random survey) were holders of university degrees in law or sharia. "Allegations of corruption within the formal justice system have tarnished its legitimacy and made the informal justice sector more appealing in the eyes of the many citizens." The formal court system, however, does represent Afghanistan's attempts to evolve a secular interpretation of law, based on international law and Western jurisprudence, elements that are missing in some aspects of the traditional justice system. The traditional mechanism relies on customary law, or orf, that is delivered through the shuras or jirgas to settle disputes. The customary law varies according to region and ethnic group. While the main principle of customary law is to restore balance and order in a community, this order can sometimes be achieved by means that are considered to be brutal or violative of internationally recognized principles of humanitarian and human rights laws. "Although the restorative aspect is a positive concept in itself, the way crimes and disputes are settled has an extremely harmful impact on the lives of women," a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime states. Baad, for example is identified as one of the four main principles of justice applied by traditional jirgas and shuras by the report. It "gives" a woman from the family of the accused to the victim's family as compensation. Though the underlying principle may be to create family ties and resolve the dispute, the outcome is the barter of a woman as a commodity. Other practices such as badal, forced marriages to settle disputes and forcing a widow to marry someone from her husband's family, however unsuitable, are part of the customary practices. The report points out that such practices as baad are of serious concern and adds, "Women are almost totally excluded from participating in the decision-making of jirgas/shuras, resulting in serious consequences for their status and the protection of their rights." The report argues that the hybrid model will harness the positive aspects of non-state dispute-settlement institutions while ensuring that their decisions are compatible with the Afghan constitution, Afghan laws and international human-rights standards. The report argues that unlike the state justice system, which creates winners and losers, the jirgas/shuras reach community-led decisions that promote restorative justice, helping to restore peace and dignity among the victims, offenders and other key stakeholders. While arguing that the proposed collaborative system would make justice more widely accessible, efficient, cost-effective and humane, the report recognizes the challenge of reconciling inherent tensions between the formal and informal justice system while nurturing the respective strengths of these sometimes competing and conflicting approaches to the rule of law. Though the proposal of the hybrid model is likely to evoke some controversy, what is undisputed is the urgent need for justice-sector reform and justice delivery systems. The judicial system is a first line of defense to many social ills in any democracy, especially in war-ravaged societies. The report's data on human development indices paint a dismal picture, showing that Afghanistan's human-development indicators are actually lower than earlier assessments. The National Human Development Report for 2007, the second since the ouster of the Taliban, reveals a literacy rate of 23.5%, down from the 2004 assessment, which put it at 28.7%. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared with the estimated 44.5 in 2004, according to the report released by President Hamid Karzai in New York on Wednesday. (The 2004 National Human Development Report was based on data collected in 2003, while the latest one is based on data collected in 2005-06.) Analysts familiar with the figures, however, caution that no comparison should be made with the earlier-cited figures, since the methodology used is significantly different. Aiso Vas, technical adviser to the Ministry of Rural Development and the Central Statistical Organization of Afghanistan, which jointly carried out the National Risk and Vulnerability Survey of 2005, the basis for much of the report, is emphatic on this point, saying the sampling frame has changed. Collection of data is difficult in Afghanistan, which has yet to see its first fully fledged census. Notwithstanding the risks of comparison, the current data reveal that Afghanistan remains among the poorest countries in the world, despite billions of dollars in aid over the past six years. Positive trends in the report include an increase in gross domestic product and a drop in infant mortality, which has fallen from 165 to 135 per 1,000 live births, though maternal mortality figures remain constant at 1,600 per 100,000 live births. The report also refers to another area of major concern, the increase in violence. In 2006 alone, it points out, the number of civilian deaths was twice as many as in 2005. Vested criminal interests preclude the Afghan judiciary from operating independently, free of intimidation and in accordance with the constitution and international human-rights standards. The report states that a climate of impunity still prevails in Afghanistan and political resistance within the government and other state institutions to address past human-rights violations and war crimes persists. "The judiciary, police and legislature are failing in their mission to meet the changing needs of Afghan citizens. Under-resourced with a limited reach, the formal state institutions of justice require a renewed and more coherent strengthening and restructuring effort," the report states.
Asia Times
Afghanistan's latest National Human Development Report has called for a new and hybrid justice system that will bring together modern formal justice systems and the local traditional shuras and jirgas that have functioned as dispute-resolution mechanisms. The proposal for a collaborative model is a radical departure from the current efforts to expand the reach of the modern formal justice system, an effort that has met with limited success so far. The differences in the two justice systems, both in law and in principle, are also likely to stir up some controversy, especially among purists. Proposing the launch of a pilot project of the hybrid model in five provinces by mid-2008, the report, released on Wednesday, argues that the current formal justice system does not reach the majority of Afghans, with more than 80% of the cases throughout Afghanistan settled through traditional decision-making assemblies. By acting in isolation, state and non-state institutions of justice are missing an opportunity to improve the delivery of justice significantly, the report states. The justice sector is an area that is commonly accepted to have lagged far behind others in the efforts at reconstruction of the country. Despite sporadic efforts at reform, the changes have not been far-reaching. Severe constraints in capacity, including basic training and education of judicial staff, have severely hampered uniform delivery of justice through the formal court systems, and public perception of corruption of the courts is also high. The report notes this, saying the judiciary suffers from severe deficiencies: "Most judges cannot access legal textbooks, procedures and practices." Only a little more than half of the judges (in a random survey) were holders of university degrees in law or sharia. "Allegations of corruption within the formal justice system have tarnished its legitimacy and made the informal justice sector more appealing in the eyes of the many citizens." The formal court system, however, does represent Afghanistan's attempts to evolve a secular interpretation of law, based on international law and Western jurisprudence, elements that are missing in some aspects of the traditional justice system. The traditional mechanism relies on customary law, or orf, that is delivered through the shuras or jirgas to settle disputes. The customary law varies according to region and ethnic group. While the main principle of customary law is to restore balance and order in a community, this order can sometimes be achieved by means that are considered to be brutal or violative of internationally recognized principles of humanitarian and human rights laws. "Although the restorative aspect is a positive concept in itself, the way crimes and disputes are settled has an extremely harmful impact on the lives of women," a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime states. Baad, for example is identified as one of the four main principles of justice applied by traditional jirgas and shuras by the report. It "gives" a woman from the family of the accused to the victim's family as compensation. Though the underlying principle may be to create family ties and resolve the dispute, the outcome is the barter of a woman as a commodity. Other practices such as badal, forced marriages to settle disputes and forcing a widow to marry someone from her husband's family, however unsuitable, are part of the customary practices. The report points out that such practices as baad are of serious concern and adds, "Women are almost totally excluded from participating in the decision-making of jirgas/shuras, resulting in serious consequences for their status and the protection of their rights." The report argues that the hybrid model will harness the positive aspects of non-state dispute-settlement institutions while ensuring that their decisions are compatible with the Afghan constitution, Afghan laws and international human-rights standards. The report argues that unlike the state justice system, which creates winners and losers, the jirgas/shuras reach community-led decisions that promote restorative justice, helping to restore peace and dignity among the victims, offenders and other key stakeholders. While arguing that the proposed collaborative system would make justice more widely accessible, efficient, cost-effective and humane, the report recognizes the challenge of reconciling inherent tensions between the formal and informal justice system while nurturing the respective strengths of these sometimes competing and conflicting approaches to the rule of law. Though the proposal of the hybrid model is likely to evoke some controversy, what is undisputed is the urgent need for justice-sector reform and justice delivery systems. The judicial system is a first line of defense to many social ills in any democracy, especially in war-ravaged societies. The report's data on human development indices paint a dismal picture, showing that Afghanistan's human-development indicators are actually lower than earlier assessments. The National Human Development Report for 2007, the second since the ouster of the Taliban, reveals a literacy rate of 23.5%, down from the 2004 assessment, which put it at 28.7%. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared with the estimated 44.5 in 2004, according to the report released by President Hamid Karzai in New York on Wednesday. (The 2004 National Human Development Report was based on data collected in 2003, while the latest one is based on data collected in 2005-06.) Analysts familiar with the figures, however, caution that no comparison should be made with the earlier-cited figures, since the methodology used is significantly different. Aiso Vas, technical adviser to the Ministry of Rural Development and the Central Statistical Organization of Afghanistan, which jointly carried out the National Risk and Vulnerability Survey of 2005, the basis for much of the report, is emphatic on this point, saying the sampling frame has changed. Collection of data is difficult in Afghanistan, which has yet to see its first fully fledged census. Notwithstanding the risks of comparison, the current data reveal that Afghanistan remains among the poorest countries in the world, despite billions of dollars in aid over the past six years. Positive trends in the report include an increase in gross domestic product and a drop in infant mortality, which has fallen from 165 to 135 per 1,000 live births, though maternal mortality figures remain constant at 1,600 per 100,000 live births. The report also refers to another area of major concern, the increase in violence. In 2006 alone, it points out, the number of civilian deaths was twice as many as in 2005. Vested criminal interests preclude the Afghan judiciary from operating independently, free of intimidation and in accordance with the constitution and international human-rights standards. The report states that a climate of impunity still prevails in Afghanistan and political resistance within the government and other state institutions to address past human-rights violations and war crimes persists. "The judiciary, police and legislature are failing in their mission to meet the changing needs of Afghan citizens. Under-resourced with a limited reach, the formal state institutions of justice require a renewed and more coherent strengthening and restructuring effort," the report states.
Justice fails Afghan women
Al Jazeera
By
Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Many female prisoners face rejection by their families after their release [File: EPA]
Afghanistan is building new jails for women. Though there are only 300 female prisoners now, that number is expected to grow.
While there are no signs of a crime wave, one of the reasons for the increase is an unlikely one.
Lacking in transitional houses for released prisoners, a suggested solution includes using jails as secure places where women can stay until they are reintegrated into society. By some strange logic, funding for building jails is much easier to come by. But again, half of the women in jail should not be there at all.
Imprisoned for what are loosely described as "moral crimes", these women would qualify as victims rather than criminals under any interpretation of international human rights laws, including those to which Afghanistan is a signatory.
A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on Afghanistan's female prisoners and their social reintegration drew attention to their dismal condition in a country where women face acute discrimination.
Not only are an estimated half victims themselves, but they are further victimised by the criminal justice process.
And on release from prison, they face victimisation for a third time. This can take the form of, at best, the family leaving the woman to fend for herself, and at worst, a so-called honour killing.Released in Kabul on Sunday, the UNODC report recommended laws changes, better facilities and improved legal aid to address some of the issues facing female prisoners. These suggestions were debated with representatives of the ministry of justice, the supreme court and other Afghan departments.
Forced marriagesThe UN women's fund (Unifem) found that 80 per cent of the violence perpetrated against women in Afghanistan originated in their homes.According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), 60 to 80 per cent of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, some of them involving girls as young as six years old.
Subjected to sexual and psychological abuse along with violence in their marital home, many girls run away. And when they come in contact with Afghanistan's criminal justice system, instead of receiving any protection, they are seen as offenders and convicted.
Opening a seminar organised jointly with the ministry of justice, Christina Orguz, UNODC country office representative, said that many people do not want to talk about the issue of female inmates.
Many are "in prison for things that would make them victims not perpetrators", she said.
Increased awarenessAnou Borrey, a gender and justice consultant with Unifem, said: "There is a need to increase the awareness of women about their rights so they don't end up in prison".
She said simple measures like registering marriages and the birth of a child could prevent adultery charges and stop child marriages.
"Currently the majority of the female prisoners are being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms" UN Office on Drugs and Crime"Currently the majority of the female prisoners are being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms," UNODC said.
The reason is the lack of a robust formal criminal justice system.
An estimated 80 per cent of all legal cases are dealt with by the traditional justice system, based on customary laws that vary from region to region and tribe to tribe.
Documentation of the customary laws by the International Legal Foundation showed that the laws are at their most discriminatory towards women.Not only are women penalised disproportionately for crimes, but they are punished on evidentiary standards that discriminate against them. Moreover, some of the customary laws also allow for them to be used as barter for settling other disputes, debts and feuds.
"In the restorative practice of the justice in Afghanistan, women who are regarded as the property of men, are often used as valuable commodities in the settlement of crimes and disputes" UNODC said.
"Rape may be treated as adultery and punished accordingly if a settlement cannot be reached between the two families concerned."
Unclear definitionEven Afghanistan's formal justice system does not clearly define rape as a separate crime, including it under the offence of "zina" or adultery, pederasty and violation of honour.
In practice, a woman often has to prove her lack of consent in a rape case in order to avoid being punished for it.
Although there is no distinct penalty for rape, there is a distinction - the so-called honour crimes. Those who commit them are exempt from the charge of murder, the conviction is discretionary and imprisonment is for a maximum of two years.
A 30-year-old woman serving a six year sentence in Pul-e-Charkhi jail became the victim of this clause of the law.
When her husband killed his neighbour during a dispute, he claimed he had been driven to murder by the man committing adultery with his "property". He received leniency from the court and his wife was jailed for committing adultery.
Mercenary reasonsSeveral women who were interviewed by UNODC were verbally divorced and had married again, but were later "reported" by their first husbands and jailed. In one case the woman had been in her second marriage for 10 years and had given birth to five children.
"Rape may be treated as adultery and punished accordingly if a settlement cannot be reached between the two families concerned" UN Office of Drugs and CrimeThe reason is not necessarily malignancy but often mercenary. If a man can prove his "property" has been seized by another, he can claim compensation using the threat of the criminal justice system.
But, as the UNODC report says, being in prison for moral crimes is only part of the problem.
Other women are dealt with outside the formal justice system, a threat that still awaits the prisoners when they step out of jail.
Shukria Noori, the national project co-ordinator for social reintegration of prisoners, says that women may be "threatened, violated and even killed".
Shelters for women do not have the capacity to absorb the large numbers of victims and are reluctant to accept inmates from prison, she said.
Borrey said there is a lack of support from the government, non-governmental organisations and the community to ensure that the women are reintegrated.Even if she does not become the victim of a so-called honour crime, a female prisoner's chance of survival after her release is very low.
Social moresIn a substantial number of cases, her family refuses to take her back. She has few marketable skills and Afghanistan's social mores make it extremely difficult for a single woman to survive on her own.
"A lot of women in prison are not criminals according to international standards" Dorothea Grieger, a criminal justice programme assistant with UNODC, said.
"But the underlying principles of minimum standard rules apply to them as well. Improvement should be used to help them to lead self-supporting lives after release."
This is something that UN bodies and women's organisations like Medica Mondiale are trying to address.
Legal aid as well as literacy, education and vocational training inside the prisons would empower the women prisoners with some marketable skills that could help them survive.
But most important of all perhaps is preparing them for release.
Mediation with the family, local elders or religious leaders enhances the chances of her acceptance. Sudden releases, like during Id al-Fitr, can actually harm the women more, leaving them on the streets.
By
Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Many female prisoners face rejection by their families after their release [File: EPA]
Afghanistan is building new jails for women. Though there are only 300 female prisoners now, that number is expected to grow.
While there are no signs of a crime wave, one of the reasons for the increase is an unlikely one.
Lacking in transitional houses for released prisoners, a suggested solution includes using jails as secure places where women can stay until they are reintegrated into society. By some strange logic, funding for building jails is much easier to come by. But again, half of the women in jail should not be there at all.
Imprisoned for what are loosely described as "moral crimes", these women would qualify as victims rather than criminals under any interpretation of international human rights laws, including those to which Afghanistan is a signatory.
A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on Afghanistan's female prisoners and their social reintegration drew attention to their dismal condition in a country where women face acute discrimination.
Not only are an estimated half victims themselves, but they are further victimised by the criminal justice process.
And on release from prison, they face victimisation for a third time. This can take the form of, at best, the family leaving the woman to fend for herself, and at worst, a so-called honour killing.Released in Kabul on Sunday, the UNODC report recommended laws changes, better facilities and improved legal aid to address some of the issues facing female prisoners. These suggestions were debated with representatives of the ministry of justice, the supreme court and other Afghan departments.
Forced marriagesThe UN women's fund (Unifem) found that 80 per cent of the violence perpetrated against women in Afghanistan originated in their homes.According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), 60 to 80 per cent of marriages in Afghanistan are forced, some of them involving girls as young as six years old.
Subjected to sexual and psychological abuse along with violence in their marital home, many girls run away. And when they come in contact with Afghanistan's criminal justice system, instead of receiving any protection, they are seen as offenders and convicted.
Opening a seminar organised jointly with the ministry of justice, Christina Orguz, UNODC country office representative, said that many people do not want to talk about the issue of female inmates.
Many are "in prison for things that would make them victims not perpetrators", she said.
Increased awarenessAnou Borrey, a gender and justice consultant with Unifem, said: "There is a need to increase the awareness of women about their rights so they don't end up in prison".
She said simple measures like registering marriages and the birth of a child could prevent adultery charges and stop child marriages.
"Currently the majority of the female prisoners are being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms" UN Office on Drugs and Crime"Currently the majority of the female prisoners are being held for violating social, behavioural and religious norms," UNODC said.
The reason is the lack of a robust formal criminal justice system.
An estimated 80 per cent of all legal cases are dealt with by the traditional justice system, based on customary laws that vary from region to region and tribe to tribe.
Documentation of the customary laws by the International Legal Foundation showed that the laws are at their most discriminatory towards women.Not only are women penalised disproportionately for crimes, but they are punished on evidentiary standards that discriminate against them. Moreover, some of the customary laws also allow for them to be used as barter for settling other disputes, debts and feuds.
"In the restorative practice of the justice in Afghanistan, women who are regarded as the property of men, are often used as valuable commodities in the settlement of crimes and disputes" UNODC said.
"Rape may be treated as adultery and punished accordingly if a settlement cannot be reached between the two families concerned."
Unclear definitionEven Afghanistan's formal justice system does not clearly define rape as a separate crime, including it under the offence of "zina" or adultery, pederasty and violation of honour.
In practice, a woman often has to prove her lack of consent in a rape case in order to avoid being punished for it.
Although there is no distinct penalty for rape, there is a distinction - the so-called honour crimes. Those who commit them are exempt from the charge of murder, the conviction is discretionary and imprisonment is for a maximum of two years.
A 30-year-old woman serving a six year sentence in Pul-e-Charkhi jail became the victim of this clause of the law.
When her husband killed his neighbour during a dispute, he claimed he had been driven to murder by the man committing adultery with his "property". He received leniency from the court and his wife was jailed for committing adultery.
Mercenary reasonsSeveral women who were interviewed by UNODC were verbally divorced and had married again, but were later "reported" by their first husbands and jailed. In one case the woman had been in her second marriage for 10 years and had given birth to five children.
"Rape may be treated as adultery and punished accordingly if a settlement cannot be reached between the two families concerned" UN Office of Drugs and CrimeThe reason is not necessarily malignancy but often mercenary. If a man can prove his "property" has been seized by another, he can claim compensation using the threat of the criminal justice system.
But, as the UNODC report says, being in prison for moral crimes is only part of the problem.
Other women are dealt with outside the formal justice system, a threat that still awaits the prisoners when they step out of jail.
Shukria Noori, the national project co-ordinator for social reintegration of prisoners, says that women may be "threatened, violated and even killed".
Shelters for women do not have the capacity to absorb the large numbers of victims and are reluctant to accept inmates from prison, she said.
Borrey said there is a lack of support from the government, non-governmental organisations and the community to ensure that the women are reintegrated.Even if she does not become the victim of a so-called honour crime, a female prisoner's chance of survival after her release is very low.
Social moresIn a substantial number of cases, her family refuses to take her back. She has few marketable skills and Afghanistan's social mores make it extremely difficult for a single woman to survive on her own.
"A lot of women in prison are not criminals according to international standards" Dorothea Grieger, a criminal justice programme assistant with UNODC, said.
"But the underlying principles of minimum standard rules apply to them as well. Improvement should be used to help them to lead self-supporting lives after release."
This is something that UN bodies and women's organisations like Medica Mondiale are trying to address.
Legal aid as well as literacy, education and vocational training inside the prisons would empower the women prisoners with some marketable skills that could help them survive.
But most important of all perhaps is preparing them for release.
Mediation with the family, local elders or religious leaders enhances the chances of her acceptance. Sudden releases, like during Id al-Fitr, can actually harm the women more, leaving them on the streets.
No jirga like a peace jirga
Himal
Analysis
Kabul and Islamabad have taken an important step back from guiding the attempt at détente. Now it’s up to the myriad others to take the nascent peace process forward.
By : Aunohita Mojumdar
Now let’s get down to business: Pakistani jirga members arrive in Kabul, August 2007
In the feeding frenzy of deadline journalism, the first-ever Afghanistan-Pakistan ‘peace jirga’ quickly turned into a snack for the mass media. Insta-pundits and participants were asked to offer snap assessments of the four-day jamboree. Demanding instantaneous declarations on whether the jirga, held 9-12 August in Kabul, had been a failure or a success, media organisations sought to simplify the phenomenon, variously terming it a ‘tribal assembly’ or reducing it to the pronouncements by Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf. But the jirga itself was much more than that.
Though termed a jirga because it was modelled on the tribal assemblies of the past, the ‘peace jirga’, like the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002 and the Constitutional Loya Jirga of 2003, included not just tribal leaders, but also politicians, warlords and refugees recently returned to their homeland. The previous jirgas had seen the proactive, behind-the-scenes presence of the international community. During the peace jirga, however, there was a concerted effort to minimise international presence, and to emphasise the indigenous nature of the event. But the fact was that the idea of the peace jirga itself was first mooted in Washington, DC last year, following the separate meetings of presidents Musharraf and Karzai with George W Bush.
Backed by the US, and held at the initiative of the Kabul and Islamabad governments, the jirga departed from the traditional script by handing over some of the lead to non-government representatives. Parliamentarians, provincial-council members, tribal leaders, elders, civil-society activists as well as representatives of Islamabad and Kabul were brought together in the marathon four-day gathering. While a high degree of government involvement ensured that the jirga did not throw up completely unpleasant surprises, the format allowed the participants to debate issues without the pressures of government agendas, diplomatic niceties and the need to produce rhetorical results.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the meeting was that it was held at all, and allowed some 700 Afghans and Pakistanis to come together and openly exchange views. In the tense and fraught relationship between the two countries (and certainly between their capitals), such exchanges are exceptional. Of late, most of the traffic between the neighbours has been one way, with Afghans travelling to Pakistan – for refuge, for employment, for trade and even, Kabul would allege, for militant training. Here was a rare opportunity for opinion-makers from the two countries to discuss outstanding crossborder issues.
The intense involvement of Pakistan over the last two decades of Afghanistan’s conflict has resulted in a constant blame game. Though much of Islamabad’s involvement was fuelled by Western powers playing out the Cold War, Kabul would now like nothing more than to lay the blame for all conflict within its borders squarely on Pakistan. This would help to absolve the Afghan government of the pressure of admitting its failures regarding internal reconciliation and power sharing with disparate political groups. Islamabad, on the other hand, would like to point fingers at this very factor, insisting that the violence is bred wholly within the neighbour, and refusing to admit that the support and safe havens inside Pakistani territory energise the violence and complicate the politics of the insurgency, allowing for no easy solution.
Attempts over the last six years to produce some kind of détente have been largely confined to the two governments, and have yielded little – instead, exacerbating tensions as the political leadership engages in the ritual finger pointing. By now stepping away from full control of the attempted peace process, the two governments can be credited with at least the realisation that peace must include a people’s engagement, as well as the task of addressing the issues of dissatisfied communities.
And peopleThe August peace jirga took cognisance of this realisation, and its eventual recommendations addressed the shortcomings of both the Pakistani and Afghan governments. A joint declaration described “terrorism” as a “common threat”, and pledged that “the government and people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centres for terrorists in their respective countries.” This is an oft repeated sentiment, of course, but a crucial difference here was the reference to “people”. The sharing of the onus of responsibility with the citizenry was further spelled out in the recommendations of the subcommittees that were set up to look at various issues. These called for “utilising tribal influence and traditional means against terrorism”, and stated that “whoever gives sanctuary to a terrorist or otherwise supports him should be identified by the concerned tribe to the government authorities.”
The declaration and recommendations, if implemented with commitment, would indeed strengthen current attempts to rein in militant elements in the frontier. Islamabad and Kabul have varying and fluctuating degrees of control in these areas, and their best-intentioned plans for implementing order would make little headway without the support of the local inhabitants and the loose power structures of tribes and communities that form the de facto frontier government.
The downside of devolving the responsibility onto the ‘people’ is that it has the potential to divest the governments of responsibility. Two such ‘local peace agreements’ – in North Waziristan, and on a much smaller scale in Musa Qala District of Helmund in Afghanistan – have unravelled spectacularly, potentially leaving the areas even more unstable than before. The insecurity in North Waziristan has recently escalated to such an extent that there were few participants from the area at the peace jirga, an absence attributed to fears of retribution from those opposing the jirga, most notably the Taliban.
Participation, or lack thereof, was one of the main weaknesses of the jirga, and this eroded some of its achievements. Missing were not only some of the tribal and community leaders from the Pakistani border areas and senior members of Pakistan’s opposition parties, but also anti-government insurgents in Afghanistan. Since the participation of Afghan delegates in the jirga mandated adherence to the Constitution and laying-down of arms, it automatically precluded any representation from those groups engaged in armed struggle.
Despite the weaknesses in participation, the meet did underline the importance of engaging with these groups. The joint declaration resolved to constitute a jirgagai, or a smaller jirga of 25 representatives from each country, which would, among other things, work to expedite the ongoing process of dialogue for peace and reconciliation with the “opposition”. When asked to spell out exactly what ‘opposition’ meant in this case, the jirga functionaries were coy about the specifics, but admitted it included those not reconciled with the government.
Regardless, the fact that the issue of reconciliation and militant sanctuaries appeared in the joint declaration represents a step forward for both governments, taken at the behest of the civil society in each country. Afghan Urban Development Minister Yousaf Pashtun told this writer that the jirga represented the two countries coming to “a more realistic approach on the issue”. Likewise, Kabul’s top official on the jirga, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Farooq Wardak, said the big achievement was that the two countries had adopted a common stand on the issue of ‘terrorism’ – a unified approach rather than that of two parties.
Much of the success or failure of the jirga will, of course, depend on the subsequent steps taken. The jirgagai is supposed to meet at regular intervals to oversee the implementation of the summit’s decisions. The five new subcommittees also have an extensive list of their own recommendations, including: relaxing trade restrictions, expediting clearance of goods at border crossings, establishing relations between the universities of the two countries, deployment of Pakistani doctors in Afghanistan, technical training of Afghans, identifying special export zones in the border areas, exchange of parliamentary delegations, establishing a crossborder chamber of commerce, cultural and media exchanges, a joint committee to counter drug trafficking, and bilateral education and social-welfare projects in militancy-affected areas.
If even a portion of these initiatives is eventually implemented, the result would be a multilayered interaction between the people of both countries. This would herald a gradual deceleration of the extant mutual hostility. By operating a step away from the governments, the members of the jirga would face less of the jingoistic pressure under which politicians inevitably find themselves. Both their mandate and their achievements would be based on real progress on peace, rather than on the shrill hostility that politicians in power often utilise to secure popular appeal.
Only time will tell whether the jirga will actually prove to be a functional blueprint for use in other parts of Southasia, where people’s engagement could be tapped to reduce hostility and lay the groundwork for solving longstanding problems. Otherwise, the Afghanistan-Pakistan peace jirga of August 2007 will remain nothing more than a four-day wonder.
Analysis
Kabul and Islamabad have taken an important step back from guiding the attempt at détente. Now it’s up to the myriad others to take the nascent peace process forward.
By : Aunohita Mojumdar
Now let’s get down to business: Pakistani jirga members arrive in Kabul, August 2007
In the feeding frenzy of deadline journalism, the first-ever Afghanistan-Pakistan ‘peace jirga’ quickly turned into a snack for the mass media. Insta-pundits and participants were asked to offer snap assessments of the four-day jamboree. Demanding instantaneous declarations on whether the jirga, held 9-12 August in Kabul, had been a failure or a success, media organisations sought to simplify the phenomenon, variously terming it a ‘tribal assembly’ or reducing it to the pronouncements by Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf. But the jirga itself was much more than that.
Though termed a jirga because it was modelled on the tribal assemblies of the past, the ‘peace jirga’, like the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002 and the Constitutional Loya Jirga of 2003, included not just tribal leaders, but also politicians, warlords and refugees recently returned to their homeland. The previous jirgas had seen the proactive, behind-the-scenes presence of the international community. During the peace jirga, however, there was a concerted effort to minimise international presence, and to emphasise the indigenous nature of the event. But the fact was that the idea of the peace jirga itself was first mooted in Washington, DC last year, following the separate meetings of presidents Musharraf and Karzai with George W Bush.
Backed by the US, and held at the initiative of the Kabul and Islamabad governments, the jirga departed from the traditional script by handing over some of the lead to non-government representatives. Parliamentarians, provincial-council members, tribal leaders, elders, civil-society activists as well as representatives of Islamabad and Kabul were brought together in the marathon four-day gathering. While a high degree of government involvement ensured that the jirga did not throw up completely unpleasant surprises, the format allowed the participants to debate issues without the pressures of government agendas, diplomatic niceties and the need to produce rhetorical results.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the meeting was that it was held at all, and allowed some 700 Afghans and Pakistanis to come together and openly exchange views. In the tense and fraught relationship between the two countries (and certainly between their capitals), such exchanges are exceptional. Of late, most of the traffic between the neighbours has been one way, with Afghans travelling to Pakistan – for refuge, for employment, for trade and even, Kabul would allege, for militant training. Here was a rare opportunity for opinion-makers from the two countries to discuss outstanding crossborder issues.
The intense involvement of Pakistan over the last two decades of Afghanistan’s conflict has resulted in a constant blame game. Though much of Islamabad’s involvement was fuelled by Western powers playing out the Cold War, Kabul would now like nothing more than to lay the blame for all conflict within its borders squarely on Pakistan. This would help to absolve the Afghan government of the pressure of admitting its failures regarding internal reconciliation and power sharing with disparate political groups. Islamabad, on the other hand, would like to point fingers at this very factor, insisting that the violence is bred wholly within the neighbour, and refusing to admit that the support and safe havens inside Pakistani territory energise the violence and complicate the politics of the insurgency, allowing for no easy solution.
Attempts over the last six years to produce some kind of détente have been largely confined to the two governments, and have yielded little – instead, exacerbating tensions as the political leadership engages in the ritual finger pointing. By now stepping away from full control of the attempted peace process, the two governments can be credited with at least the realisation that peace must include a people’s engagement, as well as the task of addressing the issues of dissatisfied communities.
And peopleThe August peace jirga took cognisance of this realisation, and its eventual recommendations addressed the shortcomings of both the Pakistani and Afghan governments. A joint declaration described “terrorism” as a “common threat”, and pledged that “the government and people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centres for terrorists in their respective countries.” This is an oft repeated sentiment, of course, but a crucial difference here was the reference to “people”. The sharing of the onus of responsibility with the citizenry was further spelled out in the recommendations of the subcommittees that were set up to look at various issues. These called for “utilising tribal influence and traditional means against terrorism”, and stated that “whoever gives sanctuary to a terrorist or otherwise supports him should be identified by the concerned tribe to the government authorities.”
The declaration and recommendations, if implemented with commitment, would indeed strengthen current attempts to rein in militant elements in the frontier. Islamabad and Kabul have varying and fluctuating degrees of control in these areas, and their best-intentioned plans for implementing order would make little headway without the support of the local inhabitants and the loose power structures of tribes and communities that form the de facto frontier government.
The downside of devolving the responsibility onto the ‘people’ is that it has the potential to divest the governments of responsibility. Two such ‘local peace agreements’ – in North Waziristan, and on a much smaller scale in Musa Qala District of Helmund in Afghanistan – have unravelled spectacularly, potentially leaving the areas even more unstable than before. The insecurity in North Waziristan has recently escalated to such an extent that there were few participants from the area at the peace jirga, an absence attributed to fears of retribution from those opposing the jirga, most notably the Taliban.
Participation, or lack thereof, was one of the main weaknesses of the jirga, and this eroded some of its achievements. Missing were not only some of the tribal and community leaders from the Pakistani border areas and senior members of Pakistan’s opposition parties, but also anti-government insurgents in Afghanistan. Since the participation of Afghan delegates in the jirga mandated adherence to the Constitution and laying-down of arms, it automatically precluded any representation from those groups engaged in armed struggle.
Despite the weaknesses in participation, the meet did underline the importance of engaging with these groups. The joint declaration resolved to constitute a jirgagai, or a smaller jirga of 25 representatives from each country, which would, among other things, work to expedite the ongoing process of dialogue for peace and reconciliation with the “opposition”. When asked to spell out exactly what ‘opposition’ meant in this case, the jirga functionaries were coy about the specifics, but admitted it included those not reconciled with the government.
Regardless, the fact that the issue of reconciliation and militant sanctuaries appeared in the joint declaration represents a step forward for both governments, taken at the behest of the civil society in each country. Afghan Urban Development Minister Yousaf Pashtun told this writer that the jirga represented the two countries coming to “a more realistic approach on the issue”. Likewise, Kabul’s top official on the jirga, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Farooq Wardak, said the big achievement was that the two countries had adopted a common stand on the issue of ‘terrorism’ – a unified approach rather than that of two parties.
Much of the success or failure of the jirga will, of course, depend on the subsequent steps taken. The jirgagai is supposed to meet at regular intervals to oversee the implementation of the summit’s decisions. The five new subcommittees also have an extensive list of their own recommendations, including: relaxing trade restrictions, expediting clearance of goods at border crossings, establishing relations between the universities of the two countries, deployment of Pakistani doctors in Afghanistan, technical training of Afghans, identifying special export zones in the border areas, exchange of parliamentary delegations, establishing a crossborder chamber of commerce, cultural and media exchanges, a joint committee to counter drug trafficking, and bilateral education and social-welfare projects in militancy-affected areas.
If even a portion of these initiatives is eventually implemented, the result would be a multilayered interaction between the people of both countries. This would herald a gradual deceleration of the extant mutual hostility. By operating a step away from the governments, the members of the jirga would face less of the jingoistic pressure under which politicians inevitably find themselves. Both their mandate and their achievements would be based on real progress on peace, rather than on the shrill hostility that politicians in power often utilise to secure popular appeal.
Only time will tell whether the jirga will actually prove to be a functional blueprint for use in other parts of Southasia, where people’s engagement could be tapped to reduce hostility and lay the groundwork for solving longstanding problems. Otherwise, the Afghanistan-Pakistan peace jirga of August 2007 will remain nothing more than a four-day wonder.
Reform of Afghan police force hindered
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
FT.com site
Published: Sep 03, 2007
Reform of the Afghan police system has been hindered by neglect by the international donor community, according to a Brussels-based think-tank, leaving the force corrupt, inefficient, and politicised.
In a report released Thursday, the International Crisis Group said that despite being paid less than the army, police were being used in anti-insurgency operations for which they are ill-trained and badly equipped. Last year (May 2006-2007), 406 police officers were killed compared with 170 soldiers, it said.
There have been some improvements in terms of equipment and buildings, the report said, but the "return on invested human and financial capital is modest ".
The ICG criticised the lead nation approach in which different donor countries were given responsibility for different security sectors - the US for the Afghan National Army and Germany (recently replaced by the EU Police Mission to Afghanistan) for the police. This, it said, resulted in the "absence of a comprehensive strategy " and a failure to grasp the "centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors ".
The Afghan National Army "received the lion's share of attention though a reformed police and judiciary would have had far more impact on the average citizen's life and perception of the government's legitimacy, "according to the report.
The outcome has been the emergence of a police force that citizens view "more as a source of fear than of security, " ICG said, noting that currently even the numbers of Afghanistan's police force on duty are not known.
The report documents a highly politicised appointments procedure with factional networks and those linked to the drugs world competing for posts, especially ones that oversee smuggling routes. ICG said the Karzai government lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and end political interference, merely shuffling police chiefs from one province to another in response to complaints.
Presidential spokesperson Humayun Hamidzada said: "I have not seen the report as yet, but in general I can say the president and the government are trying seriously to reform the police. The president yesterday called a meeting of police chiefs and spoke of the urgent need of building confidence and regaining the trust of the people. "
Dr Ali Wardak, a senior researcher with the Centre for Policy and Human Development, who has not seen the report either but has been working on the issue of rule of law, said: "One of the problems with the Afghan national police is that it does not operate as an integral part of the justice system and has little to do with prosecution. The judicial system should be one system in its entirety. "
FT.com site
Published: Sep 03, 2007
Reform of the Afghan police system has been hindered by neglect by the international donor community, according to a Brussels-based think-tank, leaving the force corrupt, inefficient, and politicised.
In a report released Thursday, the International Crisis Group said that despite being paid less than the army, police were being used in anti-insurgency operations for which they are ill-trained and badly equipped. Last year (May 2006-2007), 406 police officers were killed compared with 170 soldiers, it said.
There have been some improvements in terms of equipment and buildings, the report said, but the "return on invested human and financial capital is modest ".
The ICG criticised the lead nation approach in which different donor countries were given responsibility for different security sectors - the US for the Afghan National Army and Germany (recently replaced by the EU Police Mission to Afghanistan) for the police. This, it said, resulted in the "absence of a comprehensive strategy " and a failure to grasp the "centrality of comprehensive reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors ".
The Afghan National Army "received the lion's share of attention though a reformed police and judiciary would have had far more impact on the average citizen's life and perception of the government's legitimacy, "according to the report.
The outcome has been the emergence of a police force that citizens view "more as a source of fear than of security, " ICG said, noting that currently even the numbers of Afghanistan's police force on duty are not known.
The report documents a highly politicised appointments procedure with factional networks and those linked to the drugs world competing for posts, especially ones that oversee smuggling routes. ICG said the Karzai government lacks the political will to tackle a culture of impunity and end political interference, merely shuffling police chiefs from one province to another in response to complaints.
Presidential spokesperson Humayun Hamidzada said: "I have not seen the report as yet, but in general I can say the president and the government are trying seriously to reform the police. The president yesterday called a meeting of police chiefs and spoke of the urgent need of building confidence and regaining the trust of the people. "
Dr Ali Wardak, a senior researcher with the Centre for Policy and Human Development, who has not seen the report either but has been working on the issue of rule of law, said: "One of the problems with the Afghan national police is that it does not operate as an integral part of the justice system and has little to do with prosecution. The judicial system should be one system in its entirety. "
Karzai blames west for poppy 'explosion'
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul and Alex Barker and James Blitz,in London,
Financial TimesPublished: Aug 30, 2007
Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, yesterday launch-ed a powerful attack on the international community's failure to come up with a coherent counter-narcotics strategy for his country, blaming the west for Afghanistan's explosion in opium poppy cultivation.
In the aftermath of a United Nations report showing that opium production soared in Afghanistan by 34 per cent last year, Mr Karzai said there was insufficient co-operation among members of the international community in the fight against drug production in Afghanistan.
The president told journalists in Kabul that part ofthe problem facing Afghan-istan was that theinternational community had not respected the Kabulgovernment's proposals to reduce poppy production.
Mr Karzai did not explain which ideas were being over-ruled, but said: "Wherever the government is present, the drug fight is successful but where the government is overshadowed it is not successful."
Mr Karzai's comments were strongly rebutted by the UK government in London, which is leading the international fight against opium production in Afghanistan.
Britain has been under pressure on the issue because this week's report from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime showed that the biggest increase in opium production last year took place in Helmand province, where British troops are fighting the Taliban insurgency.
"The Afghan CounterNarcotics strategy is an Afghan-owned strategy and supported by the international community," a Foreign Office spokesman said last night.
"It has shown signs of progress in some provinces, and we are following the same approach in Helmand. The increase of cultivation in Helmand is a real concern but we are working very hard, side by side withthe Afghan authorities, to provide the security that will allow the counter-narcotics strategy to take hold."
British officials argue that there is no easy solution to Afghanistan's drugs problem.
"Bringing down drugs production [in Afghanistan] will take 10 to 15 years," one senior official said yesterday.
British officials say production has been soaring in Helmand because of rising insecurity and because the Taliban are taking a more active role in the trade.
British officials argue that production can only be brought down by a balanced strategy that improves incentives for farmers to switch crops, better governance and more targetederadication.
Nato has also adjusted its tactics to step up eradication in recognition of the links between the Taliban insurgency and the drugs trade. Nato will therefore provide greater support for Afghan law enforcement.
Senior US officials are keen to use aerial crop spraying as a means of tackling the soaring production rates in some of the country's provinces.
However, crop spraying has been strongly resisted by many European, Afghan and Nato officials who fear it will force farmers to shift their support away from the Afghan government and towards the Taliban insurgency.
Some western officials also believe the Afghans need to be more proactive themselves in the fight against the narcotics trade.
"We do need high-level arrests to begin to disrupt the big traffickers," said one official.
"We're slowly seeing some progress on this from the Afghans."
Financial TimesPublished: Aug 30, 2007
Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, yesterday launch-ed a powerful attack on the international community's failure to come up with a coherent counter-narcotics strategy for his country, blaming the west for Afghanistan's explosion in opium poppy cultivation.
In the aftermath of a United Nations report showing that opium production soared in Afghanistan by 34 per cent last year, Mr Karzai said there was insufficient co-operation among members of the international community in the fight against drug production in Afghanistan.
The president told journalists in Kabul that part ofthe problem facing Afghan-istan was that theinternational community had not respected the Kabulgovernment's proposals to reduce poppy production.
Mr Karzai did not explain which ideas were being over-ruled, but said: "Wherever the government is present, the drug fight is successful but where the government is overshadowed it is not successful."
Mr Karzai's comments were strongly rebutted by the UK government in London, which is leading the international fight against opium production in Afghanistan.
Britain has been under pressure on the issue because this week's report from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime showed that the biggest increase in opium production last year took place in Helmand province, where British troops are fighting the Taliban insurgency.
"The Afghan CounterNarcotics strategy is an Afghan-owned strategy and supported by the international community," a Foreign Office spokesman said last night.
"It has shown signs of progress in some provinces, and we are following the same approach in Helmand. The increase of cultivation in Helmand is a real concern but we are working very hard, side by side withthe Afghan authorities, to provide the security that will allow the counter-narcotics strategy to take hold."
British officials argue that there is no easy solution to Afghanistan's drugs problem.
"Bringing down drugs production [in Afghanistan] will take 10 to 15 years," one senior official said yesterday.
British officials say production has been soaring in Helmand because of rising insecurity and because the Taliban are taking a more active role in the trade.
British officials argue that production can only be brought down by a balanced strategy that improves incentives for farmers to switch crops, better governance and more targetederadication.
Nato has also adjusted its tactics to step up eradication in recognition of the links between the Taliban insurgency and the drugs trade. Nato will therefore provide greater support for Afghan law enforcement.
Senior US officials are keen to use aerial crop spraying as a means of tackling the soaring production rates in some of the country's provinces.
However, crop spraying has been strongly resisted by many European, Afghan and Nato officials who fear it will force farmers to shift their support away from the Afghan government and towards the Taliban insurgency.
Some western officials also believe the Afghans need to be more proactive themselves in the fight against the narcotics trade.
"We do need high-level arrests to begin to disrupt the big traffickers," said one official.
"We're slowly seeing some progress on this from the Afghans."
Afghanistan on course for record opium crop, says UN
By Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
Financial TimesPublished:
Aug 28, 2007
This year's opium harvest in Afghanistan is projected to reach record levels, up 34 per cent on 2006, with Helmand province "single-handedly" becoming the world's largest source of illicit drugs, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime said yesterday.
Better yields have combined with a 17 per cent increase in land under cultivation to undermine poppy- eradication efforts and produce a record harvest of 8,200 tonnes. Afghanistan accounted for 92 per cent of global production, with an area of opium cultivation larger than the combined coca cultivation area in Latin America, said UNODC.
Most of the increased production is concentrated in unstable southern provinces, which account for 80 per cent of cultivation. The largest rise has been in the volatile province of Helmand, where British troops are fighting insurgency.
The number of northern and central provinces free of opium doubled to 13. In Balkh, a northern province, opium cultivation has been cut to zero from 7,200 hectares last year.
Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC's executive director, said poverty could not be used as an excuse since the south had some of the country's most fertile land and provinces in the centre and north had half the per capita income of the south.
Poppy-growing was linked to insecurity and inversely related to the degree of government control. Mr Costa has called for higher rewards for non-opium farmers and warned that delay in disbursing assistance could lead to opium-free provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation. Calling for greater deterrents to planting poppies, he urged an end to practices enabling rich land-lords to evade eradication.
The total area under op-ium cultivation rose from 165,000 ha to 193,000 ha, with Helmand alone ac-counting for 102,770 ha, a rise of 48 per cent over last year.
Mr Costa called on Nato to extend active support to anti-narcotic operations. Nato forces have so far steered clear of dealing with the issue on the grounds that it is a task primarily for the police. He would take up the issue during the meeting of the Nato council in Brussels on September 5.
He also urged the Afghan government to submit the names of known traffickers to the UN Security Council for inclusion alongside al-Qaeda and Taliban members on a list of those barred from travelling, who have their assets seized and face extradition.
Financial TimesPublished:
Aug 28, 2007
This year's opium harvest in Afghanistan is projected to reach record levels, up 34 per cent on 2006, with Helmand province "single-handedly" becoming the world's largest source of illicit drugs, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime said yesterday.
Better yields have combined with a 17 per cent increase in land under cultivation to undermine poppy- eradication efforts and produce a record harvest of 8,200 tonnes. Afghanistan accounted for 92 per cent of global production, with an area of opium cultivation larger than the combined coca cultivation area in Latin America, said UNODC.
Most of the increased production is concentrated in unstable southern provinces, which account for 80 per cent of cultivation. The largest rise has been in the volatile province of Helmand, where British troops are fighting insurgency.
The number of northern and central provinces free of opium doubled to 13. In Balkh, a northern province, opium cultivation has been cut to zero from 7,200 hectares last year.
Antonio Maria Costa, UNODC's executive director, said poverty could not be used as an excuse since the south had some of the country's most fertile land and provinces in the centre and north had half the per capita income of the south.
Poppy-growing was linked to insecurity and inversely related to the degree of government control. Mr Costa has called for higher rewards for non-opium farmers and warned that delay in disbursing assistance could lead to opium-free provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation. Calling for greater deterrents to planting poppies, he urged an end to practices enabling rich land-lords to evade eradication.
The total area under op-ium cultivation rose from 165,000 ha to 193,000 ha, with Helmand alone ac-counting for 102,770 ha, a rise of 48 per cent over last year.
Mr Costa called on Nato to extend active support to anti-narcotic operations. Nato forces have so far steered clear of dealing with the issue on the grounds that it is a task primarily for the police. He would take up the issue during the meeting of the Nato council in Brussels on September 5.
He also urged the Afghan government to submit the names of known traffickers to the UN Security Council for inclusion alongside al-Qaeda and Taliban members on a list of those barred from travelling, who have their assets seized and face extradition.
PROFILE The people’s king
The Hindu
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Mohammed Zahir Shah presided over the last uninterrupted peace the country enjoyed.
Photo: AP An observer: Mohammed Zahir Shah at his KabuL office.
It is not often in history that an era can be defined by the lack of what didn’t exist, the absence of what didn’t occur. tO many in Afghanistan, the 40-year reign of Afghanistan’s last king is defined by exactly that — the ab sence of war and violence and major changes.
Mohammad Zahir Shah came to power when his father was assassinated in 1933. In 1973, he relinquished power to his cousin in a bloodless coup. That was the last peaceful transition that Afghanistan was to see and the last uninterrupted peace.Behind the thrnone
If the absence of violence characterised his reign, at least part of the reason was Shah’s personality. In the first 30 years of his 40-year reign, power was exercised from behind the throne. The 19-year-old boy steered by his uncles gave way to the middle-aged monarch who seemed content to allow his ambitious cousin Daud Khan to wield power as Prime Minister. In 1963, an order prohibiting members of the royal family from taking positions of power in government was promulgated. This move, popular with citizens, also helped remove his powerful and sometimes controversial Prime Minister Daud Khan.
For 10 years, Zahir Shah ruled alone. In 1964, a new constitution was adopted providing for a representative government through a bicameral parliament though the powers of the parliament were confined to the consultative process and not all members were elected. The royal family’s attitude towards women was liberal and Shah also tried to take this forward through education. Uneasy reforms
However, he lacked both the forceful personality and political savvy needed to survive in the changing social and political milieu of Afghanistan. The reforms sat uneasily on his shoulders. Easily persuaded that allowing political parties would weaken his position, he never signed the bill that would enable them to participate in parliamentary politics (a political position he shared with the current Afghan president Hamid Karzai). Liberal reforms proceeded fitfully.
Much of the development and the programmes remained confined to Kabul, as the king exercised varying degrees of control in outlying areas. For the royal family, it was a time of hunting parties and foreign visits.
A severe famine and lack of economic opportunities helped create the conditions for the removal of Shah by a determined Daud Khan, who seized power and declared Afghanistan a republic while the monarch was in Rome.
The coup supposedly took place while Shah was taking a mud bath, a story that has assumed mythic symbolism. For the next 34 years, Shah was to largely play the role of an observer, the first 29 years in Rome and the remaining in Afghanistan until his death last week.
Though he expressed disquiet with the events in his lost kingdom from time to time, his intervention never took a more forceful form and he never attempted to regain his place.
Perhaps the lack of a powerful personality was also the reason why there were attempts to reinstate him from time to time. His neutral personality was viewed as being largely acceptable to most ethnic and political groups. Comebacks
The first attempt was after the Soviet withdrawal, but failed because of the bitter opposition from conservative groups. The move saw a new lease of life in 2001, as the international community searched for a non-controversial figure following the ouster of the Taliban. Contemporary accounts of the proceedings suggest that Shah was ‘persuaded’ to drop out in favour of the US-backed Hamid Karzai. The 2004 Constitution anointed Zahir Shah the ‘father of the nation’, effectively stripping him of the last vestiges of monarchy.
Since 2002, when he returned to the country, Shah’s presence did create a political space that has now acquired a momentum. Shah was allowed to retain part of the royal palace as his personal quarters and his presence helped leverage the influence of the members of the royal family. New political front
Unsullied by the bloodletting of the last three decades, members of the royal family also command a respect denied to factional political leaders. This has emerged as an important political element in the current fractured polity of Afghanistan. The past six years has seen a concerted attempt to consolidate power in the hands of an executive style presidency, and the result has been a growing alienation and frustration of disparate political groups.
Three months ago, disparate groups, apparently sharing little in the way of a common platform other than a disenchantment with the sources of power, came together to form a new political front.
The members of the Afghanistan National Front, include the former president Burhanuddin Rabbani; the former warlord from the North Abdul Rashid Dostum; the Vice president Ahmad Zia Massoud; the former war lord from the West Ismail Khan, Younus Qanuni from the Northern Alliance and Mustafa Zahir the grandson of the former king, among others.
While their efficacy as a united front is yet to be tested, it is already clear that they wield considerable influence. Buttressed by this new political group, Northern Alliance’ Younus Qanooni has used his position as speaker of the lower house to maintain an adamant stance on parliament’s powers to dismiss ministers, the case in point being that of the Foreign Minister Dadfar Spanta.
In a nascent democracy with an ongoing demarcation of powers, the influence of the royal family will go some way in shaping the new political balance of power, the reshaping of a republic by an erstwhile monarchy.
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Mohammed Zahir Shah presided over the last uninterrupted peace the country enjoyed.
Photo: AP An observer: Mohammed Zahir Shah at his KabuL office.
It is not often in history that an era can be defined by the lack of what didn’t exist, the absence of what didn’t occur. tO many in Afghanistan, the 40-year reign of Afghanistan’s last king is defined by exactly that — the ab sence of war and violence and major changes.
Mohammad Zahir Shah came to power when his father was assassinated in 1933. In 1973, he relinquished power to his cousin in a bloodless coup. That was the last peaceful transition that Afghanistan was to see and the last uninterrupted peace.Behind the thrnone
If the absence of violence characterised his reign, at least part of the reason was Shah’s personality. In the first 30 years of his 40-year reign, power was exercised from behind the throne. The 19-year-old boy steered by his uncles gave way to the middle-aged monarch who seemed content to allow his ambitious cousin Daud Khan to wield power as Prime Minister. In 1963, an order prohibiting members of the royal family from taking positions of power in government was promulgated. This move, popular with citizens, also helped remove his powerful and sometimes controversial Prime Minister Daud Khan.
For 10 years, Zahir Shah ruled alone. In 1964, a new constitution was adopted providing for a representative government through a bicameral parliament though the powers of the parliament were confined to the consultative process and not all members were elected. The royal family’s attitude towards women was liberal and Shah also tried to take this forward through education. Uneasy reforms
However, he lacked both the forceful personality and political savvy needed to survive in the changing social and political milieu of Afghanistan. The reforms sat uneasily on his shoulders. Easily persuaded that allowing political parties would weaken his position, he never signed the bill that would enable them to participate in parliamentary politics (a political position he shared with the current Afghan president Hamid Karzai). Liberal reforms proceeded fitfully.
Much of the development and the programmes remained confined to Kabul, as the king exercised varying degrees of control in outlying areas. For the royal family, it was a time of hunting parties and foreign visits.
A severe famine and lack of economic opportunities helped create the conditions for the removal of Shah by a determined Daud Khan, who seized power and declared Afghanistan a republic while the monarch was in Rome.
The coup supposedly took place while Shah was taking a mud bath, a story that has assumed mythic symbolism. For the next 34 years, Shah was to largely play the role of an observer, the first 29 years in Rome and the remaining in Afghanistan until his death last week.
Though he expressed disquiet with the events in his lost kingdom from time to time, his intervention never took a more forceful form and he never attempted to regain his place.
Perhaps the lack of a powerful personality was also the reason why there were attempts to reinstate him from time to time. His neutral personality was viewed as being largely acceptable to most ethnic and political groups. Comebacks
The first attempt was after the Soviet withdrawal, but failed because of the bitter opposition from conservative groups. The move saw a new lease of life in 2001, as the international community searched for a non-controversial figure following the ouster of the Taliban. Contemporary accounts of the proceedings suggest that Shah was ‘persuaded’ to drop out in favour of the US-backed Hamid Karzai. The 2004 Constitution anointed Zahir Shah the ‘father of the nation’, effectively stripping him of the last vestiges of monarchy.
Since 2002, when he returned to the country, Shah’s presence did create a political space that has now acquired a momentum. Shah was allowed to retain part of the royal palace as his personal quarters and his presence helped leverage the influence of the members of the royal family. New political front
Unsullied by the bloodletting of the last three decades, members of the royal family also command a respect denied to factional political leaders. This has emerged as an important political element in the current fractured polity of Afghanistan. The past six years has seen a concerted attempt to consolidate power in the hands of an executive style presidency, and the result has been a growing alienation and frustration of disparate political groups.
Three months ago, disparate groups, apparently sharing little in the way of a common platform other than a disenchantment with the sources of power, came together to form a new political front.
The members of the Afghanistan National Front, include the former president Burhanuddin Rabbani; the former warlord from the North Abdul Rashid Dostum; the Vice president Ahmad Zia Massoud; the former war lord from the West Ismail Khan, Younus Qanuni from the Northern Alliance and Mustafa Zahir the grandson of the former king, among others.
While their efficacy as a united front is yet to be tested, it is already clear that they wield considerable influence. Buttressed by this new political group, Northern Alliance’ Younus Qanooni has used his position as speaker of the lower house to maintain an adamant stance on parliament’s powers to dismiss ministers, the case in point being that of the Foreign Minister Dadfar Spanta.
In a nascent democracy with an ongoing demarcation of powers, the influence of the royal family will go some way in shaping the new political balance of power, the reshaping of a republic by an erstwhile monarchy.
Jirga aims for dialogue
Al Jazeera
By
Aunohita Mojumdar
Security around Kabul was tight ahead of the jirgaTribal elders from two of Pakistan's most troubled zones said they would not attend the event.
The Taliban dismissed the three-day gathering as a US-organised farce.
Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, excused himself from attending by citing "engagements in the capital" as the reason for a meeting to which he agreed nearly a year ago.
But despite the party poopers, Kabul has been spruced up to receive guests from neighbouring Pakistan for a headline meeting that was first announced in Washington in September last year following separate meetings of Musharraf and Hamid Karzai, his Afghan counterpart, with George Bush, the US president.
That over 300 delegates from across the border are in the city is in itself unusual, as Pakistanis rarely visit Afghanistan.
"Travel between the two countries has mainly been in one direction. Millions of Afghans have gone to Pakistan as refugees," says Amin Mudaqiq, the Kabul bureau chief of Radio Azadi.
Need for dialogue
Exchanges, especially post-9/11, have been largely between governments.
"When the governments have been in contact there have been slight misunderstandings" says Waheed Omar, deputy assistant of the jirga.
Haseeb Humayoon, an analyst with the Kabul-based Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, an independent research centre, is more blunt, saying bilateral government dialogue has sometimes widened the gap between the two countries.
Hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani delegateshave been attending the meeting [AFP] Featuring Pakistani and Afghan representatives, the three-day meeting is modelled on a tradition of calling jirgas - or tribal assemblies - in times of crisis.
And the rationale for a jirga that aims to take debate away from the strictures of formal government has never been more pressing.Both countries have seen the worst instability in territories that straddle the international border.
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have only limited control over these areas, where tribal elders hold particular influence and where the Taliban and al-Qaeda hold bases. If tribal elders, community leaders or residents who provide food and shelter to the insurgents in the border regions were to be convinced to turn against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the fighters would find it difficult to maintain their campaigns.
"If this jirga endorses punishment of the extremists, then the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have a legal [that is, acceptable to the tribal communities] basis for carrying out military operations in those areas," says Mudaqiq, adding that the political impact of any negative fallout from such operations would be much reduced.
Though the problem is too complex to be solved with one peace jirga, this week's council meeting could be a step towards reducing a long history of tension, he says.
Pessimistic view
Shinkai Karokhail, a member of the lower house of Afghanistan's parliament, endorses Mudaqiq's view. Emphasising that she cannot talk about what the result of the jirga may be, she says it is a good step in opening a dialogue.
The jirga will aim to foster mutualunderstanding on security issuesShe is hopeful there might be a change of attitude in Pakistan, since it has also felt the impact of terrorism in its own territory. She points out that Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, Pakistan's interior minister and that country's leader of the jirga, was himself the victim of an attack. Not everyone is quite so optimistic. Mustafa Kazemi, the spokesperson of the newly formed united front, which is now commonly viewed as Afghanistan’s first opposition, dismissed the jirga days before it began. Ramazan Bashar Dost, an outspoken Afghan MP, attacked the jirga on grounds that it was a futile exercise. Ahmed, a young Afghan, feels the real issue is one of ownership and power sharing. Calling Karzai's government US-dominated, he says: "Pashtuns will not come to Kabul while the Americans are here. In my village they came looking for me. I was not there but my cousin's son is now in Guantanamo and he has been there for the last six years. They have reduced the heroes of yesterday to terrorists."
Scope of meeting
The internal opposition to the government is something that the country has to deal with on its own and is not a bilateral issue, Omar says. The jirga will only examine the sanctuary and support provided to the insurgents in the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan's prime minister, said in his opening speech that global terrorism, Afghanistan's home-grown insurgency and the phenomenon of Talibanisation affecting Pakistan's own border areas were his country's main concerns.
However, Aziz also claimed that Afghanistan was not at peace with itself, adding that Kabul could not blame anyone else for this failure.
Some feel that the issues outlined by Aziz are already well known by the various parties concerned, but Omar says the jirga is an attempt to increase understanding.
The people of the affected areas, he says, "felt that they were ignored in addressing the problem they were most affected by. They felt the governments had taken the most superficial policy against terrorists and insurgents and that they were the ones who should have been asked. We feel this [jirga] is part of the democratic process."
By
Aunohita Mojumdar
Security around Kabul was tight ahead of the jirgaTribal elders from two of Pakistan's most troubled zones said they would not attend the event.
The Taliban dismissed the three-day gathering as a US-organised farce.
Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, excused himself from attending by citing "engagements in the capital" as the reason for a meeting to which he agreed nearly a year ago.
But despite the party poopers, Kabul has been spruced up to receive guests from neighbouring Pakistan for a headline meeting that was first announced in Washington in September last year following separate meetings of Musharraf and Hamid Karzai, his Afghan counterpart, with George Bush, the US president.
That over 300 delegates from across the border are in the city is in itself unusual, as Pakistanis rarely visit Afghanistan.
"Travel between the two countries has mainly been in one direction. Millions of Afghans have gone to Pakistan as refugees," says Amin Mudaqiq, the Kabul bureau chief of Radio Azadi.
Need for dialogue
Exchanges, especially post-9/11, have been largely between governments.
"When the governments have been in contact there have been slight misunderstandings" says Waheed Omar, deputy assistant of the jirga.
Haseeb Humayoon, an analyst with the Kabul-based Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, an independent research centre, is more blunt, saying bilateral government dialogue has sometimes widened the gap between the two countries.
Hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani delegateshave been attending the meeting [AFP] Featuring Pakistani and Afghan representatives, the three-day meeting is modelled on a tradition of calling jirgas - or tribal assemblies - in times of crisis.
And the rationale for a jirga that aims to take debate away from the strictures of formal government has never been more pressing.Both countries have seen the worst instability in territories that straddle the international border.
The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have only limited control over these areas, where tribal elders hold particular influence and where the Taliban and al-Qaeda hold bases. If tribal elders, community leaders or residents who provide food and shelter to the insurgents in the border regions were to be convinced to turn against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the fighters would find it difficult to maintain their campaigns.
"If this jirga endorses punishment of the extremists, then the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have a legal [that is, acceptable to the tribal communities] basis for carrying out military operations in those areas," says Mudaqiq, adding that the political impact of any negative fallout from such operations would be much reduced.
Though the problem is too complex to be solved with one peace jirga, this week's council meeting could be a step towards reducing a long history of tension, he says.
Pessimistic view
Shinkai Karokhail, a member of the lower house of Afghanistan's parliament, endorses Mudaqiq's view. Emphasising that she cannot talk about what the result of the jirga may be, she says it is a good step in opening a dialogue.
The jirga will aim to foster mutualunderstanding on security issuesShe is hopeful there might be a change of attitude in Pakistan, since it has also felt the impact of terrorism in its own territory. She points out that Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, Pakistan's interior minister and that country's leader of the jirga, was himself the victim of an attack. Not everyone is quite so optimistic. Mustafa Kazemi, the spokesperson of the newly formed united front, which is now commonly viewed as Afghanistan’s first opposition, dismissed the jirga days before it began. Ramazan Bashar Dost, an outspoken Afghan MP, attacked the jirga on grounds that it was a futile exercise. Ahmed, a young Afghan, feels the real issue is one of ownership and power sharing. Calling Karzai's government US-dominated, he says: "Pashtuns will not come to Kabul while the Americans are here. In my village they came looking for me. I was not there but my cousin's son is now in Guantanamo and he has been there for the last six years. They have reduced the heroes of yesterday to terrorists."
Scope of meeting
The internal opposition to the government is something that the country has to deal with on its own and is not a bilateral issue, Omar says. The jirga will only examine the sanctuary and support provided to the insurgents in the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan's prime minister, said in his opening speech that global terrorism, Afghanistan's home-grown insurgency and the phenomenon of Talibanisation affecting Pakistan's own border areas were his country's main concerns.
However, Aziz also claimed that Afghanistan was not at peace with itself, adding that Kabul could not blame anyone else for this failure.
Some feel that the issues outlined by Aziz are already well known by the various parties concerned, but Omar says the jirga is an attempt to increase understanding.
The people of the affected areas, he says, "felt that they were ignored in addressing the problem they were most affected by. They felt the governments had taken the most superficial policy against terrorists and insurgents and that they were the ones who should have been asked. We feel this [jirga] is part of the democratic process."
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