Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN

Himal December 2007

Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN
The long shadow
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.