Afghanistan 2007
South Asia Journal
Afghanistan completed its sixth year since the removal of the Taliban with an erratic record of post conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. Though designated as a ‘post-conflict’ country since November 2001, the country continued to see pitched battles with Taliban in large parts of Southern Afghanistan as well as intermittent incidents of violence in others parts of the country. The capital Kabul saw explosions, suicide bombings and rocket attacks and Taliban activities crept closer to the capital. The province of Ghazni was used as a base by the Taliban for their kidnapping of the Korean hostages, an event which also allowed the Taliban to openly hold a press conference, the first since 2001.
In several parts of the South, the Taliban were able to hold districts for varying lengths of time until the government and international forces were able to take control again. There were repeated calls for more troops contribution from the NATO countries, but numbers continued to fall short of what was required given the magnitude of problem. The resource constraint as well as operational methods used by some of the countries also led to heavy reliance on air power and concurrently high rates of civilian casualties. While no exact numbers were made public, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour expressed concern over the civilian casualties during her visit to Afghanistan, terming it “alarming.”
The year also saw a change in the command and control structure of NATO-led ISAF. The rotational system of command where a single NATO member country assumed command was replaced and the ISAF troops will henceforth be commanded an American general in perpetuity.
Other developments on the security front saw the Afghan National Army grow at a slow incremental rate and this year saw greater emphasis on the need for building up the Afghan National Police. Alarmingly, the call for rearming village communities as a means of meeting the shortfall of regular forces, both international and national, continued to gain ground. The first step saw the deployment of the auxiliary police, drawn from the local community and under the command of local commanders. The auxiliary police were deployed with less training than the regular forces.
While government and international forces claimed that they had turned the corner and forced the Taliban to adopt desperate strategies like suicide bombings there appeared to be no let up in the violence. A major suicide bombing in the relatively peaceful province of Baghlan towards the end of the year shocked the country claiming the lives of several parliamentarians visiting the province, including the spokesman of the United National Front and former Minister of Commerce, Syed Mustafa Kazemi.
The United National Front emerged as the political opposition to the government this year, bringing together members of the Northern Alliance, as well as powerful former commanders and members of the royal family who had not played an overt political part in recent years. The year also saw the death of the last king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who had returned to the country as the ‘father of the nation’.
The country’s parliament, dominated by members of the United National Front also continued to function as an opposition, coming into regular confrontation with the government. The most visible conflict arose after the parliament dismissed two ministers for non performance. While President Hamid Karzai accepted one dismissal he challenged the other seeking and obtaining a Supreme Court decision against it. However Parliament refused to accept it, claiming that the government was trying to subvert parliamentary prerogative, and the country saw the bizarre spectacle of a foreign minister who dealt with foreign countries and the international community while parliament refused to accept his authority.
The parliament also succeeded in passing a resolution seeking to grant amnesty to all those who had participated in the ‘jehad’ of the last few decades, immunizing warlords and their followers from any prosecution for war crimes or criminal acts. The amnesty, though criticised by the international community, was made into legislation with presidential assent with minor changes. Despite having accepted the plan for transitional justice, the government dragged its feet on implementing any part of it.
President Karzai’s apparent ‘weakness’ was the subject of some criticism from some of the international partners who also drew attention to the inefficiency and corruption in governance. The Afghan government on its part continued seeking greater ownership over the aid being routed into this country. With an estimated 75% of the aid flowing into the ‘external’ budget(i.e. not through the government), the government argued that it can neither build capacity nor assert its authority without control over resources. The international aid community however argued that lack of capacity and endemic corruption in the government prevents it from routing its resources through the government. A significant portion of the aid through the external budget however flows out of the country leading to resentment in the local population. An assessment of the $1.36 billion spent in the Afghan year1384 revealed that the local impact was 31.2%.
Whatever the arguments, the limited efficacy of the aid delivered to Afghanistan so far is clearly visible on the ground. The conflict with the Taliban and the violence occupy the major portion of attention on Afghanistan and the more insidious violence gets much less notice. Though larger numbers of children enrolled in schools and health services improved in some parts of the country, the 2007 National Human Development Report revealed that human development indicators were lower than what was estimated at the time the reconstruction began.
Afghanistan’s HDI ranking was 174, only above the three lowest countries of Niger, Sierra Leone and Mali. The NHDR for 2007, the second since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, reveals a literacy rate of 23.5%, down from the 2004 assessment which put it at 28.7%. Life expectancy is also lower at 43.1 years compared to 44.5 in the past. International aid still fell woefully short of requirements, while government revenues remained at a dismal 7% of the GDP. Disbursement of aid over 2002-2005 was $83 per capita, even though the Afghan government estimated at a minimum of $168 per capita was needed for minimal stablisation.
According to the latest National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 30% of the population remains below the minimum level of dietary energy consumption and only 31% has access to safe drinking water. The rate of infant mortality has dropped from 165 per 1000 to 135 per 1000, but the maternal mortality ratio has remained unchanged at 1600 per 100,000 live births, one of the highest in the world.
The situation of women in Afghanistan remains one of the most dismal and the country has a Gender Development Index which ranks it alongside Niger. Despite the removal of the Taliban who were seen as one of the most important reasons for oppression of women, the situation of women has improved only tangentially. Though the country has one of the highest number of women parliamentarians thanks to reservation of seats in the first parliamentary elections, the women parliamentarians are severely disempowered to exercise their roles. There are few women in public service and even fewer in high office. Women’s rights has remained more a token declaration with token representation in the form of one woman cabinet minister and one woman governor.
Violence against women continued in many horrific forms, most patently in the domestic sphere with considerable evidence of forced marriages including child marriages and domestic violence. The practice of suicides and self immolations by women desperate to escape their marriage received some public attention but apart from sporadic and isolated efforts there was little to signal the engagement of either the international community or the Afghan government on this issue. Those working in the area of gender rights continued their effort to reverse or mitigate the worst impacts of customary law and practice which treat women as property. The conflation of several trends – the customary practices, war, the displacement of populations, the return of refugees, the advent of the consumer culture and its commodification of women and the attempts to introduce a more liberal approach – sees an increasingly confrontational approach on the issue of women’s role, rights and participation in the public space.
The country recorded a high growth rate but the economic progress has been patchy and uneven, its inequality hidden behind a façade of glitzy malls in capital cities, new shops and businesses, palatial houses and plenty of hot money that prop up an artificial economy.
Much of the ostentatious wealth was attributed to the narco-economy. The year saw a record opium cultivation. With this Afghanistan, already the world’s single largest supplier of opium, also surpassed any other country in history to have produced opium on such a large scale. An increased acreage of 17% combined with good weather conditions forecasts an increase in opium production by 34%. There were continuing differences of opinion within the international community on the best counter narcotics strategy. At the level of implementation, actions continued to be carried out in selective areas to crackdown on opium farmers with very little enforcement on interdiction, or high value targets like drug traffickers.
Attention continued to be drawn to the linkages between criminals, drug traffickers, terrorists and anti-government elements but yielded little results with security operations continuing in a fractured manner- the US Coalition forces responsible for the war against terror, the NATO-led ISAF responsible for counter insurgency and the police entrusted to deal with counter narcotics. One southern district of Helmund alone accounting for an increase of 48% in opium cultivation.
Helmund proved to be a critical location in more ways than one. The Musa Qala district shot into the limelight following an ‘agreement’ for a ceasefire. The deal, ostensibly between the government authorities and the local tribal elders, resulted in NATO withdrawing its forces from the area in exchange for a guarantee of peace and no Taliban activities in a demarcated area. The agreement, sold as a new way of engaging the tribal community fell through soon however with the area becoming a safe haven for the Taliban. It was only pitched battles at the end of the year that resulted in the government forces supported by NATO’s British troops taking back control.
The need for engaging communities however was given some precedence this year in different forms. A peace jirga between tribal elders from the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan along with government officials and parliamentarians resulted in the first Pak-Afghan peace jirga taking discussions on violence and peace beyond the government to government talks. There were other attempts to engage the communities at the local and provincial level by international organisations as well as NGOs.
The concept of bringing the moderate Taliban back into the fold also gained momentum with renewed calls for holding negotiations. While no details of specific talks were made public, there was continuing anecdotal evidence of overtures between parts of the Taliban and anti government leaderships and the authorities at various levels.
Negotiations with the Taliban led to successful outcomes on atleast two occasions The ICRC mediated between the Taliban and Korean authorities for the release of the Korean hostages and the UN agencies successfully negotiated days of tranquillity that allowed them to carry out much needed vaccinations campaigns in difficult areas of the South after the Taliban assured them of safe passage.
While events on the ground did not provide a cheerful outlook in 2007, one of the most significant shifts was in the overall perception, especially of the international community, that efforts for aid, development and reconstruction needed to be oriented much more towards the Afghan community.
2008 will tell whether this realisation actually results in concrete results and greater cohesiveness of effort that will bring about substantial changes in the lives of Afghans. ‘Afghanisation’ of the process of helping Afghans in the seventh year of rebuilding their country will be a remarkable step forward.
April 05, 2008
Life here is bleak
Life here is bleak
Times of India/February 12, 2008
Escalating violence in Afghanistan and the attention that it commands worldwide has obscured the far more dangerous but insidious phenomenon of a resurgence of political, social and cultural intolerance inside the country. Occupied with the overt aspects of the spread of the Taliban- territorially and in terms of their military capacity- the international community has paid little attention to the slow but steady growth of fundamentalism.
This trend is making itself visible in different ways: through increasing curbs on women, restrictions on moral and social codes of behaviour, controls on a vibrant and independent media, curtailment of rights and restorative justice, intolerance of political opposition and increasing hostility towards foreigners.
Though most of these phenomena are popularly associated with the Taliban and their ideology, Afghanistan today clearly shows that fundamentalism is not limited solely to a narrow political grouping. It never was.
In the run up to 9/11 and thereafter, the Taliban, stripped of their utility as an easy means of accessing the region’s energy, were slowly and steadily turned into global pariahs. Their interpretation of Islam was seen as a horrific violation of human rights, especially evident in their treatment of women. There was little attempt to understand the roots of their ideology, since it was much easier to treat the Taliban as an alien phenomenon, a tumour, that could be surgically removed. Ergo, it was assumed the removal of the Taliban would also remove the ideology, with Afghans rushing to embrace democratic freedoms. Nothing could be further from the truth.
While the Taliban certainly alienated large sections of the population with their strict interpretation of codes of behaviour, in some areas of the country and in some aspects their interpretation only differed in minor degree with behaviour that had been traditionally practiced. Customary law, portions of which would be considered barbaric in modern jurisprudence, has governed Afghanistan’s rule of law and according to current data, 80% of the country’s cases are still resolved through it.
Even in the government’s judicial system, the application of law is often guided if not governed by custom. Take for example Afghanistan’s largest prison, the Pul e Charkhi prison on the outskirts of Kabul. A UNODC study of the population of women prisoners revealed that half the women prisoners were incarcerated for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for running away from abusive situations.
The women, most of whom were victims of abuse, were being treated as perpetrators for having left home. Treated as property in an extremely patriarchal system, a woman is a possession who cannot leave home without permission.
Afghanistan’s parliament also attempted to pass a legislation requiring women in public office to have a mehram or male escort from the close family members to accompany them when abroad. The upper house of parliament sought to reduce the age of majority of girls to 13. Both moves were fortunately thwarted.
On the issue of ‘human rights’, the pursuance of reparation for war crimes is being dismissed easily and simplistically as a ‘western’ and hence alien concept, while the country’s parliament accorded amnesty to all those who participated in the conflict of the last decades, a move endorsed by President Karzai. The international community which worked to remove the Taliban from power has been strangely silent on these moves.
This is not to say that there is little difference between life under the Taliban and now. Far from it. The Taliban’s interpretation represented an extreme end of the fundamentalism. The intolerance that characterised their approach has however not disappeared.
Despite an overt veneer of liberal institutions of democracy Afghanistan today faces the likelihood of an increasing confrontation between forces of intolerance and a more democratic polity that will be increasingly posited as a ‘clash of civilisations’ by those keen to cling to old structures of power.
References to Afghanistan’s age-old culture and its traditions notwithstanding, it is clear that thirty years of war have had an enormous impact in shaping both. There is perhaps not a single tradition or practice that has not been shaped by the tumult. Whether it is the traditions practiced by those who stayed behind in this country, modified and affected by war, the traditions of those who were internally displaced, moving from one cultural milieu to another, the practices modified by those who spent years in refugee camps , or the educated and the elite who managed to carve out new lives for themselves in developed countries, Afghanistan’s traditions have been either preserved, changed and destroyed in not one, but many ways. Now, as the different trends come together there is antagonism and hostility.
Understanding and dealing with the growth of ‘Talibanisation’ will mean looking at both the complexities as well as the origins of intolerance. Unfortunately, while the Western world treats the phenomenon simplistically, viewing the defeat of the ‘Taliban’ as an end, countries with greater experience of pluralities and complexities, like India, choose to adopt a hands off approach in terms of their political and social engagement. India appears to lack the confidence to play a role, cowed down by the overwhelming economic and political wherewithal demonstrated by countries like the US in Afghanistan. If ‘Talibanisation’ does spread in the neighbourhood, South Block can always blame Pakistan.
Times of India/February 12, 2008
Escalating violence in Afghanistan and the attention that it commands worldwide has obscured the far more dangerous but insidious phenomenon of a resurgence of political, social and cultural intolerance inside the country. Occupied with the overt aspects of the spread of the Taliban- territorially and in terms of their military capacity- the international community has paid little attention to the slow but steady growth of fundamentalism.
This trend is making itself visible in different ways: through increasing curbs on women, restrictions on moral and social codes of behaviour, controls on a vibrant and independent media, curtailment of rights and restorative justice, intolerance of political opposition and increasing hostility towards foreigners.
Though most of these phenomena are popularly associated with the Taliban and their ideology, Afghanistan today clearly shows that fundamentalism is not limited solely to a narrow political grouping. It never was.
In the run up to 9/11 and thereafter, the Taliban, stripped of their utility as an easy means of accessing the region’s energy, were slowly and steadily turned into global pariahs. Their interpretation of Islam was seen as a horrific violation of human rights, especially evident in their treatment of women. There was little attempt to understand the roots of their ideology, since it was much easier to treat the Taliban as an alien phenomenon, a tumour, that could be surgically removed. Ergo, it was assumed the removal of the Taliban would also remove the ideology, with Afghans rushing to embrace democratic freedoms. Nothing could be further from the truth.
While the Taliban certainly alienated large sections of the population with their strict interpretation of codes of behaviour, in some areas of the country and in some aspects their interpretation only differed in minor degree with behaviour that had been traditionally practiced. Customary law, portions of which would be considered barbaric in modern jurisprudence, has governed Afghanistan’s rule of law and according to current data, 80% of the country’s cases are still resolved through it.
Even in the government’s judicial system, the application of law is often guided if not governed by custom. Take for example Afghanistan’s largest prison, the Pul e Charkhi prison on the outskirts of Kabul. A UNODC study of the population of women prisoners revealed that half the women prisoners were incarcerated for ‘moral crimes’, most of them for running away from abusive situations.
The women, most of whom were victims of abuse, were being treated as perpetrators for having left home. Treated as property in an extremely patriarchal system, a woman is a possession who cannot leave home without permission.
Afghanistan’s parliament also attempted to pass a legislation requiring women in public office to have a mehram or male escort from the close family members to accompany them when abroad. The upper house of parliament sought to reduce the age of majority of girls to 13. Both moves were fortunately thwarted.
On the issue of ‘human rights’, the pursuance of reparation for war crimes is being dismissed easily and simplistically as a ‘western’ and hence alien concept, while the country’s parliament accorded amnesty to all those who participated in the conflict of the last decades, a move endorsed by President Karzai. The international community which worked to remove the Taliban from power has been strangely silent on these moves.
This is not to say that there is little difference between life under the Taliban and now. Far from it. The Taliban’s interpretation represented an extreme end of the fundamentalism. The intolerance that characterised their approach has however not disappeared.
Despite an overt veneer of liberal institutions of democracy Afghanistan today faces the likelihood of an increasing confrontation between forces of intolerance and a more democratic polity that will be increasingly posited as a ‘clash of civilisations’ by those keen to cling to old structures of power.
References to Afghanistan’s age-old culture and its traditions notwithstanding, it is clear that thirty years of war have had an enormous impact in shaping both. There is perhaps not a single tradition or practice that has not been shaped by the tumult. Whether it is the traditions practiced by those who stayed behind in this country, modified and affected by war, the traditions of those who were internally displaced, moving from one cultural milieu to another, the practices modified by those who spent years in refugee camps , or the educated and the elite who managed to carve out new lives for themselves in developed countries, Afghanistan’s traditions have been either preserved, changed and destroyed in not one, but many ways. Now, as the different trends come together there is antagonism and hostility.
Understanding and dealing with the growth of ‘Talibanisation’ will mean looking at both the complexities as well as the origins of intolerance. Unfortunately, while the Western world treats the phenomenon simplistically, viewing the defeat of the ‘Taliban’ as an end, countries with greater experience of pluralities and complexities, like India, choose to adopt a hands off approach in terms of their political and social engagement. India appears to lack the confidence to play a role, cowed down by the overwhelming economic and political wherewithal demonstrated by countries like the US in Afghanistan. If ‘Talibanisation’ does spread in the neighbourhood, South Block can always blame Pakistan.
After Serena, not so serene
After Serena, not so serene
Hard News/February 2008
An attack on Kabul's swish Serena Hotel earlier this week may have seemed like yet another incident of violence to most outside observers. But for those living in Afghanistan it represented yet another level of escalation in the ongoing violent conflict. It was not that the attack was on the rich and elite of Kabul city, nor that the attack targeted expatriates in contrast to the daily attacks which kill Afghans everyday, but that it breached one of the most fortified sites in the capital, the poshest hotel in Kabul, rebuilt by the Mumbai-based firm Shapoorji Pallonji. The attack showed the reach of the anti-government elements. This was no straightforward suicide bombing, the one phenomenon against which most security agencies say they have no defence. This was an armed attack which allowed the entry of gunmen who managed to carry out a shooting spree before they were stopped.
Though Afghanistan has been a 'post conflict' State for more than six years since the ouster of the Taliban in the American-led attack, violence has worsened in many parts of the country while parts of southern Afghanistan are embattled by continuous conflict. Sporadically, districts of the southern provinces slip out of the tenuous hold of the Hamid Karzai government into the control of the Taliban — till yet another pitched battle frees the area. Kabul the capital, relatively incident free in the first two years after the removal of the Taliban, now sees sporadic incidents of violence in the form of rocket attacks, shootings, kidnappings, bomb explosions and suicide bombings that seem to be increasing their penetrating power.
Unlike Iraq, the 'invasion' of Afghanistan had considerable support among sections of the Afghan population. However, like Iraq, America's military intervention there had more to do with its own politics and rather less to do with Afghanistan. The direct military response to 9/11, saw the removal of the Taliban, the regime which had lent support and shelter to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives. That the Taliban also had a wretched human rights record and a worse record on women's rights helped build the case for the military intervention.
Unfortunately, the inability to broaden this narrow objective has meant that much of what has happened in Afgha-nistan in the past six years has had more to do with donor-driven interests and less with the ground reality in the country.
It is no one's case that Afghanistan has not benefited from six years of 'reconstruction'. In a country where almost all infrastructure and economy had been destroyed, gains, though incremental, are clearly visible. Hundreds of schoolchildren including young girls going to school, millions of refugees returning to the country, greater access to health and the buzz of new construction. A new Constitution was introduced, a presidential election and a parliamentary election were held with less disruption than any of the Bihar polls. Visitors to Kabul might be forgiven for thinking the country has turned around, and all that is needed to spread the prosperity is time. They would be wrong.
Along with the incremental growth over the last six years are very serious systemic flaws that are even now creating new problems and making the State dysfunctional. The issue is not that progress has been slow in a very difficult place, but that many of the policies of the international (western) community are intrinsically unsound. At best, this has resulted in a short-sighted approach, putting immediate gains before sustainable goals. At worst, the interests of Afghanistan have been subverted to the interests of the international community — whether it is in terms of withholding resources or in prioritising needs.
Nothing illustrates this with as much damning evidence as the security sector. In 2001, the Bonn agreement, that provided the framework for rebuilding of the country, did not make a peace accord, but focussed on establishing a working government. Subsequently, military operations continued in areas where the Taliban and Al Qaeda were thought to be hiding, under America's Operation Enduring Freedom a part of the 'war on global terrorism'. UN mandated NATO forces, which had a broader mandate of helping secure Afghanistan, were confined to the narrow geographical boundary of Kabul. It was not until 2004 that they would begin to expand, their further expansion coinciding with the regrouping of anti-government elements, including the Taliban. At no time was the military focused on the stabilisation of Afghanistan or on securing areas that were 'cleared' of the Taliban. The result: after every military defeat the Taliban would melt away, only to return as soon as the foreign troops left, thus leaving the local population with no support, security or stakes in the military operations.
Even now, security operations in the country are compartmentalised into three distinct slots. The global war against terror is led by the US-led Coalition Forces (largely US troops under US command and control), the counter— insurgency war is waged by NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, (largely NATO troops) and the war against drugs is led by the Afghan police. This approach rests on a naïve presumption of the lack of interlinkages between the three problems, undermining the efforts to deal with each of them. The compartmentalisation has also resulted in very different tactical approaches to the military operations being conducted, resulting in confusion and controversy.
The reluctance of the western nations to put boots on the ground has also resulted in sparse deployment of troops. The upshot is heavy reliance on air power with its concomitant “collateral damage”, the euphemism for the killing of civilians. The consequence of this is increasing public hostility which is bolstered by the UN's apparent inability to take a firm stand on this issue. Despite some sporadic statements calling for an end to the high civilian casualties, no effort has been made to document or investigate these charges in a systematic manner, an effort that would go a long way to restore public confidence in the government and the international community, as well as blunt the edge of public anger fuelled by injustice.
While the disinclination of troop-contributing countries to contribute greater numbers has some validity, it is less evident why the western nations failed to pursue the one goal that would have helped reduce Afghanistan's dependence on them — the building up of Afghanistan's forces, both the army and the police. Instead of focussing on strengthening the legitimate use of force, the international community, faced with growing instability, has now endorsed the rearming of communities through the auxiliary police, a euphemism for giving guns and power back to the very same commanders who they spent five years trying to disarm. The consequences of this short-sighted approach will be visible in Afghanistan in the coming months and years.
Last but not the least, is the pendulum approach to the 'Taliban'. Though anti-government forces are of different kinds, the demonisation of the Taliban and efforts to apportion a monolithic identity to all anti-government forces has led to a limited understanding of the problems of power-sharing in this complex land. Six years after the Taliban were ousted from power, the pendulum of policy swings between making peace with the Taliban as the only way forward to deporting those who are talking to them.
The writer is a senior journalist based in Kabul
Hard News/February 2008
An attack on Kabul's swish Serena Hotel earlier this week may have seemed like yet another incident of violence to most outside observers. But for those living in Afghanistan it represented yet another level of escalation in the ongoing violent conflict. It was not that the attack was on the rich and elite of Kabul city, nor that the attack targeted expatriates in contrast to the daily attacks which kill Afghans everyday, but that it breached one of the most fortified sites in the capital, the poshest hotel in Kabul, rebuilt by the Mumbai-based firm Shapoorji Pallonji. The attack showed the reach of the anti-government elements. This was no straightforward suicide bombing, the one phenomenon against which most security agencies say they have no defence. This was an armed attack which allowed the entry of gunmen who managed to carry out a shooting spree before they were stopped.
Though Afghanistan has been a 'post conflict' State for more than six years since the ouster of the Taliban in the American-led attack, violence has worsened in many parts of the country while parts of southern Afghanistan are embattled by continuous conflict. Sporadically, districts of the southern provinces slip out of the tenuous hold of the Hamid Karzai government into the control of the Taliban — till yet another pitched battle frees the area. Kabul the capital, relatively incident free in the first two years after the removal of the Taliban, now sees sporadic incidents of violence in the form of rocket attacks, shootings, kidnappings, bomb explosions and suicide bombings that seem to be increasing their penetrating power.
Unlike Iraq, the 'invasion' of Afghanistan had considerable support among sections of the Afghan population. However, like Iraq, America's military intervention there had more to do with its own politics and rather less to do with Afghanistan. The direct military response to 9/11, saw the removal of the Taliban, the regime which had lent support and shelter to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives. That the Taliban also had a wretched human rights record and a worse record on women's rights helped build the case for the military intervention.
Unfortunately, the inability to broaden this narrow objective has meant that much of what has happened in Afgha-nistan in the past six years has had more to do with donor-driven interests and less with the ground reality in the country.
It is no one's case that Afghanistan has not benefited from six years of 'reconstruction'. In a country where almost all infrastructure and economy had been destroyed, gains, though incremental, are clearly visible. Hundreds of schoolchildren including young girls going to school, millions of refugees returning to the country, greater access to health and the buzz of new construction. A new Constitution was introduced, a presidential election and a parliamentary election were held with less disruption than any of the Bihar polls. Visitors to Kabul might be forgiven for thinking the country has turned around, and all that is needed to spread the prosperity is time. They would be wrong.
Along with the incremental growth over the last six years are very serious systemic flaws that are even now creating new problems and making the State dysfunctional. The issue is not that progress has been slow in a very difficult place, but that many of the policies of the international (western) community are intrinsically unsound. At best, this has resulted in a short-sighted approach, putting immediate gains before sustainable goals. At worst, the interests of Afghanistan have been subverted to the interests of the international community — whether it is in terms of withholding resources or in prioritising needs.
Nothing illustrates this with as much damning evidence as the security sector. In 2001, the Bonn agreement, that provided the framework for rebuilding of the country, did not make a peace accord, but focussed on establishing a working government. Subsequently, military operations continued in areas where the Taliban and Al Qaeda were thought to be hiding, under America's Operation Enduring Freedom a part of the 'war on global terrorism'. UN mandated NATO forces, which had a broader mandate of helping secure Afghanistan, were confined to the narrow geographical boundary of Kabul. It was not until 2004 that they would begin to expand, their further expansion coinciding with the regrouping of anti-government elements, including the Taliban. At no time was the military focused on the stabilisation of Afghanistan or on securing areas that were 'cleared' of the Taliban. The result: after every military defeat the Taliban would melt away, only to return as soon as the foreign troops left, thus leaving the local population with no support, security or stakes in the military operations.
Even now, security operations in the country are compartmentalised into three distinct slots. The global war against terror is led by the US-led Coalition Forces (largely US troops under US command and control), the counter— insurgency war is waged by NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, (largely NATO troops) and the war against drugs is led by the Afghan police. This approach rests on a naïve presumption of the lack of interlinkages between the three problems, undermining the efforts to deal with each of them. The compartmentalisation has also resulted in very different tactical approaches to the military operations being conducted, resulting in confusion and controversy.
The reluctance of the western nations to put boots on the ground has also resulted in sparse deployment of troops. The upshot is heavy reliance on air power with its concomitant “collateral damage”, the euphemism for the killing of civilians. The consequence of this is increasing public hostility which is bolstered by the UN's apparent inability to take a firm stand on this issue. Despite some sporadic statements calling for an end to the high civilian casualties, no effort has been made to document or investigate these charges in a systematic manner, an effort that would go a long way to restore public confidence in the government and the international community, as well as blunt the edge of public anger fuelled by injustice.
While the disinclination of troop-contributing countries to contribute greater numbers has some validity, it is less evident why the western nations failed to pursue the one goal that would have helped reduce Afghanistan's dependence on them — the building up of Afghanistan's forces, both the army and the police. Instead of focussing on strengthening the legitimate use of force, the international community, faced with growing instability, has now endorsed the rearming of communities through the auxiliary police, a euphemism for giving guns and power back to the very same commanders who they spent five years trying to disarm. The consequences of this short-sighted approach will be visible in Afghanistan in the coming months and years.
Last but not the least, is the pendulum approach to the 'Taliban'. Though anti-government forces are of different kinds, the demonisation of the Taliban and efforts to apportion a monolithic identity to all anti-government forces has led to a limited understanding of the problems of power-sharing in this complex land. Six years after the Taliban were ousted from power, the pendulum of policy swings between making peace with the Taliban as the only way forward to deporting those who are talking to them.
The writer is a senior journalist based in Kabul
Afghanistan gets ready for tourists
Afghanistan gets ready for tourists
Al Jazeera/January 2008
Afiyat Khan, a former mujahideen soldier, survived numerous gun battles and the US invasion of his country, but nothing had prepared him for the challenge of climbing the Italian Alps in 2005.
"I didn't know there was something called equipment and mountaineering gear. It was also very expensive," said the 28-year-old amateur mountaineer from the village of Qazideh in Afghanistan's Badakshan province.
Khan was one of a handful of Afghans selected by Mountain Wilderness, a Rome-based organisation, for the first mountaineering training course in Europe for Afghans.
Headed by Carlo Alberto Pinelli, the well-known Italian mountaineer, Mountain Wilderness has for the past few years offered environment-friendly mountaineering courses for Afghan youngsters in the hope that they will work as guides in the mountain areas.
Soon after the fall of the Taliban, Mountain Wilderness organised the Oxus Mission: Mountains for Peace, with the aim of reopening some of Afghanistan's mountains to tourism.
Isolated region
In the 1970's, the stunningly beautiful wilderness of the Badakshan province, along the Wakhan land corridor in the Hindu Kush bordering the Oxus River, was a big draw for mountaineers from all over the world.
"I had heard many tales from my father, the headman of our village, who would accompany foreign tourists into the mountains," Khan told Al Jazeera.
Morning sets across the Badakshan mountain
range [Anne Feenstra]
But in 1979, Soviet troops crossed the Oxus River bordering the Wakhan Corridor, from Tajikistan, bringing regional tourism to an end.
Three decades of war put an end to adventure travel in this exotic land, making climbing, trekking, hiking and other outdoor sports a hazardous activity even now.
The area was so inaccessible that Badakshan became the only province in the country where the Taliban could not gain a foothold during their rule of the country; the terrain was a natural barrier against the movement of mechanised infantry and material.
The province paid a price for this. As the only "opposition" stronghold it was also completely cut off from the Taliban "government".
The international borders - the Tajik north and Pakistan to the west - were sealed even to the normal traffic of goods and locals that comprised the economy.
This pushed the region into severe economic deprivation, forcing it to rely completely on an agro-pastoral economy and humanitarian aid from international agencies.
Mountaineering
But Afiyat Khan is one of a growing number of Afghans hoping to resuscitate the country's defunct mountaineering tourism industry.
The Hindu Kush Wakhan Corridor in
northern Afghanistan.
He is currently working as a master mason on a visitor's centre and gate house project financed by the Asian Development Bank in coordination with the ministry of agriculture for the proposed Wakhan Pamir national park in the village of Qala-e-Panja.
The project is expected to reap the benefits of safety and security not found elsewhere in Afghanistan and become a big draw for the more adventurous tourists.
Expatriate workers in Afghanistan have already been making their way inwards during the short season that lasts from late June to mid-September, before temperatures plummet.
Plans to designate the Wakhan Pamir area and the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan as natural reserves are also currently under consideration by officials in Kabul for the first time since the 1979 Soviet invasion.
Dad Mohammad Baheer, the deputy executive director general of the National Environment Protection Agency, said the Wakhan Pamir is one of four top priority areas for the government's environment conservation projects.
He said: "Plans to declare the area a natural reserve were interrupted by the war but currently, the Wildlife Conservation Society, an international organisation, is mapping its bio-diversity."
International aid
The Aga Khan Foundation, in coordination with the Norwegian Action Committee, has also been working with the local population to train guides and help set up simple guest houses along the roads leading to Wakhan.
The two agencies have also pursued eco-tourism initiatives for the Wakhan corridor.
Mehboob Aziz, a coordinator for eco-tourism projects in the town of Ishkashim at the beginning of the Wakhan corridor, recently returned from "an exposure trip" of Afghans to the adjoining region of the Wakhan in Pakistan.
"We are trying to encourage tourists to cross the borders as opposed to the terrorists," he said referring to the influx of insurgents across Afghanistan's southern border.
The group he supervised was taught "food preparation and basic hygiene for tourists", concepts he says the people of Wakhan are not familiar with.
Arts and music festival
Aziz says 115 tourists visited the Wakhan mountain passes in 2006. That figure rose to more than 145 in 2007.
Aziz hopes that the first Wakhan Pamir arts and music festival, held last November, and the construction of new guest houses, will encourage more tourists to visit the area.
Afiyat Khan is himself toying with the idea of either opening a guest house or a shop to sell local handicrafts to tourists.
He said: "When the tourists come I would like to work full time as a tourist guide. I want to be there to travel with them into the heart of my area."
"Hopefully, one day, I will also be able to climb Afghanistan's highest peak, Noshaq."
Al Jazeera/January 2008
Afiyat Khan, a former mujahideen soldier, survived numerous gun battles and the US invasion of his country, but nothing had prepared him for the challenge of climbing the Italian Alps in 2005.
"I didn't know there was something called equipment and mountaineering gear. It was also very expensive," said the 28-year-old amateur mountaineer from the village of Qazideh in Afghanistan's Badakshan province.
Khan was one of a handful of Afghans selected by Mountain Wilderness, a Rome-based organisation, for the first mountaineering training course in Europe for Afghans.
Headed by Carlo Alberto Pinelli, the well-known Italian mountaineer, Mountain Wilderness has for the past few years offered environment-friendly mountaineering courses for Afghan youngsters in the hope that they will work as guides in the mountain areas.
Soon after the fall of the Taliban, Mountain Wilderness organised the Oxus Mission: Mountains for Peace, with the aim of reopening some of Afghanistan's mountains to tourism.
Isolated region
In the 1970's, the stunningly beautiful wilderness of the Badakshan province, along the Wakhan land corridor in the Hindu Kush bordering the Oxus River, was a big draw for mountaineers from all over the world.
"I had heard many tales from my father, the headman of our village, who would accompany foreign tourists into the mountains," Khan told Al Jazeera.
Morning sets across the Badakshan mountain
range [Anne Feenstra]
But in 1979, Soviet troops crossed the Oxus River bordering the Wakhan Corridor, from Tajikistan, bringing regional tourism to an end.
Three decades of war put an end to adventure travel in this exotic land, making climbing, trekking, hiking and other outdoor sports a hazardous activity even now.
The area was so inaccessible that Badakshan became the only province in the country where the Taliban could not gain a foothold during their rule of the country; the terrain was a natural barrier against the movement of mechanised infantry and material.
The province paid a price for this. As the only "opposition" stronghold it was also completely cut off from the Taliban "government".
The international borders - the Tajik north and Pakistan to the west - were sealed even to the normal traffic of goods and locals that comprised the economy.
This pushed the region into severe economic deprivation, forcing it to rely completely on an agro-pastoral economy and humanitarian aid from international agencies.
Mountaineering
But Afiyat Khan is one of a growing number of Afghans hoping to resuscitate the country's defunct mountaineering tourism industry.
The Hindu Kush Wakhan Corridor in
northern Afghanistan.
He is currently working as a master mason on a visitor's centre and gate house project financed by the Asian Development Bank in coordination with the ministry of agriculture for the proposed Wakhan Pamir national park in the village of Qala-e-Panja.
The project is expected to reap the benefits of safety and security not found elsewhere in Afghanistan and become a big draw for the more adventurous tourists.
Expatriate workers in Afghanistan have already been making their way inwards during the short season that lasts from late June to mid-September, before temperatures plummet.
Plans to designate the Wakhan Pamir area and the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan as natural reserves are also currently under consideration by officials in Kabul for the first time since the 1979 Soviet invasion.
Dad Mohammad Baheer, the deputy executive director general of the National Environment Protection Agency, said the Wakhan Pamir is one of four top priority areas for the government's environment conservation projects.
He said: "Plans to declare the area a natural reserve were interrupted by the war but currently, the Wildlife Conservation Society, an international organisation, is mapping its bio-diversity."
International aid
The Aga Khan Foundation, in coordination with the Norwegian Action Committee, has also been working with the local population to train guides and help set up simple guest houses along the roads leading to Wakhan.
The two agencies have also pursued eco-tourism initiatives for the Wakhan corridor.
Mehboob Aziz, a coordinator for eco-tourism projects in the town of Ishkashim at the beginning of the Wakhan corridor, recently returned from "an exposure trip" of Afghans to the adjoining region of the Wakhan in Pakistan.
"We are trying to encourage tourists to cross the borders as opposed to the terrorists," he said referring to the influx of insurgents across Afghanistan's southern border.
The group he supervised was taught "food preparation and basic hygiene for tourists", concepts he says the people of Wakhan are not familiar with.
Arts and music festival
Aziz says 115 tourists visited the Wakhan mountain passes in 2006. That figure rose to more than 145 in 2007.
Aziz hopes that the first Wakhan Pamir arts and music festival, held last November, and the construction of new guest houses, will encourage more tourists to visit the area.
Afiyat Khan is himself toying with the idea of either opening a guest house or a shop to sell local handicrafts to tourists.
He said: "When the tourists come I would like to work full time as a tourist guide. I want to be there to travel with them into the heart of my area."
"Hopefully, one day, I will also be able to climb Afghanistan's highest peak, Noshaq."
The Wakhan Corridor
THE WAKHAN CORRIDOR
Outlook Traveller/January 2008
Aunohita Mojumdar travels to the lost valleys on our imaginary frontier with Afghanistan
A lush field of wheat ripening to gold. Beyond that an ancient river celebrated in the Puranas and early Greek texts—a river that flows now across four countries, its colours changing from silver-grey to sparkling deep blues and greens, bordered by sandy beaches of many colours. Beyond that the surrounding mountains, the distant Pamirs in the east, Karakoram in the north and the steep looming peaks of the Hindukush in the south. Jagged cliffs with glaciers, gradual inclines, gentle browns, greys, rocky sides with an explosion of surrealistic colours. In the wide valley below, a people who can be both gentle and strong, survivors, living off a hard land that yields little, waiting for tourists to bring some relief to the struggle for survival. Welcome to Wakhan. Welcome to Afghanistan.
A conflict zone which yields a daily diet of reports about violence is not quite the inspiration regular tourists need to pack their bags for Afghanistan. But an increasing number of foreigners working in Afghanistan and a small trail of foreign tourists are now exploring the safer parts of the country, becoming the first travellers in decades to discover spots of unparalleled beauty, a warm and hospitable people, and unique cultures.
The Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip of land that juts out of eastern Afghanistan like a pointing finger, bordered by Tajikistan and in the north and Pakistan in the south until it reaches China. Its shape is not incidental—it was a political construct to separate the Russian empire from the British during the ‘Great Game’.
Look at any map of India and examine the crown of Kashmir. North, above Gilgit, you can see a small strip of territory that borders Afghanistan. This border is notional, of course, since the territory is not under Indian control. But if it were, Wakhan is where India and Afghanistan would meet.Known locally as the Bam-e-Duniya or ‘roof of the world’, the area is where three mountain ranges—the Pamir, the Hindu¬kush and the Karakoram—converge to form the Pamir Knot. As the origin of the Oxus, which runs along the corridor separating Tajikistan from Afghanistan, it drew travellers, adventurers and explorers trying to discover the origin of the mighty river, which runs 2,500km into the Aral Sea.
Once a buzzing thoroughfare on the Silk Route, Wakhan has been completely isolated in three decades of war. The Soviets used the Amu Darya to cross into Afghanistan and even after their withdrawal the ensuing civil conflict ensured that the area was largely abandoned to its fate. With the international borders sealed off, the narrow corridor was forced to rely on supplies through the Afghan mainland, a tortuous process in the forbidding terrain. In fact the terrain is so hostile that Badakshan province (of which Wakhan is a part) was the only province in Afghanistan that remained impregnable to the Taliban. This remoteness has always been both a blessing and a curse. The isolation continues to be a cause of economic deprivation but also results in a stunning wilderness, unblemished by the residue of war and untrammelled tourism. With only one major arterial road, most of Wakhan has to be accessed on small tracks or roads open for only a few short months. It is much more usual to see mules, donkeys, camels and yaks being used for transportation here than motorised transport.
During my visit in early October, we stayed at Qala-e-Panja, a large village from where the route branches off between the bigger and smaller Pamir. Located on the banks of the Panj river, the village spans a small but wide valley ringed by mountains. There is no electricity and there are no shops. Few houses own generators and one or two own four-wheel vehicles. Across the river Tajikistan’s power lines and well-asphalted road power provide a striking contrast. But on both sides of the river the landscape is the same, with autumn turning the trees a vivid yellow, red, orange, brown and russet. Through the day the colours of the surrounding mountains change as the sun runs across the circumference, lighting up each mountainside, every one of a different texture and colour.On the banks of the river is a huge mound of stones, the ruined Qala of the former Mir, the ruler of the area. Battles between rival Mirs and changes of government resulted in a decline of the family fortunes. Closer towards the village is a hunting lodge of the former king, Zahir Shah, whose passion for hunting has led to such lodges dotting the entire country.
Down in the village wheat is being harvested. Unlike most other parts of Afghanistan where women cover their faces in public, men and women work side by side in the fields, turning their curious gaze on the outsiders. The Shia Ismaeli’s gentle observance of religion belies the rigidities of much of Afghanistan, where a strong conservative culture keeps outsiders at bay. Ethnically, too, the inhabitants of the Wakhan Corridor are very different, comprising the Wakhi in lower Wakhan and the Kyrghyz in the higher areas with their distinct languages. Overtures meet with first a cautious and then increasingly friendly response. Requests from me to photograph the women, usually refused in many rural areas, are smilingly accepted. By the end of a 10-day stay I am being summoned to photograph women all over the village till I run out of space on my small digital camera.
In the village where we stay the guesthouse is the first of its kind for travellers. Encouraging this are the combined efforts by the Norwegian Action Committee and the Aga Khan Foundation to introduce eco-friendly tourism that will help the local economy. With financing from the NAC and expertise from the AKF, a series of guesthouses have been set up along the corridor up to the last motorable point of Sarhad-e-Broghil, from where the way forward is on yaks, donkeys, horses or camels. Trekking routes and itineraries have been identified by the AKF.
In Qala-e-Panja the guesthouse is owned by the Shah, one of the two hereditary leaders of the Shia Ismaelis, whose religious position has now transcended into a political leadership. The rooms are bare but functional and the eco-tourism training includes lessons in hygiene and toilet facilities, which has resulted in all guesthouses having their own western-style toilet.
Laundry comes in the way of two young girls—Daulatmand and Barfaq—who quickly turn into friends. Amazingly Daulatmand, who looks like she is 16 but has a child of one, still goes to school along with a considerable number of other young girls and boys. I soon begin receiving gifts of delicate beadwork—most women wear intricate chokers, as well as kohl or ‘surma’, which the area is famous for.
In the higher reaches the Kyrghyz depend entirely on their herds of goats and sheep, the rarest of which is named after the famous traveller Marco Polo. The Marco Polo is not the only exotic species. A 1977 wildlife survey, the last before war erupted, revealed the presence of snow leopards, the Himalayan lynx, bears and the Siberian Ibex. The Wildlife Conservation Society is currently undertaking a survey to map the flora and fauna of the area. Plans to declare the area a natural reserve are being revived and the Wakhan Pamir may soon be declared one of Afghanistan’s first national parks along with the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan.
In the village of Qala-e-Panja, the visitor’s centre for the national park is already under construction. Working as a mason on the building is Afiyat Khan. His real passion, however, is mountain climbing and he is among a handful of young Afghans who are becoming pioneers in the revival of this adventure sport. Mountain Wilderness, an Italian organisation, has conducted training courses here for Afghans to enable them to become guides. Afiyat hopes the visitor’s centre is yet another step towards drawing more adventure tourists to the area so he can earn his living through tourism rather than the trowel. There is no reason why it shouldn’t. Despite a short warm season, the weather in the area is ideal, according to mountaineers like the accomplished Carlo Alberto Pinelli. The short distance from the road to the base camp is another attraction. The biggest lure, however, will be the fact the area is relatively virgin and unexplored.Mehboob Aziz, who oversees the eco-tourism program of the Aga Khan
Foundation here is hopeful that tourism will emerge as an alternative source of livelihood for the area. Afghan guides and guesthouse owners have been taken on exposure visits across the border into the Wakhi area of Pakistan. Aziz hopes there will be more tourists coming via Tajikistan and, indeed, many visitors have opted for that route —flying into Dushanbe allows you to travel on smooth roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim. The Afghan Ishkashim marks the beginning of the Wakhan Corridor. “Tourists rather than terrorists are being encouraged to cross the border here,” jokes Aziz. If they do come in larger numbers, they could help turn around the lives of a peaceful community. l
THE INFORMATIONGETTING THERE Fly to Kabul and take a domestic flight to Faizabad using Ariana Airlines or travel by road via Kunduz after checking route safety. From Faizabad, a bumpy road suggests a break at Ishkashim, the beginning of the Wakhan. Alternately enter from Tajikistan: fly to Dushanbe and drive on better roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim, crossing into Afghanistan across the Oxus river. All road travel must be with a good four-wheel drive (you will need to ford rivers) with spare parts and petrol. The nearest petrol station is in Ishkashim though a few litres can be cadged in Khandud, 82km inside the Wakhan corridor. Vehicles cost $120-150 a day.
WHERE TO STAY Guesthouses offering simple basic fare and basic hygiene including a toilet are available at Ishkashim, Qazi Deh, Khandud, Qala-e-Panja, Gozkhun, Sargaz and Sarhad-e-Broghil. Rooms typically cost $25 per person per night—not as high as it seems in Afghanistan’s post conflict economy. Longer stays can be negotiated.
WHAT TO SEE & DO Breathe in the glorious natural beauty, go for walks—perfectly safe— but with the help of local guides. Visit the friendly locals, drink endless cups of tea with naan. Visit the shrines dotting the landscape, walk along the Oxus river, visit the locals, climb mountains, go trekking and hiking on foot or using animals or both.
TOUR OPERATORSThe Aga Khan Foundation makes it very clear that it is in no way a travel or tourism company but its exceedingly charming employees who work to promote eco-tourism will help any visitors as a gesture of goodwill until the time that Afghan Tourism develops its own capacity. Contact Asif Soroush in Faizabad (+93-799431933) or Mehboob Aziz in Ishkasim (799418060).At least two tour companies operate in Afghanistan currently. They can take care of permits, travel, stay, interpreters and other logistics including security where required. The first is Afghan Logistics (702-77408/ 70288668/799391462, 24-hour satellite phone: 0088-216-2116-4294, www.afghanlogisticstours.com). The second, more high-end company, is The Great Game Travel Company Limited (799-686688, 799-489120, www.greatgametravel.co.uk).
WHEN TO GOBest during the short summer, which lasts from late June till mid September.
WHAT TO PACK Warm clothing, including a high-altitude sleeping bag. If you’re going trekking or mountaineering, all gear must be brought along. Satellite phone, extra phone batteries, camera and extra film and additional batteries, good torches, sun screen, fresh vegetables (locals are always happy to cook for you for a consideration), fruit and canned food. Carry sufficient bottled water to tide you over until you discover a clean water source. Carry everything you might need, from shampoo to rubber bands. Remember, there are no shops though you can always get anything the villagers themselves use—either as a loan, on rent or by buying it.
PERMITS/SAFETY Permission to travel into Wakhan must be obtained from the border police at Ishkasim, currently Commander Waheed (+93-799139962). Make sure the commander is in town or arrange to have letters of approval prepared in advance. The Wakhan is perfectly safe with no hint of the Taliban or conflicts, but like any other remote area, it’s always good to check the current security situation before travelling.
TIPS Wear loose clothing—such as full-sleeved salwar kameez and a headscarf. Ask permission before photographing. Ask permission before speaking to women if the tourist is a man. Don’t drink alcohol publicly.
RESOURCES > Culture, Information and Tourism Department, Faizabad (+93-799863931)> For information, look up http://www.wakhan.org/, www.akdn.org
For trekking and mountaineering, consult Peaks of Silver and Jade by Carlo Alberto Pinelli and Gianni Predan
Outlook Traveller/January 2008
Aunohita Mojumdar travels to the lost valleys on our imaginary frontier with Afghanistan
A lush field of wheat ripening to gold. Beyond that an ancient river celebrated in the Puranas and early Greek texts—a river that flows now across four countries, its colours changing from silver-grey to sparkling deep blues and greens, bordered by sandy beaches of many colours. Beyond that the surrounding mountains, the distant Pamirs in the east, Karakoram in the north and the steep looming peaks of the Hindukush in the south. Jagged cliffs with glaciers, gradual inclines, gentle browns, greys, rocky sides with an explosion of surrealistic colours. In the wide valley below, a people who can be both gentle and strong, survivors, living off a hard land that yields little, waiting for tourists to bring some relief to the struggle for survival. Welcome to Wakhan. Welcome to Afghanistan.
A conflict zone which yields a daily diet of reports about violence is not quite the inspiration regular tourists need to pack their bags for Afghanistan. But an increasing number of foreigners working in Afghanistan and a small trail of foreign tourists are now exploring the safer parts of the country, becoming the first travellers in decades to discover spots of unparalleled beauty, a warm and hospitable people, and unique cultures.
The Wakhan Corridor is a narrow strip of land that juts out of eastern Afghanistan like a pointing finger, bordered by Tajikistan and in the north and Pakistan in the south until it reaches China. Its shape is not incidental—it was a political construct to separate the Russian empire from the British during the ‘Great Game’.
Look at any map of India and examine the crown of Kashmir. North, above Gilgit, you can see a small strip of territory that borders Afghanistan. This border is notional, of course, since the territory is not under Indian control. But if it were, Wakhan is where India and Afghanistan would meet.Known locally as the Bam-e-Duniya or ‘roof of the world’, the area is where three mountain ranges—the Pamir, the Hindu¬kush and the Karakoram—converge to form the Pamir Knot. As the origin of the Oxus, which runs along the corridor separating Tajikistan from Afghanistan, it drew travellers, adventurers and explorers trying to discover the origin of the mighty river, which runs 2,500km into the Aral Sea.
Once a buzzing thoroughfare on the Silk Route, Wakhan has been completely isolated in three decades of war. The Soviets used the Amu Darya to cross into Afghanistan and even after their withdrawal the ensuing civil conflict ensured that the area was largely abandoned to its fate. With the international borders sealed off, the narrow corridor was forced to rely on supplies through the Afghan mainland, a tortuous process in the forbidding terrain. In fact the terrain is so hostile that Badakshan province (of which Wakhan is a part) was the only province in Afghanistan that remained impregnable to the Taliban. This remoteness has always been both a blessing and a curse. The isolation continues to be a cause of economic deprivation but also results in a stunning wilderness, unblemished by the residue of war and untrammelled tourism. With only one major arterial road, most of Wakhan has to be accessed on small tracks or roads open for only a few short months. It is much more usual to see mules, donkeys, camels and yaks being used for transportation here than motorised transport.
During my visit in early October, we stayed at Qala-e-Panja, a large village from where the route branches off between the bigger and smaller Pamir. Located on the banks of the Panj river, the village spans a small but wide valley ringed by mountains. There is no electricity and there are no shops. Few houses own generators and one or two own four-wheel vehicles. Across the river Tajikistan’s power lines and well-asphalted road power provide a striking contrast. But on both sides of the river the landscape is the same, with autumn turning the trees a vivid yellow, red, orange, brown and russet. Through the day the colours of the surrounding mountains change as the sun runs across the circumference, lighting up each mountainside, every one of a different texture and colour.On the banks of the river is a huge mound of stones, the ruined Qala of the former Mir, the ruler of the area. Battles between rival Mirs and changes of government resulted in a decline of the family fortunes. Closer towards the village is a hunting lodge of the former king, Zahir Shah, whose passion for hunting has led to such lodges dotting the entire country.
Down in the village wheat is being harvested. Unlike most other parts of Afghanistan where women cover their faces in public, men and women work side by side in the fields, turning their curious gaze on the outsiders. The Shia Ismaeli’s gentle observance of religion belies the rigidities of much of Afghanistan, where a strong conservative culture keeps outsiders at bay. Ethnically, too, the inhabitants of the Wakhan Corridor are very different, comprising the Wakhi in lower Wakhan and the Kyrghyz in the higher areas with their distinct languages. Overtures meet with first a cautious and then increasingly friendly response. Requests from me to photograph the women, usually refused in many rural areas, are smilingly accepted. By the end of a 10-day stay I am being summoned to photograph women all over the village till I run out of space on my small digital camera.
In the village where we stay the guesthouse is the first of its kind for travellers. Encouraging this are the combined efforts by the Norwegian Action Committee and the Aga Khan Foundation to introduce eco-friendly tourism that will help the local economy. With financing from the NAC and expertise from the AKF, a series of guesthouses have been set up along the corridor up to the last motorable point of Sarhad-e-Broghil, from where the way forward is on yaks, donkeys, horses or camels. Trekking routes and itineraries have been identified by the AKF.
In Qala-e-Panja the guesthouse is owned by the Shah, one of the two hereditary leaders of the Shia Ismaelis, whose religious position has now transcended into a political leadership. The rooms are bare but functional and the eco-tourism training includes lessons in hygiene and toilet facilities, which has resulted in all guesthouses having their own western-style toilet.
Laundry comes in the way of two young girls—Daulatmand and Barfaq—who quickly turn into friends. Amazingly Daulatmand, who looks like she is 16 but has a child of one, still goes to school along with a considerable number of other young girls and boys. I soon begin receiving gifts of delicate beadwork—most women wear intricate chokers, as well as kohl or ‘surma’, which the area is famous for.
In the higher reaches the Kyrghyz depend entirely on their herds of goats and sheep, the rarest of which is named after the famous traveller Marco Polo. The Marco Polo is not the only exotic species. A 1977 wildlife survey, the last before war erupted, revealed the presence of snow leopards, the Himalayan lynx, bears and the Siberian Ibex. The Wildlife Conservation Society is currently undertaking a survey to map the flora and fauna of the area. Plans to declare the area a natural reserve are being revived and the Wakhan Pamir may soon be declared one of Afghanistan’s first national parks along with the spectacular lakes of Band-i-Amir in central Afghanistan.
In the village of Qala-e-Panja, the visitor’s centre for the national park is already under construction. Working as a mason on the building is Afiyat Khan. His real passion, however, is mountain climbing and he is among a handful of young Afghans who are becoming pioneers in the revival of this adventure sport. Mountain Wilderness, an Italian organisation, has conducted training courses here for Afghans to enable them to become guides. Afiyat hopes the visitor’s centre is yet another step towards drawing more adventure tourists to the area so he can earn his living through tourism rather than the trowel. There is no reason why it shouldn’t. Despite a short warm season, the weather in the area is ideal, according to mountaineers like the accomplished Carlo Alberto Pinelli. The short distance from the road to the base camp is another attraction. The biggest lure, however, will be the fact the area is relatively virgin and unexplored.Mehboob Aziz, who oversees the eco-tourism program of the Aga Khan
Foundation here is hopeful that tourism will emerge as an alternative source of livelihood for the area. Afghan guides and guesthouse owners have been taken on exposure visits across the border into the Wakhi area of Pakistan. Aziz hopes there will be more tourists coming via Tajikistan and, indeed, many visitors have opted for that route —flying into Dushanbe allows you to travel on smooth roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim. The Afghan Ishkashim marks the beginning of the Wakhan Corridor. “Tourists rather than terrorists are being encouraged to cross the border here,” jokes Aziz. If they do come in larger numbers, they could help turn around the lives of a peaceful community. l
THE INFORMATIONGETTING THERE Fly to Kabul and take a domestic flight to Faizabad using Ariana Airlines or travel by road via Kunduz after checking route safety. From Faizabad, a bumpy road suggests a break at Ishkashim, the beginning of the Wakhan. Alternately enter from Tajikistan: fly to Dushanbe and drive on better roads up to the Tajik Ishkashim, crossing into Afghanistan across the Oxus river. All road travel must be with a good four-wheel drive (you will need to ford rivers) with spare parts and petrol. The nearest petrol station is in Ishkashim though a few litres can be cadged in Khandud, 82km inside the Wakhan corridor. Vehicles cost $120-150 a day.
WHERE TO STAY Guesthouses offering simple basic fare and basic hygiene including a toilet are available at Ishkashim, Qazi Deh, Khandud, Qala-e-Panja, Gozkhun, Sargaz and Sarhad-e-Broghil. Rooms typically cost $25 per person per night—not as high as it seems in Afghanistan’s post conflict economy. Longer stays can be negotiated.
WHAT TO SEE & DO Breathe in the glorious natural beauty, go for walks—perfectly safe— but with the help of local guides. Visit the friendly locals, drink endless cups of tea with naan. Visit the shrines dotting the landscape, walk along the Oxus river, visit the locals, climb mountains, go trekking and hiking on foot or using animals or both.
TOUR OPERATORSThe Aga Khan Foundation makes it very clear that it is in no way a travel or tourism company but its exceedingly charming employees who work to promote eco-tourism will help any visitors as a gesture of goodwill until the time that Afghan Tourism develops its own capacity. Contact Asif Soroush in Faizabad (+93-799431933) or Mehboob Aziz in Ishkasim (799418060).At least two tour companies operate in Afghanistan currently. They can take care of permits, travel, stay, interpreters and other logistics including security where required. The first is Afghan Logistics (702-77408/ 70288668/799391462, 24-hour satellite phone: 0088-216-2116-4294, www.afghanlogisticstours.com). The second, more high-end company, is The Great Game Travel Company Limited (799-686688, 799-489120, www.greatgametravel.co.uk).
WHEN TO GOBest during the short summer, which lasts from late June till mid September.
WHAT TO PACK Warm clothing, including a high-altitude sleeping bag. If you’re going trekking or mountaineering, all gear must be brought along. Satellite phone, extra phone batteries, camera and extra film and additional batteries, good torches, sun screen, fresh vegetables (locals are always happy to cook for you for a consideration), fruit and canned food. Carry sufficient bottled water to tide you over until you discover a clean water source. Carry everything you might need, from shampoo to rubber bands. Remember, there are no shops though you can always get anything the villagers themselves use—either as a loan, on rent or by buying it.
PERMITS/SAFETY Permission to travel into Wakhan must be obtained from the border police at Ishkasim, currently Commander Waheed (+93-799139962). Make sure the commander is in town or arrange to have letters of approval prepared in advance. The Wakhan is perfectly safe with no hint of the Taliban or conflicts, but like any other remote area, it’s always good to check the current security situation before travelling.
TIPS Wear loose clothing—such as full-sleeved salwar kameez and a headscarf. Ask permission before photographing. Ask permission before speaking to women if the tourist is a man. Don’t drink alcohol publicly.
RESOURCES > Culture, Information and Tourism Department, Faizabad (+93-799863931)> For information, look up http://www.wakhan.org/, www.akdn.org
For trekking and mountaineering, consult Peaks of Silver and Jade by Carlo Alberto Pinelli and Gianni Predan
Afghanistan needs Muslim aid effort
Afghanistan needs Muslim aid effort
Al Jazeera/December 31
In the second of a two-part exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Daan Everts, the special civilian representative of Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer, Nato secretary-general, criticises Arab and Islamic countries for not doing enough in rehabilitating Afghanistan.
Everts, who officially demits his office on December 31, also says the Taliban could have a played a political role in Afghanistan.
Al Jazeera: You have mentioned the American point of view several times. Do you feel reconstruction in Afghanistan has been circumscribed by American political interests?
Everts: No. I am much more positive than others about US involvement in Afghanistan. Certainly, they have gone further on the road to integrating civilian and military efforts. They are of course dominant and you can't blame them because they provide the bulk of forces and the bulk of the financial aid.
So there may be criticism sometimes about ways and behaviour but I would be the last to throw a stone seeing that the efforts of others are so marginal in comparison.
Do you feel Europeans are too politically coy about expressing their views because they are so dominated by the US?
Part one of interview with Daan Everts
Nation building key in AfghanistanI don't know what explains the relatively junior role of the EU. There is this issue of internal decision-making; it is not easy to get 27 nations on one line. America, of course, was psychologically much more motivated to move and act in Afghanistan. Anything that can be linked to 9/11 can be counted on to generate huge political interest.
The EU does express its views but it doesn't have the clout. It is fractured not just because of the EU decision-making process but also by this regionalised provincial pre-occupation of member states – that has not helped a strong European presentation on issues.
More worrisome, I think, is the absence of others – non-European, non-American actors. I find that somewhat dismaying. Afghanistan is a geopolitically important country that can only become more important, being right at the cross-roads – the axis of central Asia, south Asia, west and the east. It has a strategic location and vast resources of minerals and energy - it is all here.
But I see no strong effort in the non-Western world to join the overall stabilisation effort. The whole task of trying to bring the country back on its feet and restoring security – by tackling the forces of the extremism and intolerance – why is this burden not more widely shared. Where is the Muslim world?
Sure, they provide some assistance. But why is there not more international interest? Why is it not a big priority with the UN?
The whole of Afghanistan does not seem to figure in the top of the priorities list in New York. I have been disappointed by the lack of focus from non-Western players. Maybe they consider this too much of America's business. But this is not good because Afghanistan's future is an issue of worldwide concern. I would like more of the UN to be here - like the UN police- and other countries to become stakeholders here and not sit on the fence watching.
So having more of a Muslim participation in the overall stabilisation - not just handing out some cash - but a larger presence in the international support effort would be beneficial. This also calls for de-emphasising the Western role here and to heighten the UN world-wide character and the Afghan ownership.
It is not easy to ask people not to be proud of what they do or claim success and it is probably needed for the home constituency. To be self-effacing is rare especially for prominent states but that is what is called for.
This is a real test case of cooperation between the non-Muslim and Muslim world, both of them in defence of modern Islam and against a very regressive variant that is a threat to mainstream Islam.
That's why we expect a lot more support from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) or the Arab League. They should see the great joint interest here to bring stability to Afghanistan; and to throw the Taliban back to where they belong, in the middle ages.
They should take a greater interest and a larger share. That would be perfectly all right. Take co-ownership.
This is ironic that we are here in defence of mainstream Islam. This is the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. And in the hours of need why are non-Muslim states taking the main share of the burden?
There are some efforts, of course, financially, but political support has been very lukewarm, maybe because it is perceived as US dominated intervention. But this is not right. This is UN-mandated.
Of course there is this fundamental mistake of mixing it up with Iraq – the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission is a very different venture – Muslim nations should make that distinction.
Do you think the Taliban should have been involved in the reconciliation conferences in Bonn in 2001?
This is a hard question. There are two views on it. The easy position is they should have been there – and you would not have driven them underground and into insurgency. Whether at the time of Bonn - an extremely emotional time after 9/11 - you could have had them in the Bonn conference and whether the Afghan side would have accepted them, I don't know.
On the other hand when I see how former enemies and opponents sit together in this Afghan parliament and in this government – you have communists and war lords – they are able to live together [and] work together. It wouldn't be beyond comprehension if you could have had the Taliban there – maybe not in Bonn but subsequently.
What we hear from the Taliban – directly and indirectly - is 'give us an opportunity to open an office, have a political wing, a future role in elections'. One should not be afraid of it because what we see is that support for Taliban has always been very low even in the south – so we could bring them in the tent. Some say Bonn could have done it. But at that time for the hardliners that may have been a bridge too far.
But the Taliban were less about power sharing and more about deal making. Does the international community prefer to back individuals rather than a more equitable power sharing formula?
Yes, politics and governance are extremely personalised. This has been encouraged by the electoral system of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) – it reinforced individualised dynamics. I don't think that has been helpful – it would have been better to have allowed more organised structures, more political actors like parties.
That has been done elsewhere with good results. [In Afghanistan], the result has been an extremely chaotic parliament. There are 248 talking heads with very little discipline and little organised deliberations that are meant to produce legislation which the country so badly needs.
We deliberately did this. To reinforce presidential position and power you weaken the parliament – understandable from the US perspective who felt that the country, given its history and shattered state of economy, needed a strong hand.
This approach is very personalised and very centred on one person to be in command. I think it is asking too much of someone to do everything - to take on the whole of the international representation and being a sort of father of the nation and making all sorts of difficult decisions - that is very hard.
Like being everything to everyone …
Yes, but then you cannot be effective in governance. That is a structural choice which can be reconsidered. It needs another loya jirga [grand tribal council] to make constitutional adjustments.
Al Jazeera/December 31
In the second of a two-part exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Daan Everts, the special civilian representative of Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer, Nato secretary-general, criticises Arab and Islamic countries for not doing enough in rehabilitating Afghanistan.
Everts, who officially demits his office on December 31, also says the Taliban could have a played a political role in Afghanistan.
Al Jazeera: You have mentioned the American point of view several times. Do you feel reconstruction in Afghanistan has been circumscribed by American political interests?
Everts: No. I am much more positive than others about US involvement in Afghanistan. Certainly, they have gone further on the road to integrating civilian and military efforts. They are of course dominant and you can't blame them because they provide the bulk of forces and the bulk of the financial aid.
So there may be criticism sometimes about ways and behaviour but I would be the last to throw a stone seeing that the efforts of others are so marginal in comparison.
Do you feel Europeans are too politically coy about expressing their views because they are so dominated by the US?
Part one of interview with Daan Everts
Nation building key in AfghanistanI don't know what explains the relatively junior role of the EU. There is this issue of internal decision-making; it is not easy to get 27 nations on one line. America, of course, was psychologically much more motivated to move and act in Afghanistan. Anything that can be linked to 9/11 can be counted on to generate huge political interest.
The EU does express its views but it doesn't have the clout. It is fractured not just because of the EU decision-making process but also by this regionalised provincial pre-occupation of member states – that has not helped a strong European presentation on issues.
More worrisome, I think, is the absence of others – non-European, non-American actors. I find that somewhat dismaying. Afghanistan is a geopolitically important country that can only become more important, being right at the cross-roads – the axis of central Asia, south Asia, west and the east. It has a strategic location and vast resources of minerals and energy - it is all here.
But I see no strong effort in the non-Western world to join the overall stabilisation effort. The whole task of trying to bring the country back on its feet and restoring security – by tackling the forces of the extremism and intolerance – why is this burden not more widely shared. Where is the Muslim world?
Sure, they provide some assistance. But why is there not more international interest? Why is it not a big priority with the UN?
The whole of Afghanistan does not seem to figure in the top of the priorities list in New York. I have been disappointed by the lack of focus from non-Western players. Maybe they consider this too much of America's business. But this is not good because Afghanistan's future is an issue of worldwide concern. I would like more of the UN to be here - like the UN police- and other countries to become stakeholders here and not sit on the fence watching.
So having more of a Muslim participation in the overall stabilisation - not just handing out some cash - but a larger presence in the international support effort would be beneficial. This also calls for de-emphasising the Western role here and to heighten the UN world-wide character and the Afghan ownership.
It is not easy to ask people not to be proud of what they do or claim success and it is probably needed for the home constituency. To be self-effacing is rare especially for prominent states but that is what is called for.
This is a real test case of cooperation between the non-Muslim and Muslim world, both of them in defence of modern Islam and against a very regressive variant that is a threat to mainstream Islam.
That's why we expect a lot more support from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Countries) or the Arab League. They should see the great joint interest here to bring stability to Afghanistan; and to throw the Taliban back to where they belong, in the middle ages.
They should take a greater interest and a larger share. That would be perfectly all right. Take co-ownership.
This is ironic that we are here in defence of mainstream Islam. This is the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. And in the hours of need why are non-Muslim states taking the main share of the burden?
There are some efforts, of course, financially, but political support has been very lukewarm, maybe because it is perceived as US dominated intervention. But this is not right. This is UN-mandated.
Of course there is this fundamental mistake of mixing it up with Iraq – the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mission is a very different venture – Muslim nations should make that distinction.
Do you think the Taliban should have been involved in the reconciliation conferences in Bonn in 2001?
This is a hard question. There are two views on it. The easy position is they should have been there – and you would not have driven them underground and into insurgency. Whether at the time of Bonn - an extremely emotional time after 9/11 - you could have had them in the Bonn conference and whether the Afghan side would have accepted them, I don't know.
On the other hand when I see how former enemies and opponents sit together in this Afghan parliament and in this government – you have communists and war lords – they are able to live together [and] work together. It wouldn't be beyond comprehension if you could have had the Taliban there – maybe not in Bonn but subsequently.
What we hear from the Taliban – directly and indirectly - is 'give us an opportunity to open an office, have a political wing, a future role in elections'. One should not be afraid of it because what we see is that support for Taliban has always been very low even in the south – so we could bring them in the tent. Some say Bonn could have done it. But at that time for the hardliners that may have been a bridge too far.
But the Taliban were less about power sharing and more about deal making. Does the international community prefer to back individuals rather than a more equitable power sharing formula?
Yes, politics and governance are extremely personalised. This has been encouraged by the electoral system of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) – it reinforced individualised dynamics. I don't think that has been helpful – it would have been better to have allowed more organised structures, more political actors like parties.
That has been done elsewhere with good results. [In Afghanistan], the result has been an extremely chaotic parliament. There are 248 talking heads with very little discipline and little organised deliberations that are meant to produce legislation which the country so badly needs.
We deliberately did this. To reinforce presidential position and power you weaken the parliament – understandable from the US perspective who felt that the country, given its history and shattered state of economy, needed a strong hand.
This approach is very personalised and very centred on one person to be in command. I think it is asking too much of someone to do everything - to take on the whole of the international representation and being a sort of father of the nation and making all sorts of difficult decisions - that is very hard.
Like being everything to everyone …
Yes, but then you cannot be effective in governance. That is a structural choice which can be reconsidered. It needs another loya jirga [grand tribal council] to make constitutional adjustments.
Nation building key in Afghanistan
Nation building key in Afghanistan
Al Jazeera/Dec 23
Everts, Nato's civilian envoy, ends his mission in Afghanistanthis month after 16 months in the country [Nato website]Daan Everts, the special civilian representative of Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer, the Nato secretary-general, concludes his mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2007 after 16 months in the country.In the first of a two-part interview with Al Jazeera a few days before demitting office, Everts says the international community's involvement in Afghanistan has been marked by inefficiency and a fragmented approach to development and reconstruction.He believes strengthening the Kabul government and earning the trust of the Afghan people are keys to ensuring stability in the war-ravaged country.
Al Jazeera: In your assessment, how has the situation in Afghanistan changed in the past few years?
Everts: There is a better recognition of the complexity of the tasks and of the challenges. The notion of approaching these challenges comprehensively, that has dawned finally on everybody. It's a bit late, but it has happened. So the civilian and military efforts are finally seen to be intricately linked - you cannot have separate track approaches. It doesn't work. It still needs to progress, but the awareness has increased.
The other notions I have seen improve over my one and a half years is the concept of "Afghanisation". I have been pushing this from the start. The idea of Afghan first; the Afghan face, and the [concept of] Afghan ownership have become pretty much accepted.
The third is that since military efforts alone will not do the job, there is more interest in [the] non-military approaches to settling the conflict. Political outreach and reconciliation has gained weight - which I welcome.
But what I mentioned as gains [came] after a lot of lost time. I think the efficiency of international efforts can be greatly enhanced. When I speak of Afghan ownership, there is an implicit criticism of donor-driven activities. The problem is that we have started with very little emphasis on nation building and development. Only over time have we realised this is key and that we have to heavily invest in governance, development, in reconstruction besides security.
So we start from a light footprint to a heavier one. If we had done it the other way around it would have been much more effective. We would have been much further ahead and could have lessened the footprint. This has also resulted in a very incremental approach to the whole of Afghanistan and basically partitioning Afghanistan into lots ... that were apportioned to the various donor countries.
So you have a little "German Afghanistan" in the North, an "Italian Afghanistan" in the west, "Dutch Afghanistan" in Uruzgan and a "Canadian Afghanistan" in Kandahar and so on.
Geographically we have been fractured, but also sectorally with equal ineffectiveness - like giving the justice sector totally to the Italians, counter narcotics to the British, the police to Germans, anti-terrorism to Americans - very fractured and that's why we have the problems with the police and the justice sector - its only now, six years later, that it's being forcefully addressed.
What are the other impacts of this "balkanisation"?
Well, we have these individual donor capital approaches to common problems like counter narcotics or governance or police or corruption but also infrastructure, agriculture ... you name it.
There is no unity of analysis or effort because it is so fractured and it must lead ... to inefficiency. It also leads to great inequality, particularly between provinces, as you have poor, under-endowed provinces like Ghor or Daikundi where hardly anyone wanted to volunteer and you have over-endowed provinces where there are vast American or British aid programmes available or Uruzgan under the Dutch - so we have promoted inequality.
This fragmentation is a basic defect that we did not recognise enough in 2001. The other key one is the light footprint - if you opt for a light footprint, you cannot be leaning too heavily on the government, so I have seen in my time a certain reticence or timidity to interfere ... leaving it to some individual countries to throw their weight around.
Internationally we have a rather soft UN presence - there was not an international factor here that was prominently present and leaning on the government where it was required like for instance on the issue of corruption or the rule of law ... that may change but ... the Afghans have now become used to a rather soft international presence.
You had mentioned earlier that after 2001 the emphasis was on pursuing al-Qaeda and Taliban and not on stabilisation of Afghanistan. Could you elaborate on that?
That is part of the light footprint - the main emphasis was on anti-terrorism which was the American concern, understandably so. But there was little interest to take on the critical challenges of nation building and that was, of course, supported ironically by the UN which did not pursue a large presence here because it would not fit the concept of national sovereignty.
Then, of course, the whole thing was further set back by Iraq - sad but true, it has sucked the oxygen away from Afghanistan.
You have said that the resources being put into this country are less than in other areas, for example Kosovo.
In comparative terms our efforts are pretty stingy. I am concerned about the aid both in terms of quantity and quality. There is of course an issue of absorption capacity but I think we are still relying much too much on outside sources of supplies and of expertise.
It has been a bonanza for consultants, serious consultants, half-baked consultants, marginal consultants, mail boxes consultants - as well as other service providers. There has been an outflow of resources from Afghans.
This is very depressing to see - and it makes [Afghans] cynical. Because of this, probably, 40 per cent of Afghanistan aid is flowing out. So there is this aid industry that descends on a poor nation and runs away with part of the loot, to put it bluntly and with some exaggeration. Of course, there are many bona fide actors, including NGOs.
Three-fourths of the aid is being spent through the external budget, so the Afghan government can hardly be blamed.
Yes, it's a bit of the chicken and egg [situation]. The foreigners create their own channels outside the central government because it is weak, but you keep the central government weak by not going through it - it's a vicious circle. It's not good. The old saying "it's better to have the host country do things imperfectly than the outside doing things perfectly" of course holds true.
What improvements would be crucial for this country in the next few years?
A better more unified international presence here that is speaking with a clearer and more unequivocal voice and a government that is more serious about problems and firm in tackling those diseases that are discrediting and undermining its authority such as corruption and related to it counter narcotics and poor law enforcement.
That is where a qualitative change is needed. Without credibility among people it will be very difficult to make progress. Also, in terms of discouraging insurgency and anti-government elements. The only caveat to be made here that we should not demand too much in too little time.
There is talk now of your job and that of Tom Koenigs [the UN secretary -general's special representative to Afghanistan who is also concluding his tenure this month] being amalgamated into one. How do you view that?
That we have more of an organic link between Nato, UN and possibly the EU - that, I think, is certainly desirable. How exactly to give it form, is not clear. The UN has a problem in being directly related to Nato - obviously we are a regional defence organisation and there are members in the UN that may not want it.
Also, Nato cannot be seen as a simple sub-organisation of the UN. I cannot see a special envoy of the UN secretary-general being in command of forces. We have to find a very special arrangement where, at the least, constant consultation and exchange of information is guaranteed. I am in favour of linking the posts - not merging, but linking.
Al Jazeera/Dec 23
Everts, Nato's civilian envoy, ends his mission in Afghanistanthis month after 16 months in the country [Nato website]Daan Everts, the special civilian representative of Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer, the Nato secretary-general, concludes his mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2007 after 16 months in the country.In the first of a two-part interview with Al Jazeera a few days before demitting office, Everts says the international community's involvement in Afghanistan has been marked by inefficiency and a fragmented approach to development and reconstruction.He believes strengthening the Kabul government and earning the trust of the Afghan people are keys to ensuring stability in the war-ravaged country.
Al Jazeera: In your assessment, how has the situation in Afghanistan changed in the past few years?
Everts: There is a better recognition of the complexity of the tasks and of the challenges. The notion of approaching these challenges comprehensively, that has dawned finally on everybody. It's a bit late, but it has happened. So the civilian and military efforts are finally seen to be intricately linked - you cannot have separate track approaches. It doesn't work. It still needs to progress, but the awareness has increased.
The other notions I have seen improve over my one and a half years is the concept of "Afghanisation". I have been pushing this from the start. The idea of Afghan first; the Afghan face, and the [concept of] Afghan ownership have become pretty much accepted.
The third is that since military efforts alone will not do the job, there is more interest in [the] non-military approaches to settling the conflict. Political outreach and reconciliation has gained weight - which I welcome.
But what I mentioned as gains [came] after a lot of lost time. I think the efficiency of international efforts can be greatly enhanced. When I speak of Afghan ownership, there is an implicit criticism of donor-driven activities. The problem is that we have started with very little emphasis on nation building and development. Only over time have we realised this is key and that we have to heavily invest in governance, development, in reconstruction besides security.
So we start from a light footprint to a heavier one. If we had done it the other way around it would have been much more effective. We would have been much further ahead and could have lessened the footprint. This has also resulted in a very incremental approach to the whole of Afghanistan and basically partitioning Afghanistan into lots ... that were apportioned to the various donor countries.
So you have a little "German Afghanistan" in the North, an "Italian Afghanistan" in the west, "Dutch Afghanistan" in Uruzgan and a "Canadian Afghanistan" in Kandahar and so on.
Geographically we have been fractured, but also sectorally with equal ineffectiveness - like giving the justice sector totally to the Italians, counter narcotics to the British, the police to Germans, anti-terrorism to Americans - very fractured and that's why we have the problems with the police and the justice sector - its only now, six years later, that it's being forcefully addressed.
What are the other impacts of this "balkanisation"?
Well, we have these individual donor capital approaches to common problems like counter narcotics or governance or police or corruption but also infrastructure, agriculture ... you name it.
There is no unity of analysis or effort because it is so fractured and it must lead ... to inefficiency. It also leads to great inequality, particularly between provinces, as you have poor, under-endowed provinces like Ghor or Daikundi where hardly anyone wanted to volunteer and you have over-endowed provinces where there are vast American or British aid programmes available or Uruzgan under the Dutch - so we have promoted inequality.
This fragmentation is a basic defect that we did not recognise enough in 2001. The other key one is the light footprint - if you opt for a light footprint, you cannot be leaning too heavily on the government, so I have seen in my time a certain reticence or timidity to interfere ... leaving it to some individual countries to throw their weight around.
Internationally we have a rather soft UN presence - there was not an international factor here that was prominently present and leaning on the government where it was required like for instance on the issue of corruption or the rule of law ... that may change but ... the Afghans have now become used to a rather soft international presence.
You had mentioned earlier that after 2001 the emphasis was on pursuing al-Qaeda and Taliban and not on stabilisation of Afghanistan. Could you elaborate on that?
That is part of the light footprint - the main emphasis was on anti-terrorism which was the American concern, understandably so. But there was little interest to take on the critical challenges of nation building and that was, of course, supported ironically by the UN which did not pursue a large presence here because it would not fit the concept of national sovereignty.
Then, of course, the whole thing was further set back by Iraq - sad but true, it has sucked the oxygen away from Afghanistan.
You have said that the resources being put into this country are less than in other areas, for example Kosovo.
In comparative terms our efforts are pretty stingy. I am concerned about the aid both in terms of quantity and quality. There is of course an issue of absorption capacity but I think we are still relying much too much on outside sources of supplies and of expertise.
It has been a bonanza for consultants, serious consultants, half-baked consultants, marginal consultants, mail boxes consultants - as well as other service providers. There has been an outflow of resources from Afghans.
This is very depressing to see - and it makes [Afghans] cynical. Because of this, probably, 40 per cent of Afghanistan aid is flowing out. So there is this aid industry that descends on a poor nation and runs away with part of the loot, to put it bluntly and with some exaggeration. Of course, there are many bona fide actors, including NGOs.
Three-fourths of the aid is being spent through the external budget, so the Afghan government can hardly be blamed.
Yes, it's a bit of the chicken and egg [situation]. The foreigners create their own channels outside the central government because it is weak, but you keep the central government weak by not going through it - it's a vicious circle. It's not good. The old saying "it's better to have the host country do things imperfectly than the outside doing things perfectly" of course holds true.
What improvements would be crucial for this country in the next few years?
A better more unified international presence here that is speaking with a clearer and more unequivocal voice and a government that is more serious about problems and firm in tackling those diseases that are discrediting and undermining its authority such as corruption and related to it counter narcotics and poor law enforcement.
That is where a qualitative change is needed. Without credibility among people it will be very difficult to make progress. Also, in terms of discouraging insurgency and anti-government elements. The only caveat to be made here that we should not demand too much in too little time.
There is talk now of your job and that of Tom Koenigs [the UN secretary -general's special representative to Afghanistan who is also concluding his tenure this month] being amalgamated into one. How do you view that?
That we have more of an organic link between Nato, UN and possibly the EU - that, I think, is certainly desirable. How exactly to give it form, is not clear. The UN has a problem in being directly related to Nato - obviously we are a regional defence organisation and there are members in the UN that may not want it.
Also, Nato cannot be seen as a simple sub-organisation of the UN. I cannot see a special envoy of the UN secretary-general being in command of forces. We have to find a very special arrangement where, at the least, constant consultation and exchange of information is guaranteed. I am in favour of linking the posts - not merging, but linking.
Women Cook Up Restaurants in Shaky Kabul
Women Cook Up Restaurants in Shaky Kabul
Run Date: 12/18/07
The capital of Afghanistan is a tough place to start and run a restaurant but a handful of foreign women are doing just that. For one, Kabul is the latest in a series of post-conflict cities where she has catered to the nomadic "U.N. crowd."
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--For restaurateurs, the unnerving routine of rocket attacks and suicide bombings in Afghanistan's capital city means that business often depends on that week's security advisory.
Saska Galic, for instance, has just thrown out all the duck in her freezer. The customers just didn't show.
But the 51-year-old Croatian shrugs it off, saying she isn't looking to make an enormous profit. "I just like to make people happy."
Kabul is relatively stable compared to other parts of Afghanistan, boasting amenities such as health care, education, transportation, entertainment and even the semblance of a functioning government.
A hungry crowd of ex-pats meanwhile has fueled an explosion of restaurants serving cuisines from all over the world: Italian, Lebanese, Chinese, Indian, French, Mexican, German, Filipino, Korean, Azerbaijani, even Tex-Mex. Now about several dozen restaurants are serving meals and each month sees the opening of yet another.
But it's not an easy place to run a restaurant.
Hamid Karzai's government struggles with a variety of factions displaced by the power restructuring six years ago, from a resurgent Taliban to resurgent warlords. And the city still has plenty of war scars. Streets are potholed. Electricity often dips to two hours every fourth day, disrupting refrigeration. Most food is imported.
To attract foreigners, entrepreneurs must meet United Nations security specifications that turn a business into a small fortress, with armed guards at the doors and coils of barbed wire in the yards.
Add the counter-cultural aspect of women in authority in Afghanistan and foreign women owning and running restaurants seems like a recipe for disaster.
But in a sector dominated by men Galic and a handful of others are nonetheless participating in the small boom that is one of the few signs of private enterprise daring the city's business and political risks.
Following the Chaos
For Lalitha Thongngamkam, Kabul's chaos is a prerequisite.
Thongngamkam, a Thai in her 50s, has followed the "U.N. crowd" from one war-torn country to the next, exploiting a frontier niche. Before Kabul there was Kosovo. Before that Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda and East Timor.
In each place she operated a restaurant for as long as the aid workers lasted. When the political situation settles down the competition picks up, the international community moves on and she follows suit.
In 2003 when she set up her restaurant, Lai Thai, it was the only high-security restaurant catering to Kabul's foreign influx. Soaked in the fragrance of lemon grass and coconut milk, it was an ideal oasis, a perfect sliver of all that the city was not. Tables had to be reserved.
Business is slower now. But she hopes a place she just opened this week inside the NATO military headquarters and another opened inside a second NATO compound in May 2005 will make up for it.
Galic's restaurant, Zadar, is named after her hometown. Behind high walls and armed guards, outdoor tables sprawl over a lawn and tables covered in white linen and Croatian dishware sit inside. Along with food she doles out equal portions of advice about what to eat and what not to order because it isn't of the best quality that day.
Cooking on Her Own
Galic, who came to Kabul four years ago for a better paying job in telecommunications so her daughter could enroll in the Royal College of Music in London, opened the restaurant in 2004 and built it up entirely on her own. She still works at the telecom company in the morning, then heads to the restaurant from four to midnight to serve her evening customers.
She says her restaurant draws a loyal base of customers, but she is just managing to survive and is not in it for the money.
"I have always cooked as a wife and mother and I like to cook," says the mother of two grown children. "I like to make people happy."
Last year Gay Le Clerc helped open the Kabul Coffee House, a colorful, cozy place open from morning into late evening that seats about 40 and combines a breakfast menu with Mexican fast food.
Le Clerc and her Afghan husband had run a cafe in Reno, Nev., but when they moved to Kabul in 2002, another wasn't on the agenda. Hoping to rebuild the country, they worked on projects ranging from helping women develop businesses to restoring local government.
But when Le Clerc's friend Deborah Rodriguez, author of "Kabul Beauty School," suggested they open a coffee house together, she felt it was a good idea that could provide two things missing in the city: good coffee and a comfortable place for women to be.
Published this year, Rodriguez's bestselling book stirred controversy. She was accused of making money off the girls who worked in her hair salon and endangering their lives. Her new wealth also posed a threat to her, and she left the country soon after returning from a book promotion tour in the United States. Since then Le Clerc has been sole owner of the coffee house.
Focal Point for Internationals
Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, a development consultant, calls it her regular hangout. "They have Internet and great coffee and nobody bothers you . . . It's kind of a focal point for the aid community and you can chill out alone but also run into people you need to meet."
Le Clerc, in her mid-50s, imports all her coffee from Dubai, where she makes frequent stocking-up visits. "I can't get a good supply of fresh milk here so I am forced to concede and use packaged milk with the coffee," she says.
On a brighter note, she says the business is not as heavily taxed or regulated as in the United States. But there are gunmen; former groups of militia yet to be disarmed who occasionally shake owners down. "Businesses can experience unregulated tax-collection efforts," she says.
Sometimes the unwanted visits are from officials.
Alcohol is banned by the Afghan constitution but restaurants can apply for a license to serve it to foreigners. The legal gray area can cause police officials to raid restaurants on the pretext that Afghans are being served.
Britta Petersen is the German co-owner of Sufi, which serves traditional Afghan fare of kebabs, rice pilaf, tender lamb, steamed dumplings and lentils.
She recounts how a local commander strolled in every other night to eat with his guards, expecting a free meal on the grounds that he was a local commander.
Instead of confronting him she says her Afghan staff handled it in a traditional way. They invited him for a meal and established a relationship. After that, the commander came less frequently and was less demanding when he did.
To start the restaurant in 2004 Petersen, who is 41, and her business partner, Sultan Karimi, an Afghan German, scoured the markets of Kabul for traditional woodwork and textiles.
They say it was difficult finding Afghan cooks after decades of war and displacement. People had moved around, recipes were lost and ingredients disappeared from the market. But they did manage to find an older cook who knew the secrets.
Petersen, who is also a media consultant, moved to Delhi last year but comes back every few months to check on things.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 17 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
Run Date: 12/18/07
The capital of Afghanistan is a tough place to start and run a restaurant but a handful of foreign women are doing just that. For one, Kabul is the latest in a series of post-conflict cities where she has catered to the nomadic "U.N. crowd."
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--For restaurateurs, the unnerving routine of rocket attacks and suicide bombings in Afghanistan's capital city means that business often depends on that week's security advisory.
Saska Galic, for instance, has just thrown out all the duck in her freezer. The customers just didn't show.
But the 51-year-old Croatian shrugs it off, saying she isn't looking to make an enormous profit. "I just like to make people happy."
Kabul is relatively stable compared to other parts of Afghanistan, boasting amenities such as health care, education, transportation, entertainment and even the semblance of a functioning government.
A hungry crowd of ex-pats meanwhile has fueled an explosion of restaurants serving cuisines from all over the world: Italian, Lebanese, Chinese, Indian, French, Mexican, German, Filipino, Korean, Azerbaijani, even Tex-Mex. Now about several dozen restaurants are serving meals and each month sees the opening of yet another.
But it's not an easy place to run a restaurant.
Hamid Karzai's government struggles with a variety of factions displaced by the power restructuring six years ago, from a resurgent Taliban to resurgent warlords. And the city still has plenty of war scars. Streets are potholed. Electricity often dips to two hours every fourth day, disrupting refrigeration. Most food is imported.
To attract foreigners, entrepreneurs must meet United Nations security specifications that turn a business into a small fortress, with armed guards at the doors and coils of barbed wire in the yards.
Add the counter-cultural aspect of women in authority in Afghanistan and foreign women owning and running restaurants seems like a recipe for disaster.
But in a sector dominated by men Galic and a handful of others are nonetheless participating in the small boom that is one of the few signs of private enterprise daring the city's business and political risks.
Following the Chaos
For Lalitha Thongngamkam, Kabul's chaos is a prerequisite.
Thongngamkam, a Thai in her 50s, has followed the "U.N. crowd" from one war-torn country to the next, exploiting a frontier niche. Before Kabul there was Kosovo. Before that Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda and East Timor.
In each place she operated a restaurant for as long as the aid workers lasted. When the political situation settles down the competition picks up, the international community moves on and she follows suit.
In 2003 when she set up her restaurant, Lai Thai, it was the only high-security restaurant catering to Kabul's foreign influx. Soaked in the fragrance of lemon grass and coconut milk, it was an ideal oasis, a perfect sliver of all that the city was not. Tables had to be reserved.
Business is slower now. But she hopes a place she just opened this week inside the NATO military headquarters and another opened inside a second NATO compound in May 2005 will make up for it.
Galic's restaurant, Zadar, is named after her hometown. Behind high walls and armed guards, outdoor tables sprawl over a lawn and tables covered in white linen and Croatian dishware sit inside. Along with food she doles out equal portions of advice about what to eat and what not to order because it isn't of the best quality that day.
Cooking on Her Own
Galic, who came to Kabul four years ago for a better paying job in telecommunications so her daughter could enroll in the Royal College of Music in London, opened the restaurant in 2004 and built it up entirely on her own. She still works at the telecom company in the morning, then heads to the restaurant from four to midnight to serve her evening customers.
She says her restaurant draws a loyal base of customers, but she is just managing to survive and is not in it for the money.
"I have always cooked as a wife and mother and I like to cook," says the mother of two grown children. "I like to make people happy."
Last year Gay Le Clerc helped open the Kabul Coffee House, a colorful, cozy place open from morning into late evening that seats about 40 and combines a breakfast menu with Mexican fast food.
Le Clerc and her Afghan husband had run a cafe in Reno, Nev., but when they moved to Kabul in 2002, another wasn't on the agenda. Hoping to rebuild the country, they worked on projects ranging from helping women develop businesses to restoring local government.
But when Le Clerc's friend Deborah Rodriguez, author of "Kabul Beauty School," suggested they open a coffee house together, she felt it was a good idea that could provide two things missing in the city: good coffee and a comfortable place for women to be.
Published this year, Rodriguez's bestselling book stirred controversy. She was accused of making money off the girls who worked in her hair salon and endangering their lives. Her new wealth also posed a threat to her, and she left the country soon after returning from a book promotion tour in the United States. Since then Le Clerc has been sole owner of the coffee house.
Focal Point for Internationals
Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, a development consultant, calls it her regular hangout. "They have Internet and great coffee and nobody bothers you . . . It's kind of a focal point for the aid community and you can chill out alone but also run into people you need to meet."
Le Clerc, in her mid-50s, imports all her coffee from Dubai, where she makes frequent stocking-up visits. "I can't get a good supply of fresh milk here so I am forced to concede and use packaged milk with the coffee," she says.
On a brighter note, she says the business is not as heavily taxed or regulated as in the United States. But there are gunmen; former groups of militia yet to be disarmed who occasionally shake owners down. "Businesses can experience unregulated tax-collection efforts," she says.
Sometimes the unwanted visits are from officials.
Alcohol is banned by the Afghan constitution but restaurants can apply for a license to serve it to foreigners. The legal gray area can cause police officials to raid restaurants on the pretext that Afghans are being served.
Britta Petersen is the German co-owner of Sufi, which serves traditional Afghan fare of kebabs, rice pilaf, tender lamb, steamed dumplings and lentils.
She recounts how a local commander strolled in every other night to eat with his guards, expecting a free meal on the grounds that he was a local commander.
Instead of confronting him she says her Afghan staff handled it in a traditional way. They invited him for a meal and established a relationship. After that, the commander came less frequently and was less demanding when he did.
To start the restaurant in 2004 Petersen, who is 41, and her business partner, Sultan Karimi, an Afghan German, scoured the markets of Kabul for traditional woodwork and textiles.
They say it was difficult finding Afghan cooks after decades of war and displacement. People had moved around, recipes were lost and ingredients disappeared from the market. But they did manage to find an older cook who knew the secrets.
Petersen, who is also a media consultant, moved to Delhi last year but comes back every few months to check on things.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 17 years and she has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict development in Punjab extensively.
Killing fields of Wakhan
Killing fields of Wakhan
The Hindu/December 2, 2007
Because of the inhospitable terrain, the people of Wakhan, Afghanistan, lack access to medical care. So, while poppy cultivation is on the decline, addiction is on the rise.
Amidst growing concern over the record levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, the province of Badakshan provided some good news this year. Contrary to the general trend, the province was one of those showing a drastic decline — 72 per cent in one year. And up in the remote mountainous region of the province, however, Mubarak Kadam spent the festival of Id in an opium de-addiction clinic in Khandud village in the province’s Wakhan corridor.
Kadam is 49 years old but looks more like 60. A teacher at the local high school where he has been employed for 12 years, Kadam is now trying to cure an opium habit of 20 years. Until his family forced him into the clinic, he spent 100 Afghani everyday on teryak, as opium is called here, selling his sheep and wheat to feed the habit.
Kadam still has his job to return to. Mohammad Zayar is not so lucky. The 50-year-old farmer lost all his land to his habit, forcing his sons to go out to work as cattle traders. The close family unit which lived together off the land fell apart. Zayar realised he was losing his family and entered the de-addiction programme.
Root cause
Opium grown in Badakshan and elsewhere in Afghanistan feeds heroin addiction on the streets of London and NewYork, where youngsters fuel their desire for excitement with heroin and cocaine. Here in remote Badakshan, neither Zayar nor Kadam were using opium for recreational purposes. The single biggest reason for opium addiction in the isolated area of the Wakhan is the lack of access to medical care.
Located in the eastern region of the country, Badakshan’s rugged terrain and inhospitable geography ensured that it was the only province where the Taliban could not enter. It is also the reason for its isolation and economic deprivation.
On the province’s eastern extremity is the Wakhan, a slender corridor of Afghan land separating Tajikistan from Pakistan, and the source of the mighty Amu Darya, or Oxus as it was named by the Bactrians. The Karakoram, Pamir and Hindukush ranges come together here.
Astoundingly beautiful, the Wakhan, all of which is above 2,500 metres altitude with valleys of 3,500 metres and bordered by mountains 7,000 metres high on the South, is even more inaccessible and economically deprived. A flourishing trade corridor on the silk route in earlier times, the area is today isolated and marginalised. International borders have been sealed off due to the war, cutting off access to the closest points of goods and services.
Not a viable crop
One of the reasons for the decrease in poppy cultivation in the province this year was the drastic decline in poppy prices, says the Counter Narcotics chief of Badakshan, Abdul Jamel Hadafmand. Poppy cultivation in Badakshan was simply not competitive, says Hadafmand, compared to other areas with better connections. Strict policing on the borders also led to the drop in poppy growth. Tajikistan for example, has such strict enforcement that it does not allow even medicines through some of the border crossings, a cost that is paid by the people of Wakhan. The farm gate price of dry opium in Badakshan and two adjoining provinces was the lowest in Afghanistan this year, having fallen by 31 per cent in one year.
In the lower Wakhan, inhabited by the Wakhi people, the economy is agro-pastoral. But crop yields are low and few vegetables grow in the stony, arid terrain, forcing the province to import most of its basic goods and vegetables. In the higher regions, inhabited by the Kyrghyz community, the economy is completely dependant on livestock which graze on the high altitude pastures of the Pamirs.
The nearest petrol station in the Wakhan is at the mouth of the Wakhan in Ishqasim. Summer is a short few months between June and September and the severe cold and heavy snow makes most of the Wakhan inaccessible during the long winter. There are few motorable roads and most areas are accessed on foot or using donkeys, mules, camels and yaks.
Medical services have been scarce in this inhospitable terrain. Doctors from the plains are reluctant to be posted to this isolated area, even at higher salaries. Medicines have to be brought via the provincial capital of Faizabad, a two-day drive away and villagers may have to travel hours, if not days, on foot to receive medical attention.
“Providing healthcare is not just a small job for the health provider if the support of other sectors is not there” says Dr. Abdul Momin Jalaly, the Director of Health Services in Badakshan. It has to be an integrated effort here, Jalaly says, pointing out that even to reach the services roads are needed while implementation needs initiatives to reduce poverty and malnutrition.
In this situation opium works as an easily available analgesic, as it did for Kadam and Zayar, both of whom started the habit to relieve themselves of pain. The acceptability of the practice also widened its use, and locals would take it not just for extreme pain but to counter the stress of the daily struggle.
In the de-addiction centre in Khandud, Nigar, a 35-year-old woman, says she has been taking opium for 25 years. “I do very hard work,” she says when asked how she started her habit. Nigar was sent there by her husband, who got himself cured at the clinic.
The livestock that Kadam and Zayar lost to the habit is not unusual. The plentiful livestock are an attraction for traders from the lower regions who travel to the area bringing basic goods. Opium is carried from the lower poppy producing regions into the mountainous regions where it can be exchanged for a large number of cattle once a farmer is addicted. Local addiction also helps smugglers seeking to use the route to take out the opium into Tajikistan and Pakistan.
Habib Jalali, the manager of the Aga Khan de-addiction clinic in Khandud which is named “Omid” (Hope), says they work with local shouras to try and stop traders from selling opium. Initially located in the Futur village, the clinic treated 500 addicts before moving further up the Wakhan to target another stretch of population. With one doctor and three nurses, the clinic relies on medicine, social counselling, community pressure and religious leadership to try and curb the habit. Addicts typically spend 12-15 days at the clinic where they are provided tranquilisers and analgesics, good food and take part in group activities including music and sports.
The provincial public health Director Abdul Momin Jalaly mentions unemployment as a major reason for the addiction. Agricultural land is scarce and other employment opportunities almost non existent. Poppy cultivation has decreased but addiction may be increasing, he warns.
In Kabul there are other fears. The UNODC has emphasised that it is especially important to achieve zero opium cultivation in the provinces of Nangarhar and Badakshan (both in eastern Afghanistan) in order to confine the opium problem totally to the southern insurgency infested areas. The UNODC’s chief warned earlier of the risk of some provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation. In Badakshan the lack of alternative livelihoods is a very real danger for the backsliding. It is also a very real danger for increase in addiction.
The Hindu/December 2, 2007
Because of the inhospitable terrain, the people of Wakhan, Afghanistan, lack access to medical care. So, while poppy cultivation is on the decline, addiction is on the rise.
Amidst growing concern over the record levels of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, the province of Badakshan provided some good news this year. Contrary to the general trend, the province was one of those showing a drastic decline — 72 per cent in one year. And up in the remote mountainous region of the province, however, Mubarak Kadam spent the festival of Id in an opium de-addiction clinic in Khandud village in the province’s Wakhan corridor.
Kadam is 49 years old but looks more like 60. A teacher at the local high school where he has been employed for 12 years, Kadam is now trying to cure an opium habit of 20 years. Until his family forced him into the clinic, he spent 100 Afghani everyday on teryak, as opium is called here, selling his sheep and wheat to feed the habit.
Kadam still has his job to return to. Mohammad Zayar is not so lucky. The 50-year-old farmer lost all his land to his habit, forcing his sons to go out to work as cattle traders. The close family unit which lived together off the land fell apart. Zayar realised he was losing his family and entered the de-addiction programme.
Root cause
Opium grown in Badakshan and elsewhere in Afghanistan feeds heroin addiction on the streets of London and NewYork, where youngsters fuel their desire for excitement with heroin and cocaine. Here in remote Badakshan, neither Zayar nor Kadam were using opium for recreational purposes. The single biggest reason for opium addiction in the isolated area of the Wakhan is the lack of access to medical care.
Located in the eastern region of the country, Badakshan’s rugged terrain and inhospitable geography ensured that it was the only province where the Taliban could not enter. It is also the reason for its isolation and economic deprivation.
On the province’s eastern extremity is the Wakhan, a slender corridor of Afghan land separating Tajikistan from Pakistan, and the source of the mighty Amu Darya, or Oxus as it was named by the Bactrians. The Karakoram, Pamir and Hindukush ranges come together here.
Astoundingly beautiful, the Wakhan, all of which is above 2,500 metres altitude with valleys of 3,500 metres and bordered by mountains 7,000 metres high on the South, is even more inaccessible and economically deprived. A flourishing trade corridor on the silk route in earlier times, the area is today isolated and marginalised. International borders have been sealed off due to the war, cutting off access to the closest points of goods and services.
Not a viable crop
One of the reasons for the decrease in poppy cultivation in the province this year was the drastic decline in poppy prices, says the Counter Narcotics chief of Badakshan, Abdul Jamel Hadafmand. Poppy cultivation in Badakshan was simply not competitive, says Hadafmand, compared to other areas with better connections. Strict policing on the borders also led to the drop in poppy growth. Tajikistan for example, has such strict enforcement that it does not allow even medicines through some of the border crossings, a cost that is paid by the people of Wakhan. The farm gate price of dry opium in Badakshan and two adjoining provinces was the lowest in Afghanistan this year, having fallen by 31 per cent in one year.
In the lower Wakhan, inhabited by the Wakhi people, the economy is agro-pastoral. But crop yields are low and few vegetables grow in the stony, arid terrain, forcing the province to import most of its basic goods and vegetables. In the higher regions, inhabited by the Kyrghyz community, the economy is completely dependant on livestock which graze on the high altitude pastures of the Pamirs.
The nearest petrol station in the Wakhan is at the mouth of the Wakhan in Ishqasim. Summer is a short few months between June and September and the severe cold and heavy snow makes most of the Wakhan inaccessible during the long winter. There are few motorable roads and most areas are accessed on foot or using donkeys, mules, camels and yaks.
Medical services have been scarce in this inhospitable terrain. Doctors from the plains are reluctant to be posted to this isolated area, even at higher salaries. Medicines have to be brought via the provincial capital of Faizabad, a two-day drive away and villagers may have to travel hours, if not days, on foot to receive medical attention.
“Providing healthcare is not just a small job for the health provider if the support of other sectors is not there” says Dr. Abdul Momin Jalaly, the Director of Health Services in Badakshan. It has to be an integrated effort here, Jalaly says, pointing out that even to reach the services roads are needed while implementation needs initiatives to reduce poverty and malnutrition.
In this situation opium works as an easily available analgesic, as it did for Kadam and Zayar, both of whom started the habit to relieve themselves of pain. The acceptability of the practice also widened its use, and locals would take it not just for extreme pain but to counter the stress of the daily struggle.
In the de-addiction centre in Khandud, Nigar, a 35-year-old woman, says she has been taking opium for 25 years. “I do very hard work,” she says when asked how she started her habit. Nigar was sent there by her husband, who got himself cured at the clinic.
The livestock that Kadam and Zayar lost to the habit is not unusual. The plentiful livestock are an attraction for traders from the lower regions who travel to the area bringing basic goods. Opium is carried from the lower poppy producing regions into the mountainous regions where it can be exchanged for a large number of cattle once a farmer is addicted. Local addiction also helps smugglers seeking to use the route to take out the opium into Tajikistan and Pakistan.
Habib Jalali, the manager of the Aga Khan de-addiction clinic in Khandud which is named “Omid” (Hope), says they work with local shouras to try and stop traders from selling opium. Initially located in the Futur village, the clinic treated 500 addicts before moving further up the Wakhan to target another stretch of population. With one doctor and three nurses, the clinic relies on medicine, social counselling, community pressure and religious leadership to try and curb the habit. Addicts typically spend 12-15 days at the clinic where they are provided tranquilisers and analgesics, good food and take part in group activities including music and sports.
The provincial public health Director Abdul Momin Jalaly mentions unemployment as a major reason for the addiction. Agricultural land is scarce and other employment opportunities almost non existent. Poppy cultivation has decreased but addiction may be increasing, he warns.
In Kabul there are other fears. The UNODC has emphasised that it is especially important to achieve zero opium cultivation in the provinces of Nangarhar and Badakshan (both in eastern Afghanistan) in order to confine the opium problem totally to the southern insurgency infested areas. The UNODC’s chief warned earlier of the risk of some provinces sliding back to poppy cultivation. In Badakshan the lack of alternative livelihoods is a very real danger for the backsliding. It is also a very real danger for increase in addiction.
Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN
Himal December 2007
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN
The long shadow
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.Commentary / AFGHANISTAN / PAKISTAN
The long shadow
Afghanistan’s umbilical cord with its southern neighbour ensures that every political and economic shift in Pakistan is quickly reflected across the border. As such, as the battle over democratic polity unfolds in Pakistan, Afghans are watching closely to see which way events will go – and how they will impact on their country. For the moment, there is general anxiety due to the absence of a predictable course.
Though General Pervez Musharraf would have us believe that he is doing his utmost to battle the forces of extremism and fundamentalism in his country – all the while trying not to exacerbate the instability in Afghanistan – the weakening of the mainstream political parties in Islamabad over the years has clearly boosted fringe elements within the extremists. Their legitimisation by the Pakistani polity has, in turn, given the rebels an extended life in Afghanistan. To a certain extent, Gen Musharraf’s continuation in power depends on his ability to convince the international community of his indispensability in dealing with the insurgents that have gotten the Western powers bogged down in Afghanistan. Ergo, the fundamentalists are essential for his perpetuity in power, and he needs to keep them in situ.
In the short run, would Gen Musharraf crack down on the extremist elements in Pakistan, in order to earn brownie points with Washington, DC and cling to power? If not, what of Benazir Bhutto? In Afghanistan, her name is synonymous with Nasurrullah Babar and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and is credited with the installation of the Taliban in Kabul. On the other hand, does it really matter who wins this current political tussle in Islamabad, since in the view of many Kabul observers the ISI will inevitably continue to call the shots on Afghanistan, regardless of who is in power? Or, will the ensuing political confusion and threat of diminishing state support force the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Taliban to come to the drawing table and cut a deal with the government of Hamid Karzai?
To a large extent, the expectations and analysis of the current situation vary tremendously, and are determined by the ethnic, religious, geographical and political denominations of the author of any particular theory. What we would like to hear is that the bases, support and supply lines nurturing the extremists and anti-government elements operating in Afghanistan have been diminishing, but there is no evidence of that.
While the security situation may be something of a wait-and-watch scenario, the instability in Pakistan also makes it more difficult for Afghanistan to carry forward with the peace process, several elements of which are intricately linked to Pakistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, which took place in Kabul in early August, is the most obvious example of this, necessitating not just the goodwill but the attention of Islamabad.
Meanwhile, the contentious Durand line, ostensibly separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, seeks to divide a population that is contiguous in culture, language and social custom. Even during the best of times, neither Kabul’s nor Islamabad’s writ has extended to this area. As such, any serious attempt to deal with the anti-government insurgency will need to either exert governmental authority in these areas, or secure the consent of the local tribal leaders. Since the former seems impossible given the limitations of state power in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, an understanding with the local tribal leaders will be the only feasible solution. Any such agreement will have to be reached with an eye to ensuring that the shelter and support given to ‘guests’, including militants, is scaled back dramatically. No internal operations inside Afghanistan can be successful if the anti-government elements are able to quickly retreat to safe havens across the border.
Reflexive blameWhile the political and security ramifications are currently the dominant areas of much discourse and observation, no less important is the economic impact. The prices of rice, oil and wheat have shot up massively in Kabul in recent times, and other goods are also showing price increases. The lack of any production capacity for goods in Afghanistan has meant that the country continues to import large quantities of basic goods, including milk, butter, salt and sugar. Meanwhile, transit of goods through the Afghan-Pakistani frontier has been made significantly more difficult since the imposition of Gen Musharraf’s state of emergency.
Though many Afghans will have little compunction about blaming Pakistan for most of their troubles, they must also realise that what happens across the border cannot be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in their country. Afghanistan’s own indigenous insurgency might receive weapons and support from across the border, but it also has strong indigenous roots. An inability on the part of the Karzai government to provide security and stability, deliver on development, address grievances and curb illegitimate armed groups, coupled with rampant corruption and an unwillingness to share power, has created a tangle that will only be dismantled through a great deal of determination and patience – elements that currently can be seen as most lacking in both national and international leadership.
For better or worse, for many Afghans the immediate impact of the developments in Pakistan has only been that, for the moment, most people are looking across the border at Pakistan’s chaos, rather than at their own.
Nobody guarding Afghanistan's guards
Nobody guarding Afghanistan's guards
Nov 21, 2007 Asia Times
KABUL - The Afghan government and its international partners are struggling to bolster the country's security forces, fighting the twin problems of boosting the numbers of the national army and trying to disband illegal armed groups.
Yet, an unmonitored, unregulated and unauthorized force is on the streets, not just under the noses of authorities but also hired and legitimized by those working on building the security sector.
As many as 28,000 armed personnel are hired by private security
companies (PSCs), which have been operating as a lucrative business in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion to oust the Taliban in 2001, providing protection to foreigners and elite Afghans, guarding institutions, homes and individuals.
The number of armed contractors is more than half the Afghan National Army, which is estimated at between 35,000 to 50,000, and could be larger if the numbers of "irregular" forces are added to the ranks of legal contractors.
As a report on private security companies released recently by Swiss Peace points out, part of the problem of estimating the numbers of armed personnel of the PSCs is that in the absence of regulations there is little to distinguish between a professional firm that is in the business of providing security from a ragtag bunch of former militiamen who should have been demobilized but who have merely turned into hired guns.
Though at least eight PSCs have been closed down in the past few weeks, and the government is currently finalizing a regulatory framework for PSCs, six years of unfettered freedom to do as they please may make it difficult to bring the PSCs under control, and to implement the regulatory framework, especially one as complex as the one being drafted.
As he travels to work every day, Ahmed sees dozens of armed men. They hurry him on as he passes high walls of reinforced cement bags, stop him for questioning and block his entry not just into offices and houses but also roads where they have set up barricades - usually with a mixture of arrogance and rude behavior.
Ahmed's fault is that he is an ordinary Afghan, without arms, money or a large motorcar, (usually a sports utility vehicle), the three ingredients that constitute the password separating those who are protected from those who constitute the "threat".
Six years into nation-building, Afghans are very much second-class citizens in their own capital city, considered a potential threat unless proven otherwise, as the international community keeps its safe distance from the citizens of the country it is rebuilding. This makes the PSCs indispensable and has in part been responsible for the fact that despite considerable money and expense poured into the justice sector, they fall into the blind spot, neither disarmed as illegal armed groups, nor recognized as a licensed business bound by strict guidelines on the hiring of personnel, use of arms and a code of conduct.
Naeem, a resident of Kabul who works with an international non-governmental agency, sees little difference between the armed personnel of security companies he encounters every day and the fighters of earlier years. "They are the people who fought for money earlier," he said. "Now with their guns they enrolled in private companies to make money. They still think they rule. They cannot show their power towards foreigners so they show it towards Afghans. Their attitude is: if you are an Afghan we decide for you."
Brashness and an aggressive policing style apart, the lack of regulation presents a very real danger, and "contributes to a blurring among international PSCs and international military actors; international PSC staff and the international civilian community; local PSCs and illegal armed groups," said the Swiss Peace report.
The report, the first of its kind, which looks at both Angola and Afghanistan, argues that the lack of a regulatory framework creates distrust due to a lack of transparency, a sense of insecurity due to a perceived heavily armed presence of PSCs, distrust due to "bad" or criminal behavior and human-rights abuses by PSC staff, loss of trust in the state and its monopoly of the use of force.
On the positive side, its notes that the groups provide employment opportunities, especially for former militia fighters and demobilized soldiers.
Susanne Schmeidl, who co-authored the report, said there is no known account of the PSCs being used for active combat duties in Afghanistan. However, she pointed out that they are used for providing security to military compounds which may involve them in combat duties. Unauthorized though they are, they are also used extensively for training the army and police, poppy eradication and interrogation.
Schmeidl said that during her research she found a lot of "pushing of responsibility". She feels the international community has a responsibility since it is trying to build a legal state. "On the one hand you are trying to build a strong legal state and then you refuse to comply when the state tries to exert its power. On the one hand you are building it and on the other hand you are undermining it," she said describing the situation as "problematic".
Khaled, who works with a private business which doesn't use security firms, feels the larger than life presence of the private security companies means "the government's power is shown as being weak, making the ambit of the government's security forces smaller". Though he sees the private companies as a necessity, he feels they should be brought under government control. "Afghanistan is full of guns," he said, "and to do business you need guns too."
Zabi, his colleague, feels the companies provide employment for some but said there is anecdotal evidence of their criminality.
Schmeidl said some of the behavior of the use of private security resembles that of the mafia. Locals she interviewed complained that some contractors would go into an area, find the bad man or the strongman and pay him. Humayun, a student of Kabul University, feels they the PSCs should be regulated, registered and with an accounted numbers of arms and weapons, unlike now when "they are doing whatever they want".
A big question that remains is who will bell the cat. Current draft legislation suggests for example that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) would have to certify the clean criminal records of PSC Afghan staff. In the absence of criminal records in the country and the lack of capacity of the AIHRC that will prove impossible. Introducing legislation that cannot be implemented, as in Angola, the report points out, would defeat its purpose.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Nov 21, 2007 Asia Times
KABUL - The Afghan government and its international partners are struggling to bolster the country's security forces, fighting the twin problems of boosting the numbers of the national army and trying to disband illegal armed groups.
Yet, an unmonitored, unregulated and unauthorized force is on the streets, not just under the noses of authorities but also hired and legitimized by those working on building the security sector.
As many as 28,000 armed personnel are hired by private security
companies (PSCs), which have been operating as a lucrative business in Afghanistan since the US-led invasion to oust the Taliban in 2001, providing protection to foreigners and elite Afghans, guarding institutions, homes and individuals.
The number of armed contractors is more than half the Afghan National Army, which is estimated at between 35,000 to 50,000, and could be larger if the numbers of "irregular" forces are added to the ranks of legal contractors.
As a report on private security companies released recently by Swiss Peace points out, part of the problem of estimating the numbers of armed personnel of the PSCs is that in the absence of regulations there is little to distinguish between a professional firm that is in the business of providing security from a ragtag bunch of former militiamen who should have been demobilized but who have merely turned into hired guns.
Though at least eight PSCs have been closed down in the past few weeks, and the government is currently finalizing a regulatory framework for PSCs, six years of unfettered freedom to do as they please may make it difficult to bring the PSCs under control, and to implement the regulatory framework, especially one as complex as the one being drafted.
As he travels to work every day, Ahmed sees dozens of armed men. They hurry him on as he passes high walls of reinforced cement bags, stop him for questioning and block his entry not just into offices and houses but also roads where they have set up barricades - usually with a mixture of arrogance and rude behavior.
Ahmed's fault is that he is an ordinary Afghan, without arms, money or a large motorcar, (usually a sports utility vehicle), the three ingredients that constitute the password separating those who are protected from those who constitute the "threat".
Six years into nation-building, Afghans are very much second-class citizens in their own capital city, considered a potential threat unless proven otherwise, as the international community keeps its safe distance from the citizens of the country it is rebuilding. This makes the PSCs indispensable and has in part been responsible for the fact that despite considerable money and expense poured into the justice sector, they fall into the blind spot, neither disarmed as illegal armed groups, nor recognized as a licensed business bound by strict guidelines on the hiring of personnel, use of arms and a code of conduct.
Naeem, a resident of Kabul who works with an international non-governmental agency, sees little difference between the armed personnel of security companies he encounters every day and the fighters of earlier years. "They are the people who fought for money earlier," he said. "Now with their guns they enrolled in private companies to make money. They still think they rule. They cannot show their power towards foreigners so they show it towards Afghans. Their attitude is: if you are an Afghan we decide for you."
Brashness and an aggressive policing style apart, the lack of regulation presents a very real danger, and "contributes to a blurring among international PSCs and international military actors; international PSC staff and the international civilian community; local PSCs and illegal armed groups," said the Swiss Peace report.
The report, the first of its kind, which looks at both Angola and Afghanistan, argues that the lack of a regulatory framework creates distrust due to a lack of transparency, a sense of insecurity due to a perceived heavily armed presence of PSCs, distrust due to "bad" or criminal behavior and human-rights abuses by PSC staff, loss of trust in the state and its monopoly of the use of force.
On the positive side, its notes that the groups provide employment opportunities, especially for former militia fighters and demobilized soldiers.
Susanne Schmeidl, who co-authored the report, said there is no known account of the PSCs being used for active combat duties in Afghanistan. However, she pointed out that they are used for providing security to military compounds which may involve them in combat duties. Unauthorized though they are, they are also used extensively for training the army and police, poppy eradication and interrogation.
Schmeidl said that during her research she found a lot of "pushing of responsibility". She feels the international community has a responsibility since it is trying to build a legal state. "On the one hand you are trying to build a strong legal state and then you refuse to comply when the state tries to exert its power. On the one hand you are building it and on the other hand you are undermining it," she said describing the situation as "problematic".
Khaled, who works with a private business which doesn't use security firms, feels the larger than life presence of the private security companies means "the government's power is shown as being weak, making the ambit of the government's security forces smaller". Though he sees the private companies as a necessity, he feels they should be brought under government control. "Afghanistan is full of guns," he said, "and to do business you need guns too."
Zabi, his colleague, feels the companies provide employment for some but said there is anecdotal evidence of their criminality.
Schmeidl said some of the behavior of the use of private security resembles that of the mafia. Locals she interviewed complained that some contractors would go into an area, find the bad man or the strongman and pay him. Humayun, a student of Kabul University, feels they the PSCs should be regulated, registered and with an accounted numbers of arms and weapons, unlike now when "they are doing whatever they want".
A big question that remains is who will bell the cat. Current draft legislation suggests for example that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) would have to certify the clean criminal records of PSC Afghan staff. In the absence of criminal records in the country and the lack of capacity of the AIHRC that will prove impossible. Introducing legislation that cannot be implemented, as in Angola, the report points out, would defeat its purpose.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
‘Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
‘Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
NRC Handelsblad/29 November 2007
Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
Het kabinet moest lang nadenken over verlenging van de militaire missie in Uruzgan. In Afghanistan zelf zijn de Nederlanders glashelder: de troepen moeten blijven.
Door Aunohita Mojumdar
Kabul, 29 nov. Voor Anja de Beer is het geen punt van discussie. De Nederlandse militairen moeten in Afghanistan blijven, vindt de directeur van Acbar in Kabul, coördinator van niet-gouvernementele hulp aan het land. „Als ze vertrekken, stort alles waarschijnlijk in.”
De Beer werkt nu zevenenhalf jaar in het land en constateert bitter weinig vooruitgang. De militaire activiteiten doorkruisen die van de hulpverleners soms. Dat de NAVO elke Afghaan eerder als potentiële vijand ziet dan als potentiële vriend, heeft de hulpverleners volgens De Beer krediet gekost, evenals het grote aantal burgerslachtoffers door militaire operaties. Maar de hulpgemeenschap zou nog minder hebben bereikt, denkt ze, zonder NAVO-troepen.
Nederland heeft ervoor gekozen troepen naar Uruzgan te sturen, stelt de Acbar-directeur vast, en „nu moeten ze volhouden.” Terugtrekking is volgens haar contraproductief. Militairen uit een ander NAVO-land doorgronden de omstandigheden niet zo goed als de Nederlanders, vindt ze. Het vertrek van de Nederlanders zou bovendien betekenen dat er minder geld voor hulp beschikbaar komt.
Ontwikkelingsconsultant Mary Munnik deelt die mening. Ze noemt zichzelf pacifist, maar acht de troepen hard nodig om de veiligheid in Afghanistan te garanderen. Tegelijk stelt ze vast dat de Nederlandse regering „de missie heeft onderschat”. Daardoor is er niets gebeurd op het gebied van ontwikkeling en is de veiligheid evenmin verbeterd. Op het platteland wacht de bevolking wanhopig op bescherming, zegt ze.
Munnik en De Beer verwoorden de opvattingen van de Nederlandse gemeenschap in Kabul. Nederland moet zijn troepen ook na augustus 2008 in Afghanistan houden, luidt het eensgezind. Wel verschillen de meningen over de prestaties van de Nederlandse missie, de noodzaak van een andere strategie en de aard van de verlenging.
Nesar Popal deelt de zorg over de continuïteit, die geschaad zou worden door wijziging van het militaire commando. Deze Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, werkzaam in het kantoor van de tweede vicepresident van Afghanistan, merkt op dat nieuwe troepen de ervaring met de lokale omstandigheden missen die de Nederlanders zich nu hebben verworven.
Ambassadeur Daan Everts, de speciale vertegenwoordiger van de secretaris-generaal van de NAVO in Afghanistan, is ook tegen een plotselinge aftocht van de Nederlandse troepen. Dat zou een „vernietigend psychologisch effect” hebben. Hoewel de Nederlanders wellicht „onevenredig zwaar” worden belast, vindt Everts dat Afghanistan „niet kan worden gestraft voor ruzies binnen het bondgenootschap.” Andere troepen kunnen naar Uruzgan komen, maar „de Nederlanders moeten de hoofdmacht blijven leveren.”
Everts noemt de situatie in Uruzgan ernstiger dan verwacht, maar dat kon volgens hem niet worden voorzien. Uruzgan was betrekkelijk rustig toen het besluit viel er troepen heen te sturen. Door uitbreiding van de militaire activiteiten naar het zuiden en zwaardere druk op aangrenzende provincies werden de Talibaan geprovoceerd, legt hij uit, „zodat ze actiever en zichtbaarder zijn geworden. Ze gingen Uruzgan als een van de veiligere gebieden beschouwen, waar ze zich konden schuilhouden en van waaruit ze konden opereren.”
Militair was het noodzakelijk in Uruzgan op te treden, vindt Everts. „We moeten daar zijn. Het is onderdeel van onze belofte Afghanistan weer op eigen benen te leren staan.” En die belofte was nodig omdat „dit terrorisme een bron van oneindige moeilijkheden is. Dit zijn regressieve, duistere krachten, die geen recht hebben op een veilige thuishaven.”
Een VN-functionaris die anoniem wil blijven, onderstreept dat de Nederlandse missie in Uruzgan vooral voor wederopbouw was bedoeld. Slechts elf bataljons (330 van de 1.600 militairen) bestaan uit gevechtstroepen, de rest is ondersteunend personeel. De Nederlanders werden volgens hem verrast door de wederopstanding van de Talibaan. Niettemin, zegt hij, is overdracht van het militaire commando ongewenst. Dit zou betekenen dat alles weer van het begin af aan moet worden opgebouwd, met alle problemen vandien.
Inzet van extra eenheden van het nationale leger is een van de beloften die de Afghaanse regering aan Nederland heeft gedaan om verlenging van de troepeninzet te vergemakkelijken. Nesar Popal gaat ervan uit Afghanistan 30.000 militairen extra naar de vier zuidelijke provincies stuurt, waaronder Uruzgan. Analisten hebben overigens twijfel aan hun inzetbaarheid. Desertie in onveilige situaties kwam in het verleden vaak voor.
Uruzgan is met afstand de armste van de instabiele zuidelijke provincies. De kindersterfte is er hoog, er gaan weinig kinderen naar school en maar heel weinig meisjes en vrouwen kunnen lezen en schrijven. De extreme armoede valt eerder te wijten aan aan decennia van verwaarlozing dan aan het beleid in de post-Talibaan-jaren. De Nederlandse troepen wilden er snel een aantal ontwikkelingsprojecten realiseren, maar dat lukte nauwelijks door de grote onveiligheid.
Kailash Muttreja, een Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, is een van de weinige ondernemers die een kantoor hebben geopend in Tarin Kowt, de hoofdstad van Uruzgan. Hij leidt Afghan Solar, een bedrijf dat het gebruik van alternatieve energiebronnen ontwikkelt in het energiearme Afghanistan. Hij had gezien welk goed werk de Nederlanders hadden verricht in de provincie Baghlan. Omdat ze ook naar Uruzgan kwamen, opende hij er een kantoor. Vandaag de dag is hij een teleurgesteld man. „Mijn kantoor krijgt opdrachten, maar niet van de Nederlanders. Hun bijdrage is nul komma nul.”
Muttreja voelde zich gemotiveerd om activiteiten in Uruzgan te ontplooien, toen de Nederlanders daarheen kwamen. Nu verwijt hij hun een gebrek aan visie. Wat hem betreft blijven ze alleen, „als ze ook echt iets gaan doen.”
NRC Handelsblad/29 November 2007
Als ze weggaan, stort alles waarschijnlijk in’
Het kabinet moest lang nadenken over verlenging van de militaire missie in Uruzgan. In Afghanistan zelf zijn de Nederlanders glashelder: de troepen moeten blijven.
Door Aunohita Mojumdar
Kabul, 29 nov. Voor Anja de Beer is het geen punt van discussie. De Nederlandse militairen moeten in Afghanistan blijven, vindt de directeur van Acbar in Kabul, coördinator van niet-gouvernementele hulp aan het land. „Als ze vertrekken, stort alles waarschijnlijk in.”
De Beer werkt nu zevenenhalf jaar in het land en constateert bitter weinig vooruitgang. De militaire activiteiten doorkruisen die van de hulpverleners soms. Dat de NAVO elke Afghaan eerder als potentiële vijand ziet dan als potentiële vriend, heeft de hulpverleners volgens De Beer krediet gekost, evenals het grote aantal burgerslachtoffers door militaire operaties. Maar de hulpgemeenschap zou nog minder hebben bereikt, denkt ze, zonder NAVO-troepen.
Nederland heeft ervoor gekozen troepen naar Uruzgan te sturen, stelt de Acbar-directeur vast, en „nu moeten ze volhouden.” Terugtrekking is volgens haar contraproductief. Militairen uit een ander NAVO-land doorgronden de omstandigheden niet zo goed als de Nederlanders, vindt ze. Het vertrek van de Nederlanders zou bovendien betekenen dat er minder geld voor hulp beschikbaar komt.
Ontwikkelingsconsultant Mary Munnik deelt die mening. Ze noemt zichzelf pacifist, maar acht de troepen hard nodig om de veiligheid in Afghanistan te garanderen. Tegelijk stelt ze vast dat de Nederlandse regering „de missie heeft onderschat”. Daardoor is er niets gebeurd op het gebied van ontwikkeling en is de veiligheid evenmin verbeterd. Op het platteland wacht de bevolking wanhopig op bescherming, zegt ze.
Munnik en De Beer verwoorden de opvattingen van de Nederlandse gemeenschap in Kabul. Nederland moet zijn troepen ook na augustus 2008 in Afghanistan houden, luidt het eensgezind. Wel verschillen de meningen over de prestaties van de Nederlandse missie, de noodzaak van een andere strategie en de aard van de verlenging.
Nesar Popal deelt de zorg over de continuïteit, die geschaad zou worden door wijziging van het militaire commando. Deze Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, werkzaam in het kantoor van de tweede vicepresident van Afghanistan, merkt op dat nieuwe troepen de ervaring met de lokale omstandigheden missen die de Nederlanders zich nu hebben verworven.
Ambassadeur Daan Everts, de speciale vertegenwoordiger van de secretaris-generaal van de NAVO in Afghanistan, is ook tegen een plotselinge aftocht van de Nederlandse troepen. Dat zou een „vernietigend psychologisch effect” hebben. Hoewel de Nederlanders wellicht „onevenredig zwaar” worden belast, vindt Everts dat Afghanistan „niet kan worden gestraft voor ruzies binnen het bondgenootschap.” Andere troepen kunnen naar Uruzgan komen, maar „de Nederlanders moeten de hoofdmacht blijven leveren.”
Everts noemt de situatie in Uruzgan ernstiger dan verwacht, maar dat kon volgens hem niet worden voorzien. Uruzgan was betrekkelijk rustig toen het besluit viel er troepen heen te sturen. Door uitbreiding van de militaire activiteiten naar het zuiden en zwaardere druk op aangrenzende provincies werden de Talibaan geprovoceerd, legt hij uit, „zodat ze actiever en zichtbaarder zijn geworden. Ze gingen Uruzgan als een van de veiligere gebieden beschouwen, waar ze zich konden schuilhouden en van waaruit ze konden opereren.”
Militair was het noodzakelijk in Uruzgan op te treden, vindt Everts. „We moeten daar zijn. Het is onderdeel van onze belofte Afghanistan weer op eigen benen te leren staan.” En die belofte was nodig omdat „dit terrorisme een bron van oneindige moeilijkheden is. Dit zijn regressieve, duistere krachten, die geen recht hebben op een veilige thuishaven.”
Een VN-functionaris die anoniem wil blijven, onderstreept dat de Nederlandse missie in Uruzgan vooral voor wederopbouw was bedoeld. Slechts elf bataljons (330 van de 1.600 militairen) bestaan uit gevechtstroepen, de rest is ondersteunend personeel. De Nederlanders werden volgens hem verrast door de wederopstanding van de Talibaan. Niettemin, zegt hij, is overdracht van het militaire commando ongewenst. Dit zou betekenen dat alles weer van het begin af aan moet worden opgebouwd, met alle problemen vandien.
Inzet van extra eenheden van het nationale leger is een van de beloften die de Afghaanse regering aan Nederland heeft gedaan om verlenging van de troepeninzet te vergemakkelijken. Nesar Popal gaat ervan uit Afghanistan 30.000 militairen extra naar de vier zuidelijke provincies stuurt, waaronder Uruzgan. Analisten hebben overigens twijfel aan hun inzetbaarheid. Desertie in onveilige situaties kwam in het verleden vaak voor.
Uruzgan is met afstand de armste van de instabiele zuidelijke provincies. De kindersterfte is er hoog, er gaan weinig kinderen naar school en maar heel weinig meisjes en vrouwen kunnen lezen en schrijven. De extreme armoede valt eerder te wijten aan aan decennia van verwaarlozing dan aan het beleid in de post-Talibaan-jaren. De Nederlandse troepen wilden er snel een aantal ontwikkelingsprojecten realiseren, maar dat lukte nauwelijks door de grote onveiligheid.
Kailash Muttreja, een Nederlander van Afghaanse afkomst, is een van de weinige ondernemers die een kantoor hebben geopend in Tarin Kowt, de hoofdstad van Uruzgan. Hij leidt Afghan Solar, een bedrijf dat het gebruik van alternatieve energiebronnen ontwikkelt in het energiearme Afghanistan. Hij had gezien welk goed werk de Nederlanders hadden verricht in de provincie Baghlan. Omdat ze ook naar Uruzgan kwamen, opende hij er een kantoor. Vandaag de dag is hij een teleurgesteld man. „Mijn kantoor krijgt opdrachten, maar niet van de Nederlanders. Hun bijdrage is nul komma nul.”
Muttreja voelde zich gemotiveerd om activiteiten in Uruzgan te ontplooien, toen de Nederlanders daarheen kwamen. Nu verwijt hij hun een gebrek aan visie. Wat hem betreft blijven ze alleen, „als ze ook echt iets gaan doen.”
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