Hard News May 2009
Seven-and-a-half years after the removal of the Taliban, the feeling is of a city increasingly under siege
Aunohita Mojumdar Kabul
In capital Kabul, every week sees new cement bollards in front of buildings, fresh barbed wire concertinas strung across roads, new check points and road blocks. Each successive bomb blast in front of an important building, that is, buildings housing important people, sees yet another road being blocked to the Afghan public. The international community and elite Afghans barricade themselves behind more sandbags as ordinary Afghans get squeezed more and more into the remaining open areas of the capital.
Seven-and-a-half years after the removal of the Taliban, the feeling is of a city increasingly under siege. This fact made it all the more curious when the Director General of Afghanistan's National Security Directorate, Amrullah Saleh, claimed this week. "We are victorious." Making a speech at a security seminar, he asked: "What more victory do you want?"
Saleh explained his contention: the world had finally come around to accepting the Afghan government's claim that the source of insecurity lay beyond Afghanistan's borders. Finally, he said, the battle had been taken to the place where those centres existed.Saleh was referring to the recent formulation of an 'Af-Pak' policy by the Barack Obama administration and its attention on Pakistan as a source of terror.
It is an approach that has gone down well with the governments of both Afghanistan as well as India, both of whom view it as a triumph of their diplomatic efforts. Officials of both countries are, however, less clear on how the Obama administration intends to act upon this understanding and how this will play into their strategies.
Within Afghanistan the mood is a somber one - of waiting. Opinion across the spectrum is agreed only on one thing: that the fresh influx of US troops will mean intensified fighting as the winter snows melt allowing for easier access across the rugged terrain.
For Afghan citizens the war against terror being waged in their territory in their name is not the only source of violence. While there is intense fighting between pro and anti-government elements in many of the southern and south eastern provinces, violence against citizens comes from multiple sources.
In Balkh province, governor Mohammad Atta, a former northern alliance commander, overlooks a province that has eradicated poppy and has been free of insurgency. However, he knows he sits on a powder keg. Balkh was hit by a severe drought last year and its dry brown fields point to the failure of crop. Economic deprivation could upset the fragile balance pushing people to re-enter poppy cultivation and destabilise the modicum of law and order that has been achieved.
In capital Kabul, its elite live in fear of kidnappings. While kidnappings in the city are usually followed by reports of the approaching spectre of the Taliban, the reality is that they are carried out by criminal networks looking for ransom - a get rich quick scheme that is made lucrative by the absence of an effective law and order machinery. Part of the problem of policing Afghanistan has been the use of police in counter insurgency duties for which they are ill-equipped. Between 2007 and 2009, 568 Afghan National Army soliders were killed compared to 1,504 policemen in the same period.
In the central province of Bamiyan, one of the most peaceful areas of the country, a hotelier explains why they never advertise widely. "It is better to get to know by word of mouth. Going to public could invite the wrong kind of attention." There are many armed militia or even gunmen who have no compunction shaking down businessmen and rich Afghans knowing that in all likelihood they will escape the criminal justice system.
In the Shind and district of the western province of Herat, an estimated 90 civilians were killed in bombing by international military forces. The international forces initially claimed they had bombed a Taliban camp but later conceded they had been misled by misinformation. Warring groups or tribes see the use of US air power as an easy and cost effective way to settle feuds.
The combination of poor intelligence on the ground, and heavy reliance on air strikes, has caused an escalation in civilian casualties. In the year 2008, the use of aerial munitions went up by 40 per cent. In the same period the number of civilian deaths from air strikes shot up by 72 per cent. Almost 60 per cent of the deaths were attributable to the approximately 10-20,000 (numbers are constantly changing) US- Operation Enduring Freedom (number of American forces stationed in Afghanistan under the command of the US Operation Enduring Freedom); rather than the 50-62,000 by International Security Assistance Force (number of forces stationed in Afghanistan under NATO command and control).
In the southern provinces where heavy fighting and civilian casualties are frequent, villagers in many areas no longer care who is in charge, just wanting peace at any cost. While outside Afghanistan the battle is seen as one between Al Qaeda and Taliban and the government and international forces, the character of the anti government armed battle is more complex. While there is a core of the Taliban regime which remains under the command and control of Mullah Omar, the homogeneous picture of the 'enemy' is more of a convenient construct of the war against terror.
The anti-government fighters comprise a mix of ideologically motivated Taliban, the Taliban merely fighting for a share of the pie, small time commanders who have been divested of their 'territory', criminals and drug traders. Their links with each other and with the Al Qaeda are fluid and changing, making this nexus much more dangerous than it would have been had it been a clear-cut homogeneous group with a clear command and control structure.
Parallel movements such as that led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are also active and coordinate with the Taliban on a needs-based basis. Each of these groups has been able to hold small areas for short bursts of time but do not have staying power. Rather, their real impact lies in their ability to disrupt governance, instill fear and erode public trust in the mechanisms of governance both in terms of security forces and administration.
Popular perception outside Afghanistan puts the Taliban at the doorstep of Kabul. Indeed, the Taliban has been able to carry out some audacious strikes inside the capital with increasing degrees of coordination. However, their support base within the capital remains extremely limited, restricting their ability to plan and coordinate operations.
While it is more convenient to countries like the US to project the perception of an 'evil' movement that can be annihilated, neither the numbers nor the ideology can be eliminated quite so easily. While the body count has been replaced with growing numbers, the intolerant ideology is not limited to those who call themselves the Taliban. Within Afghanistan's 'legitimate' polity, there are politicians, commanders and power brokers who are much more comfortable with the social and cultural practices of the Taliban than they are with the more modern political paradigm Afghanistan is currently under.
For Afghanistan's single biggest minority, its women, the greatest threat comes from the growing power of cultural conservatives and the rising intolerance. Though its Constitution promises equality, and initial steps with the urging of the international community reserved more than 20 per cent of seats in Afghanistan's Parliament for women, women in public space face increasing threats, and Constitutional guarantees appear to be only as good as its implementers want it to be.
The recent controversy over the Shia personal family law, portions of which are discriminatory towards women, brought this into sharp focus. While this particular law received considerable international focus, in part because of the sensationalised reporting on complex issues of conjugal rights, there has been far less attention on the increasing intolerance for women's participation in public space and the general growth of violence against women.
While several women have been killed by Taliban in the southern provinces such as the killings of Malalai Kakar, a senior and well- known policewoman, and recently Sitara Achakzai, a woman activist (both were killed in Kandahar), there have been several murders in non-Taliban areas as well, such as that of Zakia Zaki who ran a radio station in Jabbal Seraj in Parwan province close to Kabul. In Kabul city, the head of a woman's organisation says the staff, mainly women, have become more nervous about their role as advocate of women's rights, preferring to stay low key.
The increasing violence against women is taking place in a milieu where aspects of human rights, media freedoms and democratic principles are increasingly being attacked from powerful sections of Afghanistan's polity as being 'alien' to Afghanistan. Many women fear that it is their rights which may be the first to be sacrificed. They point out that in the 'negotiations' with the Taliban, half of Afghanistan's population remains unrepresented. Women's groups feel that their rights may be the easiest compromise their leaders and the international community may be willing to make, pushing them into a renewed cycle of violence and oppressions.
MAY 2009
September 06, 2009
AFGHANISTAN: EXCLUSIONARY HUMANITARIAN AID PRACTICES HITTING HEARTS AND MINDS
EURASIA INSIGHT
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/30/09
The governor of Balkh, a northern Afghan province bordering Uzbekistan, is a smooth-talking, dapper former mujaheddin commander, Atta Mohammad. During a recent interview, he repeatedly expressed frustration with the international approach to Afghanistan. His chief complaint: Despite totally eradicating poppy cultivation in 2007, his province is being ignored by the international aid community.
Atta expressed pride in achieving a measure of security and stability in Balkh. Crime is low and anti-government insurgents are not posing a particular problem. But endemic poverty and a critical humanitarian situation, he said, are threatening to reverse these fragile gains. Under current conditions aid agencies are finding it increasingly difficult to meet the population’s needs. The reason, many say: donors predominantly fund political and military objectives.
Balkh’s plight seems to be connected in large part to this competition for resources. Dependent on rain-fed agriculture, the province was devastated by severe drought in 2008, crippling a region without substantial access to ground water. Yet despite the security and the need, Balkh’s overwhelming needs have largely gone unaddressed.
If the issue was one of scarce funds thinly spread between competing emergencies, the Balkh governor would perhaps not be complaining. The reason for his resentment, though, is that there seems to be plenty of money available -- so much that some donors have been "throwing it at NGOs" says one aid worker. Money is available for the asking, if aid agencies and NGOs are willing to work for projects when and where the donors dictate.
"We have no problems getting funds for conflict areas," says Dave Hampson of Save the Children, "but it is a struggle to continue excellent work in the non-conflict areas. The interest of donors is quite often in the areas where they have troops. It is understandable for them as a country, but it is not a division of resources based on humanitarian aid needs."
Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, Manager of Policy Advocacy and Research of Action Aid Afghanistan, concurs. "Aid is tied to locations where [a donor’s] troops are based. Some countries preference them through PRTs," he says, referring to the controversial civil-military provincial reconstruction teams. ECHO, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office, is the only donor giving independent funding to NGOs now, he says.
Humanitarian aid, intended for basic survival and emergencies, is under pressure. On a visit to Afghanistan in early April, Esko Kentrschynskyj, the Head of Unit for Asia and Latin America of ECHO, emphasized that despite the huge commitment for development and reconstruction in Afghanistan, humanitarian aid had been very limited. "One should not lose sight of significant humanitarian needs that remain in this country," he told journalists in Kabul.
ECHO’s acting country director, Luc Verna, says the humanitarian needs in Afghanistan "are so huge that it will take years and years to cover them all." While he and other aid workers caution that reliable and comprehensive estimates are hard to measure as large swathes of Afghanistan are out of bounds even for assessment, he affirms that anecdotal evidence from the field suggests malnutrition is again on the rise. "The trends are not very good," he says.
The Humanitarian Action Plan appeal launched by the United Nations in February points out that "extreme poverty and lack of development have also left the population more susceptible during times of crisis and emergency, limiting their coping strategies and draining contingency reserves."
"People are resorting to negative coping mechanisms," such as selling off their livestock, says another aid worker who asked to remain anonymous. "The lack of humanitarian funding is a huge issue. All the funding we get is development funding. The humanitarian funding that is offered is linked to political objectives."
This linkage can vary vastly. "We are constantly being pushed to take up projects in areas where the major donors have their troops. They are throwing money at those projects even though the complete push on the south has not prevented the insecurity from spreading," says the aid worker. Other linkages include contractual obligations on the NGOs to build strong ties with military PRTs, or, in the most blatant cases, stipulations that the NGO beneficiary may be asked to do "post battlefield clean-up." "We are forced to reject many projects because of the stipulations," she says.
"After 2001, there was significant involvement of the international community in humanitarian aid that was replaced step-by-step by a trend towards the development of political assets or infrastructure," says Verna of ECHO. He feels that this was probably because of the initial security improvements, but the practice is continuing, despite a drastic change in the situation.
"Independent and flexible humanitarian funding has not been a priority of the donor community in Afghanistan," says Ingrid Macdonald, the Regional Protection and Advocacy Adviser of the Norwegian Refugee Council. "The tendency has been to fund large scale and high-value development and reconstruction projects. Often these projects are implemented through large for-profit private companies, linked to military and political priorities, and targeting geographic areas where the donors have a military presence or political interest. The humanitarian needs of the Afghan people are not being met, despite significant donor funding to Afghanistan," she says.
In an interview with EurasiaNet in August last year, then-UNODC country chief, Christina Oguz, warned that provinces like Balkh, which had suffered severely from drought, might slip back into poppy cultivation unless steps were taken to redress the unfolding humanitarian crises. If the province does slip from its current position as a secure and stable province, Governor Atta’s angry message may become prophetic.
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/30/09
The governor of Balkh, a northern Afghan province bordering Uzbekistan, is a smooth-talking, dapper former mujaheddin commander, Atta Mohammad. During a recent interview, he repeatedly expressed frustration with the international approach to Afghanistan. His chief complaint: Despite totally eradicating poppy cultivation in 2007, his province is being ignored by the international aid community.
Atta expressed pride in achieving a measure of security and stability in Balkh. Crime is low and anti-government insurgents are not posing a particular problem. But endemic poverty and a critical humanitarian situation, he said, are threatening to reverse these fragile gains. Under current conditions aid agencies are finding it increasingly difficult to meet the population’s needs. The reason, many say: donors predominantly fund political and military objectives.
Balkh’s plight seems to be connected in large part to this competition for resources. Dependent on rain-fed agriculture, the province was devastated by severe drought in 2008, crippling a region without substantial access to ground water. Yet despite the security and the need, Balkh’s overwhelming needs have largely gone unaddressed.
If the issue was one of scarce funds thinly spread between competing emergencies, the Balkh governor would perhaps not be complaining. The reason for his resentment, though, is that there seems to be plenty of money available -- so much that some donors have been "throwing it at NGOs" says one aid worker. Money is available for the asking, if aid agencies and NGOs are willing to work for projects when and where the donors dictate.
"We have no problems getting funds for conflict areas," says Dave Hampson of Save the Children, "but it is a struggle to continue excellent work in the non-conflict areas. The interest of donors is quite often in the areas where they have troops. It is understandable for them as a country, but it is not a division of resources based on humanitarian aid needs."
Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, Manager of Policy Advocacy and Research of Action Aid Afghanistan, concurs. "Aid is tied to locations where [a donor’s] troops are based. Some countries preference them through PRTs," he says, referring to the controversial civil-military provincial reconstruction teams. ECHO, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office, is the only donor giving independent funding to NGOs now, he says.
Humanitarian aid, intended for basic survival and emergencies, is under pressure. On a visit to Afghanistan in early April, Esko Kentrschynskyj, the Head of Unit for Asia and Latin America of ECHO, emphasized that despite the huge commitment for development and reconstruction in Afghanistan, humanitarian aid had been very limited. "One should not lose sight of significant humanitarian needs that remain in this country," he told journalists in Kabul.
ECHO’s acting country director, Luc Verna, says the humanitarian needs in Afghanistan "are so huge that it will take years and years to cover them all." While he and other aid workers caution that reliable and comprehensive estimates are hard to measure as large swathes of Afghanistan are out of bounds even for assessment, he affirms that anecdotal evidence from the field suggests malnutrition is again on the rise. "The trends are not very good," he says.
The Humanitarian Action Plan appeal launched by the United Nations in February points out that "extreme poverty and lack of development have also left the population more susceptible during times of crisis and emergency, limiting their coping strategies and draining contingency reserves."
"People are resorting to negative coping mechanisms," such as selling off their livestock, says another aid worker who asked to remain anonymous. "The lack of humanitarian funding is a huge issue. All the funding we get is development funding. The humanitarian funding that is offered is linked to political objectives."
This linkage can vary vastly. "We are constantly being pushed to take up projects in areas where the major donors have their troops. They are throwing money at those projects even though the complete push on the south has not prevented the insecurity from spreading," says the aid worker. Other linkages include contractual obligations on the NGOs to build strong ties with military PRTs, or, in the most blatant cases, stipulations that the NGO beneficiary may be asked to do "post battlefield clean-up." "We are forced to reject many projects because of the stipulations," she says.
"After 2001, there was significant involvement of the international community in humanitarian aid that was replaced step-by-step by a trend towards the development of political assets or infrastructure," says Verna of ECHO. He feels that this was probably because of the initial security improvements, but the practice is continuing, despite a drastic change in the situation.
"Independent and flexible humanitarian funding has not been a priority of the donor community in Afghanistan," says Ingrid Macdonald, the Regional Protection and Advocacy Adviser of the Norwegian Refugee Council. "The tendency has been to fund large scale and high-value development and reconstruction projects. Often these projects are implemented through large for-profit private companies, linked to military and political priorities, and targeting geographic areas where the donors have a military presence or political interest. The humanitarian needs of the Afghan people are not being met, despite significant donor funding to Afghanistan," she says.
In an interview with EurasiaNet in August last year, then-UNODC country chief, Christina Oguz, warned that provinces like Balkh, which had suffered severely from drought, might slip back into poppy cultivation unless steps were taken to redress the unfolding humanitarian crises. If the province does slip from its current position as a secure and stable province, Governor Atta’s angry message may become prophetic.
Old military hardware in a new bottle
Asia Times
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - Obama's call for a fresh approach to Afghanistan and his promise of allocating greater resources have all but obscured the fact that Washington remains focused on its strategic military interests and the exit strategy, goals not synonymous with the interests of Afghans or long-term stability in the region. The added danger this time round is that the use of soft power - diplomacy and aid initiatives that kept a counterbalance to the military perspective - may now be reduced to handmaidens in the aid of strategic military aims.
One does not have to go much further than last month's White Paper outlining the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy to understand the Obama administration's main tactical aims in Afghanistan. The "core goal of the US", the paper states, "must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan
and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan". This core has been reiterated time and again at different levels by senior administration officials, but continues to be ignored by other members of the international community. Desperate for some signs of a positive change, other donor countries, the United Nations (UN) and even the Afghan government have cherry-picked the parts of the Obama strategy that suit their contentions.
While President Hamid Karzai dwelt on the US recognition that the theater of war would now extend to Pakistan, the UN's top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, focused on the "greater balance between the military and civilian sides". Indeed the White Paper has something for everyone. The hold-all strategy lays out a number of simultaneous aims that include bolstering governance, economic aid, building political institutions and establishing the rule of law. What analysts are ignoring, however, is that the Obama administration has already signaled its priorities within the wish list it has spelt out and these remain focused on short-term tactical military advantages.
A focus on the military strategy itself does not presage an undermining of other goals. The evidence for that lies in the details: the budgetary details, the tools of implementation, a high tolerance for operating procedures that result in violence against civilians, and a "hearts and minds" campaign that impacts on the ability of aid workers to deliver independent aid. The evidence also lies in hints about the apparent willingness to compromise on some aspects of fundamental democratic and human-rights principles.
Obama's core goals are a reiteration of the early goals of the Bush era before it got into the messy business of "nation-building". The means it uses to achieve these may also merely result in an expanded version of the George W Bush administration's toolbox.
Take the talk of a civilian surge. At best the number of civilians who are going to be sent by Washington will number in the hundreds, not the thousands that the "military surge" entails. Moreover, according to the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan's Reconstruction in the US administration, the 215 civilian posts are related to the expansion of the civilian-military provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), ie the civilian and aid workers will be embedded within the military bases. The decision to expand the PRTs comes at a time when 11 reputable international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with a track record of years of consistent work in Afghanistan, have called for a phasing out of the PRTs. The NGOs Oxfam, Care, Action Aid, Save the Children and others have joined hands to express concern that the continued delivery of humanitarian and development aid through the military component has not only been ineffective but is continuing to intensify the danger to the operations of civilian agencies working on the ground.
While the PRTs were set up as a means of reaching out to areas where the civilian agencies had not been able to reach, the intensifying conflict since 2005 has fundamentally altered that role. The heavy fighting has meant that soldiers engaged in fighting are also delivering aid, blurring the lines between the civilian and military and eroding the neutrality that aid workers depend on for effective and safe delivery of aid.
There appears to be a willful disregard of the need to maintain this distinction. Though the international military forces have signed onto the May 2008 Afghanistan National Civilian Military guidelines, they have not followed them. The UN, which is expected to play the role of coordinator, has also not fulfilled its mandate. "It is profoundly regrettable that for over a year the UN took few steps to fulfill this important responsibility" said a report on civilians caught in conflict released earlier this month by this group of NGOs. Some examples of the disregard are in the unwillingness of military forces to carry clear identification, the military's continued use of unmarked white vehicles that are universally used by humanitarian workers, and the location of military facilities and the passage of military convoys in urban areas.
Rather than emphasizing the need for the neutrality in aid delivery, many of the major donors have tended to pour their money into the PRTs. As fighting has intensified, donor money has also followed the troops, with some of the largest donors like the US, Britain and Canada routing substantive chunks of their money into the provinces where their troops are fighting. In the existing conditions the aid money has come to resemble pacification tactics: money that is expected to win the hearts and minds battle and mitigate the fallout of the intense fighting.
Humanitarian and aid agencies talk of the difficulty of getting donor money. "We are feeling the pull on our sleeve from the military tent and the political tent", said Dave Hampson of Save the Children UK, adding "we are not being funded on the basis of humanitarian need".
The $75.5 billion for Afghanistan and Iraq in the Supplemental Appropriations Request for 2009 has been widely reported. Less reported is the fine print: $38 billion will fund ongoing military operations, $11.6 billion is for equipment, $3.6 billion is for the Afghan security forces and $3.1 billion for counter-terrorism operations. Only $1.6 billion will go towards economic assistance for Afghanistan, a portion of it for supporting additional civilian personnel and diplomatic operations. Only $170 million is earmarked to support economic growth in Afghanistan, including agriculture sector development.
An example of the preference for routing funds through the military is evident in the figures for the US Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). In 2008, this was close to $0.5 billion, which exceeds the total amount the Afghan government spends on health and education. The supplementary budget provides for an additional $0.5 billion in additional funds to continue the CERP "which enables US military commanders to respond to urgent, humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs in their areas of responsibility".
With a former military commander, General Karl Eikenberry, nominated in March as the next US ambassador to Afghanistan, will the emphasis on using aid to buttress military strategy undergo any change?
The tolerance for civilian casualties is another example of how the long-term goal of stability and security of the civilian population is being compromised for short-term military goals. "Corollary damage" - that euphemistic term for civilian casualties from use of excessive use of force - has grown not diminished. In the year 2008, a year when the international military forces reportedly changed their operating methods to minimize civilian casualties, the number of deaths from air strikes by international military forces rose by 72% over the previous year, with a 40% increase in the use of aerial munitions.
According to the NGO report, almost 60% of the civilian deaths caused by international military forces were attributable to American-led forces serving in Operation Enduring Freedom.
The NGOs have also expressed concern about the possible adverse fallout of the presence of an increased number of international troops on the civilian population. They are calling for significant changes in the operating procedures of the international military forces.
US policy makers have made much of not creating a "Valhalla" in Afghanistan, speaking of shorter goal posts and lowered ambitions. There are fears here that these could represent a willingness to compromise on essential human and democratic rights in exchange for a measure of illusory "stability".
A resurgent conservatism has provided a useful tool for political mobilization amongst a section of powerful political powerbrokers. Debate within the international community has also shifted. It now speaks of the need for "Afghanisation" and to respect Afghanistan's culture. There has been increasing rhetoric around the fact that Afghanistan does not need to replicate the model of democracy. While such talk is always made with deference to the country's constitution, the recent controversy over the Shia bill - that would return Taliban-style restrictions on women - has shown that the constitution is only as good as its implementers and no bulwark to the erosion of basic rights.
Aspects of women's rights, democracy, media freedoms and cultural tolerance are increasingly being labeled as "foreign concepts" by a powerful section of Afghan leaders. The international community has largely left this unchallenged. Long before Afghanistan's citizens can lay claim to the basic rights of life and liberty, the debate now centers around the need to curtail these rights in accordance with Afghanistan's traditions.
President Bush was castigated for the US policy of supporting predatory warlords with untenable human-rights records. There are no signs that this policy will change. Individual commanders with poor track records continue to be propped up by the US administration on the grounds of being 'can do guys' that the Obama administration feels it can do business with. The world view and ideologies of some of these so-called leaders have little to differentiate them from that of many of the Taliban on several counts.
Little wonder then that negotiations with the Taliban are increasingly being touted as a way out of the current morass. If hard-won democratic freedoms and human rights are bartered in exchange, it will undoubtedly be dubbed "the Afghan way" of doing things. After all the US has long been quite comfortable with authoritarian undemocratic regimes, as long as they are seen to be on the American side.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - Obama's call for a fresh approach to Afghanistan and his promise of allocating greater resources have all but obscured the fact that Washington remains focused on its strategic military interests and the exit strategy, goals not synonymous with the interests of Afghans or long-term stability in the region. The added danger this time round is that the use of soft power - diplomacy and aid initiatives that kept a counterbalance to the military perspective - may now be reduced to handmaidens in the aid of strategic military aims.
One does not have to go much further than last month's White Paper outlining the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy to understand the Obama administration's main tactical aims in Afghanistan. The "core goal of the US", the paper states, "must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan
and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan". This core has been reiterated time and again at different levels by senior administration officials, but continues to be ignored by other members of the international community. Desperate for some signs of a positive change, other donor countries, the United Nations (UN) and even the Afghan government have cherry-picked the parts of the Obama strategy that suit their contentions.
While President Hamid Karzai dwelt on the US recognition that the theater of war would now extend to Pakistan, the UN's top man in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, focused on the "greater balance between the military and civilian sides". Indeed the White Paper has something for everyone. The hold-all strategy lays out a number of simultaneous aims that include bolstering governance, economic aid, building political institutions and establishing the rule of law. What analysts are ignoring, however, is that the Obama administration has already signaled its priorities within the wish list it has spelt out and these remain focused on short-term tactical military advantages.
A focus on the military strategy itself does not presage an undermining of other goals. The evidence for that lies in the details: the budgetary details, the tools of implementation, a high tolerance for operating procedures that result in violence against civilians, and a "hearts and minds" campaign that impacts on the ability of aid workers to deliver independent aid. The evidence also lies in hints about the apparent willingness to compromise on some aspects of fundamental democratic and human-rights principles.
Obama's core goals are a reiteration of the early goals of the Bush era before it got into the messy business of "nation-building". The means it uses to achieve these may also merely result in an expanded version of the George W Bush administration's toolbox.
Take the talk of a civilian surge. At best the number of civilians who are going to be sent by Washington will number in the hundreds, not the thousands that the "military surge" entails. Moreover, according to the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan's Reconstruction in the US administration, the 215 civilian posts are related to the expansion of the civilian-military provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), ie the civilian and aid workers will be embedded within the military bases. The decision to expand the PRTs comes at a time when 11 reputable international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with a track record of years of consistent work in Afghanistan, have called for a phasing out of the PRTs. The NGOs Oxfam, Care, Action Aid, Save the Children and others have joined hands to express concern that the continued delivery of humanitarian and development aid through the military component has not only been ineffective but is continuing to intensify the danger to the operations of civilian agencies working on the ground.
While the PRTs were set up as a means of reaching out to areas where the civilian agencies had not been able to reach, the intensifying conflict since 2005 has fundamentally altered that role. The heavy fighting has meant that soldiers engaged in fighting are also delivering aid, blurring the lines between the civilian and military and eroding the neutrality that aid workers depend on for effective and safe delivery of aid.
There appears to be a willful disregard of the need to maintain this distinction. Though the international military forces have signed onto the May 2008 Afghanistan National Civilian Military guidelines, they have not followed them. The UN, which is expected to play the role of coordinator, has also not fulfilled its mandate. "It is profoundly regrettable that for over a year the UN took few steps to fulfill this important responsibility" said a report on civilians caught in conflict released earlier this month by this group of NGOs. Some examples of the disregard are in the unwillingness of military forces to carry clear identification, the military's continued use of unmarked white vehicles that are universally used by humanitarian workers, and the location of military facilities and the passage of military convoys in urban areas.
Rather than emphasizing the need for the neutrality in aid delivery, many of the major donors have tended to pour their money into the PRTs. As fighting has intensified, donor money has also followed the troops, with some of the largest donors like the US, Britain and Canada routing substantive chunks of their money into the provinces where their troops are fighting. In the existing conditions the aid money has come to resemble pacification tactics: money that is expected to win the hearts and minds battle and mitigate the fallout of the intense fighting.
Humanitarian and aid agencies talk of the difficulty of getting donor money. "We are feeling the pull on our sleeve from the military tent and the political tent", said Dave Hampson of Save the Children UK, adding "we are not being funded on the basis of humanitarian need".
The $75.5 billion for Afghanistan and Iraq in the Supplemental Appropriations Request for 2009 has been widely reported. Less reported is the fine print: $38 billion will fund ongoing military operations, $11.6 billion is for equipment, $3.6 billion is for the Afghan security forces and $3.1 billion for counter-terrorism operations. Only $1.6 billion will go towards economic assistance for Afghanistan, a portion of it for supporting additional civilian personnel and diplomatic operations. Only $170 million is earmarked to support economic growth in Afghanistan, including agriculture sector development.
An example of the preference for routing funds through the military is evident in the figures for the US Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). In 2008, this was close to $0.5 billion, which exceeds the total amount the Afghan government spends on health and education. The supplementary budget provides for an additional $0.5 billion in additional funds to continue the CERP "which enables US military commanders to respond to urgent, humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs in their areas of responsibility".
With a former military commander, General Karl Eikenberry, nominated in March as the next US ambassador to Afghanistan, will the emphasis on using aid to buttress military strategy undergo any change?
The tolerance for civilian casualties is another example of how the long-term goal of stability and security of the civilian population is being compromised for short-term military goals. "Corollary damage" - that euphemistic term for civilian casualties from use of excessive use of force - has grown not diminished. In the year 2008, a year when the international military forces reportedly changed their operating methods to minimize civilian casualties, the number of deaths from air strikes by international military forces rose by 72% over the previous year, with a 40% increase in the use of aerial munitions.
According to the NGO report, almost 60% of the civilian deaths caused by international military forces were attributable to American-led forces serving in Operation Enduring Freedom.
The NGOs have also expressed concern about the possible adverse fallout of the presence of an increased number of international troops on the civilian population. They are calling for significant changes in the operating procedures of the international military forces.
US policy makers have made much of not creating a "Valhalla" in Afghanistan, speaking of shorter goal posts and lowered ambitions. There are fears here that these could represent a willingness to compromise on essential human and democratic rights in exchange for a measure of illusory "stability".
A resurgent conservatism has provided a useful tool for political mobilization amongst a section of powerful political powerbrokers. Debate within the international community has also shifted. It now speaks of the need for "Afghanisation" and to respect Afghanistan's culture. There has been increasing rhetoric around the fact that Afghanistan does not need to replicate the model of democracy. While such talk is always made with deference to the country's constitution, the recent controversy over the Shia bill - that would return Taliban-style restrictions on women - has shown that the constitution is only as good as its implementers and no bulwark to the erosion of basic rights.
Aspects of women's rights, democracy, media freedoms and cultural tolerance are increasingly being labeled as "foreign concepts" by a powerful section of Afghan leaders. The international community has largely left this unchallenged. Long before Afghanistan's citizens can lay claim to the basic rights of life and liberty, the debate now centers around the need to curtail these rights in accordance with Afghanistan's traditions.
President Bush was castigated for the US policy of supporting predatory warlords with untenable human-rights records. There are no signs that this policy will change. Individual commanders with poor track records continue to be propped up by the US administration on the grounds of being 'can do guys' that the Obama administration feels it can do business with. The world view and ideologies of some of these so-called leaders have little to differentiate them from that of many of the Taliban on several counts.
Little wonder then that negotiations with the Taliban are increasingly being touted as a way out of the current morass. If hard-won democratic freedoms and human rights are bartered in exchange, it will undoubtedly be dubbed "the Afghan way" of doing things. After all the US has long been quite comfortable with authoritarian undemocratic regimes, as long as they are seen to be on the American side.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian journalist who is currently based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for 16 years and has covered the Kashmir conflict and post-conflict situation in Punjab extensively.
AFGHANISTAN: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS REVEAL COMPLEXITIES IN THE AFGHAN POLITICAL
EURASIA INSIGHT
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/21/09
One of the chief weaknesses of President Hamid Karzai’s administration in Afghanistan is that its authority does not extend across the entire country. It is ironic, then, that one of Karzai’s main challengers in Afghanistan’s upcoming presidential election asserts that the incumbent has too much power concentrated in his hands.
Speaking at an April 20 security conference, Abdullah Abdullah -- a former Afghan foreign minister and himself a presidential hopeful in the August election -- complained that Afghanistan’s current security woes can be attributed in part to the marginalization of forces that played an instrumental role in resisting both Soviet occupation and Taliban rule.
"Those who played a role in bringing security" in earlier years should have a say in the present security debates, Abdullah asserted. Instead, Karzai in recent years has managed to consolidate authority in his hands, and has succeeded in pushing out those individuals and forces that could provide checks on his authority. The current governmental decision-making process is so centralized that "even the smallest decisions have to go to the president’s office," Abdullah said.
Abdullah should know. He was part of the team that took over in Kabul after a US-led blitz toppled the Taliban. His influence stemmed from the fact that he was a leader of the Northern Alliance, which provided most of the armed resistance to the Taliban only to see its influence wane dramatically in recent years.
The need to strike a new balance in Afghanistan’s still nascent democratic system seems to be one of the emerging themes of the presidential campaign. But as Abdullah and others are finding, fixing perceived flaws in the system will not be easy. As Karzai critics now see it, the United States and European Union miscalculated during the 2001 Bonn Conference, which created the country’s existing political framework and launched the process of drafting a new constitution.
Back then, the United States reportedly pushed strongly for the creation of a powerful presidency -- apparently believing that a strong chief executive would offer the best way to promote stability in the strife-torn country. Over time, however, Karzai’s administration has proven ineffectual in combating corruption, and the consensus among democratization advocates has shifted -- to the point where some policy-makers in the West reportedly now wish that stronger checks and balances on presidential authority had been built into the Afghan system.
In March, the British daily The Guardian reported that US officials were keen to create the post of prime minister in the Afghan government structure as a way of counter-balancing Karzai’s influence. But in an interview with EurasiaNet, a US government spokesman denied that Washington had any such plans.
In any event, introducing the post of prime minister at this point would be a difficult task. Afghanistan’s Constitution currently does not provide for that post and thus would require amending. While amendments can be introduced by a majority in parliament, the commission that approves amendments, and the Loya Jirga, or grand tribal council, which ratifies constitutional changes, both require presidential assent, as does the final endorsement of the amendments. Any sitting president, not just Karzai, would seem unlikely to support a measure that would considerably dilute his (or potentially her) presidential authority.
In addition, any perception that the United States supports the creation of the prime ministerial post would, at this stage, seem a sure way of squashing all hopes of it ever becoming reality. Most Afghans are convinced that Washington wants to influence the election’s outcome, despite Washington’s insistence that it is neither supporting nor opposing any candidate. Within Afghanistan, anti-foreigner sentiment, especially anti-American sentiment, may well turn out to be a major factor in the presidential election.
The question of checks and balances is just one of the complexities of the Afghan system that is exerting influence on the presidential campaign. One other major issue is the matter of individual influence in politics, and the lack of well-organized political parties.
Afghanistan’s electoral law poses obstacles to the involvement of political parties in the presidential campaign. As a result, the campaign’s outcome hinges on not necessarily the articulation of policy programs, but on back-room deals made by power brokers -- a process that appears to be currently underway.
For example, to blunt Abdullah’s criticism, Karzai loyalists announced on April 21 that another leader of the Northern Alliance, Mohammad Fahim, was formally endorsing the incumbent for reelection. The announcement thus exposed a split in the National Front, the main political opposition group in the country.
Yet another intricacy of this presidential election revolves around citizenship. Some of those who aspire to the Afghan presidency now find themselves in a position of first having to reaffirm their Afghan citizenship. One such presidential hopeful is Ashraf Ghani, a former World Bank economist who also served as Afghanistan’s finance minister from 2002-2004. Ghani is currently in the United States, where he is in the midst of revoking his US citizenship. According to his office here in Kabul, Ghani intends to return to Afghanistan on an Afghan passport.
The citizenship hurdle confronted by Ghani and others is connected with Afghanistan’s legacy of three-plus decades of foreign occupation and civil strife. Over that time, more than 8 million Afghans became refugees, with most finding safe havens in Pakistan and Iran. A privileged few, including Ghani, migrated to the West, where they acquired US and European citizenship.
Ghani’s citizenship did not prevent him from serving as finance minister, but the constitution expressly forbids the chief executive from being a citizen of any other country. Ministers are appointed, not elected, and the prerogative of vetting the qualifications of a ministerial nominee rests with the Wolesi Jirga, or the lower house of parliament. In presidential contests, the Independent Election Commission has the responsibility of ensuring that candidates meet all constitutional requirements.
The commission’s deputy chief, Zekria Barakzai, told EurasiaNet that the IEC will strictly interpret the constitution on the citizenship issue. "They [candidates] have to provide proof of revoking their citizenship (of another country), and the proof must state that they have already annulled the citizenship," Barakzai said. The requirement will affect not only Ghani, but several other contenders including the former interior minister, Ali Ahmed Jalali, who was born in Afghanistan in 1940, but subsequently acquired American citizenship.
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/21/09
One of the chief weaknesses of President Hamid Karzai’s administration in Afghanistan is that its authority does not extend across the entire country. It is ironic, then, that one of Karzai’s main challengers in Afghanistan’s upcoming presidential election asserts that the incumbent has too much power concentrated in his hands.
Speaking at an April 20 security conference, Abdullah Abdullah -- a former Afghan foreign minister and himself a presidential hopeful in the August election -- complained that Afghanistan’s current security woes can be attributed in part to the marginalization of forces that played an instrumental role in resisting both Soviet occupation and Taliban rule.
"Those who played a role in bringing security" in earlier years should have a say in the present security debates, Abdullah asserted. Instead, Karzai in recent years has managed to consolidate authority in his hands, and has succeeded in pushing out those individuals and forces that could provide checks on his authority. The current governmental decision-making process is so centralized that "even the smallest decisions have to go to the president’s office," Abdullah said.
Abdullah should know. He was part of the team that took over in Kabul after a US-led blitz toppled the Taliban. His influence stemmed from the fact that he was a leader of the Northern Alliance, which provided most of the armed resistance to the Taliban only to see its influence wane dramatically in recent years.
The need to strike a new balance in Afghanistan’s still nascent democratic system seems to be one of the emerging themes of the presidential campaign. But as Abdullah and others are finding, fixing perceived flaws in the system will not be easy. As Karzai critics now see it, the United States and European Union miscalculated during the 2001 Bonn Conference, which created the country’s existing political framework and launched the process of drafting a new constitution.
Back then, the United States reportedly pushed strongly for the creation of a powerful presidency -- apparently believing that a strong chief executive would offer the best way to promote stability in the strife-torn country. Over time, however, Karzai’s administration has proven ineffectual in combating corruption, and the consensus among democratization advocates has shifted -- to the point where some policy-makers in the West reportedly now wish that stronger checks and balances on presidential authority had been built into the Afghan system.
In March, the British daily The Guardian reported that US officials were keen to create the post of prime minister in the Afghan government structure as a way of counter-balancing Karzai’s influence. But in an interview with EurasiaNet, a US government spokesman denied that Washington had any such plans.
In any event, introducing the post of prime minister at this point would be a difficult task. Afghanistan’s Constitution currently does not provide for that post and thus would require amending. While amendments can be introduced by a majority in parliament, the commission that approves amendments, and the Loya Jirga, or grand tribal council, which ratifies constitutional changes, both require presidential assent, as does the final endorsement of the amendments. Any sitting president, not just Karzai, would seem unlikely to support a measure that would considerably dilute his (or potentially her) presidential authority.
In addition, any perception that the United States supports the creation of the prime ministerial post would, at this stage, seem a sure way of squashing all hopes of it ever becoming reality. Most Afghans are convinced that Washington wants to influence the election’s outcome, despite Washington’s insistence that it is neither supporting nor opposing any candidate. Within Afghanistan, anti-foreigner sentiment, especially anti-American sentiment, may well turn out to be a major factor in the presidential election.
The question of checks and balances is just one of the complexities of the Afghan system that is exerting influence on the presidential campaign. One other major issue is the matter of individual influence in politics, and the lack of well-organized political parties.
Afghanistan’s electoral law poses obstacles to the involvement of political parties in the presidential campaign. As a result, the campaign’s outcome hinges on not necessarily the articulation of policy programs, but on back-room deals made by power brokers -- a process that appears to be currently underway.
For example, to blunt Abdullah’s criticism, Karzai loyalists announced on April 21 that another leader of the Northern Alliance, Mohammad Fahim, was formally endorsing the incumbent for reelection. The announcement thus exposed a split in the National Front, the main political opposition group in the country.
Yet another intricacy of this presidential election revolves around citizenship. Some of those who aspire to the Afghan presidency now find themselves in a position of first having to reaffirm their Afghan citizenship. One such presidential hopeful is Ashraf Ghani, a former World Bank economist who also served as Afghanistan’s finance minister from 2002-2004. Ghani is currently in the United States, where he is in the midst of revoking his US citizenship. According to his office here in Kabul, Ghani intends to return to Afghanistan on an Afghan passport.
The citizenship hurdle confronted by Ghani and others is connected with Afghanistan’s legacy of three-plus decades of foreign occupation and civil strife. Over that time, more than 8 million Afghans became refugees, with most finding safe havens in Pakistan and Iran. A privileged few, including Ghani, migrated to the West, where they acquired US and European citizenship.
Ghani’s citizenship did not prevent him from serving as finance minister, but the constitution expressly forbids the chief executive from being a citizen of any other country. Ministers are appointed, not elected, and the prerogative of vetting the qualifications of a ministerial nominee rests with the Wolesi Jirga, or the lower house of parliament. In presidential contests, the Independent Election Commission has the responsibility of ensuring that candidates meet all constitutional requirements.
The commission’s deputy chief, Zekria Barakzai, told EurasiaNet that the IEC will strictly interpret the constitution on the citizenship issue. "They [candidates] have to provide proof of revoking their citizenship (of another country), and the proof must state that they have already annulled the citizenship," Barakzai said. The requirement will affect not only Ghani, but several other contenders including the former interior minister, Ali Ahmed Jalali, who was born in Afghanistan in 1940, but subsequently acquired American citizenship.
AFGHANISTAN’S FIRST FEMALE GOVERNOR STRIVES TO CHANGE ATTITUDES AND HABITS
EURASIA INSIGHT
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/16/09
Habiba Sarobi is levying punitive fines -- fines for arriving late and fines for failing to silence cell phones during meetings. The penalties are a major part the governor of Bamiyan’s strategy to overhaul the work ethic of her province, a place made famous by the Taliban’s destruction of giant Buddhas in 2001.
Though it is still early in her reform effort, some provincial officials quietly express surprise at the progress already made. At one recent public function, for example, several functionaries showed up early, a fact practically unheard of elsewhere in Afghanistan. Already Sarobi is Afghanistan’s first and only female governor. If her experiment in punctuality succeeds, she would also become the first governor to instill in bureaucrats a healthy respect for time and discipline anywhere in the country. "One man paid the fine this morning," she declares with a mischievous smile.
In a country still ravaged by conflict, and where corruption and nepotism are rampant, late arrivals at meetings may seem like an outlandish issue -- one too trivial to bother with amid pressing economic and social concerns. But for Bamiyan, discipline may be the critical component in promoting economic growth. The province is fortunate to be one of the most stable in Afghanistan. But stability is both a blessing and a curse: with international attention focused on the more insecure provinces in the south and east, Bamiyan has been largely left to its own devices during the reconstruction process.
For Sarobi and other officials in the province, there is not a lot to work with other than their own ingenuity. Bamiyan’s history -- going back to before the Soviet invasion -- is one of economic deprivation. As a province dominated by the Hazara community, who are racially distinct and face social segregation and discrimination throughout the country, Bamiyan has experienced years of neglect from successive rulers. While a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are now working there, the absence of essential infrastructure makes it difficult for Bamiyan to capitalize on the benefits of their work.
According to Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy, Afghanistan has rehabilitated 12,200 kilometers of roads since 2001. Only in the last year has the rehabilitation reached Bamiyan. So far the province has just one mile of asphalt, hardly enough to encourage investment in industries or tourism.
As Bamiyan does not tie into existing infrastructure networks, NGO aid does not yield the same benefits that it would in other provinces. The province enjoys renown for its fertile fields and agriculture, but farmers have difficulty in getting their produce to market because of the lack of roads. It has the potential for tourism, but no commercial flights land in the vicinity.
Sarobi has ideas for promoting growth. The tourism potential is ripe. But despite the province’s spectacular beauty, fascinating history and linkage with contemporary events, tourism in Bamiyan could only provide small revenues. Agriculture and mining (the region has abundant iron and coal deposits) would seem to be the best engines for growth.
These days, Sarobi can usually be found multitasking: asking NGOs to invest in small scale units to help with milk and wool production; drawing up plans to extract iron in the Hajigak mines; flying off to New Zealand where she succeeded in persuading Wellington to provide a $1 million grant towards tourism development at a time when most of the international community has grave doubts about Afghanistan’s security; or lobbying the central government to relocate the tiny airport so Bamiyan can retain its status as a world heritage site, an accolade bestowed on the remote valley in 2003 for its beauty and archeological treasures.
Sarobi is hands on, whether it is organizing a meeting at the spectacular lakes of Band-i Amir where she has had lakeside buildings removed to preserve the pristine beauty of the lake, or clambering up the steep scaffolding in front of one of the Buddhas on hearing an ancient relic had been discovered hidden in a small alcove.
"We hope we can have a regional museum here to keep the archeological finds," says Sarobi. It is a proposal that is endorsed by the director of National Museums in Kabul, Omara Khan Masoudi.
On the debate about the future of the Buddhas, she dismisses outlandish proposals to reconstruct them and says simply, "I would like them to be reconstructed using anastylosis" (a process where no new material is used, but the fragments are reattached to the existing structure wherever possible).
Sarobi’s greatest contribution to the province’s regeneration is perhaps the one that defies quantification -- serving as a role model for Afghan girls and women who desire to participate in civil society development. It is a space Sarobi herself has carved out after a long struggle, which began with discrimination within her own family.
After much persuasion, she speaks of childhood matter-of-factly, but with an underlying sadness. "The first stage of my life was very tough. My father, like all other men in Afghanistan, had an attitude of discrimination. He preferred my brothers to me. This affected me a lot. It affected me enough to [work hard and] show my family that I am here and I can do something. I would work hard and always come first in class to show I could do better than my brothers," she says.
It was not her father, however, who was convinced by this determination, but her uncles who encouraged Sarobi to continue studying: "This changed my personality at that time. In university I became involved with some student unions during the [era of Soviet occupation in the 1980s]. I was a very emotional person. But in middle age, I said it is not good for a woman to be emotional but better to be strong. I witnessed many crimes during the mujahedeen time and I decided to stop crying."
Sarobi helps both her sister and daughter overcome the prevalent disadvantages facing females in Afghan society. "I witness many bad attitudes towards women even among educated families," she says. In her own family she has found support from her husband whose own liberal views influence their children, two sons and a daughter. But Sarobi feels Afghan society has a long way to go.
"I hope that it will change," she said.
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/16/09
Habiba Sarobi is levying punitive fines -- fines for arriving late and fines for failing to silence cell phones during meetings. The penalties are a major part the governor of Bamiyan’s strategy to overhaul the work ethic of her province, a place made famous by the Taliban’s destruction of giant Buddhas in 2001.
Though it is still early in her reform effort, some provincial officials quietly express surprise at the progress already made. At one recent public function, for example, several functionaries showed up early, a fact practically unheard of elsewhere in Afghanistan. Already Sarobi is Afghanistan’s first and only female governor. If her experiment in punctuality succeeds, she would also become the first governor to instill in bureaucrats a healthy respect for time and discipline anywhere in the country. "One man paid the fine this morning," she declares with a mischievous smile.
In a country still ravaged by conflict, and where corruption and nepotism are rampant, late arrivals at meetings may seem like an outlandish issue -- one too trivial to bother with amid pressing economic and social concerns. But for Bamiyan, discipline may be the critical component in promoting economic growth. The province is fortunate to be one of the most stable in Afghanistan. But stability is both a blessing and a curse: with international attention focused on the more insecure provinces in the south and east, Bamiyan has been largely left to its own devices during the reconstruction process.
For Sarobi and other officials in the province, there is not a lot to work with other than their own ingenuity. Bamiyan’s history -- going back to before the Soviet invasion -- is one of economic deprivation. As a province dominated by the Hazara community, who are racially distinct and face social segregation and discrimination throughout the country, Bamiyan has experienced years of neglect from successive rulers. While a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are now working there, the absence of essential infrastructure makes it difficult for Bamiyan to capitalize on the benefits of their work.
According to Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy, Afghanistan has rehabilitated 12,200 kilometers of roads since 2001. Only in the last year has the rehabilitation reached Bamiyan. So far the province has just one mile of asphalt, hardly enough to encourage investment in industries or tourism.
As Bamiyan does not tie into existing infrastructure networks, NGO aid does not yield the same benefits that it would in other provinces. The province enjoys renown for its fertile fields and agriculture, but farmers have difficulty in getting their produce to market because of the lack of roads. It has the potential for tourism, but no commercial flights land in the vicinity.
Sarobi has ideas for promoting growth. The tourism potential is ripe. But despite the province’s spectacular beauty, fascinating history and linkage with contemporary events, tourism in Bamiyan could only provide small revenues. Agriculture and mining (the region has abundant iron and coal deposits) would seem to be the best engines for growth.
These days, Sarobi can usually be found multitasking: asking NGOs to invest in small scale units to help with milk and wool production; drawing up plans to extract iron in the Hajigak mines; flying off to New Zealand where she succeeded in persuading Wellington to provide a $1 million grant towards tourism development at a time when most of the international community has grave doubts about Afghanistan’s security; or lobbying the central government to relocate the tiny airport so Bamiyan can retain its status as a world heritage site, an accolade bestowed on the remote valley in 2003 for its beauty and archeological treasures.
Sarobi is hands on, whether it is organizing a meeting at the spectacular lakes of Band-i Amir where she has had lakeside buildings removed to preserve the pristine beauty of the lake, or clambering up the steep scaffolding in front of one of the Buddhas on hearing an ancient relic had been discovered hidden in a small alcove.
"We hope we can have a regional museum here to keep the archeological finds," says Sarobi. It is a proposal that is endorsed by the director of National Museums in Kabul, Omara Khan Masoudi.
On the debate about the future of the Buddhas, she dismisses outlandish proposals to reconstruct them and says simply, "I would like them to be reconstructed using anastylosis" (a process where no new material is used, but the fragments are reattached to the existing structure wherever possible).
Sarobi’s greatest contribution to the province’s regeneration is perhaps the one that defies quantification -- serving as a role model for Afghan girls and women who desire to participate in civil society development. It is a space Sarobi herself has carved out after a long struggle, which began with discrimination within her own family.
After much persuasion, she speaks of childhood matter-of-factly, but with an underlying sadness. "The first stage of my life was very tough. My father, like all other men in Afghanistan, had an attitude of discrimination. He preferred my brothers to me. This affected me a lot. It affected me enough to [work hard and] show my family that I am here and I can do something. I would work hard and always come first in class to show I could do better than my brothers," she says.
It was not her father, however, who was convinced by this determination, but her uncles who encouraged Sarobi to continue studying: "This changed my personality at that time. In university I became involved with some student unions during the [era of Soviet occupation in the 1980s]. I was a very emotional person. But in middle age, I said it is not good for a woman to be emotional but better to be strong. I witnessed many crimes during the mujahedeen time and I decided to stop crying."
Sarobi helps both her sister and daughter overcome the prevalent disadvantages facing females in Afghan society. "I witness many bad attitudes towards women even among educated families," she says. In her own family she has found support from her husband whose own liberal views influence their children, two sons and a daughter. But Sarobi feels Afghan society has a long way to go.
"I hope that it will change," she said.
AFGHANISTAN: IS THE OBLIGATORY SEX LAW POLITICALLY MOTIVATED TO BOLSTER KARZAI'S POLL HOPES?
Eurasia Insight:
Aunohita Mojumdar: 4/10/09
Following an international outcry, officials in Afghanistan have backtracked on legislation that would have drastically curtailed women's rights. While some international observers characterized the draft bill as an aberration in Afghanistan's democratization process, critics insist Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration is willing to endorse discrimination in order to bolster its standing in conservative constituencies.
The Shi'a Personal Status bill would codify unequal marriage rights and duties for men and women within the Shi'a minority. Foreign critics have complained that the legislation would enable a husband to compel his wife to have sex with impunity, in effect engaging in action that in several Western states meets a legal standard of rape. The law would also lower the marriage age below the minimum enshrined in the civil law, currently 16 for girls and 18 for boys, allowing for the marriage of minors.
Women's rights activists say they have been agitating against the discriminatory provisions of the law since it was first drafted in 2007. They see a negative trend and fear that the bill is the beginning of a process that will see women's rights bartered in lieu of political deals and compromises, both during the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections and in the larger process of reconciliation with the Taliban.
Female MP Shinkai Karokhail, who has been at the forefront of raising this issue within parliament, says the discriminatory provisions were by no means an aberration or oversight. "We have pointed these out in detail over the past two years. As recently as March, just before the bill got presidential assent, we had questioned why the bill contained these discriminatory provisions," she told EurasiaNet.
The bill has been passed by both houses of parliament and signed by President Karzai, thus completing three of the four stages for adoption of the law. However, it has still not been published, the last step before it becomes legally binding. Karokhail says the bill was passed in haste. "Different departments of the legislative process rushed through the bill. This was entirely for political reasons. Only four or five powerful people within parliament supported it, but not the majority," she asserted.
The perception that political machinations or a political deal were behind the bill is widespread amongst women's rights activists. "It has nothing to do with religion," asserts Wajma Frogh, the Country Director of Global Rights in Afghanistan. "It is political. Women's issues are being compromised for political gain."
Activists, however, are also aware that they have to tread cautiously so as not to be seen as discriminatory toward a religious minority group in Afghanistan. Karokhail emphasizes that the changes they are demanding in the Shi'a bill are similar to the safeguards they are seeking under the Sunni version of the law, which is still in the drafting process. Indeed, the fear is that if the discriminatory provisions of the Shi'a law are not overturned, it could set a precedent that would impact the majority Sunni community as well.
The swift reactions of international leaders -- including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and outgoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer -- led Karzai to order a review. If anything in the legislation is found to contravene the country's constitution or Sharia law, the president said, "measures will be taken."
"We understand the concerns of our allies in the international community," Karzai told a press conference in Kabul. "Those concerns may be out of inappropriate or not-so-good translation of the law, or a misinterpretation of it."
The somewhat haphazard international reaction to the bill has, in part, allowed the government to shield itself. To date, there is no authoritative translation, preventing many organizations and international bodies from taking a firm, clear and public stand on this issue. In a statement issued early this month, UNIFEM Afghanistan made clear its concerns about the initial draft, noting that, "the question was raised as to whether the draft law was consistent with Afghanistan's own legal framework which includes the Afghan Constitution."
In the absence of a definitive version of the legislation, Karzai has some wiggle room to speak of "inappropriate" concerns based on incorrect interpretations. Some say his characterization that opposition to the bill emanated from the international community is misleading, since the most fierce and consistent opposition has come from Afghan women and Afghan groups. Local activists claim that the president's office and the Ministry of Justice have long been aware of the specific objections, as well as suggested amendments.
Bolstered by the international reaction, Afghan activists are still worried that the "review" will become an excuse for not taking action, and that the international community's interest in the issue will dwindle. "In the beginning we were a priority, and efforts were made to have the active participation of women in public life. Now we are no longer on the agenda of the government and international community," said Karokhail. "We are not being consulted on any major decisions. We are not being consulted on talks with the Taliban. There is a fear in our heart that the politicians will compromise our rights."
Rachel Reid, the Country Representative of Human Rights Watch, is worried that, as diplomats and government officials speak more openly about reconciliation with the Taliban, the bill portends a decrease in attention to women's rights. "In passing this law, Parliament and the president have behaved as though women's rights are expendable," she told EurasiaNet. "All of this makes the prospect of reconciliation with the Taliban deeply worrying if women's rights can be so easily abandoned and those who want to speak up for women can be so easily silenced. One has to hope that those international politicians who expressed outrage at the Shi'a family law will show the same commitment to women's rights when deals are being made with the Taliban."
Aunohita Mojumdar: 4/10/09
Following an international outcry, officials in Afghanistan have backtracked on legislation that would have drastically curtailed women's rights. While some international observers characterized the draft bill as an aberration in Afghanistan's democratization process, critics insist Afghan President Hamid Karzai's administration is willing to endorse discrimination in order to bolster its standing in conservative constituencies.
The Shi'a Personal Status bill would codify unequal marriage rights and duties for men and women within the Shi'a minority. Foreign critics have complained that the legislation would enable a husband to compel his wife to have sex with impunity, in effect engaging in action that in several Western states meets a legal standard of rape. The law would also lower the marriage age below the minimum enshrined in the civil law, currently 16 for girls and 18 for boys, allowing for the marriage of minors.
Women's rights activists say they have been agitating against the discriminatory provisions of the law since it was first drafted in 2007. They see a negative trend and fear that the bill is the beginning of a process that will see women's rights bartered in lieu of political deals and compromises, both during the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections and in the larger process of reconciliation with the Taliban.
Female MP Shinkai Karokhail, who has been at the forefront of raising this issue within parliament, says the discriminatory provisions were by no means an aberration or oversight. "We have pointed these out in detail over the past two years. As recently as March, just before the bill got presidential assent, we had questioned why the bill contained these discriminatory provisions," she told EurasiaNet.
The bill has been passed by both houses of parliament and signed by President Karzai, thus completing three of the four stages for adoption of the law. However, it has still not been published, the last step before it becomes legally binding. Karokhail says the bill was passed in haste. "Different departments of the legislative process rushed through the bill. This was entirely for political reasons. Only four or five powerful people within parliament supported it, but not the majority," she asserted.
The perception that political machinations or a political deal were behind the bill is widespread amongst women's rights activists. "It has nothing to do with religion," asserts Wajma Frogh, the Country Director of Global Rights in Afghanistan. "It is political. Women's issues are being compromised for political gain."
Activists, however, are also aware that they have to tread cautiously so as not to be seen as discriminatory toward a religious minority group in Afghanistan. Karokhail emphasizes that the changes they are demanding in the Shi'a bill are similar to the safeguards they are seeking under the Sunni version of the law, which is still in the drafting process. Indeed, the fear is that if the discriminatory provisions of the Shi'a law are not overturned, it could set a precedent that would impact the majority Sunni community as well.
The swift reactions of international leaders -- including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and outgoing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer -- led Karzai to order a review. If anything in the legislation is found to contravene the country's constitution or Sharia law, the president said, "measures will be taken."
"We understand the concerns of our allies in the international community," Karzai told a press conference in Kabul. "Those concerns may be out of inappropriate or not-so-good translation of the law, or a misinterpretation of it."
The somewhat haphazard international reaction to the bill has, in part, allowed the government to shield itself. To date, there is no authoritative translation, preventing many organizations and international bodies from taking a firm, clear and public stand on this issue. In a statement issued early this month, UNIFEM Afghanistan made clear its concerns about the initial draft, noting that, "the question was raised as to whether the draft law was consistent with Afghanistan's own legal framework which includes the Afghan Constitution."
In the absence of a definitive version of the legislation, Karzai has some wiggle room to speak of "inappropriate" concerns based on incorrect interpretations. Some say his characterization that opposition to the bill emanated from the international community is misleading, since the most fierce and consistent opposition has come from Afghan women and Afghan groups. Local activists claim that the president's office and the Ministry of Justice have long been aware of the specific objections, as well as suggested amendments.
Bolstered by the international reaction, Afghan activists are still worried that the "review" will become an excuse for not taking action, and that the international community's interest in the issue will dwindle. "In the beginning we were a priority, and efforts were made to have the active participation of women in public life. Now we are no longer on the agenda of the government and international community," said Karokhail. "We are not being consulted on any major decisions. We are not being consulted on talks with the Taliban. There is a fear in our heart that the politicians will compromise our rights."
Rachel Reid, the Country Representative of Human Rights Watch, is worried that, as diplomats and government officials speak more openly about reconciliation with the Taliban, the bill portends a decrease in attention to women's rights. "In passing this law, Parliament and the president have behaved as though women's rights are expendable," she told EurasiaNet. "All of this makes the prospect of reconciliation with the Taliban deeply worrying if women's rights can be so easily abandoned and those who want to speak up for women can be so easily silenced. One has to hope that those international politicians who expressed outrage at the Shi'a family law will show the same commitment to women's rights when deals are being made with the Taliban."
Afghanistan unravelling
April 2009
By: Aunohita Mojumdar
In early March, Kabul was abuzz with talk about the next presidential elections. When would they be held, and under what circumstances? Who would be able to vote? Would the Election Commission be prepared? Were any of the opposition candidates ready? Could the security forces ensure security? And how many times would the Constitution be violated in the course of whatever decision was ultimately taken?
Under Afghanistan’s Constitution, the elections should have been held by 21 April, at least a month before the constitutionally mandated date for the end of the presidential term. But following discussions, it was last year ‘agreed’ – between the parliamentarians, the country’s independent Election Commission and the presidency – to hold the elections in August 2009. This was a time period the commission said would be required if it were to attempt to implement the ballot throughout the country, large parts of which are snowbound till late spring. Now, this agreement appeared to have unravelled, with the opposition demanding that either the elections be held in accordance with the Constitution, in April itself, or that President Hamid Karzai step down for the period between the end of the presidency and the elections. With this move, the opposition – which includes the United National Front, a broad coalition of former and current strongmen, commanders from the anti-Soviet resistance, ex-Communist leaders and various social and ethnic groups – was hoping that it would be able to deprive President Karzai of the advantages of incumbency in the run-up.
Afghanistan, still a nascent political democracy, does not have public electoral campaigning in the style of most democracies. Instead, security concerns, resource constraints, geography and the very culture, which is as yet unused to a full representative government based on the principles of parliamentary democracy, conspire to limit the candidates’ access to voters. In this situation, the advantage goes to whoever controls the Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA), which still remains under state control despite numerous efforts to free up the airwaves. Any incumbent president would also benefit from the highly centralised system of authority and financial power in the current form of government, where provincial governors are appointed by the president rather than by the elected provincial councils.
President Karzai initially fought the move to shunt him out. Unwilling to step down, he first argued that he be should allowed to stay till the completion of his five-year term, since the presidential elections were last held late in 2004. When the opposition parties did not budge, he hoisted them on their own petard, ordering the Election Commission to follow the Constitution to the letter – an order that was interpreted as the president’s call for early elections in April. Not only would this have ensured that he remained in his position during the conduct of the elections because it was within the Constitutional timeframe, but it also put the opposition in quite a spot, since no one was even half ready to challenge the incumbent.
As the opposition reverted its position to supporting August elections, the international community also backed that date, terming it impossible to organise the logistics before that. Finally, the Election Commission formally stated that it would be impossible to hold free and fair elections anytime before August. While President Karzai agreed to this decision, the question of whether he could be forced to step down remains unresolved, as does the issue of constitutional impropriety of having elections well beyond the constitutionally mandated date. Worryingly, both of these matters appear to be able to be resolved only through the imposition of a state of emergency, though that is being seen as an unlikely step now.
Alienation
SABIR NAZAR, “Tree of knowledge”
It is the political manoeuvres and legal technicalities that have preoccupied those in the seat and circle of power in Kabul. But talk of the elections has also engendered some hope, in that people think a change by itself may be positive in a country that has endured a downward slide for some time. This optimism is tempered with a realisation of the limitations of the voter, however, and there is as much discussion on which candidate the Americans will back as there is regarding the candidates that are entering the fray.
An analysis of the hopes and fears about Afghanistan leaves one sober. The Asia Foundation’s annual survey (which offers the largest sample size of any survey in Afghanistan) on public opinion on a range of issues found that 36 percent of the Afghan population feels that they were more prosperous under the Taliban than they are now; only 39 percent feel they are better off today than back then. The survey further reported that of the 16 percent of the population that reported having experienced violence, only eight percent said they had faced violence at the hands of insurgents or militants; in a worrying trend, as much as six percent also said they had suffered violence at the hands of the foreign forces.
There has been a 40 percent increase in civilian casualties over the last year of intensifying conflict. UN data states that of the 2118 civilian casualties in 2008, 55 percent were attributed to anti-government elements, and 39 percent to pro-government forces. (The rest could not be attributed.) For the high number of dead from pro-government forces, there is growing public alienation from both the Kabul government and the international community. Though casualties caused by insurgents are higher, Afghans explain their anger by stating that they hold the international community to higher standards. This is because, they point out, the international community and the Karzai government has sought public support on grounds of a higher moral authority, and the promise to uphold rule of law. Increasing civilian casualties, stagnation in the delivery of development and the escalating number of barriers in the form of physical obstacles, denial of access and increasingly complex procedures designed to minimise contact with the public used by the government (including the international community working in support of it) have caused growing public anger, and led to a lower threshold of tolerance.
After seven years of development expenditure amounting to some USD 20 billion, economic progress in Afghanistan has been paltry, erratic and unbalanced. While a small section of the population has been able to benefit from the aid, the majority continue to survive on agriculture – ironically, and interestingly, the most neglected sector by the major international donors. USAID, the American aid arm, for example, has spent less than five percent of its Afghanistan budget on agriculture since 2002. It is not hard to understand why: between 2005 and 2008, an additional five percent of the country’s population was pushed below the minimum nutritional levels, while average household expenditure on food rose from 56 percent to 85 percent, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Food scarcity has been exacerbated by rising worldwide prices and a severe drought, a factor that development agencies warn could affect public health and even spark displacement and unrest.
Civilian casualties in the international military operations have acted like lightening rods on the Afghan polity, drawing criticism from the Parliament, President Karzai and the public. This has prodded the UN to join hands in demanding changes in the operational strategies of the international forces. The UN’s seniormost official in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), has called for a change in the agreements that mandate the presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil, especially with respect to house-to-house searches, arbitrary detention and the use of air power in operations. All three are elements that the Taliban has exploited to energise public opinion against the Karzai government.
In Kabul, the alienation is visible in the form of growing checkpoints and physical barriers that protect the international community and the small section of elite Afghans in power. Everyday, more road blocks are put up, barbed wire is strung, and guns are trained on the local population. Debate over the security situation is frenetic. The old mantra that a military solution alone is the answer, which made its appearance soon after the resurgence of insurgency in 2005-06, was revived in 2008, albeit with a new twist: the push for negotiations with the Taliban. While a reconciliation process with those Taliban militants willing to give up arms and join the government has been in place for some time, without yielding substantial results, the emphasis now seems to be on high-level talks. However, there are differing perceptions of who could or should be brought to the table, and at what stage that should happen. The dominant thinking at this point – that of the US with new President Barack Obama at the helm – is to increase the military pressure on the insurgents and the Taliban, while at the same time carrying on negotiations. But the efficacy of this carrot-and-stick approach is yet to be demonstrated.
The change in US administration following the last elections there was eagerly awaited in Afghanistan, though Afghans emphasise that the real change will lie in the detail. While the broad contours of President Obama’s policy on Afghanistan are yet to be spelled out, there are indications of a deepening of the militarised approach in the Afghanistan policy. The new US National Security Adviser, Marine General James Jones, is a former military commander, breaking the earlier precedent of having civilian advisors. The new US ambassador to Afghanistan is also a former military man, General Karl Eikenberry, who served as the commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan, and is currently deputy chairman of the NATO military committee in Brussels.
As an initial step, President Obama has sanctioned the sending of an additional 17,000 US troops to Afghanistan, whereas military commanders in the field had sought 30,000. The delay in the training of the Afghan National Army has also given impetus to a proposal to train and arm the tribal militia as a means of meeting the shortfall. This proposal now finds the backing of the American generals. Initial statements emanating from Washington, DC have suggested lowered political ambitions and shorter goalposts, with some officials stating that the US must concentrate on its early goals of tackling al-Qaeda and the Taliban, rather than the wider aims of nation-building and stabilisation.
Love thy neighbour
The other defining aspect to emerge from the first months of President Obama’s administration is the concept of ‘Af-Pak’, or viewing the two countries and the violence emanating from and within them as a combined problem. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy for ‘Af-Pak’ saw several other countries, including Britain, France and Germany, swiftly following suit by appointing similar envoys in addition to their ambassadors.
Pressure on Pakistan is likely to continue under the Obama administration. However, the fragility of Pakistan’s polity makes it unclear where and how the pressure can be applied. The policy of crossborder strikes carried out by US Special Forces into Pakistani territory from Afghanistan, a signature of the Bush years, was supported by candidate Obama. It is not clear whether these strikes will now continue, and it is not clear whether the Americans are sensitive to the enormous negative baggage they collect as a result of the attacks by aircrafts and drones. But it is a fact that there is greater operational coherence in the American operations now, with the Special Forces, which was not answerable to the US commander in Afghanistan, also being brought under the command of the US top military commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan.
The deepening crisis within Afghanistan has led to an escalation of anti-Pakistan rhetoric in Kabul, with repeated demands being made for international action on training camps and militant bases across the border, within Pakistan. President Karzai has asked the international forces to move out of the villages of Afghanistan’s hinterland and spread out instead along the border, in order to reach targets across the frontier. This demand for action against Pakistan cuts across the political spectrum, and is likely to increase in intensity as the country moves closer to the elections.
This rhetoric, of course, has been bolstered by similar sentiments within India, heightened in its warmongering frenzy after the Bombay blasts. New Delhi’s role vis-Ã -vis Afghanistan is likely to be enhanced in the near future, though it is far too early to predict the exact contours of this engagement. India has four consulates apart from its embassy in Kabul, a fact that Islamabad has always cited as evidence of New Delhi’s anti-Pakistan intentions in Afghanistan. For its part, South Block claims, somewhat incongruously, that the relationship with Kabul is bilateral, and has no correlation with its relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is the largest beneficiary of Indian foreign aid anywhere, with a USD 1.2 billion package covering infrastructure, capacity-building and community-based projects.
Yet India’s role in helping shape the future of Afghanistan has been limited. Either as a reaction to the criticism levelled by Pakistan or due to its own insecurity about competing with the Western-led project, India has largely stayed away from the decision-making table with regards to Afghanistan, which sees the participation of most major countries of the West as well as the Afghan government. Over the past seven and a half years, the Indian government has preferred to limit its activities to the bilateral arena or to follow the US lead in most issues relating to Afghanistan. With the possibility of a thaw in relations between Iran and the US, and a more assertive Russia increasingly active in the Central Asian republics, it will be interesting to watch whether India makes use of its earlier close ties with these countries, or restricts its role to support of the US. The only possible hiccup on the horizon of the evolving India-US relationship on the Afghanistan front is Washington’s desire to link Kashmir and India-Pakistan relations to the situation in Afghanistan – something New Delhi is adamantly set against.
The situation on the ground is shifting, with national chauvinism on the ascendancy along with an increase in conservatism. Political leaders who have relied on social and political conservative ideology to consolidate their hold have once again begun asserting themselves, and are now finding greater support from the Karzai government. As the country moves towards elections, this platform is likely to be used with increasing frequency. One finds the values of democracy, political, civil and human rights being questioned with increasing frequency, described as imported, Western concepts alien to Afghan life and culture.
This questioning has not come only from interest groups within Afghanistan. It is also emanating from Western donor countries – now eager to wrap up the Afghanistan project, which appears in danger of unravelling. Recent decisions, statements as well as the support provided to ‘leaders’ who have woeful track records in the area of democracy and human rights have shown that some in the Western compact might be willing to accept an Afghan state that is less than democratic, as long as it is somewhat stable and friendly to the Western capitals. Democracy and civil rights look likely to take a back seat as long as the country is able to control the Taliban and al-Qaeda and their ability to hit at the West.
By: Aunohita Mojumdar
In early March, Kabul was abuzz with talk about the next presidential elections. When would they be held, and under what circumstances? Who would be able to vote? Would the Election Commission be prepared? Were any of the opposition candidates ready? Could the security forces ensure security? And how many times would the Constitution be violated in the course of whatever decision was ultimately taken?
Under Afghanistan’s Constitution, the elections should have been held by 21 April, at least a month before the constitutionally mandated date for the end of the presidential term. But following discussions, it was last year ‘agreed’ – between the parliamentarians, the country’s independent Election Commission and the presidency – to hold the elections in August 2009. This was a time period the commission said would be required if it were to attempt to implement the ballot throughout the country, large parts of which are snowbound till late spring. Now, this agreement appeared to have unravelled, with the opposition demanding that either the elections be held in accordance with the Constitution, in April itself, or that President Hamid Karzai step down for the period between the end of the presidency and the elections. With this move, the opposition – which includes the United National Front, a broad coalition of former and current strongmen, commanders from the anti-Soviet resistance, ex-Communist leaders and various social and ethnic groups – was hoping that it would be able to deprive President Karzai of the advantages of incumbency in the run-up.
Afghanistan, still a nascent political democracy, does not have public electoral campaigning in the style of most democracies. Instead, security concerns, resource constraints, geography and the very culture, which is as yet unused to a full representative government based on the principles of parliamentary democracy, conspire to limit the candidates’ access to voters. In this situation, the advantage goes to whoever controls the Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA), which still remains under state control despite numerous efforts to free up the airwaves. Any incumbent president would also benefit from the highly centralised system of authority and financial power in the current form of government, where provincial governors are appointed by the president rather than by the elected provincial councils.
President Karzai initially fought the move to shunt him out. Unwilling to step down, he first argued that he be should allowed to stay till the completion of his five-year term, since the presidential elections were last held late in 2004. When the opposition parties did not budge, he hoisted them on their own petard, ordering the Election Commission to follow the Constitution to the letter – an order that was interpreted as the president’s call for early elections in April. Not only would this have ensured that he remained in his position during the conduct of the elections because it was within the Constitutional timeframe, but it also put the opposition in quite a spot, since no one was even half ready to challenge the incumbent.
As the opposition reverted its position to supporting August elections, the international community also backed that date, terming it impossible to organise the logistics before that. Finally, the Election Commission formally stated that it would be impossible to hold free and fair elections anytime before August. While President Karzai agreed to this decision, the question of whether he could be forced to step down remains unresolved, as does the issue of constitutional impropriety of having elections well beyond the constitutionally mandated date. Worryingly, both of these matters appear to be able to be resolved only through the imposition of a state of emergency, though that is being seen as an unlikely step now.
Alienation
SABIR NAZAR, “Tree of knowledge”
It is the political manoeuvres and legal technicalities that have preoccupied those in the seat and circle of power in Kabul. But talk of the elections has also engendered some hope, in that people think a change by itself may be positive in a country that has endured a downward slide for some time. This optimism is tempered with a realisation of the limitations of the voter, however, and there is as much discussion on which candidate the Americans will back as there is regarding the candidates that are entering the fray.
An analysis of the hopes and fears about Afghanistan leaves one sober. The Asia Foundation’s annual survey (which offers the largest sample size of any survey in Afghanistan) on public opinion on a range of issues found that 36 percent of the Afghan population feels that they were more prosperous under the Taliban than they are now; only 39 percent feel they are better off today than back then. The survey further reported that of the 16 percent of the population that reported having experienced violence, only eight percent said they had faced violence at the hands of insurgents or militants; in a worrying trend, as much as six percent also said they had suffered violence at the hands of the foreign forces.
There has been a 40 percent increase in civilian casualties over the last year of intensifying conflict. UN data states that of the 2118 civilian casualties in 2008, 55 percent were attributed to anti-government elements, and 39 percent to pro-government forces. (The rest could not be attributed.) For the high number of dead from pro-government forces, there is growing public alienation from both the Kabul government and the international community. Though casualties caused by insurgents are higher, Afghans explain their anger by stating that they hold the international community to higher standards. This is because, they point out, the international community and the Karzai government has sought public support on grounds of a higher moral authority, and the promise to uphold rule of law. Increasing civilian casualties, stagnation in the delivery of development and the escalating number of barriers in the form of physical obstacles, denial of access and increasingly complex procedures designed to minimise contact with the public used by the government (including the international community working in support of it) have caused growing public anger, and led to a lower threshold of tolerance.
After seven years of development expenditure amounting to some USD 20 billion, economic progress in Afghanistan has been paltry, erratic and unbalanced. While a small section of the population has been able to benefit from the aid, the majority continue to survive on agriculture – ironically, and interestingly, the most neglected sector by the major international donors. USAID, the American aid arm, for example, has spent less than five percent of its Afghanistan budget on agriculture since 2002. It is not hard to understand why: between 2005 and 2008, an additional five percent of the country’s population was pushed below the minimum nutritional levels, while average household expenditure on food rose from 56 percent to 85 percent, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Food scarcity has been exacerbated by rising worldwide prices and a severe drought, a factor that development agencies warn could affect public health and even spark displacement and unrest.
Civilian casualties in the international military operations have acted like lightening rods on the Afghan polity, drawing criticism from the Parliament, President Karzai and the public. This has prodded the UN to join hands in demanding changes in the operational strategies of the international forces. The UN’s seniormost official in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), has called for a change in the agreements that mandate the presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil, especially with respect to house-to-house searches, arbitrary detention and the use of air power in operations. All three are elements that the Taliban has exploited to energise public opinion against the Karzai government.
In Kabul, the alienation is visible in the form of growing checkpoints and physical barriers that protect the international community and the small section of elite Afghans in power. Everyday, more road blocks are put up, barbed wire is strung, and guns are trained on the local population. Debate over the security situation is frenetic. The old mantra that a military solution alone is the answer, which made its appearance soon after the resurgence of insurgency in 2005-06, was revived in 2008, albeit with a new twist: the push for negotiations with the Taliban. While a reconciliation process with those Taliban militants willing to give up arms and join the government has been in place for some time, without yielding substantial results, the emphasis now seems to be on high-level talks. However, there are differing perceptions of who could or should be brought to the table, and at what stage that should happen. The dominant thinking at this point – that of the US with new President Barack Obama at the helm – is to increase the military pressure on the insurgents and the Taliban, while at the same time carrying on negotiations. But the efficacy of this carrot-and-stick approach is yet to be demonstrated.
The change in US administration following the last elections there was eagerly awaited in Afghanistan, though Afghans emphasise that the real change will lie in the detail. While the broad contours of President Obama’s policy on Afghanistan are yet to be spelled out, there are indications of a deepening of the militarised approach in the Afghanistan policy. The new US National Security Adviser, Marine General James Jones, is a former military commander, breaking the earlier precedent of having civilian advisors. The new US ambassador to Afghanistan is also a former military man, General Karl Eikenberry, who served as the commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan, and is currently deputy chairman of the NATO military committee in Brussels.
As an initial step, President Obama has sanctioned the sending of an additional 17,000 US troops to Afghanistan, whereas military commanders in the field had sought 30,000. The delay in the training of the Afghan National Army has also given impetus to a proposal to train and arm the tribal militia as a means of meeting the shortfall. This proposal now finds the backing of the American generals. Initial statements emanating from Washington, DC have suggested lowered political ambitions and shorter goalposts, with some officials stating that the US must concentrate on its early goals of tackling al-Qaeda and the Taliban, rather than the wider aims of nation-building and stabilisation.
Love thy neighbour
The other defining aspect to emerge from the first months of President Obama’s administration is the concept of ‘Af-Pak’, or viewing the two countries and the violence emanating from and within them as a combined problem. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy for ‘Af-Pak’ saw several other countries, including Britain, France and Germany, swiftly following suit by appointing similar envoys in addition to their ambassadors.
Pressure on Pakistan is likely to continue under the Obama administration. However, the fragility of Pakistan’s polity makes it unclear where and how the pressure can be applied. The policy of crossborder strikes carried out by US Special Forces into Pakistani territory from Afghanistan, a signature of the Bush years, was supported by candidate Obama. It is not clear whether these strikes will now continue, and it is not clear whether the Americans are sensitive to the enormous negative baggage they collect as a result of the attacks by aircrafts and drones. But it is a fact that there is greater operational coherence in the American operations now, with the Special Forces, which was not answerable to the US commander in Afghanistan, also being brought under the command of the US top military commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan.
The deepening crisis within Afghanistan has led to an escalation of anti-Pakistan rhetoric in Kabul, with repeated demands being made for international action on training camps and militant bases across the border, within Pakistan. President Karzai has asked the international forces to move out of the villages of Afghanistan’s hinterland and spread out instead along the border, in order to reach targets across the frontier. This demand for action against Pakistan cuts across the political spectrum, and is likely to increase in intensity as the country moves closer to the elections.
This rhetoric, of course, has been bolstered by similar sentiments within India, heightened in its warmongering frenzy after the Bombay blasts. New Delhi’s role vis-Ã -vis Afghanistan is likely to be enhanced in the near future, though it is far too early to predict the exact contours of this engagement. India has four consulates apart from its embassy in Kabul, a fact that Islamabad has always cited as evidence of New Delhi’s anti-Pakistan intentions in Afghanistan. For its part, South Block claims, somewhat incongruously, that the relationship with Kabul is bilateral, and has no correlation with its relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is the largest beneficiary of Indian foreign aid anywhere, with a USD 1.2 billion package covering infrastructure, capacity-building and community-based projects.
Yet India’s role in helping shape the future of Afghanistan has been limited. Either as a reaction to the criticism levelled by Pakistan or due to its own insecurity about competing with the Western-led project, India has largely stayed away from the decision-making table with regards to Afghanistan, which sees the participation of most major countries of the West as well as the Afghan government. Over the past seven and a half years, the Indian government has preferred to limit its activities to the bilateral arena or to follow the US lead in most issues relating to Afghanistan. With the possibility of a thaw in relations between Iran and the US, and a more assertive Russia increasingly active in the Central Asian republics, it will be interesting to watch whether India makes use of its earlier close ties with these countries, or restricts its role to support of the US. The only possible hiccup on the horizon of the evolving India-US relationship on the Afghanistan front is Washington’s desire to link Kashmir and India-Pakistan relations to the situation in Afghanistan – something New Delhi is adamantly set against.
The situation on the ground is shifting, with national chauvinism on the ascendancy along with an increase in conservatism. Political leaders who have relied on social and political conservative ideology to consolidate their hold have once again begun asserting themselves, and are now finding greater support from the Karzai government. As the country moves towards elections, this platform is likely to be used with increasing frequency. One finds the values of democracy, political, civil and human rights being questioned with increasing frequency, described as imported, Western concepts alien to Afghan life and culture.
This questioning has not come only from interest groups within Afghanistan. It is also emanating from Western donor countries – now eager to wrap up the Afghanistan project, which appears in danger of unravelling. Recent decisions, statements as well as the support provided to ‘leaders’ who have woeful track records in the area of democracy and human rights have shown that some in the Western compact might be willing to accept an Afghan state that is less than democratic, as long as it is somewhat stable and friendly to the Western capitals. Democracy and civil rights look likely to take a back seat as long as the country is able to control the Taliban and al-Qaeda and their ability to hit at the West.
Every 29 minutes
Himal
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Last year, 1500 civilians were killed as a result of fighting between pro-government and anti-government elements in Afghanistan, the highest number since 2001. But there is another reason why Afghanistan is an unsafe country, a problem that takes some 24,000 civilian lives a year. Their deaths are less newsy; they make no banner headlines, lead to no talk shows, and generate little shock. These 24,000 were young Afghan mothers, all of whom died as a result of pregnancy and childbirth.
The maternal-mortality ratio in Afghanistan is around 1600 per 100,000 live births. In the remoter parts of the country it is several times this figure, reaching 6500 in the largely inaccessible northeastern province of Badakshan. Despite concerted attempts, and granted same success in certain areas, the underlying causes of the high maternal-mortality ratio (MMR) have not shown much change over the last seven years, since the fall of the Taliban and the influx of international aid. Afghanistan has the second-highest MMR in the world and the highest in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, the figure of 1600 is actually the lower estimate in a range of 1600-2200 – the upper estimate of which surpasses that of Sierra Leone, with an MMR of 2000 per 100,000 live births, officially the highest in the world.
In Afghanistan today, a woman giving birth is estimated to die every 29 minutes. According to the Kabul government, this extremely high MMR is due to a “tragic combination of poverty, conflict and cultural tradition”. Each factor exacerbates the impact of the other, and the overall ratio is slow to change. Explaining the individual causes, Dr Malalai Ahmadzai, a specialist in maternal health with UNICEF in the country, says the barriers are extremely straightforward: the non-recognition of a medical problem due to lack of awareness, the insufficient training of birth attendants, or the complete absence of health facilities. “People here see birth as a natural phenomenon, a private matter,” she says. “And so it complicates the decision of when to call for medical help.”
Gender dynamics play a tragic role. Even where a problem may be recognised by the pregnant woman or other female members of the family, the decision to seek medical help rests with the male head of the household. That individual, meanwhile, may or may not recognise or accept the gravity of the situation. Furthermore, even when the condition is recognised and medical help is sought, there may simply be no medical help to access, either due to the remoteness, the difficulty of travel or the expense involved. “There are great disparities in health care because of the geography of our country,” says Dr Ahmadzai. The absence of roads in much of rural Afghanistan can mean a journey lasting hours if not days, with some areas completely cut off during the winter. “Even after reaching the facility, the required medical care may not be available, even when the family can afford to pay.”
Barren Wakhan
The health of the mother and infant can remain unaddressed even if a family reaches a functioning health post. If the only available help is a male doctor or nurse, a woman patient will most likely not be able to approach him. Indeed, cultural and social factors significantly add to the vulnerability of women in Afghanistan. Another factor is that most girls are married very young, and have children soon after marriage. An estimated 50 percent of girls below the age of 15 are already married, and some of them are as young as eight years old, according to the UN Fund for Population Activities. Social custom sets an excessively high value on childbearing, with the average number of children borne by an Afghan woman being 7.2 compared with 1.2 in Iran and 3.4 in Pakistan.
The young age of childbearing, coupled with quick successive pregnancies, inevitably make women in Afghanistan more vulnerable to maternal mortality. This risk is only heightened by poor levels of nutrition, especially in the more isolated rural areas with subsistence agriculture. This is starkly evident in the fields of Wakhan, in the northeastern corner of Afghanistan. Much of the food here, including vegetables and fruit, is transported by road and therefore difficult to access because of scarcity and high costs. The barren rocky landscape, located at the junction of the Pamir, Karakoram and Hindukush ranges, is inaccessible by road for five months of the year.
With the land remaining icy and snowbound for many months of the year, nutrition levels in Wakhan are very poor. Dr Abdul Momin Jalaly, Director of Public Health for the province of Badakshan, within which Wakhan lies, says the entire province suffers from malnutrition. “In the Wakhan-Pamir area, there is no fruit and it is impossible to grow vegetables. The difficulty of reaching the area means that produce from other markets also cannot reach there. Most women here suffer from anaemia and vitamin deficiency due to bad nutrition.” The inaccessibility also means that trained health professionals are unwilling to be based there. “There are no roads in 12 districts of the province,” says Jalaly. “People use donkeys and horses to travel, and there is no communication with this area from the end of autumn to the beginning of spring. Tangshao village in Darwaz, for example, can be reached only after 72 hours of walking.” Little wonder that trained medical practitioners tend to forego the opportunity to work here.
Afghanistan has a severe shortage of trained, educated and skilled women in the health sector. Low literacy rates among girls have meant an absence of skilled female doctors and nurses; those with the means of obtaining an education are likely to be from urban centres, and unwilling to work in the remote areas. Meanwhile, qualified senior professionals have long since emigrated. In a 2005 report, Afghanistan was estimated to have just a single doctor per 10,000 people, compared to the average of 10.1 for all developing countries. New skilled professionals are difficult to find, since conservative mores have traditionally excluded girls from schooling, especially beyond the primary level. This practice has now been strengthened by the years of conflict and lack of security. In addition, the absence of educated women works as a vicious cycle. With not enough women teachers, there are fewer schools for girls, and even fewer at the secondary level. Parents prefer to have their girls stay at home as they reach puberty, and the long distances to school is a problem. The easier option is to keep the girls ‘safe’ by marrying them off.
Trivial ‘ifs’
Since 2006, the Badakshan provincial government has been running a community midwifery school, run by the Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS), aimed specifically at training girls. But even for this community school, it has been difficult to find girls from the more remote districts. While most girls do not even complete primary school, applicants must have passed Class 9 in order to join the training.
In the village of Kipkut, halfway up the Wakhan Corridor, Christel Bosman, a doctor from Holland, has been working to train community health workers in basic gynaecology. In her small room in the village, she explains why she lives in this remote outpost. She had studied tropical medicine to become broad-based in her knowledge, and had worked with Afghan refugees in the Netherlands. That was her link to Afghanistan and Wakhan. Here, her primary focus is on bringing down the MMR, which she ascribes to some very basic factors. “High blood pressure, complications during childbirth and obstructed labour resulting in haemorrhage and blood loss are the main causes,” she says. “In the Netherlands, it would mean a simple blood transfusion. Here, where can I get the blood?”
This particular day is a difficult one. Bosman has just learned of the death of one of her patients, Sahib Daulat, who died soon after childbirth. In this case, as in so many others, the family had delayed calling the doctor. By the time Bosman got to see her, Sahib Daulat had lost too much blood. “If they had only called me earlier, or if I only had access to a blood bank, I could have saved her,” she says.
The difference between life and death is often a series of seemingly trivial ‘ifs’ for the young mothers of Afghanistan. As with Sahib Daulat, haemorrhage is the most common cause of death, at 38 percent, followed by obstructed labour at 26 percent. Afghan women have a 1-in-8 risk of maternal death, compared to the average risk of 1-in-59 for Southasian women. Following the only qualitative study of MMR (by UNICEF and the US Centers for Disease Control, in 2002), the lifetime risk of death from pregnancy and childbirth-related causes for Afghan mothers was estimated to be in the range of 1 in 6 to 1 in 9. The study also found that women of reproductive age were more likely to die from maternal causes than due to any other medical reason. Perhaps most importantly, 78 percent of the cases studied were estimated to have been preventable. According to the study, deaths could be averted if complications are prevented through improving the general health status, and if complications that occur are treated to reduce their severity. These efforts require a multisectoral approach to increase availability and accessibility of health care, states the study.
This emphasis on ‘multisectoral responses’ is important. “Health in Badakshan province is not just a small job for health providers,” says Dr Jalaly. “If we do not have the support of other sectors, we cannot provide coverage. Road links, investment in agricultural and poverty reduction policies are all needed.” Although the Kabul government claims to have provided health services that cover some 85 percent of the population, “the physical access to functional facilities is far more limited,” the UNFPA’s country director, Dr Ramesh Penumaka, said in a press conference earlier this year. According to the agency, only 18 percent of deliveries last year were attended by skilled birth attendants. Even this constitutes an important increase, however. Likewise, a modest increase has also been seen in the attention given to pregnant women during pregnancy by health professionals, which increased from an estimated four percent in 2001 to 30 percent in 2007.
Bamiyan kabilas
One of the projects that have significantly assisted in this increase is located in Bamiyan, in the centre of the country, the small town put on the international map by the destruction of its giant Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001. Here, Fatima Alizada, just out of her teens, has been attending midwifery classes for the past six months, after having completed her schooling. She is a student at one of the 19 midwifery schools set up by the Aga Khan Foundation. For Alizada, her education is not a textbook course, learned in the sanitised surroundings of a classroom. A year and a half ago, she was witness to the death of her neighbour, Hawagul, a young mother who had been unable to receive medical help during labour. She was 35 when she died. Though a traditional birth attendant was called in when Hawagul was in acute labour, the attendant did not have the skills necessary to treat the problem.
Supportive traditional practices, skills and knowledge may have been lost over decades of war, as populations were repeatedly displaced, disrupting the social networks as well as access to traditional materials and techniques. As yet, says Dr Ahmadzai, there has been no study of the traditional healing practices during pregnancy and childbirth that are practiced in different parts of Afghanistan. In some areas, however, traditional practices can be deathly. In the Wakhan area, for example, local superstition prevents a mother from breastfeeding her child for the first few days after birth, on the grounds that the milk is considered impure. Dr Alex Duncan, a British doctor who has worked in Wakhan for several years, says this belief persists despite attempts to explain that the first few days of life are the most important for an infant, in order that it can acquire a natural immunisation through breast milk. On the whole, says Dr Ahmadzai, “We have seen that the traditional birth attendants have not been able to reduce the maternal mortality, and this is where skilled midwives become necessary.”
Alizada has a long, hard slog ahead of her before she can become a kabila, a midwife. Having completed six months of her training, she has another year to go before she graduates. But she has no doubts as to why she is here: “I would like to help people of this area,” she says with conviction, “to help the mother and child.” By rights, Alizada should not be here at the Bamiyan midwifery school; the school only takes students from Bamiyan, while she is from Dai Kundi province, to the southwest. However, Dai Kundi’s acute poverty and inaccessibility, even more severe than that of Bamiyan, led the school administrators to make an exception for applicants from the province. According to the charitable organisation Oxfam, the people of Dai Kundi may be facing their worst overall conditions in two decades, as well as a potential humanitarian crisis due to food insecurity. The midwifery school also relaxed its stipulation that students needed to have completed Class 9, since in many of the remoter districts they could not find girls who had studied that far. “They do have to be literate, however, since they will need to study from books,” says Farzana Dost, trainer and the deputy manager of the school.
To overcome social and cultural barriers, the selection of students involves the families as well as local community leaders and shuras (informal decision-making groups of elders), as well as the mayor from the local area. Dost says that it is only with the consent of each of these that the girls are allowed to take part in the training. This automatically overcomes one of the major barriers faced by most women Рbedune mehram, or the lack of permission to leave their homes without the escort of a male member of the immediate family. Such an arrangement also ensures that the girls will be accepted back, and allowed to work as community midwives when they return to their villages. It is not just young girls who attend the school, however. The age of students range between 18 to 35, and ten of the current students are mothers themselves, for whom a cr̬che has been provided to assist them.
To make sure their students do return to help their communities, rather than leaving for more lucrative jobs in more attractive parts of the country, the certification is dependent upon the student’s return to her own village or district. During the first two years of schooling, there was also a small stipend given to encourage girls to enrol. Happily, in the current third batch, this was not needed due to the large number of applicants – about 100 girls, of whom 25 were selected. Alizada herself was inspired to join by the examples of four girls of her area, who had attended the previous batch. Like the other students, Alizada lives in a hostel on the school grounds. When she finishes, Alizada will return to Dai Kundi’s local basic health clinic as a trained midwife.
A man’s issue
The impact of the Bamiyan school is already being felt. Most of the cases of complicated pregnancy that come to the province’s only secondary-care hospital are now referred by the trained midwives who have graduated from the school, says the hospital’s head doctor, Ghulam Mohammad Nadir. He also hopes that, over time, the presence of midwives will lessen the need for secondary health care entirely. Simple matters such as hygiene, the need for sterilisation during delivery and even nutrition can be communicated and observed in the home, without extra effort or expense. At the moment, Dr Nadir says, most families simply do not know what is required in a healthy diet. Many families own cattle and poultry for instance, but utilising the protein from milk and eggs, is not part of Afghan tradition. It is not just access to health care that decreases with remoteness, but also availability of knowledge.
Knowledge about birth spacing is another aspect that would reduce the number of pregnancies and improve the chances of survival for women of reproductive age. Again, however, cultural mores as well as religious conservatism make this one of the most challenging aspects. Two months ago, a woman health worker in Kandahar, in the southwest, was shot dead after the Taliban labelled her work in family planning and birth control as ‘un-Islamic’. And, with increasing insecurity in many parts of the country, those involved in education and health services have come under renewed threat. In November, Minister of Health Mohammed Amin Fatemi drew attention to the decreasing availability of health-care professionals, warning that this trend could lead to worsening public health, and a spurt in disease spread. According to the Ministry of Public Health, at least 51 health centres were torched or damaged in armed attacks during the 18 months leading up to June 2008.
The increasing violence has also forced schools to shut down in many districts. According to the Ministry of Education, over 600 schools in 45 districts are now closed, affecting at least 300,000 children. These schools account for 80 percent of the academic institutions in the four provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan, all in southern Afghanistan. The first casualty in the education system is inevitably girls’ schools; in Helmand, where there are currently 54 schools in operation (compared with 223 in 2002), almost all are boys’ schools. The long-term impact of this will, naturally, mean fewer educated girls and, incidentally, fewer women health professionals.
In the meantime, there has been no study since 2002 on maternal mortality, though one is currently slated for 2009-10. Either way, however, many suggest that the conception of maternal health as a problem in Afghanistan is still too limited. The issue of maternal health is not a ‘women’s issue’, says UNFPA’s Dr Penumaka. “The key to better maternal health lies with men. They have to be sensitive and aware of the health requirement and the needs of women. Maternal health is not really a woman’s issue – it’s really a man’s issue.” As such, meeting the challenge of reducing maternal mortality will require education, communication and changes in cultural practices. Due to cultural factors, there is very little communication about reproductive health and sexual behaviour within the family. In Afghanistan, the UN-developed Millennium Development Goal on MMR is to reduce the ratio by 50 percent between 2002 and 2015, well below the global target of reducing MMR by 75 percent in the same period. Yet the possibility of meeting even this target is judged to be merely a ‘potential’ rather than a probability.
The increasing number of skilled attendants at birth, the increasing recourse to health facilities, better vaccination and growing awareness collectively point to the hope that the ratio will eventually show a decline, says Dr Ahmadzai. But UNFPA cautions that several more decades will be needed before any major impact will be seen on maternal mortality in Afghanistan. In the meantime, with continuing conflict and decreasing services in the vulnerable areas, there are fears that even the small gains of the past seven years may soon be eroded. Yet this aspect of the ‘collateral damage’ of an ongoing conflict goes un-remarked upon, save for in the footnotes of public attention, tucked away in academic journals or sporadic reporting by the media.
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR
Last year, 1500 civilians were killed as a result of fighting between pro-government and anti-government elements in Afghanistan, the highest number since 2001. But there is another reason why Afghanistan is an unsafe country, a problem that takes some 24,000 civilian lives a year. Their deaths are less newsy; they make no banner headlines, lead to no talk shows, and generate little shock. These 24,000 were young Afghan mothers, all of whom died as a result of pregnancy and childbirth.
The maternal-mortality ratio in Afghanistan is around 1600 per 100,000 live births. In the remoter parts of the country it is several times this figure, reaching 6500 in the largely inaccessible northeastern province of Badakshan. Despite concerted attempts, and granted same success in certain areas, the underlying causes of the high maternal-mortality ratio (MMR) have not shown much change over the last seven years, since the fall of the Taliban and the influx of international aid. Afghanistan has the second-highest MMR in the world and the highest in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, the figure of 1600 is actually the lower estimate in a range of 1600-2200 – the upper estimate of which surpasses that of Sierra Leone, with an MMR of 2000 per 100,000 live births, officially the highest in the world.
In Afghanistan today, a woman giving birth is estimated to die every 29 minutes. According to the Kabul government, this extremely high MMR is due to a “tragic combination of poverty, conflict and cultural tradition”. Each factor exacerbates the impact of the other, and the overall ratio is slow to change. Explaining the individual causes, Dr Malalai Ahmadzai, a specialist in maternal health with UNICEF in the country, says the barriers are extremely straightforward: the non-recognition of a medical problem due to lack of awareness, the insufficient training of birth attendants, or the complete absence of health facilities. “People here see birth as a natural phenomenon, a private matter,” she says. “And so it complicates the decision of when to call for medical help.”
Gender dynamics play a tragic role. Even where a problem may be recognised by the pregnant woman or other female members of the family, the decision to seek medical help rests with the male head of the household. That individual, meanwhile, may or may not recognise or accept the gravity of the situation. Furthermore, even when the condition is recognised and medical help is sought, there may simply be no medical help to access, either due to the remoteness, the difficulty of travel or the expense involved. “There are great disparities in health care because of the geography of our country,” says Dr Ahmadzai. The absence of roads in much of rural Afghanistan can mean a journey lasting hours if not days, with some areas completely cut off during the winter. “Even after reaching the facility, the required medical care may not be available, even when the family can afford to pay.”
Barren Wakhan
The health of the mother and infant can remain unaddressed even if a family reaches a functioning health post. If the only available help is a male doctor or nurse, a woman patient will most likely not be able to approach him. Indeed, cultural and social factors significantly add to the vulnerability of women in Afghanistan. Another factor is that most girls are married very young, and have children soon after marriage. An estimated 50 percent of girls below the age of 15 are already married, and some of them are as young as eight years old, according to the UN Fund for Population Activities. Social custom sets an excessively high value on childbearing, with the average number of children borne by an Afghan woman being 7.2 compared with 1.2 in Iran and 3.4 in Pakistan.
The young age of childbearing, coupled with quick successive pregnancies, inevitably make women in Afghanistan more vulnerable to maternal mortality. This risk is only heightened by poor levels of nutrition, especially in the more isolated rural areas with subsistence agriculture. This is starkly evident in the fields of Wakhan, in the northeastern corner of Afghanistan. Much of the food here, including vegetables and fruit, is transported by road and therefore difficult to access because of scarcity and high costs. The barren rocky landscape, located at the junction of the Pamir, Karakoram and Hindukush ranges, is inaccessible by road for five months of the year.
With the land remaining icy and snowbound for many months of the year, nutrition levels in Wakhan are very poor. Dr Abdul Momin Jalaly, Director of Public Health for the province of Badakshan, within which Wakhan lies, says the entire province suffers from malnutrition. “In the Wakhan-Pamir area, there is no fruit and it is impossible to grow vegetables. The difficulty of reaching the area means that produce from other markets also cannot reach there. Most women here suffer from anaemia and vitamin deficiency due to bad nutrition.” The inaccessibility also means that trained health professionals are unwilling to be based there. “There are no roads in 12 districts of the province,” says Jalaly. “People use donkeys and horses to travel, and there is no communication with this area from the end of autumn to the beginning of spring. Tangshao village in Darwaz, for example, can be reached only after 72 hours of walking.” Little wonder that trained medical practitioners tend to forego the opportunity to work here.
Afghanistan has a severe shortage of trained, educated and skilled women in the health sector. Low literacy rates among girls have meant an absence of skilled female doctors and nurses; those with the means of obtaining an education are likely to be from urban centres, and unwilling to work in the remote areas. Meanwhile, qualified senior professionals have long since emigrated. In a 2005 report, Afghanistan was estimated to have just a single doctor per 10,000 people, compared to the average of 10.1 for all developing countries. New skilled professionals are difficult to find, since conservative mores have traditionally excluded girls from schooling, especially beyond the primary level. This practice has now been strengthened by the years of conflict and lack of security. In addition, the absence of educated women works as a vicious cycle. With not enough women teachers, there are fewer schools for girls, and even fewer at the secondary level. Parents prefer to have their girls stay at home as they reach puberty, and the long distances to school is a problem. The easier option is to keep the girls ‘safe’ by marrying them off.
Trivial ‘ifs’
Since 2006, the Badakshan provincial government has been running a community midwifery school, run by the Aga Khan Health Services (AKHS), aimed specifically at training girls. But even for this community school, it has been difficult to find girls from the more remote districts. While most girls do not even complete primary school, applicants must have passed Class 9 in order to join the training.
In the village of Kipkut, halfway up the Wakhan Corridor, Christel Bosman, a doctor from Holland, has been working to train community health workers in basic gynaecology. In her small room in the village, she explains why she lives in this remote outpost. She had studied tropical medicine to become broad-based in her knowledge, and had worked with Afghan refugees in the Netherlands. That was her link to Afghanistan and Wakhan. Here, her primary focus is on bringing down the MMR, which she ascribes to some very basic factors. “High blood pressure, complications during childbirth and obstructed labour resulting in haemorrhage and blood loss are the main causes,” she says. “In the Netherlands, it would mean a simple blood transfusion. Here, where can I get the blood?”
This particular day is a difficult one. Bosman has just learned of the death of one of her patients, Sahib Daulat, who died soon after childbirth. In this case, as in so many others, the family had delayed calling the doctor. By the time Bosman got to see her, Sahib Daulat had lost too much blood. “If they had only called me earlier, or if I only had access to a blood bank, I could have saved her,” she says.
The difference between life and death is often a series of seemingly trivial ‘ifs’ for the young mothers of Afghanistan. As with Sahib Daulat, haemorrhage is the most common cause of death, at 38 percent, followed by obstructed labour at 26 percent. Afghan women have a 1-in-8 risk of maternal death, compared to the average risk of 1-in-59 for Southasian women. Following the only qualitative study of MMR (by UNICEF and the US Centers for Disease Control, in 2002), the lifetime risk of death from pregnancy and childbirth-related causes for Afghan mothers was estimated to be in the range of 1 in 6 to 1 in 9. The study also found that women of reproductive age were more likely to die from maternal causes than due to any other medical reason. Perhaps most importantly, 78 percent of the cases studied were estimated to have been preventable. According to the study, deaths could be averted if complications are prevented through improving the general health status, and if complications that occur are treated to reduce their severity. These efforts require a multisectoral approach to increase availability and accessibility of health care, states the study.
This emphasis on ‘multisectoral responses’ is important. “Health in Badakshan province is not just a small job for health providers,” says Dr Jalaly. “If we do not have the support of other sectors, we cannot provide coverage. Road links, investment in agricultural and poverty reduction policies are all needed.” Although the Kabul government claims to have provided health services that cover some 85 percent of the population, “the physical access to functional facilities is far more limited,” the UNFPA’s country director, Dr Ramesh Penumaka, said in a press conference earlier this year. According to the agency, only 18 percent of deliveries last year were attended by skilled birth attendants. Even this constitutes an important increase, however. Likewise, a modest increase has also been seen in the attention given to pregnant women during pregnancy by health professionals, which increased from an estimated four percent in 2001 to 30 percent in 2007.
Bamiyan kabilas
One of the projects that have significantly assisted in this increase is located in Bamiyan, in the centre of the country, the small town put on the international map by the destruction of its giant Buddhas by the Taliban in 2001. Here, Fatima Alizada, just out of her teens, has been attending midwifery classes for the past six months, after having completed her schooling. She is a student at one of the 19 midwifery schools set up by the Aga Khan Foundation. For Alizada, her education is not a textbook course, learned in the sanitised surroundings of a classroom. A year and a half ago, she was witness to the death of her neighbour, Hawagul, a young mother who had been unable to receive medical help during labour. She was 35 when she died. Though a traditional birth attendant was called in when Hawagul was in acute labour, the attendant did not have the skills necessary to treat the problem.
Supportive traditional practices, skills and knowledge may have been lost over decades of war, as populations were repeatedly displaced, disrupting the social networks as well as access to traditional materials and techniques. As yet, says Dr Ahmadzai, there has been no study of the traditional healing practices during pregnancy and childbirth that are practiced in different parts of Afghanistan. In some areas, however, traditional practices can be deathly. In the Wakhan area, for example, local superstition prevents a mother from breastfeeding her child for the first few days after birth, on the grounds that the milk is considered impure. Dr Alex Duncan, a British doctor who has worked in Wakhan for several years, says this belief persists despite attempts to explain that the first few days of life are the most important for an infant, in order that it can acquire a natural immunisation through breast milk. On the whole, says Dr Ahmadzai, “We have seen that the traditional birth attendants have not been able to reduce the maternal mortality, and this is where skilled midwives become necessary.”
Alizada has a long, hard slog ahead of her before she can become a kabila, a midwife. Having completed six months of her training, she has another year to go before she graduates. But she has no doubts as to why she is here: “I would like to help people of this area,” she says with conviction, “to help the mother and child.” By rights, Alizada should not be here at the Bamiyan midwifery school; the school only takes students from Bamiyan, while she is from Dai Kundi province, to the southwest. However, Dai Kundi’s acute poverty and inaccessibility, even more severe than that of Bamiyan, led the school administrators to make an exception for applicants from the province. According to the charitable organisation Oxfam, the people of Dai Kundi may be facing their worst overall conditions in two decades, as well as a potential humanitarian crisis due to food insecurity. The midwifery school also relaxed its stipulation that students needed to have completed Class 9, since in many of the remoter districts they could not find girls who had studied that far. “They do have to be literate, however, since they will need to study from books,” says Farzana Dost, trainer and the deputy manager of the school.
To overcome social and cultural barriers, the selection of students involves the families as well as local community leaders and shuras (informal decision-making groups of elders), as well as the mayor from the local area. Dost says that it is only with the consent of each of these that the girls are allowed to take part in the training. This automatically overcomes one of the major barriers faced by most women Рbedune mehram, or the lack of permission to leave their homes without the escort of a male member of the immediate family. Such an arrangement also ensures that the girls will be accepted back, and allowed to work as community midwives when they return to their villages. It is not just young girls who attend the school, however. The age of students range between 18 to 35, and ten of the current students are mothers themselves, for whom a cr̬che has been provided to assist them.
To make sure their students do return to help their communities, rather than leaving for more lucrative jobs in more attractive parts of the country, the certification is dependent upon the student’s return to her own village or district. During the first two years of schooling, there was also a small stipend given to encourage girls to enrol. Happily, in the current third batch, this was not needed due to the large number of applicants – about 100 girls, of whom 25 were selected. Alizada herself was inspired to join by the examples of four girls of her area, who had attended the previous batch. Like the other students, Alizada lives in a hostel on the school grounds. When she finishes, Alizada will return to Dai Kundi’s local basic health clinic as a trained midwife.
A man’s issue
The impact of the Bamiyan school is already being felt. Most of the cases of complicated pregnancy that come to the province’s only secondary-care hospital are now referred by the trained midwives who have graduated from the school, says the hospital’s head doctor, Ghulam Mohammad Nadir. He also hopes that, over time, the presence of midwives will lessen the need for secondary health care entirely. Simple matters such as hygiene, the need for sterilisation during delivery and even nutrition can be communicated and observed in the home, without extra effort or expense. At the moment, Dr Nadir says, most families simply do not know what is required in a healthy diet. Many families own cattle and poultry for instance, but utilising the protein from milk and eggs, is not part of Afghan tradition. It is not just access to health care that decreases with remoteness, but also availability of knowledge.
Knowledge about birth spacing is another aspect that would reduce the number of pregnancies and improve the chances of survival for women of reproductive age. Again, however, cultural mores as well as religious conservatism make this one of the most challenging aspects. Two months ago, a woman health worker in Kandahar, in the southwest, was shot dead after the Taliban labelled her work in family planning and birth control as ‘un-Islamic’. And, with increasing insecurity in many parts of the country, those involved in education and health services have come under renewed threat. In November, Minister of Health Mohammed Amin Fatemi drew attention to the decreasing availability of health-care professionals, warning that this trend could lead to worsening public health, and a spurt in disease spread. According to the Ministry of Public Health, at least 51 health centres were torched or damaged in armed attacks during the 18 months leading up to June 2008.
The increasing violence has also forced schools to shut down in many districts. According to the Ministry of Education, over 600 schools in 45 districts are now closed, affecting at least 300,000 children. These schools account for 80 percent of the academic institutions in the four provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul and Uruzgan, all in southern Afghanistan. The first casualty in the education system is inevitably girls’ schools; in Helmand, where there are currently 54 schools in operation (compared with 223 in 2002), almost all are boys’ schools. The long-term impact of this will, naturally, mean fewer educated girls and, incidentally, fewer women health professionals.
In the meantime, there has been no study since 2002 on maternal mortality, though one is currently slated for 2009-10. Either way, however, many suggest that the conception of maternal health as a problem in Afghanistan is still too limited. The issue of maternal health is not a ‘women’s issue’, says UNFPA’s Dr Penumaka. “The key to better maternal health lies with men. They have to be sensitive and aware of the health requirement and the needs of women. Maternal health is not really a woman’s issue – it’s really a man’s issue.” As such, meeting the challenge of reducing maternal mortality will require education, communication and changes in cultural practices. Due to cultural factors, there is very little communication about reproductive health and sexual behaviour within the family. In Afghanistan, the UN-developed Millennium Development Goal on MMR is to reduce the ratio by 50 percent between 2002 and 2015, well below the global target of reducing MMR by 75 percent in the same period. Yet the possibility of meeting even this target is judged to be merely a ‘potential’ rather than a probability.
The increasing number of skilled attendants at birth, the increasing recourse to health facilities, better vaccination and growing awareness collectively point to the hope that the ratio will eventually show a decline, says Dr Ahmadzai. But UNFPA cautions that several more decades will be needed before any major impact will be seen on maternal mortality in Afghanistan. In the meantime, with continuing conflict and decreasing services in the vulnerable areas, there are fears that even the small gains of the past seven years may soon be eroded. Yet this aspect of the ‘collateral damage’ of an ongoing conflict goes un-remarked upon, save for in the footnotes of public attention, tucked away in academic journals or sporadic reporting by the media.
AFGHANISTAN: INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCIES WARY OF US-BACKED SECURITY SURGE
EURASIA INSIGHT
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/06/09
Despite increasing calls from aid agencies to let them handle Afghanistan’s humanitarian needs, NATO is proceeding with plans to enhance civil-military cooperation in the country, especially through the operations of provincial reconstruction teams.
While the rhetoric drew self-congratulatory pats from most member countries during the April 4 NATO summit in Strasbourg, France, humanitarian aid workers based in Afghanistan say they are worried about how the Atlantic Alliance’s new security and aid policies will affect their work, and their safety.
Their concerns appear to have gone largely unheeded by NATO leaders. The summit’s declaration on Afghanistan noted that NATO members "are boosting . . . efforts to coordinate the contribution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to build stability and further align their work with Afghan Government priorities."
Just before the summit, in an unprecedented move, a group of influential aid agencies joined hands to urge for an immediate halt to some of the specific civilian-military policies. In all, 11 organizations called for a de-linking of aid delivery from military goals, changes in the operational strategies of the international military forces, phasing out the strategy of distributing aid through the PRTs and halting two specific new security policies that they say will put Afghan communities at greater risk.
While humanitarian and development agencies have expressed concern about the civilian population from time to time, this concern previously tended to be expressed in general terms. Never before have NGOs gotten so specific. The NGOs who have come together to formulate a common position are all widely respected and with long-term track records in Afghanistan, including Oxfam, Care, Action Aid and Save the Children.
Among the military measures that these organizations are wary of are the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), both sometimes referred to as "empowerment programs." The ASOP seeks to build local support and communication networks by gathering information about militant activities through shuras (local bodies of influential people). The deputy head of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR, an umbrella body of over 100 NGOs), M.H. Mayar, questioned the program, saying it would compromise the independence and impartiality of NGOs that work with shuras.
The opposition to the APPF, a program that is currently in the testing phase, has been much stronger. The APPF seeks to arm local community forces, essentially creating militias to meet the shortfall in security forces, much like programs the United States has used in Iraq. The forces, which will be answerable to local networks, will have less oversight than regular police or army units, less accountability and less training. Mayar challenged the efficacy of the scheme saying such attempts had failed in the past. Mayar added that the APPF’s intent ran counter to another program, which was designed to promote disarmament among armed groups. He stressed that armed groups could change sides, or use their weapons and new status to settle local feuds, thus further endangering local communities and the NGOs delivering aid.
Concern about the safety of civilians and the aid agencies also lies at the heart of the opposition to the proposed expansion of PRTs, which were initially set up as a temporary strategy to plug the gaps in the small pockets of insecurity where civilian agencies where unable to function. As insecurity grew, they were later expanded throughout the country. With intensifying conflict, the PRTs’ role changed, focusing more on heart-and-minds campaigns. Donor agencies, under pressure from their governments, followed suit, redirecting a substantial portion of their aid to the areas where their troops were based. Increasing insecurity has meant that this aid delivery is now routinely directed from the confines of regional military bases. NGOs argue that this has resulted in increasing dangers to them, as well as to the recipients of aid, both of which are seen to be having links to the international military forces.
At a press conference to release the report, Dave Hampson, Country Director of Save the Children UK, said "the main problem is the blurring of lines" between the civilian and military. Matt Waldman of Oxfam added that the "increasing militarization of aid" means aid is more often addressing "military objectives and not the needs of Afghans." He said the NGOs and humanitarian agencies hoped that "more aid will be channeled through civilian agencies and that the PRTs will transition to focus on security."
"When security and other conditions exist, which allow specialized civilian development actors to operate, the military should not be engaged in activities in the development or humanitarian sector," says the report on civilians in conflict released by the same group of NGOs. "The PRTs’ hearts-and-minds approach to assistance, drawn from counter-insurgency doctrine, is not only unsustainable, it is highly unlikely to achieve its intended security objectives," the document states.
NATO, however, appears ready to move ahead seemingly undeterred. A statement on the NATO website after Strasbourg said that Atlantic alliance leaders "recognized that to do this work will require a greater civilian component to the forces being sent to Afghanistan." A January report to the US Congress from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction noted that the US Embassy in Kabul had proposed the establishment of four new PRTs and the creation of 215 new related civilian positions. This, Waldman of Oxfam argued, would lead to increasing distortion of the use of aid to achieve military objectives.
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/06/09
Despite increasing calls from aid agencies to let them handle Afghanistan’s humanitarian needs, NATO is proceeding with plans to enhance civil-military cooperation in the country, especially through the operations of provincial reconstruction teams.
While the rhetoric drew self-congratulatory pats from most member countries during the April 4 NATO summit in Strasbourg, France, humanitarian aid workers based in Afghanistan say they are worried about how the Atlantic Alliance’s new security and aid policies will affect their work, and their safety.
Their concerns appear to have gone largely unheeded by NATO leaders. The summit’s declaration on Afghanistan noted that NATO members "are boosting . . . efforts to coordinate the contribution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to build stability and further align their work with Afghan Government priorities."
Just before the summit, in an unprecedented move, a group of influential aid agencies joined hands to urge for an immediate halt to some of the specific civilian-military policies. In all, 11 organizations called for a de-linking of aid delivery from military goals, changes in the operational strategies of the international military forces, phasing out the strategy of distributing aid through the PRTs and halting two specific new security policies that they say will put Afghan communities at greater risk.
While humanitarian and development agencies have expressed concern about the civilian population from time to time, this concern previously tended to be expressed in general terms. Never before have NGOs gotten so specific. The NGOs who have come together to formulate a common position are all widely respected and with long-term track records in Afghanistan, including Oxfam, Care, Action Aid and Save the Children.
Among the military measures that these organizations are wary of are the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), both sometimes referred to as "empowerment programs." The ASOP seeks to build local support and communication networks by gathering information about militant activities through shuras (local bodies of influential people). The deputy head of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR, an umbrella body of over 100 NGOs), M.H. Mayar, questioned the program, saying it would compromise the independence and impartiality of NGOs that work with shuras.
The opposition to the APPF, a program that is currently in the testing phase, has been much stronger. The APPF seeks to arm local community forces, essentially creating militias to meet the shortfall in security forces, much like programs the United States has used in Iraq. The forces, which will be answerable to local networks, will have less oversight than regular police or army units, less accountability and less training. Mayar challenged the efficacy of the scheme saying such attempts had failed in the past. Mayar added that the APPF’s intent ran counter to another program, which was designed to promote disarmament among armed groups. He stressed that armed groups could change sides, or use their weapons and new status to settle local feuds, thus further endangering local communities and the NGOs delivering aid.
Concern about the safety of civilians and the aid agencies also lies at the heart of the opposition to the proposed expansion of PRTs, which were initially set up as a temporary strategy to plug the gaps in the small pockets of insecurity where civilian agencies where unable to function. As insecurity grew, they were later expanded throughout the country. With intensifying conflict, the PRTs’ role changed, focusing more on heart-and-minds campaigns. Donor agencies, under pressure from their governments, followed suit, redirecting a substantial portion of their aid to the areas where their troops were based. Increasing insecurity has meant that this aid delivery is now routinely directed from the confines of regional military bases. NGOs argue that this has resulted in increasing dangers to them, as well as to the recipients of aid, both of which are seen to be having links to the international military forces.
At a press conference to release the report, Dave Hampson, Country Director of Save the Children UK, said "the main problem is the blurring of lines" between the civilian and military. Matt Waldman of Oxfam added that the "increasing militarization of aid" means aid is more often addressing "military objectives and not the needs of Afghans." He said the NGOs and humanitarian agencies hoped that "more aid will be channeled through civilian agencies and that the PRTs will transition to focus on security."
"When security and other conditions exist, which allow specialized civilian development actors to operate, the military should not be engaged in activities in the development or humanitarian sector," says the report on civilians in conflict released by the same group of NGOs. "The PRTs’ hearts-and-minds approach to assistance, drawn from counter-insurgency doctrine, is not only unsustainable, it is highly unlikely to achieve its intended security objectives," the document states.
NATO, however, appears ready to move ahead seemingly undeterred. A statement on the NATO website after Strasbourg said that Atlantic alliance leaders "recognized that to do this work will require a greater civilian component to the forces being sent to Afghanistan." A January report to the US Congress from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction noted that the US Embassy in Kabul had proposed the establishment of four new PRTs and the creation of 215 new related civilian positions. This, Waldman of Oxfam argued, would lead to increasing distortion of the use of aid to achieve military objectives.
AFGHANISTAN: OBAMA AF-PAK STRATEGY AND AFGHANISTAN’S RESPONSE
EURASIA INSIGHT
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/02/09
Cautious optimism in Kabul is greeting US President Barack Obama’s new strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan.
When Obama originally unveiled his Afghan policy blueprint on March 27, government officials and non-governmental actors alike greeted it with a sigh of relief, as it endorsed a strong American commitment to Afghanistan. However, an initial burst of enthusiasm for the new strategy has given way to a more nuanced approach, with Afghans and Afghanistan-based internationals cautioning that the real test will lie in the details, implementation, and prioritization of multiple goals.
Speaking on conditions of anonymity, a European diplomat said that the general opinion among his European colleagues was that "it was one of the better strategies" and a "good document." But the diplomat stressed that "many questions remain."
While the regional approach outlined in the Obama administration blueprint is generally welcomed, some officials and observers worry that Washington may be conflating the problems in Pakistan and Afghanistan to an undesirable degree. "The problem is linked, but not the same in the two countries," the diplomatic source said. The diplomat added that overemphasis on Pakistan could distract attention from the very real problems within Afghanistan.
Similarly, while the Obama’s administration’s ability to recognize that a number of different factors -- including unemployment and local grievances -- is driving the insurgency, the diplomat voiced concern that problems were being oversimplified.
Both the Afghan government and the UN’s Mission in Afghanistan cheered the Obama plan for its focus on development. The UN’s top official in the country, Kai Eide, termed it a "greater balance between the military and civilian sides." Other analysts, however, see the approach as still being a predominantly military one. They point out that the "core goal of the United States" in the blueprint’s own words, "must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan."
"The stress is on defense and less on development and diplomacy," says Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, an aid worker. "The decision to send more human and development professionals is welcome, but if the development advisers are located within the PRTs (the provincial reconstruction teams of the international military forces) they will not be able to make a difference, unless they can de-link development work from the security goals."
The international NGO Oxfam said the delivery of aid by USAID, the US government’s development arm, had had limited success in part because "the US uses foreign aid to achieve short-term or security objectives."
For political analyst Ahmed Dawi, the primary problem with the Obama strategy is an absence of a matching commitment from the Afghan side. "As an Afghan, I am concerned about a lack of strategy from our side," Dawi said. "The implementation of the American strategy will depend on the conductive environment in Afghanistan. It cannot be a one-way street. The words are promising. We have to see how they will be implemented."
Dawi’s compatriot, Aziz Hakimi, an independent political analyst, is less optimistic. While the "intention is good," Hakimi said, the impulse of the US plan is worrisome. The emphasis, in Hakimi’s view, is on "al Qaeda and (US) homeland security. It is not about Afghanistan. Where is the Afghan voice in all this? It is not about us."
As the United States undertakes a military buildup in Afghanistan, some civil society activists are concerned that civilians will continue to suffer. Civilian casualties from military operations has emerged in recent years as a major source of friction between the local population and coalition forces.
"What we have to see is that the intervention does not cause harm but contributes to relief and rehabilitation that the country needs," said Siddiqui, the aid worker. "The process remains very important. Security should be a priority not just in terms of killing Taliban but protecting Afghans."
Civilian security is also becoming a rallying cry for international rights organizations. "While the United States is deploying more troops to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda, greater attention is needed to provide basic security for Afghans in both conflict and non-conflict areas," Human Rights Watch said in a recent statement on the new US policy.
Amnesty International wants to see greater accountability for violations of international humanitarian law by coalition forces. The rights group additionally has called for clarifying and harmonizing the rules of engagement by the different international military forces present in Afghanistan. "The challenge for the United States and its allies is to ensure that the surge of international troops into the country will provide better security for Afghans and not put them at greater risk," it stated.
Aunohita Mojumdar 4/02/09
Cautious optimism in Kabul is greeting US President Barack Obama’s new strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan.
When Obama originally unveiled his Afghan policy blueprint on March 27, government officials and non-governmental actors alike greeted it with a sigh of relief, as it endorsed a strong American commitment to Afghanistan. However, an initial burst of enthusiasm for the new strategy has given way to a more nuanced approach, with Afghans and Afghanistan-based internationals cautioning that the real test will lie in the details, implementation, and prioritization of multiple goals.
Speaking on conditions of anonymity, a European diplomat said that the general opinion among his European colleagues was that "it was one of the better strategies" and a "good document." But the diplomat stressed that "many questions remain."
While the regional approach outlined in the Obama administration blueprint is generally welcomed, some officials and observers worry that Washington may be conflating the problems in Pakistan and Afghanistan to an undesirable degree. "The problem is linked, but not the same in the two countries," the diplomatic source said. The diplomat added that overemphasis on Pakistan could distract attention from the very real problems within Afghanistan.
Similarly, while the Obama’s administration’s ability to recognize that a number of different factors -- including unemployment and local grievances -- is driving the insurgency, the diplomat voiced concern that problems were being oversimplified.
Both the Afghan government and the UN’s Mission in Afghanistan cheered the Obama plan for its focus on development. The UN’s top official in the country, Kai Eide, termed it a "greater balance between the military and civilian sides." Other analysts, however, see the approach as still being a predominantly military one. They point out that the "core goal of the United States" in the blueprint’s own words, "must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan."
"The stress is on defense and less on development and diplomacy," says Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, an aid worker. "The decision to send more human and development professionals is welcome, but if the development advisers are located within the PRTs (the provincial reconstruction teams of the international military forces) they will not be able to make a difference, unless they can de-link development work from the security goals."
The international NGO Oxfam said the delivery of aid by USAID, the US government’s development arm, had had limited success in part because "the US uses foreign aid to achieve short-term or security objectives."
For political analyst Ahmed Dawi, the primary problem with the Obama strategy is an absence of a matching commitment from the Afghan side. "As an Afghan, I am concerned about a lack of strategy from our side," Dawi said. "The implementation of the American strategy will depend on the conductive environment in Afghanistan. It cannot be a one-way street. The words are promising. We have to see how they will be implemented."
Dawi’s compatriot, Aziz Hakimi, an independent political analyst, is less optimistic. While the "intention is good," Hakimi said, the impulse of the US plan is worrisome. The emphasis, in Hakimi’s view, is on "al Qaeda and (US) homeland security. It is not about Afghanistan. Where is the Afghan voice in all this? It is not about us."
As the United States undertakes a military buildup in Afghanistan, some civil society activists are concerned that civilians will continue to suffer. Civilian casualties from military operations has emerged in recent years as a major source of friction between the local population and coalition forces.
"What we have to see is that the intervention does not cause harm but contributes to relief and rehabilitation that the country needs," said Siddiqui, the aid worker. "The process remains very important. Security should be a priority not just in terms of killing Taliban but protecting Afghans."
Civilian security is also becoming a rallying cry for international rights organizations. "While the United States is deploying more troops to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda, greater attention is needed to provide basic security for Afghans in both conflict and non-conflict areas," Human Rights Watch said in a recent statement on the new US policy.
Amnesty International wants to see greater accountability for violations of international humanitarian law by coalition forces. The rights group additionally has called for clarifying and harmonizing the rules of engagement by the different international military forces present in Afghanistan. "The challenge for the United States and its allies is to ensure that the surge of international troops into the country will provide better security for Afghans and not put them at greater risk," it stated.
AFGHANISTAN: US AND INDIA MULL WAYS TO CONTAIN THE TALIBAN
EURASIA INSIGHT
Aunohita Mojumdar 3/23/09
In the past, a visit to India by a CIA director could have set off a storm of protest and political jousting in New Delhi. But given the troubling Taliban issue in neighboring Pakistan, Indians’ perception of the United States is changing. These days, the emerging US-Indian partnership is developing into an important element of Washington’s stabilization plan for Afghanistan.
When newly minted CIA Director Leon Panetta visited India recently, he was greeted only by a mild protest from leftist parties over his meeting with Indian Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram. Panetta was in India to discuss Afghanistan, the ’Af-Pak’ situation and India’s role in a new American regional policy initiative. Highlighting the importance of emerging US-Indian ties, the March 19 foray to New Delhi marked Panetta’s first overseas trip since his Senate confirmation. It also followed visits by other senior US intelligence officials, including one earlier in March by FBI Director Robert Mueller. After his visit to India, Panetta went on to Islamabad for talks with Pakistani leaders.
Further emphasizing Washington’s growing interest in New Delhi’s Afghanistan approach, on March 21 President Barack Obama’s special envy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, told an audience in Brussels that India would be a "major factor in resolving" the situation in Afghanistan. Holbrooke also appeared to echo Indian concerns that Pakistan has replaced Afghanistan as the epicenter of the threat posed by international terrorists.
"We must recognize that the heart of the threat to the United States, to the European Union, to Australia, to many other countries in the world including India and, I stress, including Pakistan itself, comes from . . . western Pakistan," Holbrooke told participants at the Brussels security conference.
Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, India, which provided support and supplies to the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, has had extensive bilateral contacts with the Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s administration. Afghanistan has become the largest beneficiary of Indian aid, receiving $1.2 billion since 2001.
Through its embassy in Kabul -- as well as four consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i Sharif -- India is now able to project its influence across Afghanistan. That fact has caused consternation in Pakistan, with Islamabad calling on Kabul to curb New Delhi’s "anti-Pakistani" activities within the country, charges that range from spying to training militants operating against Pakistan.
For its part, India has consistently accused Pakistan of supporting anti-Indian and anti-Western militants. It has also drawn repeated attention to Pakistan’s unwillingness to allow Indian goods overland access to Afghanistan -- through Pakistani territory -- forcing India to route supplies for its projects through the more circuitous Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.
India’s low public profile may soon change. Given the considerable agreement between the United States and India on Afghanistan policy, New Delhi appears poised to assume a larger role in Afghan stabilization efforts.
T.C.A. Raghavan, a senior Indian diplomat overseeing the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran division in the External Affairs Ministry, recently welcomed the ’Af-Pak’ approach of developing a "coordinated policy" on Afghanistan and Pakistan. "We have always seen [the region] as a single issue," he said during a March 18 seminar on Afghanistan, organized by the Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute for Asian Studies, a think-tank funded by his ministry.
Raghavan also welcomed the "inclination to see Iran as a stabilizing element," adding that Tehran’s role in Afghanistan "cannot be minimized." The diplomat also embraced American promises to strengthen the Afghan army and remarked that the US commitment to increase its troop level in Afghanistan was a positive step and a sign of its resolve to remain committed to stabilization efforts.
While India has officially dismissed talk of sending Indian troops into Afghanistan, there is increasing talk within Indian circles of a "regional force" that could replace the "international forces" currently operating under a NATO mandate. Ved Pratap Vaidik, a scholar and analyst with close links to the government, articulated this view forcefully. He called for "a deadline for the removal of foreign forces" from Afghanistan.
It is "time for a regional solution," he said, adding that "foreign [i.e. western] forces should be replaced by regional forces." Vaidik suggested a maximum deadline of three years for this withdrawal.
India has been wary of attempts to talk to the Taliban, insisting on strict parameters for any such dialogue. India’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Jayant Prasad, told EurasiaNet last year that talking with terrorists or those who did not accept democracy and political pluralism was akin to accepting that "you can fry snowballs."
While India has had considerable links with Iran and Russia, its developing ties with the United States over the past decade have overshadowed, but not mitigated, these historical linkages. India will send representatives to the SCO meeting to be held in Moscow March 27, as well as the international meeting on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31.
Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon was in Washington earlier in March for consultations that included the ’Af-Pak’ issue. Both Holbrooke and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen are expected in India on April 8 to discuss the results of the forthcoming US strategic review on Afghanistan.
Aunohita Mojumdar 3/23/09
In the past, a visit to India by a CIA director could have set off a storm of protest and political jousting in New Delhi. But given the troubling Taliban issue in neighboring Pakistan, Indians’ perception of the United States is changing. These days, the emerging US-Indian partnership is developing into an important element of Washington’s stabilization plan for Afghanistan.
When newly minted CIA Director Leon Panetta visited India recently, he was greeted only by a mild protest from leftist parties over his meeting with Indian Home Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram. Panetta was in India to discuss Afghanistan, the ’Af-Pak’ situation and India’s role in a new American regional policy initiative. Highlighting the importance of emerging US-Indian ties, the March 19 foray to New Delhi marked Panetta’s first overseas trip since his Senate confirmation. It also followed visits by other senior US intelligence officials, including one earlier in March by FBI Director Robert Mueller. After his visit to India, Panetta went on to Islamabad for talks with Pakistani leaders.
Further emphasizing Washington’s growing interest in New Delhi’s Afghanistan approach, on March 21 President Barack Obama’s special envy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, told an audience in Brussels that India would be a "major factor in resolving" the situation in Afghanistan. Holbrooke also appeared to echo Indian concerns that Pakistan has replaced Afghanistan as the epicenter of the threat posed by international terrorists.
"We must recognize that the heart of the threat to the United States, to the European Union, to Australia, to many other countries in the world including India and, I stress, including Pakistan itself, comes from . . . western Pakistan," Holbrooke told participants at the Brussels security conference.
Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, India, which provided support and supplies to the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, has had extensive bilateral contacts with the Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s administration. Afghanistan has become the largest beneficiary of Indian aid, receiving $1.2 billion since 2001.
Through its embassy in Kabul -- as well as four consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i Sharif -- India is now able to project its influence across Afghanistan. That fact has caused consternation in Pakistan, with Islamabad calling on Kabul to curb New Delhi’s "anti-Pakistani" activities within the country, charges that range from spying to training militants operating against Pakistan.
For its part, India has consistently accused Pakistan of supporting anti-Indian and anti-Western militants. It has also drawn repeated attention to Pakistan’s unwillingness to allow Indian goods overland access to Afghanistan -- through Pakistani territory -- forcing India to route supplies for its projects through the more circuitous Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.
India’s low public profile may soon change. Given the considerable agreement between the United States and India on Afghanistan policy, New Delhi appears poised to assume a larger role in Afghan stabilization efforts.
T.C.A. Raghavan, a senior Indian diplomat overseeing the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran division in the External Affairs Ministry, recently welcomed the ’Af-Pak’ approach of developing a "coordinated policy" on Afghanistan and Pakistan. "We have always seen [the region] as a single issue," he said during a March 18 seminar on Afghanistan, organized by the Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute for Asian Studies, a think-tank funded by his ministry.
Raghavan also welcomed the "inclination to see Iran as a stabilizing element," adding that Tehran’s role in Afghanistan "cannot be minimized." The diplomat also embraced American promises to strengthen the Afghan army and remarked that the US commitment to increase its troop level in Afghanistan was a positive step and a sign of its resolve to remain committed to stabilization efforts.
While India has officially dismissed talk of sending Indian troops into Afghanistan, there is increasing talk within Indian circles of a "regional force" that could replace the "international forces" currently operating under a NATO mandate. Ved Pratap Vaidik, a scholar and analyst with close links to the government, articulated this view forcefully. He called for "a deadline for the removal of foreign forces" from Afghanistan.
It is "time for a regional solution," he said, adding that "foreign [i.e. western] forces should be replaced by regional forces." Vaidik suggested a maximum deadline of three years for this withdrawal.
India has been wary of attempts to talk to the Taliban, insisting on strict parameters for any such dialogue. India’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Jayant Prasad, told EurasiaNet last year that talking with terrorists or those who did not accept democracy and political pluralism was akin to accepting that "you can fry snowballs."
While India has had considerable links with Iran and Russia, its developing ties with the United States over the past decade have overshadowed, but not mitigated, these historical linkages. India will send representatives to the SCO meeting to be held in Moscow March 27, as well as the international meeting on Afghanistan in The Hague on March 31.
Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon was in Washington earlier in March for consultations that included the ’Af-Pak’ issue. Both Holbrooke and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen are expected in India on April 8 to discuss the results of the forthcoming US strategic review on Afghanistan.
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