Afghanistan unravelling

April 2009
By: Aunohita Mojumdar



In early March, Kabul was abuzz with talk about the next presidential elections. When would they be held, and under what circumstances? Who would be able to vote? Would the Election Commission be prepared? Were any of the opposition candidates ready? Could the security forces ensure security? And how many times would the Constitution be violated in the course of whatever decision was ultimately taken?

Under Afghanistan’s Constitution, the elections should have been held by 21 April, at least a month before the constitutionally mandated date for the end of the presidential term. But following discussions, it was last year ‘agreed’ – between the parliamentarians, the country’s independent Election Commission and the presidency – to hold the elections in August 2009. This was a time period the commission said would be required if it were to attempt to implement the ballot throughout the country, large parts of which are snowbound till late spring. Now, this agreement appeared to have unravelled, with the opposition demanding that either the elections be held in accordance with the Constitution, in April itself, or that President Hamid Karzai step down for the period between the end of the presidency and the elections. With this move, the opposition – which includes the United National Front, a broad coalition of former and current strongmen, commanders from the anti-Soviet resistance, ex-Communist leaders and various social and ethnic groups – was hoping that it would be able to deprive President Karzai of the advantages of incumbency in the run-up.

Afghanistan, still a nascent political democracy, does not have public electoral campaigning in the style of most democracies. Instead, security concerns, resource constraints, geography and the very culture, which is as yet unused to a full representative government based on the principles of parliamentary democracy, conspire to limit the candidates’ access to voters. In this situation, the advantage goes to whoever controls the Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA), which still remains under state control despite numerous efforts to free up the airwaves. Any incumbent president would also benefit from the highly centralised system of authority and financial power in the current form of government, where provincial governors are appointed by the president rather than by the elected provincial councils.

President Karzai initially fought the move to shunt him out. Unwilling to step down, he first argued that he be should allowed to stay till the completion of his five-year term, since the presidential elections were last held late in 2004. When the opposition parties did not budge, he hoisted them on their own petard, ordering the Election Commission to follow the Constitution to the letter – an order that was interpreted as the president’s call for early elections in April. Not only would this have ensured that he remained in his position during the conduct of the elections because it was within the Constitutional timeframe, but it also put the opposition in quite a spot, since no one was even half ready to challenge the incumbent.

As the opposition reverted its position to supporting August elections, the international community also backed that date, terming it impossible to organise the logistics before that. Finally, the Election Commission formally stated that it would be impossible to hold free and fair elections anytime before August. While President Karzai agreed to this decision, the question of whether he could be forced to step down remains unresolved, as does the issue of constitutional impropriety of having elections well beyond the constitutionally mandated date. Worryingly, both of these matters appear to be able to be resolved only through the imposition of a state of emergency, though that is being seen as an unlikely step now.

Alienation

SABIR NAZAR, “Tree of knowledge”
It is the political manoeuvres and legal technicalities that have preoccupied those in the seat and circle of power in Kabul. But talk of the elections has also engendered some hope, in that people think a change by itself may be positive in a country that has endured a downward slide for some time. This optimism is tempered with a realisation of the limitations of the voter, however, and there is as much discussion on which candidate the Americans will back as there is regarding the candidates that are entering the fray.

An analysis of the hopes and fears about Afghanistan leaves one sober. The Asia Foundation’s annual survey (which offers the largest sample size of any survey in Afghanistan) on public opinion on a range of issues found that 36 percent of the Afghan population feels that they were more prosperous under the Taliban than they are now; only 39 percent feel they are better off today than back then. The survey further reported that of the 16 percent of the population that reported having experienced violence, only eight percent said they had faced violence at the hands of insurgents or militants; in a worrying trend, as much as six percent also said they had suffered violence at the hands of the foreign forces.

There has been a 40 percent increase in civilian casualties over the last year of intensifying conflict. UN data states that of the 2118 civilian casualties in 2008, 55 percent were attributed to anti-government elements, and 39 percent to pro-government forces. (The rest could not be attributed.) For the high number of dead from pro-government forces, there is growing public alienation from both the Kabul government and the international community. Though casualties caused by insurgents are higher, Afghans explain their anger by stating that they hold the international community to higher standards. This is because, they point out, the international community and the Karzai government has sought public support on grounds of a higher moral authority, and the promise to uphold rule of law. Increasing civilian casualties, stagnation in the delivery of development and the escalating number of barriers in the form of physical obstacles, denial of access and increasingly complex procedures designed to minimise contact with the public used by the government (including the international community working in support of it) have caused growing public anger, and led to a lower threshold of tolerance.

After seven years of development expenditure amounting to some USD 20 billion, economic progress in Afghanistan has been paltry, erratic and unbalanced. While a small section of the population has been able to benefit from the aid, the majority continue to survive on agriculture – ironically, and interestingly, the most neglected sector by the major international donors. USAID, the American aid arm, for example, has spent less than five percent of its Afghanistan budget on agriculture since 2002. It is not hard to understand why: between 2005 and 2008, an additional five percent of the country’s population was pushed below the minimum nutritional levels, while average household expenditure on food rose from 56 percent to 85 percent, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Food scarcity has been exacerbated by rising worldwide prices and a severe drought, a factor that development agencies warn could affect public health and even spark displacement and unrest.

Civilian casualties in the international military operations have acted like lightening rods on the Afghan polity, drawing criticism from the Parliament, President Karzai and the public. This has prodded the UN to join hands in demanding changes in the operational strategies of the international forces. The UN’s seniormost official in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), has called for a change in the agreements that mandate the presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil, especially with respect to house-to-house searches, arbitrary detention and the use of air power in operations. All three are elements that the Taliban has exploited to energise public opinion against the Karzai government.

In Kabul, the alienation is visible in the form of growing checkpoints and physical barriers that protect the international community and the small section of elite Afghans in power. Everyday, more road blocks are put up, barbed wire is strung, and guns are trained on the local population. Debate over the security situation is frenetic. The old mantra that a military solution alone is the answer, which made its appearance soon after the resurgence of insurgency in 2005-06, was revived in 2008, albeit with a new twist: the push for negotiations with the Taliban. While a reconciliation process with those Taliban militants willing to give up arms and join the government has been in place for some time, without yielding substantial results, the emphasis now seems to be on high-level talks. However, there are differing perceptions of who could or should be brought to the table, and at what stage that should happen. The dominant thinking at this point – that of the US with new President Barack Obama at the helm – is to increase the military pressure on the insurgents and the Taliban, while at the same time carrying on negotiations. But the efficacy of this carrot-and-stick approach is yet to be demonstrated.

The change in US administration following the last elections there was eagerly awaited in Afghanistan, though Afghans emphasise that the real change will lie in the detail. While the broad contours of President Obama’s policy on Afghanistan are yet to be spelled out, there are indications of a deepening of the militarised approach in the Afghanistan policy. The new US National Security Adviser, Marine General James Jones, is a former military commander, breaking the earlier precedent of having civilian advisors. The new US ambassador to Afghanistan is also a former military man, General Karl Eikenberry, who served as the commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan, and is currently deputy chairman of the NATO military committee in Brussels.

As an initial step, President Obama has sanctioned the sending of an additional 17,000 US troops to Afghanistan, whereas military commanders in the field had sought 30,000. The delay in the training of the Afghan National Army has also given impetus to a proposal to train and arm the tribal militia as a means of meeting the shortfall. This proposal now finds the backing of the American generals. Initial statements emanating from Washington, DC have suggested lowered political ambitions and shorter goalposts, with some officials stating that the US must concentrate on its early goals of tackling al-Qaeda and the Taliban, rather than the wider aims of nation-building and stabilisation.

Love thy neighbour
The other defining aspect to emerge from the first months of President Obama’s administration is the concept of ‘Af-Pak’, or viewing the two countries and the violence emanating from and within them as a combined problem. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the special envoy for ‘Af-Pak’ saw several other countries, including Britain, France and Germany, swiftly following suit by appointing similar envoys in addition to their ambassadors.

Pressure on Pakistan is likely to continue under the Obama administration. However, the fragility of Pakistan’s polity makes it unclear where and how the pressure can be applied. The policy of crossborder strikes carried out by US Special Forces into Pakistani territory from Afghanistan, a signature of the Bush years, was supported by candidate Obama. It is not clear whether these strikes will now continue, and it is not clear whether the Americans are sensitive to the enormous negative baggage they collect as a result of the attacks by aircrafts and drones. But it is a fact that there is greater operational coherence in the American operations now, with the Special Forces, which was not answerable to the US commander in Afghanistan, also being brought under the command of the US top military commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan.

The deepening crisis within Afghanistan has led to an escalation of anti-Pakistan rhetoric in Kabul, with repeated demands being made for international action on training camps and militant bases across the border, within Pakistan. President Karzai has asked the international forces to move out of the villages of Afghanistan’s hinterland and spread out instead along the border, in order to reach targets across the frontier. This demand for action against Pakistan cuts across the political spectrum, and is likely to increase in intensity as the country moves closer to the elections.

This rhetoric, of course, has been bolstered by similar sentiments within India, heightened in its warmongering frenzy after the Bombay blasts. New Delhi’s role vis-à-vis Afghanistan is likely to be enhanced in the near future, though it is far too early to predict the exact contours of this engagement. India has four consulates apart from its embassy in Kabul, a fact that Islamabad has always cited as evidence of New Delhi’s anti-Pakistan intentions in Afghanistan. For its part, South Block claims, somewhat incongruously, that the relationship with Kabul is bilateral, and has no correlation with its relationship with Pakistan. Afghanistan is the largest beneficiary of Indian foreign aid anywhere, with a USD 1.2 billion package covering infrastructure, capacity-building and community-based projects.

Yet India’s role in helping shape the future of Afghanistan has been limited. Either as a reaction to the criticism levelled by Pakistan or due to its own insecurity about competing with the Western-led project, India has largely stayed away from the decision-making table with regards to Afghanistan, which sees the participation of most major countries of the West as well as the Afghan government. Over the past seven and a half years, the Indian government has preferred to limit its activities to the bilateral arena or to follow the US lead in most issues relating to Afghanistan. With the possibility of a thaw in relations between Iran and the US, and a more assertive Russia increasingly active in the Central Asian republics, it will be interesting to watch whether India makes use of its earlier close ties with these countries, or restricts its role to support of the US. The only possible hiccup on the horizon of the evolving India-US relationship on the Afghanistan front is Washington’s desire to link Kashmir and India-Pakistan relations to the situation in Afghanistan – something New Delhi is adamantly set against.

The situation on the ground is shifting, with national chauvinism on the ascendancy along with an increase in conservatism. Political leaders who have relied on social and political conservative ideology to consolidate their hold have once again begun asserting themselves, and are now finding greater support from the Karzai government. As the country moves towards elections, this platform is likely to be used with increasing frequency. One finds the values of democracy, political, civil and human rights being questioned with increasing frequency, described as imported, Western concepts alien to Afghan life and culture.

This questioning has not come only from interest groups within Afghanistan. It is also emanating from Western donor countries – now eager to wrap up the Afghanistan project, which appears in danger of unravelling. Recent decisions, statements as well as the support provided to ‘leaders’ who have woeful track records in the area of democracy and human rights have shown that some in the Western compact might be willing to accept an Afghan state that is less than democratic, as long as it is somewhat stable and friendly to the Western capitals. Democracy and civil rights look likely to take a back seat as long as the country is able to control the Taliban and al-Qaeda and their ability to hit at the West.