Times of India, July 10
The arrival of General David Petraeus in Kabul and the commotion of General Stanley Mc-Chrystal losing his job caused quite a clatter internationally with speculation on whether the new General, who was actually the old General - both in seniority and in terms of the genesis of the COIN and 'surge' strategies - would retain the same policy. Chastened by his predecessor's fate, General Petraeus is going slow on exhibiting his individuality.
What attracted less attention, except from the most assiduous of Afghanistan watchers were the swift changes executed by President Hamid Karzai in the security sector, through a series of appointments that consolidate his hold in key positions. They include the shifting of the powerful General Bismillah Khan to the Ministry of Interior, a new deputy minister in the Ministry of Defence, a new chief of staff of the army, and a new head of the National Security Directorate, the country's intelligence agency.
The local media interpreted them as signs of a greater role for Pashtuns in the security apparatus as well as paving the way for reconciliation with insurgent groups including the Taliban and the Haqqani faction. However the appointments also reflect something wider - a shift in the centre of gravity over the past few months, away from the international compact on rebuilding of the Afghan state and government towards more localised interests , both within Afghanistan and the region.
While the US still dominates in Afghanistan with the sheer size of the military and economic resources that it brings, its leverage has become more fragmented with no clarity of direction. Over the past year US engagement in Afghanistan has been fraught with tensions, as much between Karzai and the Obama administrations as within the Obama administration itself, most clearly visible here in Kabul in the wide divergence between the top military and civilian representatives in Kabul - General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. The reason perhaps, is not, as is often suggested, that Obama can't get it right, but just that his administration's attention is engaged elsewhere.
If Iraq was the distraction during the Bush era, it is domestic issues that absorb a great deal of the new president's energy and focus. In so far as Afghanistan factors into this, it is largely through a preoccupation with how quickly and how neatly the US will be able to exit Afghanistan.
While differences in the American agenda display themselves as dissonances in policy, the Afghan establishment is also working at multiple levels, but in an effort to position itself for multiple realities. These include keeping a working relationship with the international community to maintain a stream of economic and military support, overtures to the Taliban, enhanced political engagement with Pakistan, pacification of India, Iran and the Russia and most important of all, a way of consolidating its own hold on power. How the insurgency grows in the future, how much leverage Pakistan can assert and how quickly the international community wants to exit will be amongst the main factors determining which of these overtures by the Karzai government strengthens or weakens in the future.
The recent peace jirga is an illustrative example of how a single event can work at various levels. On the one hand it fed into the international community's concerns of increasing chaos by projecting reconciliation as a magic panacea, a way out of the morass; to those of the insurgents willing to bite, it held out the prospect of joining the establishment; those fearful of the return of the Taliban were assured by the various and ambiguous caveats limiting insurgent participation that are open to widely varied interpretation. The jirga assured Pakistan of its significance in an eventual political solution and reassured India that a government led by Karzai would not go too far. In concrete terms it also provided the initiation of a 'project' that could attract more donor funding - a new cash cow just when the international community was beginning to ask questions about other sectors it has been funding.
The forthcoming Kabul Conference promises to be yet another such beast. The Afghan government's priorities, which were set in 2006, refined in 2008 and reviewed in London in 2010, are now expected to be reworked in July 2010. Like the proverbial elephant in a room full of blind men, the conference may well end with each taking from it a suitable conclusion. In fact, in the current international mindset which equates a 'full calendar of events' with actual progress, not much needs to happen anyway, apart from the mere holding of the conference.
The acute concentration of attention on new, bright and shining events belies what lies beneath its shadows: increasing despair, impoverishment and estrangement of ordinary Afghans from the process of governance. The poorest segment - one third of all Afghans - do not meet their dietary requirements are getting squeezed further , being forced to sell income-generating assets as the humanitarian crisis deepens. Significant numbers of those entrusted with leadership in the task of rebuilding the Afghan state are those who have private economic interests that benefit directly from continuation of the conflict.
The growth of intolerant ideologies is pushing women back into their homes, obstructing their movement and encouraging violence against them through impunity. Ethnic minorities have started expressing their concerns about marginalisation. Political movements and the process of democratisation are being deliberately weakened. Rule of law and justice are being seen as an expendable luxury in the quest for 'stability'. Meanwhile the support for the Taliban continues to grow, albeit less rapidly than the Taliban itself.
The Taliban now operate in all 34 provinces and have shadow governments in 33 provinces of Afghanistan. Their growing capabilities and the increasing violence in Afghanistan are well-documented. Until now an overwhelming majority of the Afghan people continue to put their faith in the government and the institutions of state. But this trend is changing. People are increasingly turning away to non-state actors in search for help. Less noticeable than the shift of gravity within the political class, the centre of gravity within the Afghan population is also moving.
August 28, 2010
Taliban attack compound of US contractor in Afghanistan
The Guardian, July 2
Suicide bombers and gunmen attacked the compound of a USAid contractor in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz today, killing four people including a British national.
The attack on the compound of Development Alternatives Inc (DAI) also wounded 10 people, including a Briton whose condition was described by the British embassy as critical but stable. Initial reports suggested that the dead may have been members of a private security firm guarding the compound.
The gunbattle, which started at 3am local time and lasted for more than six hours, destroyed the compound, according to local officials.
Although the province is the hub of insurgency in the northern areas, the scale and complexity of the attack was unprecedented in the region, marking a new level of capability for the insurgency on the day General David Petraeus, the new commander of the Nato and US forces, arrived in Kabul.
"Maybe they attempted to send a signal," Nato's General Joseph Blotz said, adding "but this is senseless."
Blotz said the attack resembled an assault on a UN guesthouse in Kabul in October last year that killed eight people.
Thomas Ruttig of the thinktank the Afghan Analysts Network said: "It is a first time for Kunduz that such a complex attack has happened there, and one against a non-military target. This is another sign they are getting stronger and have a greater foothold [in this area] and can pull off attacks like this one."
A Taliban spokesman was quoted by the local Pajhwok news agency claiming responsibilty and claiming the compound was that of the US special forces, something denied by US officials.
While development agencies have found it easier to work in northern areas, many of them have reported increasing threats from insurgents moving into new areas.
DAI is termed a for-profit contractor, a distinction that traditional NGOs are keen to emphasise. Many for-profit contractors live in armed compounds, something that traditional NGOs eschew in order to emphasise their neutrality.
Ruttig said: "I have concerns about the privatisation and militarisation of development co-operation which makes people who work in these organisations very vulnerable."
USAid termed the attack "another tragic reminder of the life threatening circumstances that our Afghan and international partners face as they work to improve conditions".
The attack comes at a time when the Obama administration is trying to pump more money into the civilian surge as part of its transition strategy in the face of growing domestic resistance.
Suicide bombers and gunmen attacked the compound of a USAid contractor in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz today, killing four people including a British national.
The attack on the compound of Development Alternatives Inc (DAI) also wounded 10 people, including a Briton whose condition was described by the British embassy as critical but stable. Initial reports suggested that the dead may have been members of a private security firm guarding the compound.
The gunbattle, which started at 3am local time and lasted for more than six hours, destroyed the compound, according to local officials.
Although the province is the hub of insurgency in the northern areas, the scale and complexity of the attack was unprecedented in the region, marking a new level of capability for the insurgency on the day General David Petraeus, the new commander of the Nato and US forces, arrived in Kabul.
"Maybe they attempted to send a signal," Nato's General Joseph Blotz said, adding "but this is senseless."
Blotz said the attack resembled an assault on a UN guesthouse in Kabul in October last year that killed eight people.
Thomas Ruttig of the thinktank the Afghan Analysts Network said: "It is a first time for Kunduz that such a complex attack has happened there, and one against a non-military target. This is another sign they are getting stronger and have a greater foothold [in this area] and can pull off attacks like this one."
A Taliban spokesman was quoted by the local Pajhwok news agency claiming responsibilty and claiming the compound was that of the US special forces, something denied by US officials.
While development agencies have found it easier to work in northern areas, many of them have reported increasing threats from insurgents moving into new areas.
DAI is termed a for-profit contractor, a distinction that traditional NGOs are keen to emphasise. Many for-profit contractors live in armed compounds, something that traditional NGOs eschew in order to emphasise their neutrality.
Ruttig said: "I have concerns about the privatisation and militarisation of development co-operation which makes people who work in these organisations very vulnerable."
USAid termed the attack "another tragic reminder of the life threatening circumstances that our Afghan and international partners face as they work to improve conditions".
The attack comes at a time when the Obama administration is trying to pump more money into the civilian surge as part of its transition strategy in the face of growing domestic resistance.
In Afghanistan, drug rehab for children
Christian Science Monitor/ July 14, 2010
Najiba scrabbles through cupboards frantic for something sweet. She claws at her mother, urging her to help. Najiba, though only 13 years old, lives in the Sanga Amaj drug addiction rehab clinic in Kabul with her mother, Zainab – who is also an opium addict, a habit acquired from her husband and passed on to her daughter.
Skip to next paragraph
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.“When she was born, she kept crying, so after two months or so I started giving her opium to keep her quiet,” says Zainab. (Her and Najiba’s names have been changed to protect their privacy.)
The result is a drug dependency that Najiba is now desperately fighting.
Yet she is neither alone among Afghan children addicted to opium, nor among the worst affected. For starters, she’s one of a small minority getting professional help.
Opium as a pacifier
Opium is used in parts of Afghanistan to quiet babies and, in poorer households without access to medical help, to relieve pain – trends exacerbated by decades of conflict. Economic pressures and fragmented families have meant that women have less help at home and are more likely to give opium to cranky children, to free themselves up to do housework.
“Opium is sometimes used as a child-rearing method,” says Preeti Shah, a Narcotics Affairs Officer of the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in Kabul.
The conflict has also left people with deep physical psychological wounds, which they try to numb with narcotics.
A two-year pilot study by the INL on drug addiction and household toxicity in Afghanistan found that babies as young as nine months were testing positive for narcotics, says Thom Browne, deputy director of the INL’s anticrime programs. It also found that in many cases, the level of toxicity in young children was several times higher than that in adult heroin users. The study, which looked at 30 households in three provinces, will be expanded to cover 2,000 households in 22 provinces next year.
While other countries also face cases of babies born with addiction, in Afghanistan the problem deepens as parents continue to administer drugs to their children. According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), up to half of drug users surveyed gave their children opium. The INL found in their study of Afghan drug users’ homes significant samples of opium in the air, bedding, eating utensils, toys, and other items that children come into contact with.
Treatment as taboo
Treating drug addiction is not easy anywhere, but is especially difficult in Afghanistan because of social and cultural stigmas against females going outside the home. Many families are reluctant to let women come and stay at Sanga Amaj for the 45-day treatment period, let alone the preferred 90-day period, says Latifa Hamidi, the doctor who oversees the clinic. Even surveying women proved near impossible – they constituted only 3 percent of the UNODC’s sample size.
Skip to next paragraph
Related Stories
Afghanistan’s soaring drug trade hits home
How US is tackling opium trade in Afghanistan poppy heartland
Afghanistan news coverage
.Even more helpful would be treat the entire family, says Gilberto Gerra, the UNODC’s chief of drug prevention. Otherwise, “if a woman goes back to a home where her husband is using drugs, the risk of relapse is very high.”
Although cultural taboos prohibit men and women being treated together, the INL hopes to build treatment centers for men and women near one another, to allow family members to visit one another. Sanga Amaj, which opened in 2007, represents a step in that direction, by treating women and their children together.
The clinic’s 33 patients include 15 children, the youngest of whom is 3 years old. Zainab and Najiba have been here for two weeks. In addition to attending group therapy sessions and receiving medical treatment, during they day they exercise, sit in religion classes, and learn skills like sewing and embroidery. At the end of their time, they will go home to Zainab’s husband, who has already undergone treatment. If Zainab and Najiba stay clean, they will be entitled to free medicine from the clinic.
Facilities like Sanga Amaj are few. Kabul only has four, which can handle about 100 patients. Of Afghanistan’s 1 million drug users, at least 90 percent have no access to treatment, according to the UNODC.
Expanding treatment facilities would require considerable foreign aid and expertise, but does not rank high on donors’ list of priorities. These include instead ending the poppy farming and drug trade that make Afghanistan the supplier of 90 percent of the world’s opium.
“Afghanistan is known for being a supply country,” says Ms. Shah. “It is time to recognize it is a demand country as well.”
Najiba scrabbles through cupboards frantic for something sweet. She claws at her mother, urging her to help. Najiba, though only 13 years old, lives in the Sanga Amaj drug addiction rehab clinic in Kabul with her mother, Zainab – who is also an opium addict, a habit acquired from her husband and passed on to her daughter.
Skip to next paragraph
Related Stories
Afghanistan’s soaring drug trade hits home
How US is tackling opium trade in Afghanistan poppy heartland
Afghanistan news coverage
.“When she was born, she kept crying, so after two months or so I started giving her opium to keep her quiet,” says Zainab. (Her and Najiba’s names have been changed to protect their privacy.)
The result is a drug dependency that Najiba is now desperately fighting.
Yet she is neither alone among Afghan children addicted to opium, nor among the worst affected. For starters, she’s one of a small minority getting professional help.
Opium as a pacifier
Opium is used in parts of Afghanistan to quiet babies and, in poorer households without access to medical help, to relieve pain – trends exacerbated by decades of conflict. Economic pressures and fragmented families have meant that women have less help at home and are more likely to give opium to cranky children, to free themselves up to do housework.
“Opium is sometimes used as a child-rearing method,” says Preeti Shah, a Narcotics Affairs Officer of the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in Kabul.
The conflict has also left people with deep physical psychological wounds, which they try to numb with narcotics.
A two-year pilot study by the INL on drug addiction and household toxicity in Afghanistan found that babies as young as nine months were testing positive for narcotics, says Thom Browne, deputy director of the INL’s anticrime programs. It also found that in many cases, the level of toxicity in young children was several times higher than that in adult heroin users. The study, which looked at 30 households in three provinces, will be expanded to cover 2,000 households in 22 provinces next year.
While other countries also face cases of babies born with addiction, in Afghanistan the problem deepens as parents continue to administer drugs to their children. According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), up to half of drug users surveyed gave their children opium. The INL found in their study of Afghan drug users’ homes significant samples of opium in the air, bedding, eating utensils, toys, and other items that children come into contact with.
Treatment as taboo
Treating drug addiction is not easy anywhere, but is especially difficult in Afghanistan because of social and cultural stigmas against females going outside the home. Many families are reluctant to let women come and stay at Sanga Amaj for the 45-day treatment period, let alone the preferred 90-day period, says Latifa Hamidi, the doctor who oversees the clinic. Even surveying women proved near impossible – they constituted only 3 percent of the UNODC’s sample size.
Skip to next paragraph
Related Stories
Afghanistan’s soaring drug trade hits home
How US is tackling opium trade in Afghanistan poppy heartland
Afghanistan news coverage
.Even more helpful would be treat the entire family, says Gilberto Gerra, the UNODC’s chief of drug prevention. Otherwise, “if a woman goes back to a home where her husband is using drugs, the risk of relapse is very high.”
Although cultural taboos prohibit men and women being treated together, the INL hopes to build treatment centers for men and women near one another, to allow family members to visit one another. Sanga Amaj, which opened in 2007, represents a step in that direction, by treating women and their children together.
The clinic’s 33 patients include 15 children, the youngest of whom is 3 years old. Zainab and Najiba have been here for two weeks. In addition to attending group therapy sessions and receiving medical treatment, during they day they exercise, sit in religion classes, and learn skills like sewing and embroidery. At the end of their time, they will go home to Zainab’s husband, who has already undergone treatment. If Zainab and Najiba stay clean, they will be entitled to free medicine from the clinic.
Facilities like Sanga Amaj are few. Kabul only has four, which can handle about 100 patients. Of Afghanistan’s 1 million drug users, at least 90 percent have no access to treatment, according to the UNODC.
Expanding treatment facilities would require considerable foreign aid and expertise, but does not rank high on donors’ list of priorities. These include instead ending the poppy farming and drug trade that make Afghanistan the supplier of 90 percent of the world’s opium.
“Afghanistan is known for being a supply country,” says Ms. Shah. “It is time to recognize it is a demand country as well.”
Afghan citizens paid $1bn in bribes for public services last year, study finds
The Guardian, July 8
Afghans paid nearly $1bn (£658m) in bribes last year, according to a new survey that reveals that corruption in the country has doubled since 2007.
The study by the monitoring group Integrity Watch Afghanistan showed that the average value of bribes paid in 2009 was $156. The average per capita income is $502 per year.
Almost a third of civil servants said they have been forced to pay a bribe to obtain a public service, while 13% of households said that they had paid bribes to secure their own sources of income
The survey also showed that more than half the country's population feels that corruption is helping the Taliban's expansion.
Equally worrying for Nato forces combating the insurgency is the finding that the judiciary and the police were identified as the two most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan.
While most respondents said they hoped that state institutions would tackle the problem of corruption, there was an increasing tendency to turn to non-state actors to solve their problems, a trend that could further bolster support for the insurgency.
"Corruption is weakening the legitimacy of the state," said Lorenzo Delesgues, a founder and co-director of IWA.
The survey sampled 6,498 people in 32 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces over November and December 2009.
More than a quarter of Afghans (26%) felt deprived of access to justice and security because of corruption. Half (50%) of those surveyed said that corruption within the state was helping expansion of the Taliban either absolutely (36%) or a little (14%).
Weak law enforcement was identified as a major cause for corruption with as many as 28% of civil servants saying they had to pay bribes to secure or retain their jobs. However donor money was also identified as a major cause of corruption
President Hamid Karzai – criticised regularly by the international community for his apparent unwillingness to tackle graft – was seen as the best bet for countering corruption (80% identified the presidency as the best institution to deal with the problem), though more than half the people said he had not performed on this issue.
Afghans paid nearly $1bn (£658m) in bribes last year, according to a new survey that reveals that corruption in the country has doubled since 2007.
The study by the monitoring group Integrity Watch Afghanistan showed that the average value of bribes paid in 2009 was $156. The average per capita income is $502 per year.
Almost a third of civil servants said they have been forced to pay a bribe to obtain a public service, while 13% of households said that they had paid bribes to secure their own sources of income
The survey also showed that more than half the country's population feels that corruption is helping the Taliban's expansion.
Equally worrying for Nato forces combating the insurgency is the finding that the judiciary and the police were identified as the two most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan.
While most respondents said they hoped that state institutions would tackle the problem of corruption, there was an increasing tendency to turn to non-state actors to solve their problems, a trend that could further bolster support for the insurgency.
"Corruption is weakening the legitimacy of the state," said Lorenzo Delesgues, a founder and co-director of IWA.
The survey sampled 6,498 people in 32 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces over November and December 2009.
More than a quarter of Afghans (26%) felt deprived of access to justice and security because of corruption. Half (50%) of those surveyed said that corruption within the state was helping expansion of the Taliban either absolutely (36%) or a little (14%).
Weak law enforcement was identified as a major cause for corruption with as many as 28% of civil servants saying they had to pay bribes to secure or retain their jobs. However donor money was also identified as a major cause of corruption
President Hamid Karzai – criticised regularly by the international community for his apparent unwillingness to tackle graft – was seen as the best bet for countering corruption (80% identified the presidency as the best institution to deal with the problem), though more than half the people said he had not performed on this issue.
Sangin pullout: British troops 'have not brought peace'
Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul, Ali Safi, and Declan Walsh in Islamabad
The Guardian, July 7, 2010
Sangin's residents have criticised the planned withdrawal later this year of British troops from their town, complaining that four years of fighting have failed to bring peace or development.
"The British have failed," said Haji Fazlul Haq, a former town governor, speaking by telephone. "They could not bring security to the town and that is why they are handing it to the Americans."
The blunt assessment was shared by other residents who expressed greater confidence in US forces due to take control in November. "The Americans fight harder. I think the Taliban will be afraid of this change of command," said Haji Abdul Wahab, acting director of the peace commission of Helmand, a government body that promotes reconciliation.
Their reaction offered little consolation to British forces, who have paid a high price in Sangin. More than 100 British soldiers have died around the town since Tony Blair deployed the first troops in June 2006, making it the deadliest battlezone for western soldiers in Afghanistan.
British commanders say the withdrawal is not an admission of failure but rather a routine battlefield reorganisation that reflects the increased American presence in the province. There are currently 20,000 US soldiers in Helmand, twice as many as the British, and more are coming.
But there is little doubt that the British exit is an admission of the difficulty of purging the Taliban from a town in the grip of the heroin trade and surrounded by determined insurgents. While British soldiers have battlefield superiority over their enemy, many of whom are armed with basic rifles, the nature of the counter-insurgency requires them to conduct "presence patrols" in villages.
This makes them an easy target for insurgents who plant roadside bombs by night then melt into the population during the day. The Taliban are also becoming more canny: this year troops reported more landmines with no metal content, rendering metal detectors useless.
Some residents did recognise the British sacrifices. "I don't want to put all the blame on British because they have lost many lives here" said Shamsullah Khan, a candidate for September's parliamentary elections.
In Pakistan, the British move was seen as confirmation of the view that the Nato war in Afghanistan was unwinnable in its present form. "It's like chasing a nameless, invisible enemy," said Rustum Shah Mohmand, a former Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan. "This is not about [Hamid] Karzai, or corruption, or the marginalisation of the Pashtuns. It's about the presence of the foreign forces. Until they leave, peace will never come to Afghanistan," he said.
It is not the only high-profile pullout in Afghanistan of recent months. In April, US forces withdrew from the Korengal valley in the east of the country, dubbed the "valley of death" by soldiers, ending years of intense but fruitless fighting. Forty-two Americans died and hundreds were wounded in fighting between 2006 and 2009 in the valley.
Nato has postponed a planned surge into Kandahar until the autumn amid fears of heavy Taliban resistance.
The operations are taking place against a backdrop of regional political intrigues. In recent months Karzai has held a series of meetings with Pakistan's army and intelligence chiefs, ostensibly with a view to negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban.
Riffat Hussain, a professor of defence studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, said the Sangin withdrawal was not likely to have a major impact on the Pakistan military's calculations.
"They're more concerned with what General [David] Petraeus is going to do. That's the major strategic concern right now," he said, referring to the US commander who took over from General Stanley McChrystal after comments about the Obama administration to Rolling Stone magazine cost McChrystal his job.
Petraeus has promised to review the rules of engagement governing Nato troops, which many soldiers had complained were too restrictive. But human rights activists and many Afghans worry that a change in the rules will lead to higher civilian casualties.
In Sangin, war-weary residents are bracing for an increase in violence as American troops try to succeed where the British failed. "One thing we know: the violence will increase," said Surat Khan, a brick-factory worker in Bastonzai, near Sangin. "The Americans will not be as defensive as the British. They are serious about conducting operations."
Solaiman Shah, a vegetable seller, was more sympathetic about the British losses. "The Brits have not helped us but they sacrificed a lot.
"It will take a long time for the Americans to build the same relationship with the people."
The Guardian, July 7, 2010
Sangin's residents have criticised the planned withdrawal later this year of British troops from their town, complaining that four years of fighting have failed to bring peace or development.
"The British have failed," said Haji Fazlul Haq, a former town governor, speaking by telephone. "They could not bring security to the town and that is why they are handing it to the Americans."
The blunt assessment was shared by other residents who expressed greater confidence in US forces due to take control in November. "The Americans fight harder. I think the Taliban will be afraid of this change of command," said Haji Abdul Wahab, acting director of the peace commission of Helmand, a government body that promotes reconciliation.
Their reaction offered little consolation to British forces, who have paid a high price in Sangin. More than 100 British soldiers have died around the town since Tony Blair deployed the first troops in June 2006, making it the deadliest battlezone for western soldiers in Afghanistan.
British commanders say the withdrawal is not an admission of failure but rather a routine battlefield reorganisation that reflects the increased American presence in the province. There are currently 20,000 US soldiers in Helmand, twice as many as the British, and more are coming.
But there is little doubt that the British exit is an admission of the difficulty of purging the Taliban from a town in the grip of the heroin trade and surrounded by determined insurgents. While British soldiers have battlefield superiority over their enemy, many of whom are armed with basic rifles, the nature of the counter-insurgency requires them to conduct "presence patrols" in villages.
This makes them an easy target for insurgents who plant roadside bombs by night then melt into the population during the day. The Taliban are also becoming more canny: this year troops reported more landmines with no metal content, rendering metal detectors useless.
Some residents did recognise the British sacrifices. "I don't want to put all the blame on British because they have lost many lives here" said Shamsullah Khan, a candidate for September's parliamentary elections.
In Pakistan, the British move was seen as confirmation of the view that the Nato war in Afghanistan was unwinnable in its present form. "It's like chasing a nameless, invisible enemy," said Rustum Shah Mohmand, a former Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan. "This is not about [Hamid] Karzai, or corruption, or the marginalisation of the Pashtuns. It's about the presence of the foreign forces. Until they leave, peace will never come to Afghanistan," he said.
It is not the only high-profile pullout in Afghanistan of recent months. In April, US forces withdrew from the Korengal valley in the east of the country, dubbed the "valley of death" by soldiers, ending years of intense but fruitless fighting. Forty-two Americans died and hundreds were wounded in fighting between 2006 and 2009 in the valley.
Nato has postponed a planned surge into Kandahar until the autumn amid fears of heavy Taliban resistance.
The operations are taking place against a backdrop of regional political intrigues. In recent months Karzai has held a series of meetings with Pakistan's army and intelligence chiefs, ostensibly with a view to negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban.
Riffat Hussain, a professor of defence studies at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, said the Sangin withdrawal was not likely to have a major impact on the Pakistan military's calculations.
"They're more concerned with what General [David] Petraeus is going to do. That's the major strategic concern right now," he said, referring to the US commander who took over from General Stanley McChrystal after comments about the Obama administration to Rolling Stone magazine cost McChrystal his job.
Petraeus has promised to review the rules of engagement governing Nato troops, which many soldiers had complained were too restrictive. But human rights activists and many Afghans worry that a change in the rules will lead to higher civilian casualties.
In Sangin, war-weary residents are bracing for an increase in violence as American troops try to succeed where the British failed. "One thing we know: the violence will increase," said Surat Khan, a brick-factory worker in Bastonzai, near Sangin. "The Americans will not be as defensive as the British. They are serious about conducting operations."
Solaiman Shah, a vegetable seller, was more sympathetic about the British losses. "The Brits have not helped us but they sacrificed a lot.
"It will take a long time for the Americans to build the same relationship with the people."
No escape yet for Bill Shaw, the Briton cleared of bribery in Kabul
The Guardian, July 4
A former British army officer Bill Shaw was acquitted today of bribery charges by an Afghan court which overturned an earlier conviction and two-year jail sentence.
Though acquitted, Shaw, a senior manager at G4S, the private security company that guards the British embassy in Kabul, still has to wait for his release. At the end of a hearing lasting more than seven hours and spread over two days, he was led back to prison today to await the completion of legal formalities.
Shaw said he was "very, very excited" about the verdict, describing his time in Pul-e-Charkhi, a prison infamous for its overcrowding and squalor, as "a living hell". In a statement from their home in Leeds, West Yorkshire, his overjoyed wife Liz, said: "I just want him home and won't believe this nightmare is over until he's back with us, his family."
In an interview broadcast on BBC Radio 4's The World this Weekend, Shaw described his ordeal as the "lowest part of my life". He said: "They moved me to a place called the counter-narcotics justice centre. That to me was a picture of Guantánamo Bay.
"Everything was taken off me … all your identity is stripped from you completely.
"You put a uniform on, they issue you with one bar of soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste - that is it, no possessions. That is the lowest part of my life, nine weeks spent in there being totally controlled and administered 24 hours a day."
His daughter Lisa Luckyn-Malone added: "We have been deeply concerned about Dad's health and safety, and hope he is released very soon."
Shaw's family has led a high-profile campaign, drawing attention to the former Royal Military police officer's deteriorating health and highlighting concerns about his safety in Pul-e-Charkhi.
The father-of-three and his lawyer, Kimberley Motley, said they have both received threats and that Shaw was put in solitary confinement at his own request.
Shaw, 52, who served in the RMP for 28 years and was awarded an MBE, was arrested and fined $25,000 (£16,400) in March by Afghanistan's national security directorate for paying a bribe to secure the release of the company's bombproof vehicles which had been confiscated by the Afghan security service. Shaw said he believed he was paying a legitimate fine to release the two vehicles.
Motley said today her client had been denied basic rights, including a presumption of innocence in the first trial: "We were proving his innocence rather than the prosecution proving he was guilty." Motley said no evidence and no witnesses were produced before the court.
Motley, who told the Guardian at Shaw's conviction that the court had not followed Afghan law or UN conventions to which Afghanistan is party, said the case ought to be an eyeopener to the flaws in the system. The law, she said "does provide protection, but is not being implemented. Rule of law needs to be improved by different [donor] countries."
Donor countries, including the UK, have given considerable amounts to the Afghan government to develop legal institutions and improve the rule of law.
In a brief statement today, the Foreign Office said it was "pleased for Mr Shaw and his family", adding "the UK continues to strongly support the work of the Afghan government to counter corruption and reinforce the rule of law".
Criticism of Shaw's arrest also centred on allegations that the Afghan government was making him a scapegoat in an attempt to counter criticism of corruption.
International private security firms have also earned the hostility of the Afghan population because of their abrasive behaviour and excessive use of force, which tars even those which may be more disciplined. " We will work with the authorities to ensure that Bill is returned to his family as soon as possible," a G4S spokesman told the Guardian.
Shaw's final release will depend on whether there is a counter-appeal, though his lawyer said both his co-accused as well as the office of the attorney general had said they did not plan to appeal.
Shaw's translator, Maiwand Limar, an Afghan, was also convicted in April but had his sentence reduced today from two years to eight months, six of which he has already served.
In the absence of a counter-appeal, Shaw will be out of prison once the formalities are completed. Even if he is released, however, the court will have to rule on whether he can leave the country before the completion of the 20 days which it has given for a counter-appeal to be filed.
After his acquittal, a tearful Shaw told Sky News: "My thanks to all my supporters, here and in the UK, the British embassy and G4S who have been behind me 100%. I look forward to seeing you soon."
A former British army officer Bill Shaw was acquitted today of bribery charges by an Afghan court which overturned an earlier conviction and two-year jail sentence.
Though acquitted, Shaw, a senior manager at G4S, the private security company that guards the British embassy in Kabul, still has to wait for his release. At the end of a hearing lasting more than seven hours and spread over two days, he was led back to prison today to await the completion of legal formalities.
Shaw said he was "very, very excited" about the verdict, describing his time in Pul-e-Charkhi, a prison infamous for its overcrowding and squalor, as "a living hell". In a statement from their home in Leeds, West Yorkshire, his overjoyed wife Liz, said: "I just want him home and won't believe this nightmare is over until he's back with us, his family."
In an interview broadcast on BBC Radio 4's The World this Weekend, Shaw described his ordeal as the "lowest part of my life". He said: "They moved me to a place called the counter-narcotics justice centre. That to me was a picture of Guantánamo Bay.
"Everything was taken off me … all your identity is stripped from you completely.
"You put a uniform on, they issue you with one bar of soap, a toothbrush and toothpaste - that is it, no possessions. That is the lowest part of my life, nine weeks spent in there being totally controlled and administered 24 hours a day."
His daughter Lisa Luckyn-Malone added: "We have been deeply concerned about Dad's health and safety, and hope he is released very soon."
Shaw's family has led a high-profile campaign, drawing attention to the former Royal Military police officer's deteriorating health and highlighting concerns about his safety in Pul-e-Charkhi.
The father-of-three and his lawyer, Kimberley Motley, said they have both received threats and that Shaw was put in solitary confinement at his own request.
Shaw, 52, who served in the RMP for 28 years and was awarded an MBE, was arrested and fined $25,000 (£16,400) in March by Afghanistan's national security directorate for paying a bribe to secure the release of the company's bombproof vehicles which had been confiscated by the Afghan security service. Shaw said he believed he was paying a legitimate fine to release the two vehicles.
Motley said today her client had been denied basic rights, including a presumption of innocence in the first trial: "We were proving his innocence rather than the prosecution proving he was guilty." Motley said no evidence and no witnesses were produced before the court.
Motley, who told the Guardian at Shaw's conviction that the court had not followed Afghan law or UN conventions to which Afghanistan is party, said the case ought to be an eyeopener to the flaws in the system. The law, she said "does provide protection, but is not being implemented. Rule of law needs to be improved by different [donor] countries."
Donor countries, including the UK, have given considerable amounts to the Afghan government to develop legal institutions and improve the rule of law.
In a brief statement today, the Foreign Office said it was "pleased for Mr Shaw and his family", adding "the UK continues to strongly support the work of the Afghan government to counter corruption and reinforce the rule of law".
Criticism of Shaw's arrest also centred on allegations that the Afghan government was making him a scapegoat in an attempt to counter criticism of corruption.
International private security firms have also earned the hostility of the Afghan population because of their abrasive behaviour and excessive use of force, which tars even those which may be more disciplined. " We will work with the authorities to ensure that Bill is returned to his family as soon as possible," a G4S spokesman told the Guardian.
Shaw's final release will depend on whether there is a counter-appeal, though his lawyer said both his co-accused as well as the office of the attorney general had said they did not plan to appeal.
Shaw's translator, Maiwand Limar, an Afghan, was also convicted in April but had his sentence reduced today from two years to eight months, six of which he has already served.
In the absence of a counter-appeal, Shaw will be out of prison once the formalities are completed. Even if he is released, however, the court will have to rule on whether he can leave the country before the completion of the 20 days which it has given for a counter-appeal to be filed.
After his acquittal, a tearful Shaw told Sky News: "My thanks to all my supporters, here and in the UK, the British embassy and G4S who have been behind me 100%. I look forward to seeing you soon."
Opium Use Skyrocketing in Afghanistan - UN
June 21/ Eurasianet
Afghanistan, the world’s largest opium producer and supplier is also a country that is confronting an alarming addiction problem, a new survey published by the UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime shows. At least 1 million Afghans, or roughly 8 percent of the population, are drug addicts, the survey found.
At a June 21 news conference to mark the report’s release, Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics Mohammed Ibrahim Azhar said the number of opium users had increased by 53 percent since the last UN survey was conducted in 2005. The number of heroin users jumped 140 percent.
One place where addiction is growing the fastest is within Afghanistan’s security forces. The US Government Accountability Office reported in March that between 12 percent and 41 percent of Afghan National Police recruits (depending on the training center where the survey was conducted) suffered from drug addiction. Pointing to those findings at the June 21 news conference, the UN’s Deputy Special Representative Robert Watkins said drug use among police is a threat to the safety and security of the entire nation.
The UNODC survey also revealed the shocking statistic that as many as 50 percent of drug users provide opium to their children. In Afghanistan, raw opium paste is traditionally used to calm children, or, given the widespread lack of access to healthcare, as a pain reliever. Myriad social and economic problems – including unemployment, poverty and the general stress of over three decades of near-constant warfare – are believed to be spurring drug use among adults.
Experts say that difficulties surveying the habits and attitudes of Afghan women mean the drug-use figures, already double the global average, are likely much higher than what the survey’s findings indicate. Women comprised only 3 percent of the survey sample of over 5,000. Traditional opium-use patterns suggest there could be wide prevalence of drug use among women, pushing the nationwide figures higher.
The UNODC survey did not examine drug use among children. But an earlier study, commissioned by the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Department (INL), found an “alarming trend” of addiction to opium among younger children. “Children of nine, 14 months, and between two and four years” are addicted, the INL’s Thom Browne said during a visit to Afghanistan earlier in June. “This is the youngest age group exposed to drugs that we have seen worldwide. It has never been reported before.”
According to the survey, only 10 percent of Afghanistan’s drug users have received some treatment, though 90 percent have expressed a wish for it. “The treatment gap is enormous,” said Sarah Waller, a drug demand reduction consultant with the UNODC. Waller pointed out that drug demand reduction needs to treat not just the medical addiction, but also mental health issues.
Remedies are limited. There are few treatment centers, creating a “huge deficit,” the UN’s Watkins said. Centers for women and children are even scarcer.
Despite considerable funding of counter-narcotics programs, most attention has focused on the reduction of opium production and export. Programs for reducing drug dependency are severely under-funded.
Afghanistan, the world’s largest opium producer and supplier is also a country that is confronting an alarming addiction problem, a new survey published by the UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime shows. At least 1 million Afghans, or roughly 8 percent of the population, are drug addicts, the survey found.
At a June 21 news conference to mark the report’s release, Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics Mohammed Ibrahim Azhar said the number of opium users had increased by 53 percent since the last UN survey was conducted in 2005. The number of heroin users jumped 140 percent.
One place where addiction is growing the fastest is within Afghanistan’s security forces. The US Government Accountability Office reported in March that between 12 percent and 41 percent of Afghan National Police recruits (depending on the training center where the survey was conducted) suffered from drug addiction. Pointing to those findings at the June 21 news conference, the UN’s Deputy Special Representative Robert Watkins said drug use among police is a threat to the safety and security of the entire nation.
The UNODC survey also revealed the shocking statistic that as many as 50 percent of drug users provide opium to their children. In Afghanistan, raw opium paste is traditionally used to calm children, or, given the widespread lack of access to healthcare, as a pain reliever. Myriad social and economic problems – including unemployment, poverty and the general stress of over three decades of near-constant warfare – are believed to be spurring drug use among adults.
Experts say that difficulties surveying the habits and attitudes of Afghan women mean the drug-use figures, already double the global average, are likely much higher than what the survey’s findings indicate. Women comprised only 3 percent of the survey sample of over 5,000. Traditional opium-use patterns suggest there could be wide prevalence of drug use among women, pushing the nationwide figures higher.
The UNODC survey did not examine drug use among children. But an earlier study, commissioned by the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Department (INL), found an “alarming trend” of addiction to opium among younger children. “Children of nine, 14 months, and between two and four years” are addicted, the INL’s Thom Browne said during a visit to Afghanistan earlier in June. “This is the youngest age group exposed to drugs that we have seen worldwide. It has never been reported before.”
According to the survey, only 10 percent of Afghanistan’s drug users have received some treatment, though 90 percent have expressed a wish for it. “The treatment gap is enormous,” said Sarah Waller, a drug demand reduction consultant with the UNODC. Waller pointed out that drug demand reduction needs to treat not just the medical addiction, but also mental health issues.
Remedies are limited. There are few treatment centers, creating a “huge deficit,” the UN’s Watkins said. Centers for women and children are even scarcer.
Despite considerable funding of counter-narcotics programs, most attention has focused on the reduction of opium production and export. Programs for reducing drug dependency are severely under-funded.
June 08, 2010
Afghans talk, Taliban shoot
Asia Times June 3, 2010
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - The three-day peace jirga (council) that began on Wednesday is being projected by the international community - at least officially - as a critical moment in Afghanistan's history. The Taliban, it seems, also gave the event priority, launching a three-man suicide squad armed with rockets at the opening ceremony.
Two blasts and sporadic gunfire were heard in the air-conditioned tent as Karzai delivered his opening address, while a third took place just 200 meters from the venue. "Sit down, nothing will happen," said the Aghan president. "I have become used to this. Even my three-year-old son is used to it."
The attackers, armed with rifles and rocket launchers, had explosives strapped to their bodies under the women's burqas they had worn to slip past security staff. Two were reportedly killed and no delegates were hurt, according to local officials.
After calming delegates, Karzai said it was the Taliban's insurgency that was keeping the international occupiers they resent in the country.
"You should provide the opportunity for the foreign forces to leave," Karzai told the conference, according to the Associated Press. "Make peace with me and there will be no need for foreigners here. As long as you are not talking to us, not making peace with us, we will not let the foreigners leave."
Senior officials of Western donor countries have expressed hope that the jirga, the first concrete step in the process of "reconciliation" with armed opposition groups, including the Taliban, would provide the political impetus to bring the protracted conflict to an end. But these pronouncements smack of desperation, as the international community scrambles for the next big solution that will turn the situation around.
The three-day consultative mechanism may produce very little resolution to the insurgency. With between 1,400 to 1,600 participants expected to attend, criticism of inclusions and exclusions of participants and dissension within the government itself, an unclear agenda and threats of boycott, the peace jirga may be little more than a political endorsement mandating President Hamid Karzai to move forward toward the goal.
Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting's organizing committee, said the jirga will aim to ''identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them".
Any declaration would also likely to be shorn of real details in order to accommodate disparate views. Whatever process is set in motion this week, it is also likely that several major sections of the insurgency will remain outside the ambit of any reconciliation since they are ideologically opposed to the values represented by the incumbent government.
However, the real goal thrown up by the "reconciliation" plan is one that appears to have taken place already - rapprochement of the international community and the Karzai government.
Tired of the long military engagement, both have latched onto "reconciliation and reintegration" as the next big plan, and appear willing to subsume their differences to find a way out of the morass.
The panacea, however, is yet another refrain of the old song that a military solution alone cannot work. That song has been sung to different beats for several years now, though earlier versions included development, governance, rule of law and accountability as necessary measures to complement military achievements.
Now, apparently, those goals are being sidelined as the international community chooses to further curtail its ambitions regarding Afghanistan, reconciling itself with existing realities even when they subvert the goals of nation-building.
The goals, now pared down, are to ensure that Afghanistan does not pose a threat to Western nations, either as a staging post of international terrorist strikes or as a sanctuary for anti-Western groups to take hold.
While these aims have always been core to the Western intervention for a number of years, there was an understanding that in pursuit of those aims Afghanistan could and would be rebuilt with a new state structure, since this represented the best bet of making sure Afghanistan became a stable state, and not one vulnerable to being subverted by terrorist groups.
The safety of Afghans and internal cohesion within Afghanistan were therefore seen as being coterminous with the goal of security for the West. However, somewhere along the way the goals have diverged as the costs of the intervention have steadily risen in Western capitals.
These costs have not been inconsiderable. Ever growing casualties among Western forces, billions of dollars diverted to Afghanistan (which seem more questionable at a time of Western recession and job losses) and political prices, ranging from ministers losing their jobs in Germany, to the fall of a government in the Netherlands over the issue of Afghanistan. In the midst of this chaos, reconciliation has emerged as a way to match Western goals with existing realities in the Asian nation.
The reconciliation plan has halted, for the moment, the spectacular unraveling of relations between Karzai and the Western compact. Whatever misgivings Western nations had earlier regarding the viability of Karzai as a trusted partner - and a spate of stories in the Western media testify to this - these have now been shed in the mutual warm embrace of the reconciliation strategy. In a matter of weeks Karzai has gone from being a weak, indecisive, incapable leader burdened by an unscrupulous family to the man who will bring together the disparate interests of Afghans with exemplary leadership.
Along the way the international community appears to have swallowed several of its goals and professed commitments. Whatever the jirga may or may not discuss - it is already clear what will not be included in the discussions.
Jirga czar Farooq Wardak told a gathering of civil society representatives that "justice" and "human rights" were not on the agenda and would not be discussed. Despite the shock of the participants, Wardak was at least being honest. The issues had been sidelined long back.
Earlier this year it became clear that the government had passed an amnesty law that protected all those engaged in hostilities in the past and the present from prosecution. The law makes no distinction about the kind of crimes, whether war crimes, crimes against humanity or rape. It also makes no mention of a cut-off date.
The law was passed with scarcely a murmur from the international community even as it violates Afghanistan's commitments to international treaties, according to the country's Independent Human Rights Commission, and treads on the millions of Afghan citizens who have been victims of brutality and war crimes while also strengthening the culture of impunity.
The same international community had kicked up a fuss when the law was first introduced in 2007, but in the changed climate, the law was accepted since it had been projected as a necessary first step in the process of reconciliation.
Representatives of the millions of Afghanistan's victims have come together with the commission to present a united demand for the implementation of the transitional justice plan, under which the perpetrators of crimes - including those in the government and in powerful positions - would be held accountable.
In its eagerness not to antagonize the government and Karzai further at this juncture, the international community has failed to endorse the plan and also subverted its own proclaimed goals of strengthening Afghan institutions. The same international community, following the controversial 2009 presidential polls, had predicated its support to future elections on the government carrying out necessary electoral reforms.
However, not only were reforms not carried out, but the president introduced a new electoral law that further erodes the independence of the electoral mechanisms. While the international community had sought an independent appointment mechanism for the Independent Election Commission to prevent electoral malpractices, in actuality Karzai's new law also subverted the independence of yet another body, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which was the only institution that stood up against the electoral fraud in 2009.
Focusing purely on the international members of the ECC, the international community led by the United Nations, put all its weight behind securing the UN's right to nominate two members to the commission. This right, won through hard negotiations, was presented as an achievement but no mention was made of the fact that the new law also took away the right of independent Afghan institutions, namely the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court, to appoint members to this body.
Moreover, it institutionalized the right of Karzai, as president, to appoint members to this body, thus compromising an independent appointment mechanism. Despite the clear challenge to the process of institutional building to which the donor nations committed themselves, they accepted this erosion of independence and the forthcoming parliamentary election has received the requisite funding from the international community.
While building of institutions, rule of law, governance and support for human rights are processes which require time, resources and energy, the international community's accommodation of political expediency is not limited to this. Senior officials of the donor nations and international organizations are now saying publicly and repeatedly that they cannot afford to challenge the existing power structures in Afghanistan but must work with them.
Tackling the power structures would necessitate that the international community remain in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization senior civilian representative Mark Sedwill stated last month, while expressing hope that individuals with power and influence would support the endeavors of the government and the international community.
This hope, however, overlooks the fact that the international community, through its practice of delivering aid without adequate checks and balances, has enriched a small section of people by allowing them to acquire power disproportionate to their role, authority and legitimacy within Afghan institutions and within the community.
Sufficient levels of well-documented data have established clearly that commanders, leaders of armed militia and power-brokers have been empowered through contracts worth billions of dollars given by the international community in exchange for security, land, services and goods provided to the international community.
Moreover, the bulk of aid distributed for development and humanitarian purposes has also been channeled without sufficient oversight allowing some of its distribution to be mediated by power-brokers.
In doing so, the international community has created a clear conflict of interest. Many officials and politicians in roles of authority have profited directly from the ongoing conflict and have a direct stake in its continuation, an interest that conflicts with their expressed commitment to building a secure and stable Afghanistan.
This contradiction has been encouraged and even utilized by donor nations who, in their own domestic arena, take a dim view of a conflict of interests and have legal redress.
However, rather than tackling the contradictions, donor nations are now reconciling themselves to the existence of structural and institutional imbalances of power that they have either introduced, allowed or ignored. If that represents a contradiction between their professed word and deed, the reconciliation strategy is certainly a good way of subsuming all inconsistencies.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
By Aunohita Mojumdar
KABUL - The three-day peace jirga (council) that began on Wednesday is being projected by the international community - at least officially - as a critical moment in Afghanistan's history. The Taliban, it seems, also gave the event priority, launching a three-man suicide squad armed with rockets at the opening ceremony.
Two blasts and sporadic gunfire were heard in the air-conditioned tent as Karzai delivered his opening address, while a third took place just 200 meters from the venue. "Sit down, nothing will happen," said the Aghan president. "I have become used to this. Even my three-year-old son is used to it."
The attackers, armed with rifles and rocket launchers, had explosives strapped to their bodies under the women's burqas they had worn to slip past security staff. Two were reportedly killed and no delegates were hurt, according to local officials.
After calming delegates, Karzai said it was the Taliban's insurgency that was keeping the international occupiers they resent in the country.
"You should provide the opportunity for the foreign forces to leave," Karzai told the conference, according to the Associated Press. "Make peace with me and there will be no need for foreigners here. As long as you are not talking to us, not making peace with us, we will not let the foreigners leave."
Senior officials of Western donor countries have expressed hope that the jirga, the first concrete step in the process of "reconciliation" with armed opposition groups, including the Taliban, would provide the political impetus to bring the protracted conflict to an end. But these pronouncements smack of desperation, as the international community scrambles for the next big solution that will turn the situation around.
The three-day consultative mechanism may produce very little resolution to the insurgency. With between 1,400 to 1,600 participants expected to attend, criticism of inclusions and exclusions of participants and dissension within the government itself, an unclear agenda and threats of boycott, the peace jirga may be little more than a political endorsement mandating President Hamid Karzai to move forward toward the goal.
Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting's organizing committee, said the jirga will aim to ''identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them".
Any declaration would also likely to be shorn of real details in order to accommodate disparate views. Whatever process is set in motion this week, it is also likely that several major sections of the insurgency will remain outside the ambit of any reconciliation since they are ideologically opposed to the values represented by the incumbent government.
However, the real goal thrown up by the "reconciliation" plan is one that appears to have taken place already - rapprochement of the international community and the Karzai government.
Tired of the long military engagement, both have latched onto "reconciliation and reintegration" as the next big plan, and appear willing to subsume their differences to find a way out of the morass.
The panacea, however, is yet another refrain of the old song that a military solution alone cannot work. That song has been sung to different beats for several years now, though earlier versions included development, governance, rule of law and accountability as necessary measures to complement military achievements.
Now, apparently, those goals are being sidelined as the international community chooses to further curtail its ambitions regarding Afghanistan, reconciling itself with existing realities even when they subvert the goals of nation-building.
The goals, now pared down, are to ensure that Afghanistan does not pose a threat to Western nations, either as a staging post of international terrorist strikes or as a sanctuary for anti-Western groups to take hold.
While these aims have always been core to the Western intervention for a number of years, there was an understanding that in pursuit of those aims Afghanistan could and would be rebuilt with a new state structure, since this represented the best bet of making sure Afghanistan became a stable state, and not one vulnerable to being subverted by terrorist groups.
The safety of Afghans and internal cohesion within Afghanistan were therefore seen as being coterminous with the goal of security for the West. However, somewhere along the way the goals have diverged as the costs of the intervention have steadily risen in Western capitals.
These costs have not been inconsiderable. Ever growing casualties among Western forces, billions of dollars diverted to Afghanistan (which seem more questionable at a time of Western recession and job losses) and political prices, ranging from ministers losing their jobs in Germany, to the fall of a government in the Netherlands over the issue of Afghanistan. In the midst of this chaos, reconciliation has emerged as a way to match Western goals with existing realities in the Asian nation.
The reconciliation plan has halted, for the moment, the spectacular unraveling of relations between Karzai and the Western compact. Whatever misgivings Western nations had earlier regarding the viability of Karzai as a trusted partner - and a spate of stories in the Western media testify to this - these have now been shed in the mutual warm embrace of the reconciliation strategy. In a matter of weeks Karzai has gone from being a weak, indecisive, incapable leader burdened by an unscrupulous family to the man who will bring together the disparate interests of Afghans with exemplary leadership.
Along the way the international community appears to have swallowed several of its goals and professed commitments. Whatever the jirga may or may not discuss - it is already clear what will not be included in the discussions.
Jirga czar Farooq Wardak told a gathering of civil society representatives that "justice" and "human rights" were not on the agenda and would not be discussed. Despite the shock of the participants, Wardak was at least being honest. The issues had been sidelined long back.
Earlier this year it became clear that the government had passed an amnesty law that protected all those engaged in hostilities in the past and the present from prosecution. The law makes no distinction about the kind of crimes, whether war crimes, crimes against humanity or rape. It also makes no mention of a cut-off date.
The law was passed with scarcely a murmur from the international community even as it violates Afghanistan's commitments to international treaties, according to the country's Independent Human Rights Commission, and treads on the millions of Afghan citizens who have been victims of brutality and war crimes while also strengthening the culture of impunity.
The same international community had kicked up a fuss when the law was first introduced in 2007, but in the changed climate, the law was accepted since it had been projected as a necessary first step in the process of reconciliation.
Representatives of the millions of Afghanistan's victims have come together with the commission to present a united demand for the implementation of the transitional justice plan, under which the perpetrators of crimes - including those in the government and in powerful positions - would be held accountable.
In its eagerness not to antagonize the government and Karzai further at this juncture, the international community has failed to endorse the plan and also subverted its own proclaimed goals of strengthening Afghan institutions. The same international community, following the controversial 2009 presidential polls, had predicated its support to future elections on the government carrying out necessary electoral reforms.
However, not only were reforms not carried out, but the president introduced a new electoral law that further erodes the independence of the electoral mechanisms. While the international community had sought an independent appointment mechanism for the Independent Election Commission to prevent electoral malpractices, in actuality Karzai's new law also subverted the independence of yet another body, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), which was the only institution that stood up against the electoral fraud in 2009.
Focusing purely on the international members of the ECC, the international community led by the United Nations, put all its weight behind securing the UN's right to nominate two members to the commission. This right, won through hard negotiations, was presented as an achievement but no mention was made of the fact that the new law also took away the right of independent Afghan institutions, namely the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court, to appoint members to this body.
Moreover, it institutionalized the right of Karzai, as president, to appoint members to this body, thus compromising an independent appointment mechanism. Despite the clear challenge to the process of institutional building to which the donor nations committed themselves, they accepted this erosion of independence and the forthcoming parliamentary election has received the requisite funding from the international community.
While building of institutions, rule of law, governance and support for human rights are processes which require time, resources and energy, the international community's accommodation of political expediency is not limited to this. Senior officials of the donor nations and international organizations are now saying publicly and repeatedly that they cannot afford to challenge the existing power structures in Afghanistan but must work with them.
Tackling the power structures would necessitate that the international community remain in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization senior civilian representative Mark Sedwill stated last month, while expressing hope that individuals with power and influence would support the endeavors of the government and the international community.
This hope, however, overlooks the fact that the international community, through its practice of delivering aid without adequate checks and balances, has enriched a small section of people by allowing them to acquire power disproportionate to their role, authority and legitimacy within Afghan institutions and within the community.
Sufficient levels of well-documented data have established clearly that commanders, leaders of armed militia and power-brokers have been empowered through contracts worth billions of dollars given by the international community in exchange for security, land, services and goods provided to the international community.
Moreover, the bulk of aid distributed for development and humanitarian purposes has also been channeled without sufficient oversight allowing some of its distribution to be mediated by power-brokers.
In doing so, the international community has created a clear conflict of interest. Many officials and politicians in roles of authority have profited directly from the ongoing conflict and have a direct stake in its continuation, an interest that conflicts with their expressed commitment to building a secure and stable Afghanistan.
This contradiction has been encouraged and even utilized by donor nations who, in their own domestic arena, take a dim view of a conflict of interests and have legal redress.
However, rather than tackling the contradictions, donor nations are now reconciling themselves to the existence of structural and institutional imbalances of power that they have either introduced, allowed or ignored. If that represents a contradiction between their professed word and deed, the reconciliation strategy is certainly a good way of subsuming all inconsistencies.
Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Afghanistan peace jirga's unlikely critics: victims of war crimes
By Aunohita Mojumdar, Correspondent / June 3, 2010
Christian Science Monitor
As the Afghan government’s peace jirga meets for a second day to discuss how to reconcile with insurgents and end years of violence, an unlikely coalition is lobbying against the effort: victims of previous wars, who say their demands deserve to be heard alongside the belligerents’.
After hours of discussion Thursday, Afghan tribal elders agreed that this peace meeting had to produce an overture to the Taliban insurgents because NATO and Afghan forces weren't able to bring security to the people.
Victims say that they too want lasting peace for Afghanistan, but argue that it requires accountability, not amnesty. The lack of justice only encourages further violence, they say.
But in a country that’s seen countless factions battle brutally and shift alliances for three decades, they acknowledge that any peace deal is more likely to bury the past than try to assign blame for the suffering and deaths of millions.
Victims’ jirga
Still, surviving family members, along with a coalition of 24 NGOs called the Transitional Justice Coordination Group gathered in Kabul last month ahead of the three-day government jirga, or council, to make their point with a “victim’s jirga.” More than 100 attendees from around the country met for two days, where they recounted personal tragedies and war crimes under various regimes, and visited a suspected mass grave at Pul-e-Charki, on the outskirts of town near the country’s largest prison.
“I am like a butterfly hovering over the grave of my sons… I have a broken heart… my children, my flowers, why did you go away from me?” lamented Taj-e-Nissa, reading a poem she had composed.
The middle-aged woman, who goes by one name, lost two sons, a daughter, father, and brother to rocket attacks during the 1990s civil war as mujahideen factions, having beaten back the Soviet Army, now battled one another for power. During the Taliban era that followed, her husband, accused of opposing the regime, was imprisoned and tortured.
Amnesty law
The war victims’ lobby had hope a few years ago that the government would heed their call – in 2005 it adopted a Transitional Justice Action Plan that called for the acknowledgment of suffering, removal of war crimes perpetrators from senior positions, and documentation of human rights abuses, among other requirements. But it was never implemented and instead expired last year.
In January it came to light that the government had adopted an amnesty law in 2007 and kept it under wraps. The law protects all belligerents, past and present, from prosecution. It passed without much comment from the international community.
“Accountability, not amnesia for past and present crimes is a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan,” the TJCG said in a statement criticizing the amnesty.
The law prevents virtually all investigation or prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape, and torture, they pointed out. It has no cutoff date, thus allowing armed groups to continue to act with impunity. Though it allows victims to seek prosecution for war crimes, critics point out that individuals cannot realistically take on a warlord.
Two other independent groups – the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) – have also criticized the law. They point to Afghanistan’s international treaty obligations, which calls for the prosecution of certain serious crimes.
“It is questionable whether measures that ignore the rights of victims, promote impunity and undermine accountability contribute to stability and reconciliation in the long run,” they said in a joint statement in February.
Some survivors, though, recognizing how improbable their call for justice is, say they would settle for simply an acknowledgment of their suffering. Says Arab Shahi, whose brother was tortured to death by government forces under the Soviet regime even though he worked as an official in the Ministry of Education, “We don’t want revenge. We do not want an eye for an eye…. [But] the perpetrators should at least apologize.”
‘Not our reconciliation’
Others, like Engineer Niamat, wish they could find out exactly what happened to their missing relatives.
After his brother disappeared in 1978, Mr. Niamat, a teacher at the police academy, tried desperately to find him. Years later his family learned the brother had been killed, but his body was never found.
Niamat, who lost five other brothers in conflict, gathered last month with dozens of others at the site of the suspected mass grave. For him, that visit held more hope for him than the government’s peace jirga.
Asked about the official gathering, he is dismissive.
“This is the reconciliation of the government,” he says. “This is not our reconciliation.”
ttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0603/Afghanistan-peace-jirga-s-unlikely-critics-victims-of-war-crimes
Christian Science Monitor
As the Afghan government’s peace jirga meets for a second day to discuss how to reconcile with insurgents and end years of violence, an unlikely coalition is lobbying against the effort: victims of previous wars, who say their demands deserve to be heard alongside the belligerents’.
After hours of discussion Thursday, Afghan tribal elders agreed that this peace meeting had to produce an overture to the Taliban insurgents because NATO and Afghan forces weren't able to bring security to the people.
Victims say that they too want lasting peace for Afghanistan, but argue that it requires accountability, not amnesty. The lack of justice only encourages further violence, they say.
But in a country that’s seen countless factions battle brutally and shift alliances for three decades, they acknowledge that any peace deal is more likely to bury the past than try to assign blame for the suffering and deaths of millions.
Victims’ jirga
Still, surviving family members, along with a coalition of 24 NGOs called the Transitional Justice Coordination Group gathered in Kabul last month ahead of the three-day government jirga, or council, to make their point with a “victim’s jirga.” More than 100 attendees from around the country met for two days, where they recounted personal tragedies and war crimes under various regimes, and visited a suspected mass grave at Pul-e-Charki, on the outskirts of town near the country’s largest prison.
“I am like a butterfly hovering over the grave of my sons… I have a broken heart… my children, my flowers, why did you go away from me?” lamented Taj-e-Nissa, reading a poem she had composed.
The middle-aged woman, who goes by one name, lost two sons, a daughter, father, and brother to rocket attacks during the 1990s civil war as mujahideen factions, having beaten back the Soviet Army, now battled one another for power. During the Taliban era that followed, her husband, accused of opposing the regime, was imprisoned and tortured.
Amnesty law
The war victims’ lobby had hope a few years ago that the government would heed their call – in 2005 it adopted a Transitional Justice Action Plan that called for the acknowledgment of suffering, removal of war crimes perpetrators from senior positions, and documentation of human rights abuses, among other requirements. But it was never implemented and instead expired last year.
In January it came to light that the government had adopted an amnesty law in 2007 and kept it under wraps. The law protects all belligerents, past and present, from prosecution. It passed without much comment from the international community.
“Accountability, not amnesia for past and present crimes is a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan,” the TJCG said in a statement criticizing the amnesty.
The law prevents virtually all investigation or prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape, and torture, they pointed out. It has no cutoff date, thus allowing armed groups to continue to act with impunity. Though it allows victims to seek prosecution for war crimes, critics point out that individuals cannot realistically take on a warlord.
Two other independent groups – the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) – have also criticized the law. They point to Afghanistan’s international treaty obligations, which calls for the prosecution of certain serious crimes.
“It is questionable whether measures that ignore the rights of victims, promote impunity and undermine accountability contribute to stability and reconciliation in the long run,” they said in a joint statement in February.
Some survivors, though, recognizing how improbable their call for justice is, say they would settle for simply an acknowledgment of their suffering. Says Arab Shahi, whose brother was tortured to death by government forces under the Soviet regime even though he worked as an official in the Ministry of Education, “We don’t want revenge. We do not want an eye for an eye…. [But] the perpetrators should at least apologize.”
‘Not our reconciliation’
Others, like Engineer Niamat, wish they could find out exactly what happened to their missing relatives.
After his brother disappeared in 1978, Mr. Niamat, a teacher at the police academy, tried desperately to find him. Years later his family learned the brother had been killed, but his body was never found.
Niamat, who lost five other brothers in conflict, gathered last month with dozens of others at the site of the suspected mass grave. For him, that visit held more hope for him than the government’s peace jirga.
Asked about the official gathering, he is dismissive.
“This is the reconciliation of the government,” he says. “This is not our reconciliation.”
ttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0603/Afghanistan-peace-jirga-s-unlikely-critics-victims-of-war-crimes
Afghan Reconciliation Jirga Set to Convene amid Skepticism
June 1
Eurasianet
The checkpoint at the entrance to the Loya Jirga complex in Kabul highlights the challenge facing President Hamid Karzai as his administration strives to reconcile with moderate Taliban elements. Security at the Jirga is perhaps heavier than at a major Western airport, with all vehicles and equipment being swabbed and checked for evidence of bomb-making residue. The government’s fear of a car bombing appears to be just as great as its desire to win insurgents back over to its side.
The three-day loya jirga, or grand council, which will mull Karzai’s reconciliation and reintegration plan, is scheduled to open June 2. Taliban representatives have not been explicitly invited to participate in the debates, said Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting’s organizing committee. But, Amin added, the Taliban will have sympathizers among the participants who can represent the Islamic militants’ interests. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].
The approximately 1,600 delegates to the National Consultative Peace Jirga will aim to “identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them,” Amin said.
To keep the proceedings manageable, delegates will be divided into 28 groups. Technical facilitators have undergone training in order to keep debates efficient and orderly. At the end of the three days of discussions, it is hoped that the entire jirga will be able to produce a declaration of intent. However, distilling the decisions of the 28 groups into one common position promises to be difficult. Local Afghan media outlets in recent days have highlighted policy differences among the country’s top leaders, suggesting that the jirga could be contentious and have trouble harmonizing disparate views.
Regardless of the jirga’s outcome, its decisions and declarations will be non-binding on the government. The word “consultative” was added to the jirga’s official title after members of parliament criticized what they saw as an administration attempt to circumvent legislative authority. As a result, all jirga decisions will require the endorsement of either the cabinet or the legislature.
On the eve of the jirga, there remained the possibility that a significant number of MPs would boycott the event. Legislators had demanded that Karzai fill out his cabinet before the convocation of the jirga. Already, Abdullah Abdullah, the main opposition leader and unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2009, has announced he will stay away from the gathering, contending that it will not be adequately representative of the Afghan nation. “This jirga started with the government, and will end with the government,” Abdullah said during a news conference.
Since Karzai unveiled his plans during a donor conference in January, the reconciliation idea has faced skepticism from several Afghan constituencies. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Human rights activists have expressed concerns that Karzai was willing to make sacrifices on Afghanistan’s democratization in order to cut a deal with moderate Taliban elements. “Reconciliation should not be a reconciliation behind curtains, just a political reconciliation,” Nader Nadery, a commissioner on the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, told a gathering of civil society groups who have been working together to demand transitional justice.
An essential factor for securing a stable future for Afghanistan is an honest accounting of past actions during the country’s past 30-plus years of strife. Those who committed atrocities must be held accountable, Nadery has asserted, adding that the implementation of Karzai’s reconciliation plan could become an obstacle toward this end. In early May, some rights advocates organized their own “victims’” jirga, during which they questioned whether reconciliation without justice could bring peace.
Also skeptical about the reconciliation initiative are women’s advocacy groups. Amid intense lobbying in recent months, approximately 20 percent of the jirga’s delegates will be women. Originally, only 30 women had been slated to participate in the debates. While women will still be vastly underrepresented at the gathering in relation to their percentage of the population, observers view the expansion of female delegates as a significant development. How influential the female delegates will be in defending women’s rights remains to be seen. Some advocates worry that the small gains made in recent years in the sphere of women’s rights will be rolled back. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. While reconciliation as a means of shortening, or even ending the war has been supported by most donor states publicly, many Westerners in Kabul express doubts in private. “The Karzai government’s plan does not seem like a political plan at all,” said a Western diplomat. “It resembles a project proposal.”
To many Western policymakers, the reconciliation route seems to be the best option among an array of unappetizing choices. Perhaps the top priority should be improving the Afghan government’s responsiveness to popular needs and concerns. But many international observers emphasize that bringing about such a transformation would take decades. “We can’t reconstruct Afghanistan’s power structure from scratch, so we have to co-opt the power brokers by making clear that their only future lies in becoming part of the solution,” NATO Senior Civilian Representative Mark Sedwill said recently. Sedwill added that an attempt to remake the power structure would require an international community presence in Afghanistan for perhaps the next 20 years.
Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.
Eurasianet
The checkpoint at the entrance to the Loya Jirga complex in Kabul highlights the challenge facing President Hamid Karzai as his administration strives to reconcile with moderate Taliban elements. Security at the Jirga is perhaps heavier than at a major Western airport, with all vehicles and equipment being swabbed and checked for evidence of bomb-making residue. The government’s fear of a car bombing appears to be just as great as its desire to win insurgents back over to its side.
The three-day loya jirga, or grand council, which will mull Karzai’s reconciliation and reintegration plan, is scheduled to open June 2. Taliban representatives have not been explicitly invited to participate in the debates, said Najib Amin, a deputy on the meeting’s organizing committee. But, Amin added, the Taliban will have sympathizers among the participants who can represent the Islamic militants’ interests. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive].
The approximately 1,600 delegates to the National Consultative Peace Jirga will aim to “identify mechanisms based on which we can negotiate, identify categories of opposition with whom we can negotiate, mechanism on how to approach them, identify people who are not negotiable and what the government should do with them,” Amin said.
To keep the proceedings manageable, delegates will be divided into 28 groups. Technical facilitators have undergone training in order to keep debates efficient and orderly. At the end of the three days of discussions, it is hoped that the entire jirga will be able to produce a declaration of intent. However, distilling the decisions of the 28 groups into one common position promises to be difficult. Local Afghan media outlets in recent days have highlighted policy differences among the country’s top leaders, suggesting that the jirga could be contentious and have trouble harmonizing disparate views.
Regardless of the jirga’s outcome, its decisions and declarations will be non-binding on the government. The word “consultative” was added to the jirga’s official title after members of parliament criticized what they saw as an administration attempt to circumvent legislative authority. As a result, all jirga decisions will require the endorsement of either the cabinet or the legislature.
On the eve of the jirga, there remained the possibility that a significant number of MPs would boycott the event. Legislators had demanded that Karzai fill out his cabinet before the convocation of the jirga. Already, Abdullah Abdullah, the main opposition leader and unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2009, has announced he will stay away from the gathering, contending that it will not be adequately representative of the Afghan nation. “This jirga started with the government, and will end with the government,” Abdullah said during a news conference.
Since Karzai unveiled his plans during a donor conference in January, the reconciliation idea has faced skepticism from several Afghan constituencies. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Human rights activists have expressed concerns that Karzai was willing to make sacrifices on Afghanistan’s democratization in order to cut a deal with moderate Taliban elements. “Reconciliation should not be a reconciliation behind curtains, just a political reconciliation,” Nader Nadery, a commissioner on the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, told a gathering of civil society groups who have been working together to demand transitional justice.
An essential factor for securing a stable future for Afghanistan is an honest accounting of past actions during the country’s past 30-plus years of strife. Those who committed atrocities must be held accountable, Nadery has asserted, adding that the implementation of Karzai’s reconciliation plan could become an obstacle toward this end. In early May, some rights advocates organized their own “victims’” jirga, during which they questioned whether reconciliation without justice could bring peace.
Also skeptical about the reconciliation initiative are women’s advocacy groups. Amid intense lobbying in recent months, approximately 20 percent of the jirga’s delegates will be women. Originally, only 30 women had been slated to participate in the debates. While women will still be vastly underrepresented at the gathering in relation to their percentage of the population, observers view the expansion of female delegates as a significant development. How influential the female delegates will be in defending women’s rights remains to be seen. Some advocates worry that the small gains made in recent years in the sphere of women’s rights will be rolled back. [For background see EurasiaNet’s archive]. While reconciliation as a means of shortening, or even ending the war has been supported by most donor states publicly, many Westerners in Kabul express doubts in private. “The Karzai government’s plan does not seem like a political plan at all,” said a Western diplomat. “It resembles a project proposal.”
To many Western policymakers, the reconciliation route seems to be the best option among an array of unappetizing choices. Perhaps the top priority should be improving the Afghan government’s responsiveness to popular needs and concerns. But many international observers emphasize that bringing about such a transformation would take decades. “We can’t reconstruct Afghanistan’s power structure from scratch, so we have to co-opt the power brokers by making clear that their only future lies in becoming part of the solution,” NATO Senior Civilian Representative Mark Sedwill said recently. Sedwill added that an attempt to remake the power structure would require an international community presence in Afghanistan for perhaps the next 20 years.
Editor's note: Aunohita Mojumdar is an Indian freelance journalist based in Kabul. She has reported on the South Asian region for the past 19 years.
Jirgas and jirgas; Reconciliation without the victims?
June 3, 2010 in NRC Handelsblad
Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
No one wants to play the role of the Talib. The group of women gathered in a dusty courtyard in the poor neighbourhood of Dasht-e-Barchi in Kabul city, are all victims of the years of unrelenting violence in Afghanistan. Successive regimes saw murders, torture, looting and rapes as opposing factions fought their way into power. Most of the women had lost family members- fathers, mothers, brothers, husbands and children. Many had themselves suffered vicious violence. Now, through participatory theatre, (adapted from the pioneering work by Augusto Boal in Brazil), the women are coming to terms with their past. Enacting short skits recreating scenes from their own lives, the women intervene by adopting one of the roles in the skit and play it differently in order to transform the scene, a symbolic gesture that allows them to take control of their lives and change it.
NGOs working with the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population and local human rights groups are using community-based initiatives to address the trauma of years of violence in an effort to empower victims and help them transform their own lives. The success of this initiative stands in stark contrast to the inability of such groups to impact on the political and decision-making processes of the Afghan government and the donor community.
When the three-day consultative peace jirga to opens in Kabul on May 29 to hold inclusive discussions on reconciliation with the Taliban, missing from the table will be representatives of the victims groups who have firmly opposed some of the first steps in reconciliation taken by the Afghan government, including the amnesty law and the quiet burial of the Transitional Justice Action Plan.
Najibullah Amin, the Deputy Director of the Peace jirga is unfazed by the criticism. “We are all victims of war. The 1600 people who will participate in the jirga are all victims. The whole nation is a victim.”
At this moment the peace jirga has 13 categories of representatives including members of parliament, religious leaders, provincial council members, traders, civil society, Kuchis, governors, women and community elders amongst others. While there is no ‘ban’ on the participation of the ‘opposition’ – members of armed insurgent groups- Amin says it appears to be a hypothetical scenario. The jirga has not evolved any mechanism that would guarantee them safe passage for that participation. The jirga, he says will focus on consulting the nation on how to reach peace; the mechanism by which this can be achieved; identify those who are reconcilable and those who are not, and direct the government to take certain steps.
While Amin’s contention of every Afghan being a victim is acknowledged by civil society groups which have come together under the banner of the Transitional Justice Coordination Group(TJCG), they argue that political decisions are being taken by the powerful elite in their own interests, ignoring the larger interests of the powerless majority. An example, they say, is the Amnesty law. The law provides amnesty not just to “all political factions and hostile parties who were involved in a way or another in hostilities before the establishing of the Interim administration” (Hamid Karzai’s government of 2001), but it also provides amnesty to those “still in opposition” to the Afghan government. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission(AIHRC) has criticized the law as has the International Centre for Transitional Justice(ICTJ). In a joint paper both argued that the law was bad because: it violated the Afghan government’s obligation to pursue prosecution of war crimes as a signatory to international human rights treaties; it provided a form of self-amnesty being passed and adopted by those who would benefit from it without wider consultation of the population; it also provided amnesty in perpetuity since there was no cut-off date, thus encouraging a culture of continuing violence and impunity.
Adopted quietly in December 2008, the law only ‘appeared’ in the official gazette in December 2009, a most propitious time for its acceptance, with the donor community having identified ‘reconciliation and reintegration’ as the way out of the conflict, a decision that was officially endorsed at the London Conference in January 2010.
Predictably, any international criticism was muted and confined largely to NGOs and non-state actors. Responding to a question on the law, the new European Union Special Representative Vyguadas Usackas says the international community “did not see what we wanted to see” in terms of the Amnesty Law and Transitional Justice. He however argued that it was up to “Afghan people to use their democratic processes in influencing and developing a participatory democratic culture.” That is easier said than done. It is the Peace Jirga, reconciliation process and the Afghan government which is getting the bulk of funding and political backing of the international donor community rather than civil society initiatives relating to this process.
Those arguing for the implementation of the transitional justice plan argue that they are not opposed to reconciliation initiatives, but rather, in support of a reconciliation which is sustainable. “Reconciliation must include the victims” says Nader Nadery, a Commissioner in the AIHRC. “It should not be a reconciliation behind the curtains. It should not be just a political reconciliation.”
Amin refutes the suggestion that the current form of reconciliation is only a means of sharing power. “All Afghans have the right to political power” The peace jirga, he says, is going to address the issues that block peace.
Women’s groups for one are enthused that they have been admitted in large numbers to the jirga. Their advocacy has helped push their numbers up from 30 to over 300, a number that they hope will enable them to voice their concerns, even if they cannot influence the proceedings.
There is widespread skepticism on whether the hardcore insurgents groups can be reconciled at all. Asked why no one took on the role of the ‘Talib’ character in the participatory theatre, women gathered there said it was futile, because “a Talib is unchangeable.”
While women’s rights groups fear that their hard-won rights might be reversed in compromises with an intolerant conservative ideology, victims groups fear the jirga is a means to silence their voices. To prevent this, a ‘victims’ jirga held on May 9, brought together victims from different parts of the country to share harrowing stories of their pain and suffering. One of those who suffered brutal violence and lost most members of his family is Ali Faizi who acknowledged the common past of the victims cutting across ethnic and geographical divides. “We have a common suffering. But if we do not treat this wound now, it will afflict future generations.”
Aunohita Mojumdar in Kabul
No one wants to play the role of the Talib. The group of women gathered in a dusty courtyard in the poor neighbourhood of Dasht-e-Barchi in Kabul city, are all victims of the years of unrelenting violence in Afghanistan. Successive regimes saw murders, torture, looting and rapes as opposing factions fought their way into power. Most of the women had lost family members- fathers, mothers, brothers, husbands and children. Many had themselves suffered vicious violence. Now, through participatory theatre, (adapted from the pioneering work by Augusto Boal in Brazil), the women are coming to terms with their past. Enacting short skits recreating scenes from their own lives, the women intervene by adopting one of the roles in the skit and play it differently in order to transform the scene, a symbolic gesture that allows them to take control of their lives and change it.
NGOs working with the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population and local human rights groups are using community-based initiatives to address the trauma of years of violence in an effort to empower victims and help them transform their own lives. The success of this initiative stands in stark contrast to the inability of such groups to impact on the political and decision-making processes of the Afghan government and the donor community.
When the three-day consultative peace jirga to opens in Kabul on May 29 to hold inclusive discussions on reconciliation with the Taliban, missing from the table will be representatives of the victims groups who have firmly opposed some of the first steps in reconciliation taken by the Afghan government, including the amnesty law and the quiet burial of the Transitional Justice Action Plan.
Najibullah Amin, the Deputy Director of the Peace jirga is unfazed by the criticism. “We are all victims of war. The 1600 people who will participate in the jirga are all victims. The whole nation is a victim.”
At this moment the peace jirga has 13 categories of representatives including members of parliament, religious leaders, provincial council members, traders, civil society, Kuchis, governors, women and community elders amongst others. While there is no ‘ban’ on the participation of the ‘opposition’ – members of armed insurgent groups- Amin says it appears to be a hypothetical scenario. The jirga has not evolved any mechanism that would guarantee them safe passage for that participation. The jirga, he says will focus on consulting the nation on how to reach peace; the mechanism by which this can be achieved; identify those who are reconcilable and those who are not, and direct the government to take certain steps.
While Amin’s contention of every Afghan being a victim is acknowledged by civil society groups which have come together under the banner of the Transitional Justice Coordination Group(TJCG), they argue that political decisions are being taken by the powerful elite in their own interests, ignoring the larger interests of the powerless majority. An example, they say, is the Amnesty law. The law provides amnesty not just to “all political factions and hostile parties who were involved in a way or another in hostilities before the establishing of the Interim administration” (Hamid Karzai’s government of 2001), but it also provides amnesty to those “still in opposition” to the Afghan government. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission(AIHRC) has criticized the law as has the International Centre for Transitional Justice(ICTJ). In a joint paper both argued that the law was bad because: it violated the Afghan government’s obligation to pursue prosecution of war crimes as a signatory to international human rights treaties; it provided a form of self-amnesty being passed and adopted by those who would benefit from it without wider consultation of the population; it also provided amnesty in perpetuity since there was no cut-off date, thus encouraging a culture of continuing violence and impunity.
Adopted quietly in December 2008, the law only ‘appeared’ in the official gazette in December 2009, a most propitious time for its acceptance, with the donor community having identified ‘reconciliation and reintegration’ as the way out of the conflict, a decision that was officially endorsed at the London Conference in January 2010.
Predictably, any international criticism was muted and confined largely to NGOs and non-state actors. Responding to a question on the law, the new European Union Special Representative Vyguadas Usackas says the international community “did not see what we wanted to see” in terms of the Amnesty Law and Transitional Justice. He however argued that it was up to “Afghan people to use their democratic processes in influencing and developing a participatory democratic culture.” That is easier said than done. It is the Peace Jirga, reconciliation process and the Afghan government which is getting the bulk of funding and political backing of the international donor community rather than civil society initiatives relating to this process.
Those arguing for the implementation of the transitional justice plan argue that they are not opposed to reconciliation initiatives, but rather, in support of a reconciliation which is sustainable. “Reconciliation must include the victims” says Nader Nadery, a Commissioner in the AIHRC. “It should not be a reconciliation behind the curtains. It should not be just a political reconciliation.”
Amin refutes the suggestion that the current form of reconciliation is only a means of sharing power. “All Afghans have the right to political power” The peace jirga, he says, is going to address the issues that block peace.
Women’s groups for one are enthused that they have been admitted in large numbers to the jirga. Their advocacy has helped push their numbers up from 30 to over 300, a number that they hope will enable them to voice their concerns, even if they cannot influence the proceedings.
There is widespread skepticism on whether the hardcore insurgents groups can be reconciled at all. Asked why no one took on the role of the ‘Talib’ character in the participatory theatre, women gathered there said it was futile, because “a Talib is unchangeable.”
While women’s rights groups fear that their hard-won rights might be reversed in compromises with an intolerant conservative ideology, victims groups fear the jirga is a means to silence their voices. To prevent this, a ‘victims’ jirga held on May 9, brought together victims from different parts of the country to share harrowing stories of their pain and suffering. One of those who suffered brutal violence and lost most members of his family is Ali Faizi who acknowledged the common past of the victims cutting across ethnic and geographical divides. “We have a common suffering. But if we do not treat this wound now, it will afflict future generations.”
May 04, 2010
A narrow vision returns meagre gains
India appears to have become hostage to its own rhetoric on Afghanistan
Times of India, April 17, 2010
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Washington visit is being viewed as a having yielded some gains for Indian foreign policy, having secured an apparent endorsement of the Indian role in Afghanistan. The implication, both overt and covert, has been that India scored a win over Pakistan given the latter’s attempts to curtail India’s presence in the country. The perspective is not new. The success and failure of the Indian role and presence in Afghanistan since 2001 has been largely interpreted through the Indian ability to influence the international community on Pakistan. Bringing pressure on elements within Pakistan and the Pakistani establishment, which are supportive of insurgents with a totalitarian worldview is certainly a valid concern and gains have been made in this area.
However, by restricting its role and influence to this narrow interest, Indian foreign policy is losing sight of the bigger picture. The wider strategic interests of the international community that includes Western countries as well as regional players have been ignored as have crucial decisions impacting on the stability of Afghanistan. By focusing mainly on Pakistan, the Indian government scores brownie points domestically, but ignores the long-term interests of the region and India in particular.
Though differences between the US and India on Afghanistan is now acknowledged, a realisation of these differences remains limited to the difference of perception on how to deal with Pakistan. South Block has repeatedly stressed that India and the US share the same goal in Afghanistan, i.e. stability of the country. While it is difficult to fault such admirable ambitions, a more mature foreign policy position would require looking at the details of the ‘stability’ that has remained elusive in Afghanistan after nine years of a US-dominated policy. There is universal acknowledgement now that security in the country is at its worst since 2001 even as the Western countries are moving towards a disengagement of troops. Beyond a general commitment against terrorism, the US notion of ‘stability’ may look very different from that envisaged by India.
Unfortunately for India and the region, Indian policy in Afghanistan continues to be stuck in the past, relying on bilateralism, the historicity of Indo-Afghan friendship and the ‘feel good’ factor, rather than recognising new realities. Though there is plenty of goodwill for India, which is seen, rightly or wrongly, as a disinterested benefactor with no axe to grind, the Indian government appears to be either unwilling or unable to leverage this in the pursuit of larger strategic interests of both India and the region, ceding policy-making on stabilisation entirely to the western countries engaged in Afghanistan, particularly the US. The costs of this myopia are now becoming visible.
The Western troop surge and the accompanying civilian surge is directed towards an exit strategy — now being euphemistically termed the ‘transition’ strategy. This end goal is not without a cost, given the impatience to exit. In the pursuit of its core interests — which have been publicly and clearly defined as degradation of the capabilities of the al Qaeda and the supportive Taliban in order to prevent them from attacking the US, the Obama administration is supporting several steps in the area of security and stability that have
long-term implications for the region.
Since building Afghan national forces is painstaking and time-consuming, British and American forces are rearming tribal and community militias despite clear concerns that such a step, without clear and accountable chains of command and control will rebound with a vengeance. They are encouraging the rapid build-up of the Afghan army and police, a move that is also viewed by some experts as a dangerous acceleration that would erode institutional stability of the armed forces. The recent emphasis on reconciliation with the insurgent groups also has its genesis in the need to bring the ongoing conflict to a manageable level that would allow the Western troops to exit gracefully. Almost all the steps are designed for shortterm stability and may, in all likelihood, lead to long-term instability in Afghanistan and region.
So why are South Block’s astute mandarins and the political leadership in India still viewing their role in Afghanistan through rose-tinted glasses? Not only has India not engaged in decision making on these issues, it is completely absent from policy making on a spectrum of issues in Afghanistan. It directs its efforts in Afghanistan bilaterally on the grounds that it does not have a political agenda in Afghanistan, as if India’s neglect of multilateral strategising would make these multifarious interests disappear. Whilst projecting itself as a key regional player, India has also neglected its relationship with key players Russia and Iran who are crucial to Afghanistan’s and the region’s stability.
It is no wonder then that when decisions are taken by the Afghan government and the international community — on Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan or on making compromises with the Taliban — India finds itself out of the loop, unable to exercise its clout, its muscles having rusted from disuse.
Astute international diplomats are aware that little more is required to please the Indian establishment than the occasional rant against Pakistan, enough to keep the Indian government happy. Shrewd Afghan politicians are aware that rhetoric on the mutual goodwill and stroking the Indian establishment’s ego goes a long way, while real decisions are taken in consonance with the Afghan government’s Western allies.
Signs of the Indian establishment’s inability to comprehend Afghanistan’s enormous strategic interest are evident. Despite the presence of five consulates, the Indian embassy in Kabul has less than a handful of staff who can engage at the diplomatic level on the multilateral arena that is Afghanistan, falling far short of requirements in this complex and fast-changing environment. It is true that India will not be able to shape or influence all strategic decisions in Afghanistan given other overweening interests. The pity is that it is not even trying
Times of India, April 17, 2010
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Washington visit is being viewed as a having yielded some gains for Indian foreign policy, having secured an apparent endorsement of the Indian role in Afghanistan. The implication, both overt and covert, has been that India scored a win over Pakistan given the latter’s attempts to curtail India’s presence in the country. The perspective is not new. The success and failure of the Indian role and presence in Afghanistan since 2001 has been largely interpreted through the Indian ability to influence the international community on Pakistan. Bringing pressure on elements within Pakistan and the Pakistani establishment, which are supportive of insurgents with a totalitarian worldview is certainly a valid concern and gains have been made in this area.
However, by restricting its role and influence to this narrow interest, Indian foreign policy is losing sight of the bigger picture. The wider strategic interests of the international community that includes Western countries as well as regional players have been ignored as have crucial decisions impacting on the stability of Afghanistan. By focusing mainly on Pakistan, the Indian government scores brownie points domestically, but ignores the long-term interests of the region and India in particular.
Though differences between the US and India on Afghanistan is now acknowledged, a realisation of these differences remains limited to the difference of perception on how to deal with Pakistan. South Block has repeatedly stressed that India and the US share the same goal in Afghanistan, i.e. stability of the country. While it is difficult to fault such admirable ambitions, a more mature foreign policy position would require looking at the details of the ‘stability’ that has remained elusive in Afghanistan after nine years of a US-dominated policy. There is universal acknowledgement now that security in the country is at its worst since 2001 even as the Western countries are moving towards a disengagement of troops. Beyond a general commitment against terrorism, the US notion of ‘stability’ may look very different from that envisaged by India.
Unfortunately for India and the region, Indian policy in Afghanistan continues to be stuck in the past, relying on bilateralism, the historicity of Indo-Afghan friendship and the ‘feel good’ factor, rather than recognising new realities. Though there is plenty of goodwill for India, which is seen, rightly or wrongly, as a disinterested benefactor with no axe to grind, the Indian government appears to be either unwilling or unable to leverage this in the pursuit of larger strategic interests of both India and the region, ceding policy-making on stabilisation entirely to the western countries engaged in Afghanistan, particularly the US. The costs of this myopia are now becoming visible.
The Western troop surge and the accompanying civilian surge is directed towards an exit strategy — now being euphemistically termed the ‘transition’ strategy. This end goal is not without a cost, given the impatience to exit. In the pursuit of its core interests — which have been publicly and clearly defined as degradation of the capabilities of the al Qaeda and the supportive Taliban in order to prevent them from attacking the US, the Obama administration is supporting several steps in the area of security and stability that have
long-term implications for the region.
Since building Afghan national forces is painstaking and time-consuming, British and American forces are rearming tribal and community militias despite clear concerns that such a step, without clear and accountable chains of command and control will rebound with a vengeance. They are encouraging the rapid build-up of the Afghan army and police, a move that is also viewed by some experts as a dangerous acceleration that would erode institutional stability of the armed forces. The recent emphasis on reconciliation with the insurgent groups also has its genesis in the need to bring the ongoing conflict to a manageable level that would allow the Western troops to exit gracefully. Almost all the steps are designed for shortterm stability and may, in all likelihood, lead to long-term instability in Afghanistan and region.
So why are South Block’s astute mandarins and the political leadership in India still viewing their role in Afghanistan through rose-tinted glasses? Not only has India not engaged in decision making on these issues, it is completely absent from policy making on a spectrum of issues in Afghanistan. It directs its efforts in Afghanistan bilaterally on the grounds that it does not have a political agenda in Afghanistan, as if India’s neglect of multilateral strategising would make these multifarious interests disappear. Whilst projecting itself as a key regional player, India has also neglected its relationship with key players Russia and Iran who are crucial to Afghanistan’s and the region’s stability.
It is no wonder then that when decisions are taken by the Afghan government and the international community — on Pakistan and its role in Afghanistan or on making compromises with the Taliban — India finds itself out of the loop, unable to exercise its clout, its muscles having rusted from disuse.
Astute international diplomats are aware that little more is required to please the Indian establishment than the occasional rant against Pakistan, enough to keep the Indian government happy. Shrewd Afghan politicians are aware that rhetoric on the mutual goodwill and stroking the Indian establishment’s ego goes a long way, while real decisions are taken in consonance with the Afghan government’s Western allies.
Signs of the Indian establishment’s inability to comprehend Afghanistan’s enormous strategic interest are evident. Despite the presence of five consulates, the Indian embassy in Kabul has less than a handful of staff who can engage at the diplomatic level on the multilateral arena that is Afghanistan, falling far short of requirements in this complex and fast-changing environment. It is true that India will not be able to shape or influence all strategic decisions in Afghanistan given other overweening interests. The pity is that it is not even trying
Afghanistan aid groups say NATO threatens their neutrality
Afghanistan aid groups say NATO threatens their neutrality
21 April 2010 | Panos
Humanitarian groups in Afghanistan say NATO's involvement in development aid threatens to undermine the neutrality, reputation, and safety of aid workers.
The French aid group Solidarites, has worked in Afghanistan for 30 years. In the dusty streets and weather-beaten compounds of Kabul, Bamiyan, and Samangan, it was common to see signs and boards advertising their development work on water and sanitation. Not any more. "We now maintain a low profile" says Hassan El Sayed, the group's country director.
Intensifying conflict has forced aid groups to spend more money on travel and security. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) says the Taliban and other armed opposition groups exert varying degrees of influence over 80 per cent of the country. This growing insecurity has made it harder for humanitarians to reach vulnerable populations.
Military delivering aid
More worryingly, say NGOs, international military forces are becoming increasingly involved in delivering aid and humanitarian assistance in a bid to win hearts and minds. "When military actors try to do things we do, then actors that would target military would target us. This forces us to be low-profile," says Sayed. Solidarites, like many non-profit groups feels their safety and neutrality is increasingly under threat by the blurring of lines between military and humanitarian aid. "We have no branding or identity on our vehicles," says Farhana Faruqi Stocker, the country director of Afghan Aid, "and no signs on our compounds."
Military forces are spending money on development and humanitarian aid directly, through 26 civilian–military provincial reconstruction teams,(PRTs), the first of which was set up in 2003.These teams of military staff, diplomats, and civilian experts in reconstruction are located on military bases. Each PRT is manned by the troops of NATO countries and led by a single NATO member country.
Robert Watkins, the UN Deputy Special Representative and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator has criticised this mode of delivering aid saying it "gives the wrong signal to communities who then perceive all aid to be associated with the military." "This has led to threats of violence against the humanitarian community and hampered their ability to deliver needed services," he said in a press conference in Kabul last month.
No direct targetting
When one of Solidarites' drivers was wounded by a roadside bomb in July last year, Sayed felt sure it was not a result of direct targeting, since the NGO is well known in the area in which the accident took place. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) NGOs were involved in 172 incidents in 2009, with armed opposition groups behind most of these. Fifty-nine NGO staff were kidnapped even though most were released unharmed. All those killed were Afghan nationals, whom ANSO says, remain more exposed than their international counterparts.
Nevertheless ANSO maintains that "the Taliban and most armed opposition groups still do not systematically target NGOs."When NGOs have been attacked or threatened by armed groups, it has usually been a result of the perception that the NGO lacked neutrality, they say. "NGOs working in all provinces would be well served to adhere to humanitarian principles as AOG are harshly unforgiving to those who do not."
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) says it is involved in humanitarian aid in "extremis circumstances" only. Its spokesman Brigadier General Eric Tremblay says, "humanitarian aid is distributed on the basis of need and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality."
Lack of neutrality
NGOs however insist that the international military by definition cannot be seen as a neutral actor. Many NGOs have also refused to go into areas that have recently been ‘cleared' through operations by international military forces. In a public campaign over the past year, Oxfam, Care, Save the Children UK and other international NGOs with long experience in Afghanistan have said the militarisation of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict.
"Humanitarian aid has to be independent, neutral and impartial" says Hassan El Sayed of Solidarites. "Can you imagine how we would be perceived if we arrive after US tanks?" Most of the principled NGOs would not be able to go into these areas, he says.
Laurent Saillard, the Director of Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella body for Afghan NGOs, agrees. "What gives the NGOs their capacity to work is the quality of their relationship with the community. What guarantees the security is not the military or their operations. This is a myth. It is complete propaganda. NGOs don't buy it and have never asked ISAF or the US army for their security."
The trend of donors routing aid resources to support their military strategy appears likely to continue. The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) recently told the BBC the military and civilian efforts needed to be combined as security is such a huge problem. In its recent document on Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, the US government described its desire to have civilians acting as ‘force multipliers", and it emphasised its intention to route its (aid) money through the provincial reconstruction teams in conflict zones.
"I can understand why they do it. The deployment is unpopular and the body bags are coming back" says another NGO worker, who asked not to be named. Donor countries see aid as a means of pacifying the anger provoked by military operations, but NGOs insist that they will continue to try and carve out a neutral space, however limited.
All our journalism is free to reproduce, unless otherwise noted. Please get in touch with media@panos.org.uk for more information or to let us know that you've reproduced something
21 April 2010 | Panos
Humanitarian groups in Afghanistan say NATO's involvement in development aid threatens to undermine the neutrality, reputation, and safety of aid workers.
The French aid group Solidarites, has worked in Afghanistan for 30 years. In the dusty streets and weather-beaten compounds of Kabul, Bamiyan, and Samangan, it was common to see signs and boards advertising their development work on water and sanitation. Not any more. "We now maintain a low profile" says Hassan El Sayed, the group's country director.
Intensifying conflict has forced aid groups to spend more money on travel and security. The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) says the Taliban and other armed opposition groups exert varying degrees of influence over 80 per cent of the country. This growing insecurity has made it harder for humanitarians to reach vulnerable populations.
Military delivering aid
More worryingly, say NGOs, international military forces are becoming increasingly involved in delivering aid and humanitarian assistance in a bid to win hearts and minds. "When military actors try to do things we do, then actors that would target military would target us. This forces us to be low-profile," says Sayed. Solidarites, like many non-profit groups feels their safety and neutrality is increasingly under threat by the blurring of lines between military and humanitarian aid. "We have no branding or identity on our vehicles," says Farhana Faruqi Stocker, the country director of Afghan Aid, "and no signs on our compounds."
Military forces are spending money on development and humanitarian aid directly, through 26 civilian–military provincial reconstruction teams,(PRTs), the first of which was set up in 2003.These teams of military staff, diplomats, and civilian experts in reconstruction are located on military bases. Each PRT is manned by the troops of NATO countries and led by a single NATO member country.
Robert Watkins, the UN Deputy Special Representative and Resident Humanitarian Coordinator has criticised this mode of delivering aid saying it "gives the wrong signal to communities who then perceive all aid to be associated with the military." "This has led to threats of violence against the humanitarian community and hampered their ability to deliver needed services," he said in a press conference in Kabul last month.
No direct targetting
When one of Solidarites' drivers was wounded by a roadside bomb in July last year, Sayed felt sure it was not a result of direct targeting, since the NGO is well known in the area in which the accident took place. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) NGOs were involved in 172 incidents in 2009, with armed opposition groups behind most of these. Fifty-nine NGO staff were kidnapped even though most were released unharmed. All those killed were Afghan nationals, whom ANSO says, remain more exposed than their international counterparts.
Nevertheless ANSO maintains that "the Taliban and most armed opposition groups still do not systematically target NGOs."When NGOs have been attacked or threatened by armed groups, it has usually been a result of the perception that the NGO lacked neutrality, they say. "NGOs working in all provinces would be well served to adhere to humanitarian principles as AOG are harshly unforgiving to those who do not."
The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) says it is involved in humanitarian aid in "extremis circumstances" only. Its spokesman Brigadier General Eric Tremblay says, "humanitarian aid is distributed on the basis of need and must uphold the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality."
Lack of neutrality
NGOs however insist that the international military by definition cannot be seen as a neutral actor. Many NGOs have also refused to go into areas that have recently been ‘cleared' through operations by international military forces. In a public campaign over the past year, Oxfam, Care, Save the Children UK and other international NGOs with long experience in Afghanistan have said the militarisation of aid is putting ordinary people on the frontlines of the conflict.
"Humanitarian aid has to be independent, neutral and impartial" says Hassan El Sayed of Solidarites. "Can you imagine how we would be perceived if we arrive after US tanks?" Most of the principled NGOs would not be able to go into these areas, he says.
Laurent Saillard, the Director of Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), an umbrella body for Afghan NGOs, agrees. "What gives the NGOs their capacity to work is the quality of their relationship with the community. What guarantees the security is not the military or their operations. This is a myth. It is complete propaganda. NGOs don't buy it and have never asked ISAF or the US army for their security."
The trend of donors routing aid resources to support their military strategy appears likely to continue. The British government's Department for International Development (DFID) recently told the BBC the military and civilian efforts needed to be combined as security is such a huge problem. In its recent document on Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, the US government described its desire to have civilians acting as ‘force multipliers", and it emphasised its intention to route its (aid) money through the provincial reconstruction teams in conflict zones.
"I can understand why they do it. The deployment is unpopular and the body bags are coming back" says another NGO worker, who asked not to be named. Donor countries see aid as a means of pacifying the anger provoked by military operations, but NGOs insist that they will continue to try and carve out a neutral space, however limited.
All our journalism is free to reproduce, unless otherwise noted. Please get in touch with media@panos.org.uk for more information or to let us know that you've reproduced something
April 13, 2010
AMNESTY LAW FUELS DEBATE ON RECONCILIATION PROCESS
Eurasianet, March 15, 2010
Sakina is angry. "Who is Karzai to forgive the deaths in my family?" she fumes. "Was his home looted? Was his son killed? What gives him the right to forgive on my behalf? He has no right." The source of Sakina’s ire is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s reconciliation initiative.
As part of the reconciliation effort, Karzai is supporting an amnesty law that offers blanket immunity to all parties responsible for atrocities committed in Afghanistan over the past three decades, including Taliban militants. Forgiving the Taliban is not something that Sakina is capable of at this point in time. The middle-aged widow from Dasht-e Barchi, a poor neighborhood of west Kabul, lost her husband and niece in the conflict, and feels that Karzai’s administration is taking away her right to justice.
"He wants to give the Taliban money, land and privileges. [And] to me, a victim, he gives a widows’ pension of 300 afs [afghanis] a month [$6]," continued Sakina. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In Afghanistan’s legislative process, a draft law must be ratified by parliament, signed by the president, and then published in an official gazette before it takes effect. The actual process is sometimes far murkier. Parliament passed a controversial amnesty law - offering immunity to all those involved in past, present and future hostilities, including war crimes or crimes against humanity - in 2007. But the initiative generated considerable opposition from Karzai’s international allies and human rights groups who saw it as an attempt by former commanders-turned-MPs to give themselves immunity. Thus, the Reconciliation and General Amnesty Law was not immediately published.
In January of this year, however, news spread that the law had been quietly printed in December of 2008. With the international community now behind Karzai’s reconciliation strategy, the government is now apparently hoping that the amnesty law will be accepted without creating too much of a stir.
So far, the international community’s muted response suggests Karzai’s timing may have been right on. But growing opposition from within Afghanistan, led by human rights and civil society groups, also indicates that the president’s reconciliation efforts may soon hit a brick wall.
Opponents of the amnesty law contend that it is unconstitutional. According to a paper prepared jointly by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, a body mandated by the Afghan constitution, and the International Center for Transitional Justice, the amnesty law contradicts Kabul’s obligations under international law to prosecute serious crimes such as torture, rape, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Article 7 of the Afghan constitution spells out the country’s obligations to abide by international treaties covering war crimes.
Activists describe as especially problematic the "blanket" amnesty from prosecution, which does not make exceptions for war crimes such as rape, torture and genocide; grants immunity for crimes that may be committed in the future; and benefits former combatants who voted for the bill in their current roles as MPs.
As worded, the law covers "all political factions and hostile parties who were involved in a way or another in hostilities before establishing of the interim administration [in 2001]," as well as "those individuals and groups who are still in opposition to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and cease enmity after the enforcement of this resolution and join the process of national reconciliation and respect the constitution and other laws and abide them." Without a cut-off date, the law offers those committing crimes impunity to continue doing so until they please.
As a concession to victims of war crimes, the law provides for individuals to make claims against alleged assailants for specific crimes. However, human rights groups point out that the lack of security and rule of law in Afghanistan makes it almost impossible for individuals to gather evidence and pursue criminal cases against powerful parties involved in the war. "It is fantasy to think that an individual can take on a major war criminal alone," Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, said in a March 10 statement. "In practice, individuals have severely limited access to the justice system in Afghanistan," he pointed out, adding that the state should not transfer its obligation to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations to individuals.
The government should immediately suspend the law, argued the Transitional Justice Coordination Group (TJCG), a coalition of 24 Afghan civil society organizations. Group leaders say that, rather than promoting reconciliation and stability, the law, by granting blanket amnesty, "promotes impunity and prevents genuine reconciliation." The coalition seeks "accountability not amnesia for past and present crimes as a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation and peace," the group said in a March 10 statement. "The government of Afghanistan does not have the right to usurp the rights of victims."
The stated purpose of the law is "strengthening the reconciliation and national stability." But the TJCG coalition, human rights groups and analysts view the amnesty law as a political maneuver. "Short-term expediency in the form of reconciliation with the Taliban should not trump the rights of the Afghan people," Amnesty International said in a statement issued in early February. "The legislation is simply an effort to pervert the course of justice under the faulty guise of providing security."
"The existence of this law is as much a test of the principles of Afghanistan’s international backers, such as the United States, as it is of Karzai," said Adams of Human Rights Watch. "Will they stand with abusive warlords and insurgents, or will they stand with the Afghan people?"
"It is not for the government to decide," Azaryuon Matin of Human Rights Focus, a member of the TJCG coalition, told EurasiaNet. "Why have they not consulted with civil society [organizations]? If they sacrifice justice, democracy and human rights, there will be no way for rule of law, for human rights, no way for peace."
Sakina is angry. "Who is Karzai to forgive the deaths in my family?" she fumes. "Was his home looted? Was his son killed? What gives him the right to forgive on my behalf? He has no right." The source of Sakina’s ire is Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s reconciliation initiative.
As part of the reconciliation effort, Karzai is supporting an amnesty law that offers blanket immunity to all parties responsible for atrocities committed in Afghanistan over the past three decades, including Taliban militants. Forgiving the Taliban is not something that Sakina is capable of at this point in time. The middle-aged widow from Dasht-e Barchi, a poor neighborhood of west Kabul, lost her husband and niece in the conflict, and feels that Karzai’s administration is taking away her right to justice.
"He wants to give the Taliban money, land and privileges. [And] to me, a victim, he gives a widows’ pension of 300 afs [afghanis] a month [$6]," continued Sakina. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In Afghanistan’s legislative process, a draft law must be ratified by parliament, signed by the president, and then published in an official gazette before it takes effect. The actual process is sometimes far murkier. Parliament passed a controversial amnesty law - offering immunity to all those involved in past, present and future hostilities, including war crimes or crimes against humanity - in 2007. But the initiative generated considerable opposition from Karzai’s international allies and human rights groups who saw it as an attempt by former commanders-turned-MPs to give themselves immunity. Thus, the Reconciliation and General Amnesty Law was not immediately published.
In January of this year, however, news spread that the law had been quietly printed in December of 2008. With the international community now behind Karzai’s reconciliation strategy, the government is now apparently hoping that the amnesty law will be accepted without creating too much of a stir.
So far, the international community’s muted response suggests Karzai’s timing may have been right on. But growing opposition from within Afghanistan, led by human rights and civil society groups, also indicates that the president’s reconciliation efforts may soon hit a brick wall.
Opponents of the amnesty law contend that it is unconstitutional. According to a paper prepared jointly by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, a body mandated by the Afghan constitution, and the International Center for Transitional Justice, the amnesty law contradicts Kabul’s obligations under international law to prosecute serious crimes such as torture, rape, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Article 7 of the Afghan constitution spells out the country’s obligations to abide by international treaties covering war crimes.
Activists describe as especially problematic the "blanket" amnesty from prosecution, which does not make exceptions for war crimes such as rape, torture and genocide; grants immunity for crimes that may be committed in the future; and benefits former combatants who voted for the bill in their current roles as MPs.
As worded, the law covers "all political factions and hostile parties who were involved in a way or another in hostilities before establishing of the interim administration [in 2001]," as well as "those individuals and groups who are still in opposition to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and cease enmity after the enforcement of this resolution and join the process of national reconciliation and respect the constitution and other laws and abide them." Without a cut-off date, the law offers those committing crimes impunity to continue doing so until they please.
As a concession to victims of war crimes, the law provides for individuals to make claims against alleged assailants for specific crimes. However, human rights groups point out that the lack of security and rule of law in Afghanistan makes it almost impossible for individuals to gather evidence and pursue criminal cases against powerful parties involved in the war. "It is fantasy to think that an individual can take on a major war criminal alone," Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, said in a March 10 statement. "In practice, individuals have severely limited access to the justice system in Afghanistan," he pointed out, adding that the state should not transfer its obligation to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations to individuals.
The government should immediately suspend the law, argued the Transitional Justice Coordination Group (TJCG), a coalition of 24 Afghan civil society organizations. Group leaders say that, rather than promoting reconciliation and stability, the law, by granting blanket amnesty, "promotes impunity and prevents genuine reconciliation." The coalition seeks "accountability not amnesia for past and present crimes as a prerequisite for genuine reconciliation and peace," the group said in a March 10 statement. "The government of Afghanistan does not have the right to usurp the rights of victims."
The stated purpose of the law is "strengthening the reconciliation and national stability." But the TJCG coalition, human rights groups and analysts view the amnesty law as a political maneuver. "Short-term expediency in the form of reconciliation with the Taliban should not trump the rights of the Afghan people," Amnesty International said in a statement issued in early February. "The legislation is simply an effort to pervert the course of justice under the faulty guise of providing security."
"The existence of this law is as much a test of the principles of Afghanistan’s international backers, such as the United States, as it is of Karzai," said Adams of Human Rights Watch. "Will they stand with abusive warlords and insurgents, or will they stand with the Afghan people?"
"It is not for the government to decide," Azaryuon Matin of Human Rights Focus, a member of the TJCG coalition, told EurasiaNet. "Why have they not consulted with civil society [organizations]? If they sacrifice justice, democracy and human rights, there will be no way for rule of law, for human rights, no way for peace."
Afghan Women Fear Violence in National 'Peace'
Wenews, March 7, 2010
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Women's rights activists here fear a "peace deal" brewing with the Taliban may bring more violence into their lives.
To avert that, they are focused on the peace "jirga"--a gathering of traditional leaders--planned for this spring or summer.
Hundreds of women belonging to more than 70 women's organizations are battling for more than quota-style representation at the upcoming jirga.
"Before the jirga we have to make sure the right women get into the process," said Nargis Nehan, director of Equality for Peace and Democracy, a civil society group working with women and young people in Kabul. "Women must not be there just as a women's group, but must be represented through tribal groups, civil society groups, parliament, the private sector and government."
Nehan is also a representative to a regional peace commission set up a year ago by female peace activists in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India that has convened twice, once in Kabul and once in New Delhi.
"Will the right women be there?" asked Palwasha Hassan, a founding member of Afghan Women's Network and country director of a Canadian funded pro-democracy group, in a recent interview.
Hassan was recently nominated by President Hamid Karzai to head the women's ministry, but she was rejected by a parliament that appeared hostile to her liberal background.
Since the beginning of this year, architects of national reconciliation have increasingly assumed that negotiations with the Taliban are necessary to end a conflict characterized by intensifying fighting and spreading violence.
However, Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific director, says that's dangerous for women.
"The Taliban established a terrible record of violating human rights during their rule and they have done nothing since then to indicate they will act differently if they return to power," Zarifi said in a statement in January, issued ahead of a conference in London for donor nations and the Afghan government to discuss a new strategy for Afghanistan.
Similar Deals Increased Violations
Similar deals with the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan, Amnesty said, led to increased human rights violations. Under successive deals in areas of Pakistan's northwest frontier, ceasefires and government troops allowed Taliban forces to move in and occupy areas where they have banned girls' education, banned music and instituted summary justice like flogging, beating and even executions for those who flout their restrictions.
In addition to planning a peace jirga, early steps toward national reconciliation include the institution of an internationally funded trust fund to pay off foot soldiers of the insurgent movement.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for the inclusion of women in any peace negotiation, but Afghan women fear little, or hollow, enforcement.
More international attention is being paid to whether insurgent leaders will be present at the peace jirga than whether women will find a place. Women, after all, pose no threat to security.
Only one Afghan woman, for instance--Arzo Qanih, a member of the Afghan Women's Network--was invited to attend the London peace-planning conference in January.
"Women's engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery," Qanih told the gathering. "It is a critical precursor to success." In any negotiations, she said, women's rights must be protected.
Increasingly Insecure Environment
Afghan women face an increasingly insecure environment with a growing trend of violence against women in public life, according to a July 2009 report by the U.N.'s human rights office in Afghanistan.
Violence against women, the report found, was being perpetrated not just by anti-government forces, but also by "local traditional and religious power-holders, women's own families and communities and in some instances government authorities."
In a December report, Human Rights Watch also flagged the weakening of women's rights. "The insecurity Afghans face comes not only from the insurgency, but also from abuses by so-far untouchable government officials and warlords," the report said.
The Afghan government has promised that any peace treaty will respect the constitution's guarantees of equality for women.
Since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, women have entered the work force, joined electoral politics and taken jobs in the government.
Under the constitution, Afghan women have the same rights to voting, education and political participation as men. An article of the constitution mandates at least two female representatives from each of the country's 34 provinces.
The shakiness of such provisions was highlighted in August 2009, however, when Karzai, backed by Parliament, signed off on a Shia personal status law that subordinates women. Provisions that required a wife to ask permission to leave the house except on urgent business and a requirement that a wife have sex with her husband at least once every four days were dropped amid local and international outcry.
But the law still permits husbands to deny food and sustenance to their wives if they refuse to obey their husbands' sexual demands, grants guardianship of children exclusively to their fathers and grandfathers and requires women to get permission from their husbands to work, according to Human Rights Watch.
Fragility of Women's Gains
In February, a presidential electoral ordinance sought to reduce the representation of women in parliament from a minimum of two seats in each province of the country to a maximum of two seats. The final law restored the earlier, minimum, provision, but underscored the fragility of the gains women fought to be enshrined by the constitution, ratified in 2004.
Hassan's rejection by Parliament adds to the unease.
Women's activist circles have been buzzing over what they understood to be hostile questions Hassan faced in parliament, which gets little press coverage and for which there are no readily accessible record of proceedings.
In an interview with Women's eNews, Hassan said members of parliament questioned her knowledge of Islam, whether she would enforce 'hijab' (head covering for a woman) and the need for 'mehram' (male escort for women traveling outside their homes) and whether she repudiated "Western" precepts on the freedoms of women.
She said the hostile questions also came from female legislators, one of whom asked Hassan why she had instituted shelters for battered or abandoned women, which the MP characterized as "places of ill-repute."
When Hassan was rejected by Parliament, the Afghan Women's Network issued a statement calling it "very disappointing."
List of Demands
The Network has drawn up a list of demands addressed to the Afghan government and its international supporters. These include representation by women in the National Security Council and other bodies making decisions on peace and security; a share in the new trust fund for reintegration; and assurances that "reconciliation and reintegration will not take place at the expense of human rights."
Representation by women at these different levels is needed to ensure representation of women's rights in all levels of policymaking, including development issues, the group said in a Jan. 29 statement.
On Feb. 3, the New York-based U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women--CEDAW--expressed regret about the exclusion of women from the London peace conference.
"Afghan women must be full and equal participants in decision-making at all levels in the process of peace building, reconciliation, rebuilding and development of their country," CEDAW said, calling on the Afghan government as well as its international allies to ensure this.
"The numbers of women coming together is increasing," Nehan said. "Seven years ago we were ignored and that's a fact," she added, referring to the 2002 institution of the Afghan interim administration when women were excluded from decision-making positions. "Now we can't be ignored and that's a fact."
KABUL, Afghanistan (WOMENSENEWS)--Women's rights activists here fear a "peace deal" brewing with the Taliban may bring more violence into their lives.
To avert that, they are focused on the peace "jirga"--a gathering of traditional leaders--planned for this spring or summer.
Hundreds of women belonging to more than 70 women's organizations are battling for more than quota-style representation at the upcoming jirga.
"Before the jirga we have to make sure the right women get into the process," said Nargis Nehan, director of Equality for Peace and Democracy, a civil society group working with women and young people in Kabul. "Women must not be there just as a women's group, but must be represented through tribal groups, civil society groups, parliament, the private sector and government."
Nehan is also a representative to a regional peace commission set up a year ago by female peace activists in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India that has convened twice, once in Kabul and once in New Delhi.
"Will the right women be there?" asked Palwasha Hassan, a founding member of Afghan Women's Network and country director of a Canadian funded pro-democracy group, in a recent interview.
Hassan was recently nominated by President Hamid Karzai to head the women's ministry, but she was rejected by a parliament that appeared hostile to her liberal background.
Since the beginning of this year, architects of national reconciliation have increasingly assumed that negotiations with the Taliban are necessary to end a conflict characterized by intensifying fighting and spreading violence.
However, Sam Zarifi, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific director, says that's dangerous for women.
"The Taliban established a terrible record of violating human rights during their rule and they have done nothing since then to indicate they will act differently if they return to power," Zarifi said in a statement in January, issued ahead of a conference in London for donor nations and the Afghan government to discuss a new strategy for Afghanistan.
Similar Deals Increased Violations
Similar deals with the Taliban in neighboring Pakistan, Amnesty said, led to increased human rights violations. Under successive deals in areas of Pakistan's northwest frontier, ceasefires and government troops allowed Taliban forces to move in and occupy areas where they have banned girls' education, banned music and instituted summary justice like flogging, beating and even executions for those who flout their restrictions.
In addition to planning a peace jirga, early steps toward national reconciliation include the institution of an internationally funded trust fund to pay off foot soldiers of the insurgent movement.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 calls for the inclusion of women in any peace negotiation, but Afghan women fear little, or hollow, enforcement.
More international attention is being paid to whether insurgent leaders will be present at the peace jirga than whether women will find a place. Women, after all, pose no threat to security.
Only one Afghan woman, for instance--Arzo Qanih, a member of the Afghan Women's Network--was invited to attend the London peace-planning conference in January.
"Women's engagement is not an optional extra component of stabilization and recovery," Qanih told the gathering. "It is a critical precursor to success." In any negotiations, she said, women's rights must be protected.
Increasingly Insecure Environment
Afghan women face an increasingly insecure environment with a growing trend of violence against women in public life, according to a July 2009 report by the U.N.'s human rights office in Afghanistan.
Violence against women, the report found, was being perpetrated not just by anti-government forces, but also by "local traditional and religious power-holders, women's own families and communities and in some instances government authorities."
In a December report, Human Rights Watch also flagged the weakening of women's rights. "The insecurity Afghans face comes not only from the insurgency, but also from abuses by so-far untouchable government officials and warlords," the report said.
The Afghan government has promised that any peace treaty will respect the constitution's guarantees of equality for women.
Since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, women have entered the work force, joined electoral politics and taken jobs in the government.
Under the constitution, Afghan women have the same rights to voting, education and political participation as men. An article of the constitution mandates at least two female representatives from each of the country's 34 provinces.
The shakiness of such provisions was highlighted in August 2009, however, when Karzai, backed by Parliament, signed off on a Shia personal status law that subordinates women. Provisions that required a wife to ask permission to leave the house except on urgent business and a requirement that a wife have sex with her husband at least once every four days were dropped amid local and international outcry.
But the law still permits husbands to deny food and sustenance to their wives if they refuse to obey their husbands' sexual demands, grants guardianship of children exclusively to their fathers and grandfathers and requires women to get permission from their husbands to work, according to Human Rights Watch.
Fragility of Women's Gains
In February, a presidential electoral ordinance sought to reduce the representation of women in parliament from a minimum of two seats in each province of the country to a maximum of two seats. The final law restored the earlier, minimum, provision, but underscored the fragility of the gains women fought to be enshrined by the constitution, ratified in 2004.
Hassan's rejection by Parliament adds to the unease.
Women's activist circles have been buzzing over what they understood to be hostile questions Hassan faced in parliament, which gets little press coverage and for which there are no readily accessible record of proceedings.
In an interview with Women's eNews, Hassan said members of parliament questioned her knowledge of Islam, whether she would enforce 'hijab' (head covering for a woman) and the need for 'mehram' (male escort for women traveling outside their homes) and whether she repudiated "Western" precepts on the freedoms of women.
She said the hostile questions also came from female legislators, one of whom asked Hassan why she had instituted shelters for battered or abandoned women, which the MP characterized as "places of ill-repute."
When Hassan was rejected by Parliament, the Afghan Women's Network issued a statement calling it "very disappointing."
List of Demands
The Network has drawn up a list of demands addressed to the Afghan government and its international supporters. These include representation by women in the National Security Council and other bodies making decisions on peace and security; a share in the new trust fund for reintegration; and assurances that "reconciliation and reintegration will not take place at the expense of human rights."
Representation by women at these different levels is needed to ensure representation of women's rights in all levels of policymaking, including development issues, the group said in a Jan. 29 statement.
On Feb. 3, the New York-based U.N. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women--CEDAW--expressed regret about the exclusion of women from the London peace conference.
"Afghan women must be full and equal participants in decision-making at all levels in the process of peace building, reconciliation, rebuilding and development of their country," CEDAW said, calling on the Afghan government as well as its international allies to ensure this.
"The numbers of women coming together is increasing," Nehan said. "Seven years ago we were ignored and that's a fact," she added, referring to the 2002 institution of the Afghan interim administration when women were excluded from decision-making positions. "Now we can't be ignored and that's a fact."
Of ‘collateral damage’ and danger of ‘reductionist’ view
Deccan Herald, March 7, 2010
The weekend calm was shattered by the sound of a blast as the house shook. It was early morning Friday – the weekend here in Afghanistan – and there was no mistaking the sound. This was one of several times it had happened over the past few years – and each time it has been followed by an eerie stillness. Not this time, however. Minutes? Seconds? Later as we tried to determine the direction of the blast, we could hear what sounded like small explosions followed by gunfire.
Though Kabul has seen many explosions over the past years - remote controlled explosions and suicide bombers - the complex and well–coordinated attacks involving bombs and direct engagement have been fewer. However, the frequency of that too has been increasing. Complex and sophisticated attacks were used against the Serena Hotel, several government offices, the two guest houses attacked last week and the UN guest house with which we share our compound wall.
Since 2003 when I have been living here, the city has transformed. While in 2003 and 2004 one counted the number of new shops and buildings which seemed to spring up almost one every day, now one counts the number of new cement bollards blocking off large chunks of the street, new barbed wire fences and yet another Kabul street cut off to ordinary citizens in order to protect the international community or the Afghan elite.
Curfews, armoured cars, door to door armed escorts, safe houses, bunkers, bans on walking and shopping, armed guards - new rules for living in the conflict zone are added with every fresh incident for foreigners working with international organisations. With the intensifying conflict spreading closer and closer, Kabul resembles a city under siege in many ways and the international community assembles itself in ever tighter bubbles of sanitised protection - which prove their ephemeral nature from time to time.
Living here as an Indian woman journalist I seem to straddle several worlds. Yet I have never felt as Indian as I do now living here. The saga of the bonhomie between Indians and Afghans is now well established. Most people in India now know the tales of Afghans’ obsession with Bollywood movies, the film songs blaring from the shops and taxis, the avid viewers of the Hindi serial ‘Saas bhi kabhi bahu thi’ dubbed, in Afghanistan, in the most widely spoken Afghan language, Dari. India is seen as a friend.
Being an Indian means being greeted with warmth, with hospitality, sometimes with a barrage of tirades against Pakistan for its role in having supported the Taliban and having fuelled groups that have contributed to the violence in this country. That, especially, is the discourse in the Afghan government which blames the continuing conflict in Afghanistan entirely on Pakistan’s continuing support to armed groups of insurgents.
‘Collateral damage’
But for millions of Afghans across this country, violence comes in many forms. While armed opposition groups which include but are not confined to the Taliban perpetrate random and targeted acts of violence, especially in the volatile provinces in the South and Southeast, the presence of armed groups and the lack of rule of law cuts much wider and deeper. Afghans face violence at the hands of the groups of militias who are still to be disarmed, at the hands of predatory commanders and war lords some of whom are supported by the international community, at the hands of the government’s security forces who are supposed to protect them. They become ‘collateral damage’ from aerial bombings carried out in civilian areas by international forces. They are abused by the unofficial groups being armed to take on the task of providing stability by an international community eager to exit, and lacking the patience to see through the slow and steady growth of a national army and national police that is well-trained, armed and capable of establishing the necessary command and control structures.
Growing public discontent with the deployment of troops by western nations which see a rapidly rising toll of deaths amongst their soldiers (937 US troops died till the first of this month in Afghan-related operations), threatening even the survival of their governments (the Dutch government of Prime Minister Balkanende collapsed last month on the question of extending the deployment of Dutch troops), has meant that many western nations are now looking for a face-saving compromise: a measure of stability that will secure their own interests and allow them to exit Afghanistan gracefully. To do this they are willing to make some compromises.
Short-term measures for stability: building security institutions without adequate oversight, bypassing the government in delivering governance as well as development, propping up traditional justice mechanisms and, most significantly, questioning whether democracy is suited to Afghanistan.
‘Reductionist’ view
In a recent interview with this correspondent, the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Jayant Prasad, spoke of his concerns on these issues, and what he termed the “danger” of the “reductionist view of civilian goals in Afghanistan.” “Some in the international community are reticent about sustaining the Afghan Constitution in its present form, or sustaining democracy, women’s rights, embracing a kind of racist view of Afghans that they will never embrace democracy or gender equality,” Prasad said. “Of course whatever we do in Afghanistan has to be done in accord with the genius of the Afghan people and their traditions, by combining the wisdom of the past with a vision for the future. But to say that we abandon the project started in 2001 in Bonn that was pegged to the Afghan Constitution, would be unfortunate.”
Being an Indian here does not provide all the answers. However, it does bring an appreciation of the challenges. We too struggle with the contradictions and congruences of tradition and modernity, of a pluralistic society and the threat of social and political polarisations. We suffer from economic inequities and grapple with ways to imbibe external influences without losing sight of our roots.
Being an Indian here does not give me the right to preach solutions to Afghans. However it does give me the strength to debate issues – whether it is relating to women and their role, media freedoms, the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. It allows me to raise questions about what being an Afghan means today, because the same questions of identity and nationhood are being asked and answered in India even today. But much of this remains at the individual level, with the region, including India, curiously content to let the western nations continue taking the lead in strategies that may further destabilise Afghanistan.
I sit here writing this a week from the terrible attack that claimed the lives of six Indians and left at least 10 injured. It is again a Friday and the city is still. But underneath the quiet there is an expectancy that things will unravel further in ways we cannot imagine now. If that happens, we in the region – Indians, Pakistani, Central Asians and Iranians - will pay the price along with the Afghans.
The weekend calm was shattered by the sound of a blast as the house shook. It was early morning Friday – the weekend here in Afghanistan – and there was no mistaking the sound. This was one of several times it had happened over the past few years – and each time it has been followed by an eerie stillness. Not this time, however. Minutes? Seconds? Later as we tried to determine the direction of the blast, we could hear what sounded like small explosions followed by gunfire.
Though Kabul has seen many explosions over the past years - remote controlled explosions and suicide bombers - the complex and well–coordinated attacks involving bombs and direct engagement have been fewer. However, the frequency of that too has been increasing. Complex and sophisticated attacks were used against the Serena Hotel, several government offices, the two guest houses attacked last week and the UN guest house with which we share our compound wall.
Since 2003 when I have been living here, the city has transformed. While in 2003 and 2004 one counted the number of new shops and buildings which seemed to spring up almost one every day, now one counts the number of new cement bollards blocking off large chunks of the street, new barbed wire fences and yet another Kabul street cut off to ordinary citizens in order to protect the international community or the Afghan elite.
Curfews, armoured cars, door to door armed escorts, safe houses, bunkers, bans on walking and shopping, armed guards - new rules for living in the conflict zone are added with every fresh incident for foreigners working with international organisations. With the intensifying conflict spreading closer and closer, Kabul resembles a city under siege in many ways and the international community assembles itself in ever tighter bubbles of sanitised protection - which prove their ephemeral nature from time to time.
Living here as an Indian woman journalist I seem to straddle several worlds. Yet I have never felt as Indian as I do now living here. The saga of the bonhomie between Indians and Afghans is now well established. Most people in India now know the tales of Afghans’ obsession with Bollywood movies, the film songs blaring from the shops and taxis, the avid viewers of the Hindi serial ‘Saas bhi kabhi bahu thi’ dubbed, in Afghanistan, in the most widely spoken Afghan language, Dari. India is seen as a friend.
Being an Indian means being greeted with warmth, with hospitality, sometimes with a barrage of tirades against Pakistan for its role in having supported the Taliban and having fuelled groups that have contributed to the violence in this country. That, especially, is the discourse in the Afghan government which blames the continuing conflict in Afghanistan entirely on Pakistan’s continuing support to armed groups of insurgents.
‘Collateral damage’
But for millions of Afghans across this country, violence comes in many forms. While armed opposition groups which include but are not confined to the Taliban perpetrate random and targeted acts of violence, especially in the volatile provinces in the South and Southeast, the presence of armed groups and the lack of rule of law cuts much wider and deeper. Afghans face violence at the hands of the groups of militias who are still to be disarmed, at the hands of predatory commanders and war lords some of whom are supported by the international community, at the hands of the government’s security forces who are supposed to protect them. They become ‘collateral damage’ from aerial bombings carried out in civilian areas by international forces. They are abused by the unofficial groups being armed to take on the task of providing stability by an international community eager to exit, and lacking the patience to see through the slow and steady growth of a national army and national police that is well-trained, armed and capable of establishing the necessary command and control structures.
Growing public discontent with the deployment of troops by western nations which see a rapidly rising toll of deaths amongst their soldiers (937 US troops died till the first of this month in Afghan-related operations), threatening even the survival of their governments (the Dutch government of Prime Minister Balkanende collapsed last month on the question of extending the deployment of Dutch troops), has meant that many western nations are now looking for a face-saving compromise: a measure of stability that will secure their own interests and allow them to exit Afghanistan gracefully. To do this they are willing to make some compromises.
Short-term measures for stability: building security institutions without adequate oversight, bypassing the government in delivering governance as well as development, propping up traditional justice mechanisms and, most significantly, questioning whether democracy is suited to Afghanistan.
‘Reductionist’ view
In a recent interview with this correspondent, the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Jayant Prasad, spoke of his concerns on these issues, and what he termed the “danger” of the “reductionist view of civilian goals in Afghanistan.” “Some in the international community are reticent about sustaining the Afghan Constitution in its present form, or sustaining democracy, women’s rights, embracing a kind of racist view of Afghans that they will never embrace democracy or gender equality,” Prasad said. “Of course whatever we do in Afghanistan has to be done in accord with the genius of the Afghan people and their traditions, by combining the wisdom of the past with a vision for the future. But to say that we abandon the project started in 2001 in Bonn that was pegged to the Afghan Constitution, would be unfortunate.”
Being an Indian here does not provide all the answers. However, it does bring an appreciation of the challenges. We too struggle with the contradictions and congruences of tradition and modernity, of a pluralistic society and the threat of social and political polarisations. We suffer from economic inequities and grapple with ways to imbibe external influences without losing sight of our roots.
Being an Indian here does not give me the right to preach solutions to Afghans. However it does give me the strength to debate issues – whether it is relating to women and their role, media freedoms, the strengths and weaknesses of democracy. It allows me to raise questions about what being an Afghan means today, because the same questions of identity and nationhood are being asked and answered in India even today. But much of this remains at the individual level, with the region, including India, curiously content to let the western nations continue taking the lead in strategies that may further destabilise Afghanistan.
I sit here writing this a week from the terrible attack that claimed the lives of six Indians and left at least 10 injured. It is again a Friday and the city is still. But underneath the quiet there is an expectancy that things will unravel further in ways we cannot imagine now. If that happens, we in the region – Indians, Pakistani, Central Asians and Iranians - will pay the price along with the Afghans.
PRESIDENT KARZAI MODIFYING ELECTION LAW IN HIS FAVOR -- A EURASIANET Q & A WITH GRANT KIPPEN, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE ELECTORAL COMPLAINTS COMMISSION
Eurasianet, March 04, 2010
President Hamid Karzai has taken action to substantially curtail the independence of Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission before parliamentary elections scheduled for this September.
The ECC gained prominence in 2009 after it uncovered widespread fraud during the presidential elections last August. Citing "clear and convincing evidence of fraud," the ECC forced the invalidation of over a million votes cast in favor of Karzai. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Though Karzai eventually secured reelection, the voting irregularities considerably damaged the president’s image, as well as undermined the image of the government-appointed Independent Election Commission. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In February, calling for the removal of "foreign interference" from the Afghan electoral process, Karzai used a loophole in the constitution to force through legislation that allows him to appoint all five board members of the ECC. Prior to the introduction of the new rule, the United Nations had appointed three of the five board members. Thus, the ECC essentially came under presidential control, a development that stands to significantly diminish its ability to play a non-partisan role in Afghanistan’s democratic development.
The Canadian chairman of the previous ECC, Grant Kippen, a veteran of Afghan electoral processes, remained unflappable during the August elections despite "considerable domestic political pressure and interference" from Karzai’s government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Now, in an email interview with EurasiaNet, Kippen, who is now in Canada, speaks out for the first time about his frustrations, describing government pressure and noting that the government-appointed Independent Election Commission (IEC) did not follow the law.
EurasiaNet. What do you think was the contribution of the Electoral Complaints Commission to the electoral process and the credibility of the August 2009 presidential elections?
Kippen: For me personally, I think the greatest contribution to the process was that the ECC did its job properly as it is defined under the election law. We had over 3,000 complaints that were investigated and adjudicated during the elections process, which was no small feat. ? Contrary to how many people perceived the ECC, we were an Afghan electoral body where the vast majority of the staff were Afghans, which should be an enormous source of pride for the Afghan people.
EurasiaNet: The new electoral law introduced by President Karzai has a controversial clause that ends the right of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (the top UN official in Afghanistan) to appoint three members to the ECC and gives the president the sole right to appoint members. What is your view of this change? Will it impact the credibility of future elections?
Kippen: While it is important to recognize and respect the sovereignty of the government of Afghanistan to enact its own laws, it would be misleading to think that "Afghanizing" the ECC will automatically ensure a better quality complaints adjudication process. I think there are few people who would argue with the statement that there were serious problems with the electoral process last year. In order to address these problems, however, there should be an open, objective and public assessment completed about what went wrong. Only after that assessment can we properly identify the changes that should be made. Amending the election law prior to such an assessment is like putting a cart before the horse.
EurasiaNet: President Karzai argued that he was removing foreign interference from the elections in changing the law, pointing to the ECC’s role last August. How do you react to this charge that there was interference?
Kippen: The ECC went to great lengths throughout the entire electoral cycle to ensure that all candidates and their campaign teams, both for presidential and provincial council [polls], were fully informed about the role and processes of the ECC. During the audit and recount, we met or had communications with both President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah’s campaign teams on almost a daily basis, in addition to placing all our information in the public domain through our website and the media. While I can understand President Karzai’s frustration with the ECC decision that resulted in a second round being required, the ECC was not subjected to any international pressure, but did have to deal with considerable domestic political pressure and interference. [One of two Afghan ECC commissioners] Maulawi [Mustafa] Barakzai’s resignation was a direct result of domestic political pressure. Fahim Hakim, the ECC’s other Afghan commissioner, was also subjected to intense domestic pressure.
EurasiaNet: The IEC clearly did not implement all the decisions of the ECC as it was legally bound to do and yet the international community, especially the United States and the UN, signed off on the process, saying the IEC had upheld the constitution and the laws. Didn’t this set the stage for further erosion of these institutions and laws?
Kippen: It is unfortunate that the IEC did not respect the election law by fully implementing the ECC decisions. I would ask why the government of Afghanistan allowed this to happen.
EurasiaNet: There was a lot of talk on the need for electoral reforms following the presidential elections. What major areas did you think needed reform?
Kippen: I wouldn’t want to prejudge such an assessment, but one of the areas for major reform is within the IEC itself, as they repeatedly during the elections last year failed to discharge their responsibilities as defined under the law.
Another area requiring major reform is educating all major stakeholder groups about their roles and responsibilities during the election process. By stakeholder groups I mean candidates, their supporters, public officials (national, provincial and district level; police, border police, governors, army, etc., ministry officials particularly at the provincial and district level). One of the major reasons for electoral violations was that many of the people within these stakeholder groups didn’t have even a basic level of knowledge about the process itself.
EurasiaNet: Much attention has centered on the process of conducting elections and the flaws therein. Would you say that the problems are a result of a larger neglect of the entire electoral process and the lack of support given to the institutions in the period between elections?
Kippen: I completely agree. The four years between the 2005 [parliamentary] and 2009 [presidential] elections were squandered in terms of building up the knowledge and skill sets of people in the major stakeholder groups identified above. More attention and effort also needed to be spent on voter education, which was a recommendation contained in many of the observer group reports from 2005 (and [the first presidential elections in] 2004) but which was not funded or implemented.
EurasiaNet: Now there is talk of democracy perhaps not being the right form of governance for Afghanistan; talk of democracy being an "imposed" western notion. How do you view this?
Kippen: The whole point behind this process is to build strong democratic institutions and processes so that Afghans can build the kind of democracy that works for them. But first we need to make sure that these institutions and processes are independent and robust enough to allow Afghans to elect their representatives, as is their right under the constitution, without fear of intimidation or reprisal.
EurasiaNet: How do you look back at your contribution? Do you feel you were used to whitewash a bad process? Or do you feel you contributed to a more credible election? In the light of the charges leveled against the ECC, do you feel disappointed? Hurt? Misused?
Kippen: I am enormously proud of the work of the ECC, and in particular of the professionalism, dedication and contribution that all our staff (both Afghan and international) made last year. At the end of the day, the ECC did its job as defined under the election law (despite some fairly major challenges) and this should be a source of pride for all Afghans.
EurasiaNet: What are the long-term implications of this erosion of the credibility of the electoral process? On institutions? On governance? On the ongoing conflict?
Kippen: It just highlights the fact that building out sustainable democratic institutions and processes is a long-term endeavor.
EurasiaNet: What might be the best way forward from here?
Kippen: I think a new narrative is required to move forward. By this I mean that both the Afghan government and the international community need to develop a new approach and stop this blame game that has been going on since last fall. There needs to be a renewed focus and commitment to improving the process in advance of the next elections. The responsibility is a shared one.
President Hamid Karzai has taken action to substantially curtail the independence of Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission before parliamentary elections scheduled for this September.
The ECC gained prominence in 2009 after it uncovered widespread fraud during the presidential elections last August. Citing "clear and convincing evidence of fraud," the ECC forced the invalidation of over a million votes cast in favor of Karzai. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Though Karzai eventually secured reelection, the voting irregularities considerably damaged the president’s image, as well as undermined the image of the government-appointed Independent Election Commission. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In February, calling for the removal of "foreign interference" from the Afghan electoral process, Karzai used a loophole in the constitution to force through legislation that allows him to appoint all five board members of the ECC. Prior to the introduction of the new rule, the United Nations had appointed three of the five board members. Thus, the ECC essentially came under presidential control, a development that stands to significantly diminish its ability to play a non-partisan role in Afghanistan’s democratic development.
The Canadian chairman of the previous ECC, Grant Kippen, a veteran of Afghan electoral processes, remained unflappable during the August elections despite "considerable domestic political pressure and interference" from Karzai’s government. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Now, in an email interview with EurasiaNet, Kippen, who is now in Canada, speaks out for the first time about his frustrations, describing government pressure and noting that the government-appointed Independent Election Commission (IEC) did not follow the law.
EurasiaNet. What do you think was the contribution of the Electoral Complaints Commission to the electoral process and the credibility of the August 2009 presidential elections?
Kippen: For me personally, I think the greatest contribution to the process was that the ECC did its job properly as it is defined under the election law. We had over 3,000 complaints that were investigated and adjudicated during the elections process, which was no small feat. ? Contrary to how many people perceived the ECC, we were an Afghan electoral body where the vast majority of the staff were Afghans, which should be an enormous source of pride for the Afghan people.
EurasiaNet: The new electoral law introduced by President Karzai has a controversial clause that ends the right of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (the top UN official in Afghanistan) to appoint three members to the ECC and gives the president the sole right to appoint members. What is your view of this change? Will it impact the credibility of future elections?
Kippen: While it is important to recognize and respect the sovereignty of the government of Afghanistan to enact its own laws, it would be misleading to think that "Afghanizing" the ECC will automatically ensure a better quality complaints adjudication process. I think there are few people who would argue with the statement that there were serious problems with the electoral process last year. In order to address these problems, however, there should be an open, objective and public assessment completed about what went wrong. Only after that assessment can we properly identify the changes that should be made. Amending the election law prior to such an assessment is like putting a cart before the horse.
EurasiaNet: President Karzai argued that he was removing foreign interference from the elections in changing the law, pointing to the ECC’s role last August. How do you react to this charge that there was interference?
Kippen: The ECC went to great lengths throughout the entire electoral cycle to ensure that all candidates and their campaign teams, both for presidential and provincial council [polls], were fully informed about the role and processes of the ECC. During the audit and recount, we met or had communications with both President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah’s campaign teams on almost a daily basis, in addition to placing all our information in the public domain through our website and the media. While I can understand President Karzai’s frustration with the ECC decision that resulted in a second round being required, the ECC was not subjected to any international pressure, but did have to deal with considerable domestic political pressure and interference. [One of two Afghan ECC commissioners] Maulawi [Mustafa] Barakzai’s resignation was a direct result of domestic political pressure. Fahim Hakim, the ECC’s other Afghan commissioner, was also subjected to intense domestic pressure.
EurasiaNet: The IEC clearly did not implement all the decisions of the ECC as it was legally bound to do and yet the international community, especially the United States and the UN, signed off on the process, saying the IEC had upheld the constitution and the laws. Didn’t this set the stage for further erosion of these institutions and laws?
Kippen: It is unfortunate that the IEC did not respect the election law by fully implementing the ECC decisions. I would ask why the government of Afghanistan allowed this to happen.
EurasiaNet: There was a lot of talk on the need for electoral reforms following the presidential elections. What major areas did you think needed reform?
Kippen: I wouldn’t want to prejudge such an assessment, but one of the areas for major reform is within the IEC itself, as they repeatedly during the elections last year failed to discharge their responsibilities as defined under the law.
Another area requiring major reform is educating all major stakeholder groups about their roles and responsibilities during the election process. By stakeholder groups I mean candidates, their supporters, public officials (national, provincial and district level; police, border police, governors, army, etc., ministry officials particularly at the provincial and district level). One of the major reasons for electoral violations was that many of the people within these stakeholder groups didn’t have even a basic level of knowledge about the process itself.
EurasiaNet: Much attention has centered on the process of conducting elections and the flaws therein. Would you say that the problems are a result of a larger neglect of the entire electoral process and the lack of support given to the institutions in the period between elections?
Kippen: I completely agree. The four years between the 2005 [parliamentary] and 2009 [presidential] elections were squandered in terms of building up the knowledge and skill sets of people in the major stakeholder groups identified above. More attention and effort also needed to be spent on voter education, which was a recommendation contained in many of the observer group reports from 2005 (and [the first presidential elections in] 2004) but which was not funded or implemented.
EurasiaNet: Now there is talk of democracy perhaps not being the right form of governance for Afghanistan; talk of democracy being an "imposed" western notion. How do you view this?
Kippen: The whole point behind this process is to build strong democratic institutions and processes so that Afghans can build the kind of democracy that works for them. But first we need to make sure that these institutions and processes are independent and robust enough to allow Afghans to elect their representatives, as is their right under the constitution, without fear of intimidation or reprisal.
EurasiaNet: How do you look back at your contribution? Do you feel you were used to whitewash a bad process? Or do you feel you contributed to a more credible election? In the light of the charges leveled against the ECC, do you feel disappointed? Hurt? Misused?
Kippen: I am enormously proud of the work of the ECC, and in particular of the professionalism, dedication and contribution that all our staff (both Afghan and international) made last year. At the end of the day, the ECC did its job as defined under the election law (despite some fairly major challenges) and this should be a source of pride for all Afghans.
EurasiaNet: What are the long-term implications of this erosion of the credibility of the electoral process? On institutions? On governance? On the ongoing conflict?
Kippen: It just highlights the fact that building out sustainable democratic institutions and processes is a long-term endeavor.
EurasiaNet: What might be the best way forward from here?
Kippen: I think a new narrative is required to move forward. By this I mean that both the Afghan government and the international community need to develop a new approach and stop this blame game that has been going on since last fall. There needs to be a renewed focus and commitment to improving the process in advance of the next elections. The responsibility is a shared one.
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